Acta Oeconomica Vol. 7 (1), pp. 25—45 (1971)

R. ANDORKA

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HUNGARY

Economic development is strongly correlated with social processes, e.g. migration, social mobility, cultural change. Economic planning ought to take into consideration these social corollaries of economic growth. A comprehensive survey of social mobility in Hungary performed by the Demographic Research Institute of the Central Statistical Office provides a detailed picture of the processes of mobility, including some historical and international comparisons as well.

Theories of the relation between social mobility and socio-economic development

Scientific statements concerning the factors which determine social mobility in a given society are rather different, even contradictory:

1. A few decades ago it was general opinion both in the United States and in Europe that possibilities for social mobility are much greater in America than in the European countries, because the American society is more "democratic", more "open", the European countries being in general more "aristocratic" and more "closed"; thus social mobility depends on the social system of the country. Empirical studies of mobility, however, disproved this one popular theory [1, 2, 3].

2. On the basis of these first empirical surveys Lipset and Bendix [4] formulated their well-known theory. According to them "the overall pattern of social mobility appears to be the same in the industrial societies of various Western countries . . . Further, although it is clear that social mobility is related in many ways to the economic expansion of industrial societies, it is at least doubtful that the rates of mobility and expansion are correlated. Since a number of the countries for which we have data have had different rates of economic expansion but show comparable rates of social mobility, our tentative interpretation is that social mobility of societies becomes relatively high once their industrialization, and hence their economic expansion, reaches a certain level" (p. 13). Thus it is not the social system, its democratic or aristocratic character, nor the rate of economic development, but the level of development which determines the extent of mobility. Miller and Bryce, however, did not

find strong correlations between social mobility (more exactly: different patterns of mobility) and economic indicators [5].*

Hungarian society provides a suitable field to test these different theories. The economy almost stagnated between the two World Wars, the annual growth rate of national income being about 2 per cent; because of the consequences of the Second World War production has declined to a very low level, followed by a period of comparatively rapid economic growth in the 25 years since the War [7, 8, 9]. National income trebled from 1950 to 1970. During that time the social system changed from a conservative feudal-capitalist system to a socialist system based on the public ownership of almost all means of production.

On the other hand, we have at our disposal a detailed survey on mobility by the Demographic Research Institute [10, 11] giving a full picture of intergenerational and intragenerational (career) mobility, as well as of several factors and concomitants of mobility (migration, education [school] level, fertility etc.). Also we have at our disposal mobility data from the censuses of 1930 and 1949 [12, 13], and from a special survey on the working class in Budapest in 1929 [14].** Although several methodological problems render an analysis of the latter data difficult, they can be used for rough comparisons

Social mobility after the Second World War

In the wake of economic development and social transformations, the occupational structure of Hungarian society changed rather radically after the Second World War. In the period between the census of 1941 and the microcensus of 1963 the number of men*** in non-manual occupations increased by almost 150 per cent, the number of manual workers in industry, building and other non-agricultural sectors increased by almost 50 per cent, while the number of male manuals in agriculture decreased by about 60 per cent. Also inside the particular social strata there were deep changes, first of all in agriculture, but also in industry and trade where the number of self-employed diminished strongly. These structural changes necessitated a large extent of social mobility.

The influence of occupational structural changes was enhanced by the effect of differential fertility, as agricultural population, most of all the agri-

* Cutright recently calculated rather high correlations between the rate of development and mobility in different countries, but his analysis seems to be less conclusive than the work of Miller and Bryce, because he used a very condensed measure of mobility, the "Q" of Yule, neglecting the different types and patterns of mobility [6].

** Lackó [15] and Rupp [16] analyzed these historical data on social mobility, their results have been utilized in this study.

*** Only the mobility of men is analyzed here, because of the difficulties connected with the study of mobility of women (who are often temporarily inactive).

cultural labourers (as distinguished from small landowners or farmers) had the highest and the non-manual workers the lowest fertility between the two World Wars.

The combined effect of the changes in occupational structure and of differential fertility are reflected in the social structure of the present sample and in the social structure before the Second World War of the fathers of the men in the sample.* There are more than three times as many intellectuals and top executives in the sample at present than among the fathers, three times as many other non-manuals, more than twice many workers of all categories, but only half as many agricultural labourers and small landowners or farmes and less than half as many self-employed artisans, shop-keepers and members of industrial cooperatives taken together (Table 1).

Thus, the changes in social structure, as well as differential fertility necessarily brought about social mobility at an important scale: more than two-thirds of the intellectuals and top executives, as well as of the other non-manuals, and half of the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers must have originated from other social groups, while almost half of the sons of peasants were necessarily obliged to "outflow" from agriculture. The forces of socio-economic progress determined the *main direction of the social mobility process:*** *from the social strata of agricultural population into the groups of non-agricultural manuals, as well as from the group of agricultural and non-agricultural manuals into the groups of top executives, intellectuals and other non-manuals.*

91 per cent of those who were intergenerationally mobile in the sample changed their social position in this main direction and only 9 per cent opposite to it (Table 1). The majority of the individual mobility movements were mobility steps from the agricultural population into the manual occupations (51 per cent of all cases of mobility), a smaller part consisted of mobility steps from lower grade manual occupations to higher grade manual occupations, e.g. from the unskilled group into the skilled group etc. (32 per cent), and a relatively small part of total mobility was movement from the agricultural and non-agricultural manual strata into the non-manual strata (8 per cent). Thus the *main feature of mobility* in Hungary was the change from peasant status into non-agricultural manual status, in other words *the inflow of peasants into industry* (and partly also into the service sector).

* The sample of the mobility survey of the Demographic Research Group composed approximately 16,000 families. Here we use only the data of the approximately 12,000 male heads of families.

** The expression of "upward" and "downward" mobility are avoided in the following discussion on purpose, instead of these the expressions "mobility in the main direction" and "mobility opposite to the main direction" are used. The cause of this terminology is that — since we do not dispose of a reliable survey on the objective and subjective ranking of different occupations — it is impossible at present to state unequivocally that mobility n the main direction was always an "upward" movement.

Table 1

Intergenerational mobility in Hungary 1962—64: father in 1938, son at present

Father in 1938	Son at present											
	Executive, intellectual	Other non-manual	Artisan, member of ind. cooperative	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Office attendant	Unskilled	Day-worker	Agricultural	Other	Dependent	Total
Executive, intellectual	56.5	24.3	2.7	8.2	2.7	0.5	2.7	—	2.0	0.4	—	1000
Other non-manual	28.5	35.5	6.3	19.2	4.2	0.2	3.0	0.2	2.0	0.9	—	100.0
Artisan	9.6	17.7	10.7	29.6	8.1	2.1	7.9	0.3	12.2	1.8	—	100.0
Skilled	10.7	19.6	4.1	46.0	7.1	1.5	5.7	0.2	4.6	0.5	—	100.0
Semi-skilled	5.3	14.8	5.5	36.1	16.5	2.3	9.1	0.5	7.8	2.1	—	100.0
Office attendant	9.1	26.0	6.3	29.9	5.8	5.0	7.9	0.6	8.7	0.7	—	100.0
Unskilled	6.1	10.5	3.7	31.9	14.6	2.6	19.2	—	9.7	1.7	—	100.0
Day-worker	3.2	8.5	8.9	27.5	12.9	3.0	18.6	4.9	11.7	0.8	—	100.0
Agricultural	2.7	4.2	2.8	15.2	9.2	2.5	11.7	0.3	50.3	1.1	—	100.0
Other	10.9	23.2	5.4	26.8	8.8	1.9	8.0	—	15.0	—	—	100.0
Total	6.7	10.1	4.2	22.2	9.2	2.2	10.4	0.3	33.6	1.1	—	100.0
Executive, intellectual	16.1	4.6	1.3	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.5	—	0.1	0.6	—	1.9
Other non-manual	15.7	12.9	5.5	3.2	1.7	0.3	1.1	2.9	0.2	2.7	—	3.7
Artisan	15.0	18.3	26.6	13.9	9.2	9.8	7.8	11.2	3.8	16.3	—	10.4
Skilled	17.1	20.7	10.6	22.1	8.2	6.9	5.8	5.9	1.5	4.5	—	10.6
Semi-skilled	3.7	6.8	6.1	7.5	8.3	4.7	4.0	7.7	1.1	8.5	—	4.6
Office attendant	1.7	3.2	1.8	1.7	0.8	2.7	0.9	2.4	0.3	0.7	—	1.2
Unskilled	4.4	5.1	4.3	7.0	7.8	5.7	9.0	—	1.4	7.0	—	4.9
Day-worker	0.5	0.9	2.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.9	17.2	0.4	0.7	—	1.1
Agricultural	24.3	25.4	40.4	41.5	61.1	67.3	68.3	52.7	90.8	59.0	—	60.7
Other	1.5	2.1	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	—	0.4	—	—	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	—	100.0

Table 2

Intergenerational mobility in Hungary 1962—64: father in 1938, son at first job

Father in 1938	Social group at first job										
	Executive, intellectual	Other non-manual	Artisan, member of ind. coop.	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Office attendant	Unskilled	Day-worker	Agricultural	Other	Total
Executive, intellectual	45.4	29.2	1.4	10.0	2.7	0.5	6.9	0.9	0.8	2.2	100.0
Other non-manual	17.0	36.1	0.9	30.7	4.3	0.5	5.5	0.2	3.8	1.0	100.0
Artisan	4.5	12.3	8.2	51.1	3.1	0.1	6.7	0.7	12.5	0.8	100.0
Skilled	3.5	9.1	1.0	55.4	7.0	0.1	12.9	1.6	8.9	0.5	100.0
Semi-skilled	2.0	6.6	0.8	39.8	17.6	0.7	14.7	1.7	15.2	0.9	100.0
Office attendant	3.4	12.2	—	51.5	3.3	—	11.3	1.1	17.2	—	100.0
Unskilled	0.6	6.1	1.5	39.3	8.8	0.4	24.4	1.1	17.8	—	100.0
Day-worker	2.5	1.5	1.7	32.5	8.6	0.8	14.1	13.4	24.1	0.8	100.0
Agricultural	1.3	2.0	0.7	14.4	2.9	0.3	5.8	1.0	71.0	0.6	100.0
Other	3.4	17.2	0.8	36.7	4.5	—	17.2	—	17.6	2.6	100.0
Total	3.3	6.3	1.6	26.3	4.5	0.3	8.3	1.1	47.7	0.6	100.0
Executive	26.2	8.9	1.6	0.7	1.2	3.1	1.6	1.5	0.0	6.4	1.9
Other non-manual	18.9	21.2	2.2	4.3	3.5	6.3	2.5	0.8	0.3	5.6	3.7
Artisan	14.1	20.4	53.5	20.2	7.3	3.1	8.4	6.2	2.7	13.8	10.4
Skilled	11.1	15.5	6.4	22.4	16.7	2.5	16.6	14.9	2.0	8.3	10.6
Semi-skilled	2.7	4.9	2.3	6.9	18.2	11.3	8.2	6.8	1.5	6.4	4.6
Office attendant	1.2	2.4	—	2.4	0.9	—	1.7	1.2	0.5	—	1.2
Unskilled	1.0	4.7	4.5	7.3	9.6	7.5	14.4	4.5	1.8	—	4.9
Day-worker	0.8	0.3	1.1	1.3	2.0	3.1	1.8	12.1	0.5	1.3	1.1
Agricultural	23.0	19.1	28.0	33.2	39.7	63.1	42.9	52.0	90.3	54.5	60.7
Other	1.0	2.6	0.4	1.3	0.9	—	1.9	—	0.4	3.7	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3

Intragenerational mobility in Hungary 1962—64: first and present job

Social group at first job	Present social group										
	Executive, intellectual	Other non-manual	Artisan, member of ind. coop.	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Office attendant	Unskilled	Day-worker	Agricultural	Other	Total
Executive, intellectual	84.3	9.2	2.6	2.0	1.1	—	—	—	0.3	0.5	100.0
Other non-manual	28.8	57.3	1.4	5.1	3.1	0.6	1.9	—	1.3	0.5	100.0
Artisan, member of ind. coop.	—	11.6	25.4	23.6	8.9	1.4	11.0	0.9	16.2	1.0	100.0
Skilled	3.7	13.1	11.0	51.0	5.8	2.2	4.4	0.1	7.5	1.2	100.0
Semi-skilled	4.6	12.0	1.6	22.6	38.3	2.8	6.8	0.2	10.4	0.7	100.0
Office attendant	9.4	2.5	6.2	17.5	—	26.9	7.5	—	18.1	11.9	100.0
Unskilled	3.8	9.9	1.9	28.8	14.9	1.7	26.0	0.7	11.7	0.6	100.0
Day-worker	1.5	8.0	2.0	19.3	13.4	4.1	25.5	8.0	16.7	1.5	100.0
Agricultural	1.1	2.0	0.8	8.9	8.7	2.5	12.8	0.2	61.8	1.2	100.0
Other	4.0	22.6	1.3	10.9	7.4	6.4	17.8	—	12.0	17.6	100.0
Total	6.7	10.1	4.1	22.2	9.2	2.2	10.4	0.3	33.6	1.2	100.0
Executive, intellectual	41.7	3.0	2.1	0.3	0.4	—	—	—	0.0	1.5	3.3
Other non-manual	26.9	35.5	2.1	1.4	2.2	1.5	1.2	—	0.2	2.7	6.3
Artisan, member of ind. coop.	—	1.8	9.7	1.7	1.5	1.0	1.7	4.7	0.8	1.4	1.6
Skilled	14.4	34.2	69.8	60.6	16.6	26.1	11.2	8.3	5.9	25.9	26.3
Semi-skilled	3.1	5.3	1.8	4.6	18.7	5.5	2.9	2.4	1.4	2.7	4.5
Office attendant	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.2	—	3.3	0.2	—	0.2	2.8	0.3
Unskilled	4.7	8.1	3.8	10.7	13.4	6.3	20.6	18.9	2.9	4.6	8.2
Day-worker	0.3	0.9	0.5	1.0	1.7	2.1	2.8	31.4	0.6	1.5	1.1
Agricultural	8.1	9.6	9.6	19.2	45.0	52.3	58.3	34.3	87.8	47.7	47.7
Other	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.9	1.1	—	0.2	9.8	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4

Present social group of sons of non-manual, manual and agricultural worker fathers according to the school level

School level (years of school education)	Son at present										
	Executive, intellectual	Other non-manual	Artisan, member of ind. coop.	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Office attendant	Unskilled	Day-worker	Agricultural	Other	Total
Father: non-manual worker											
Less than 6 years	—	—	—	—	32.1	—	17.9	—	32.1	17.9	100.0
6—7 years	—	14.9	17.6	45.3	5.8	1.2	3.7	1.5	7.6	2.4	100.0
8 years	6.3	33.9	5.7	36.1	8.8	—	5.1	—	3.3	0.8	100.0
9—12 years	5.0	36.3	11.0	36.8	—	2.7	5.5	—	—	2.7	100.0
Final examination at secondary school	28.1	55.2	3.2	7.4	1.8	—	3.6	—	0.7	—	100.0
University degree	82.3	11.5	1.9	1.4	2.4	—	—	—	0.5	—	100.0
Father: manual worker											
Less than 6 years	0.4	3.9	8.0	23.3	17.5	3.9	21.9	1.6	17.1	2.4	100.0
6—7 years	0.6	5.6	8.5	43.3	13.1	3.7	10.6	0.4	13.1	1.1	1000
8 years	2.2	18.0	5.2	52.0	8.6	0,5	7.3	—	4.7	1.5	1000
9—12 years	6.2	39.4	6.4	39.6	3.8	1.1	1.7	—	0.9	0.9	100.0
Final examination at secondary school	22.0	58.5	3.9	10.8	1.5	0.4	1.7	—	0.6	0.6	100.0
University degree	88.2	7.3	2.3	1.0	—	—	—	—	—	1.2	100.0
Total											

Scool level (years of schol education)	Son at present										
	Executive, intellectual	Other non-manual	Artisan, member of ind. coop.	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Office attendant	Unskilled	Day-worker	Agricul-tural	Other	Total
Father: agricultural worker											
Less than 6 years	0.0	0.7	2.0	7.1	8.8	3.1	12.6	0.5	64.1	1.1	100.0
6—7 years	0.5	1.7	3.5	14.9	9.5	2.8	12.4	0.2	53.5	1.0	100.0
8 years	3.2	8.2	1.8	34.9	12.1	1.1	11.5	—	25.1	2.1	100.0
9—12 years	10.3	36.1	4.3	25.1	7.5	—	1.7	—	13.9	1.1	100.0
Final examination at secondary school	24.6	57.4	0.5	9.9	0.6	—	1.2	—	5.8	—	100.0
University degree	82.5	12.5	1.9	1.7	—	—	0.7	—	0.7	—	100.0

These characteristics of mobility in Hungary have a counterpart in the development of the sectoral composition of national income: the production of industry grew from 1950 to 1969 from 100 to 436, that of the building industry to 378, while that of agriculture to 116 only. Social mobility was strongly correlated with the industrialization of the country.

The question arises, however, to what extent did the more "open" or more "egalitarian" character of Hungarian society after the Second World War contribute to social mobility? It is difficult to operationalize the concept of "openness" of society. If we define open society as a society characterized by equal opportunity for everyone independently of his social origin to attain the same social status, position, or occupation, then we may measure "openness" by the extent of circular mobility compared to structural mobility, which latter may be divided again into the necessary minimum structural mobility and other structural mobility.*

In the sample of the mobility survey of the Demographic Research Institute,

59 per cent were intergenerationally mobile (compared to the father) of which:

33 per cent may be considered as minimum structural mobility,

8 per cent other structural mobility,

18 per cent circular mobility.

Thus, *the importance of structural factors in mobility was much higher than of the factors connected with the "openness" of the social system.* This empirical result is in accordance with the statement of Ossowski [17] that socialist revolution exerted its influence in the direction of increasing social mobility first of all through increasing the pace of economic and social progress and the change of political and cultural value systems had (at least in the period following immediately the socialist revolution) a smaller influence on the extent of mobility.

Two further characteristics of the mobility process in Hungary should be emphasized:

1. *Intragenerational or career mobility* [18] *played an important role* in total mobility, about half of total mobility having taken place between the fathers' occupation and the first job and another half between first and present job, i.e.

* The definitions of these concepts are: necessary minimum structural mobility: the mobility which would have occurred in the case if outflow took place from the diminishing social strata only and inflow exclusively into the increasing strata; other structural mobility is the mobility in the main direction caused by the fact that structural changes are generally realized by movements between neighbouring social groups, e.g. from the group of unskilled workers to that of semi-skilled workers, from the semi-skilled ones to the skilled group, from the skilled group into non-manual occupations etc.; circular mobility consists of vice-versa movements between different groups, regardless of structural changes, e.g. some part of the sons of skilled workers entering the non-manual group and the same amount of sons of non-manuals taking their place in the skilled group.

during the career of the respondents (Tables 2 and 3). Inflow into professional occupations necessitating attainment of higher school level is also frequent during a career. This fact seems to prove the importance of adult education, in *evening schools* (and at the universities). The inflow into the skilled occupations, on the contrary, took place in the majority of cases intergenerationally, i.e. at the time of entering the first job. By generalization it may be stated that *the young sons of peasants rather became skilled workers, while the older peasants rather entered some semi-skilled or unskilled occupation,* if they moved into the non-agricultural manual strata [11].

These facts are again in close connection with the economic development of the country. Industrialization began suddenly after the War, the demand for manpower in industry rose swiftly. The demand for skilled workers was satisfied mostly from the younger generations going through apprenticeship and from older semi-skilled and unskilled workers who had already some industrial training and learned the new skill at the job. Older peasants filled the places of these latter workers in the semi-skilled and unskilled groups.

2. The attainment of higher school qualification was a most important factor in the social mobility in the main direction (Table 4). Peasants and sons of peasants who entered some non-agricultural social group have higher school qualification, than those who remained in agriculture, the workers and peasants and their sons who entered the top executive, intellectual and other non-manual groups have higher school qualification than those who remained in their group of origin.

The growing importance of schooling in mobility is a fact often stressed by authors investigating social mobility in Western countries. It is noteworthy, however, that even in Hungary where social mobility took place under somewhat different conditions, in connection not only with general economic development, but also with a change in the social system, the *attainment of a higher school qualification was strongly connected with the change in social position either as a precondition to it, or a consequence of it.*

The connection between mobility and school qualification is even stronger if viewed from the opposite viewpoint: not everybody who originated from another social group and entered the group of top executives and intellectuals attained parallelly a higher school level (though the majority did), but *almost everybody who acquired a university degree belongs to the group of top executives and for intellectuals.* The demand for qualified manpower seems to have been so strong that sooner or later everybody who managed to graduate from a university got an adequate job. The overwhelming majority of those sons of non-manuals who are at present manual workers, did not attain even the complete secondary school qualification. This statement is not in contradiction with the fact that, in some periods after the War, there was a considerable mobility from non-manual occupations into the groups of manual

workers, but most of these returned after some years into non-manual jobs [19]. On the contrary, there was very few "return" mobility of the type: manual — non-manual — manual, i.e. those who originated from the worker and peasant social groups and entered top executive, intellectual or other non-manual occupations, very rarely returned into the manual strata (mostly only in cases when they could not attain the school level necessary for that type of job).

The importance of education in the process of social mobility may be interpreted as a manifestation of the demand for knowledge and skills, in other terms: for human investment in the conditions of modern socio-economic development. This imperative demand prevails sooner or later also in the case of revolutionary changes of the social system, as in Hungary.*

Social mobility in historical perspective

Recently *Fügedi* analyzed the conditions of social mobility in the Hungarian ruling class, the top aristocracy in the Middle Ages and demonstrated a surprising stability of the small group of ruling families [23]. For several centuries the composition of the ruling class changed very slowly, the members of the families belonging to the ruling group at the time of the original settlement of Hungarians in the Danube valley in the basin of the Carpathians and of the foundation of the Kingdom of Hungary (10th century) still belonged to the top aristocracy at the end of the Middle Ages.

It would be desirable to dispose of similar historical studies of social mobility in other periods of Hungarian history too; at present, however, we can follow the development of social mobility only from 1929 on. The working class survey of Budapest [14], as well as the censuses of 1930 [12] and 1949 [13] contain data on intergenerational mobility. Well aware of the difficulties of comparison** [7] (first of all because of the fact that the data of 1949 are published only for both sexes together, and because of differences in the classification of occupations) we may draw some conclusions on social mobility and its relation to economic development since the First World War.

Comparing the results of 1930 (Table 5)*** and 1949 (Table 6) with the

* The empirical results of the mobility survey of the Demographic Research Institute of the Central Statistical Office, as well as the conclusions drawn from them are supported by other sources of data and analyses on mobility, as a general stratification survey of the Central Statistical Office containing some data on intergenerational mobility [20], [21] and a special survey on the career of leaders of village councils [22].

** The classification of different occupations is not entirely comparable between 1930, 1949, 1960 and 1963.

*** According to the results of the survey in 1929 [14] the composition of the working class in Budapest by the social position of the father was at that time: father non-manual 5 per cent, self-employed manual 31 per cent, manual worker 29 per cent, agricultural 28 per cent, other and unknown 7 per cent.

Table 5

Intergenerational mobility of men (earners) in 1930 (n = 2 932 864)

Father	Son at present				
	non-manual	self-employed manual	manual worker	agricultural	Total
Non-manual	33	4	3	—	4
Self-employed manual	28	48	22	2	14
Manual worker	9	9	30	2	10
Agricultural	14	33	35	94	65
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Father	Son at present					
	non-manual	self-employed manual	manual worker ;	agricultural	other*	Total
Non-manual	57	8	18	2	15	100
Self-employed manual	13	29	40	10	8	100
Manual worker	5	7	72	8	8	100
Agricultural	2	4	14	76	4	100
Total	7	8	25	53	7	100

* Mostly pensionnaires.

data taken from the mobility survey of the Demographic Research Institute in 1962—64 (Table 7)* the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The percentage of those who originated from manual worker or agricultural social groups increased in the *non-manual* group from 1930 to 1962—64 i.e. the inflow of workers and peasants into non-manual occupations is higher at present than between the two World Wars.

2. The percentage of those who originated in the agricultural stratum increased in the non-agricultural *worker* groups from 1930 to 1962—64, i.e. the inflow of peasants into manual occupations in industries and services is higher at present than between the two World Wars.

Thus, *mobility in the main direction was significantly higher after the Second World War than before.*

3. The outflow of sons of non-manuals into the manual strata decreased to a certain degree.

4. The outflow of sons of manual workers into the agricultural stratum remained at the same, relatively low, level.

* Table 7 is a "summary" of Table 1.

Table 6

Intergenerational social mobility of men and women (earners) in 1949 (n = 4 409 299)

Father	Son and daughter at present				
	non-manual	self-employed manual	manual worker	agricultural	Total
Non-manual	29	6	3	1	5
Self-employed manual	20	37	14	3	11
Manual worker	31	20	40	3	19
Agricultural	18	34	40	92	63
Unknown	2	3	3	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Father	Son and daughter at present				
	non-manual	self-employed manual	manual worker	agricultural	Total
Non-manual	67	10	18	5	100
Self-employed manual	20	26	40	14	100
Manual worker	18	9	65	8	100
Agricultural	3	4	20	73	100
Unknown	10	10	51	29	100
Total	11	8	31	50	100

Table 7

Intergenerational social mobility of men in 1962—1964

Father	Son at present			
	non-manual	manual	agricultural	Total
Non-manual	23	3	—	6
Self-employed manual	17	13	4	10
Manual worker	35	32	5	23
Agricultural	25	52	91	61
Total	100	100	100	100

Father	Son at present			
	non-manual	manual	agricultural	Total
Non-manual	70	28	2	100
Manual (self-employed and worker)	25	66	9	100
Agricultural	7	43	50	100
Total	17	49	34	100

Thus, *mobility opposite to the main direction, i.e. circular mobility decreased somewhat from 1930 to 1962—64.* This seems to be a very important conclusion and is in contradiction with scientific and popular hypotheses and beliefs concerning the mobility after social revolutions. Without further deeper investigation of this phenomenon, however, it is impossible to explain the causes of this empirical finding.

5. The chances of working class sons to enter the non-manual occupations considerably increased from 1930 to 1962—64.

6. The chances of peasant sons to enter non-agricultural manual and non-manual occupations similarly grew to a high extent from 1930 to 1962—64.

Thus, *the chances for mobility of members of the working class and of the peasant class are much higher at present* than they were in the past.

All the above conclusions may be interpreted in terms of different economic development in the period before and after the Second World War. The period between the two World Wars was characterized by slow economic growth, national income rose by an annual average of 2 per cent after the setback caused by the First World War; the recession was especially prolonged and from its consequences the economy recovered slowly. Thus, industrialization which might have been a way out of the serious economic and social problems of the country (agricultural underemployment, "three million beggars" in the villages etc.), proceeded at a very moderate rate only. In consequence, the occupational and social composition of society underwent only relatively small changes, predominance of agriculture remained the main characteristic of the occupational structure (the proportion of male earners in agriculture remained above 50 per cent). The non-agricultural working class was relatively weak and grew partly by absorbing the social group of artisans, providing in consequence relatively few chances for peasants to leave agriculture. Only the years of the War brought some changes, with the upswing of industrial war production. These however, were, soon swept away by the devastations. At the census of 1949 the percentage of earners in agriculture was approximately the same as in 1941, and only 3 percentage points less than in 1930, whereas the percentage of industrial and service workers, as well as of nonmanuals rose only slightly since 1930. As against all that, in the two following decades national income grew at a yearly average rate of 5.6 per cent, industry became the leading sector of the economy, and, in consequence, the occupational and social structure changed radically: today (according to the census of 1970) only 23 per cent of active earners are maouals in agriculture, the percentage of non-agricultural manuals grew to 51 per cent and that of non-manuals to 26 per cent. The differences in the rate of change of occupational structure are displayed (of course not exactly) also by the marginal columns and rows, i.e. by the occupational composition of fathers and sons (daughters) in Tables 5—7. *Greater changes in occupational structure brought about greater mobility.*

The changes in the proportions of different social strata to each other also had an important effect on the chances of mobility: obviously, there are better chances to "outflow" from the agricultural stratum, if it becomes smaller as compared to the growing groups of manuals and non-manuals, as more "places" are available in the latter groups for fewer sons of peasants. Similarly a greater non-manual stratum provides by its growth more places for mobile persons originating from other classes.

International comparison of social mobility

In international comparison, methodological difficulties are even more important than if we try to compare social mobility at different dates in the same country. Some tentative conclusions, however, seem to be possible.

Comparing the "outflow" mobility ratios quoted by *Lipset* and *Bendix* [4] and those of the survey of the Demographic Research Institute in Hungary, at first the similarity seems to be striking. E.g.:

	The proportion		
	of sons of manuals	of sons of peasants	of sons of non-manuals
	who are at present		
	non-manuals	manuals	manuals and peasants
	(as percentage of the social group of origin)		
France	35	13	27
Germany I. survey	27	28	42
Germany II. survey	30	19	20
Germany III. survey	27	37	30
Sweden	29	42	25
Switzerland	44	19	16
United States I. survey	35	39	29
United States II. survey	31	46	35
Japan	33	22	26
Hungary	25	*43*	*30*

It would be, however, unwise to draw the conclusion that Hungarian mobility confirms the thesis of Lipset and Bendix, namely, that social mobility is similar in all industrialized countries. If, namely, the inflow mobility ratios

are calculated from the data published by Lipset and Bendix and compared with the Hungarian data,* very important differences are displayed. E.g.:

	Proportion		
	of sons of manuals	of sons of peasants	of sons of peasants
	who are at presents		
	non-manuals	non-manuals	manuals
	(as percentage of the social group of destination)		
France	18	17	24
Germany III. survey	26	11	17
Sweden	32	22	32
United States I. survey	32	20	32
Japan	16	27	32
Hungary	*52*	*25*	*52*

Thus, although *outflow mobility ratios*** *in Hungary are more or less similar to those in other countries, the inflow of workers and peasants into the non-manual stratum and the inflow of peasants into the non-agricultural manual stratum is higher in Hungary* than in any other country compared by Lipset and Bendix.***

As the very broad occupational groups used by Lipset and Bendix (non-manual — manual — farm) seem to be too aggregated and may be therefore misleading, the Hungarian mobility ratios were compared by finer occupational classification (see Table 1) to the results of two mobility surveys, that of Blau and Duncan in the United States (25) and of Glass and associates in England (1), who used comparable occupational groups.**** It was found that:

* This calculation based on the data of Lipset and Bendix and the comparison with Hungarian results was first made by *Kemény* [24].

** Outflow mobility ratio is defined as the proportion of mobile persons (in percentages) of the social group of origin. Inflow mobility ratio is defined as the proportion of mobile persons (in percentages) of the social group of destination (present group).

*** Miller [26] compared "national mobility profiles", among them also the mobility of Hungary based on the results of the 1949 census. It is possible to classify Hungarian mobility in 1962—64 according to his criteria in the following way:

— manual into non-manual: high mobility (just above the dividing line of high and low);
— non-manual into manual: high mobility;
— manual into elite (intellectuals and executives): high;
— middle classes (other non-manual) into elite: high;
— total movement out of elite: low;
— middle classes downward to upward movement: low;
— elite into manual: high.

As Miller, too, uses outflow mobility ratios, there is again no clear-cut difference between Hungarian mobility and that of Western countries.

**** Data for the United States on pages 28 and 39 in [25], data for England on page 183 in [1].

1. the outflow of sons of intellectuals (professionals), executives, and managers into other social groups is slightly higher in Hungary than in the United States and England;

2. the chances of a son of a skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled worker to enter the group of intellectuals and executives (professionals, managers) are higher in the United States and lower in England than in Hungary;

3. the chances of a son of a peasant to enter the group of intellectuals and executives (professionals, managers) are higher in the United States than in Hungary;

4. the chances of a son of a skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled worker to enter other non-manual occupations are more or less similar in the three countries;

5. the chances of a son of a peasant to enter the other non-manual occupations are smaller in Hungary than in the United States.

Thus, *circular mobility* (manifested by the outflow of intellectuals and executives into other groups) *is similar or somewhat higher in Hungary* than in the other two countries. As to the chances of sons of workers and peasants to reach intellectual, executive and other non-manual occupations, it is difficult to state any clear-cut tendency, but surely they are not higher in Hungary than in the United States.

The inflow mobility ratios, however, display again very clear differences:

1. *the percentage of sons of manual workers and peasants in the social group of intellectuals and executives* (managers, professionals) *is decidedly higher in Hungary* than in the two other countries,

2. *the percentage of sons of peasants in all groups of non-agricultural manual workers is much higher in Hungary* than in the United States.

Thus, the finer international comparison based on a more detailed list of social groups confirms the above-mentioned conclusions drawn from the comparison of Hungarian mobility with the data used by Lipset and Bendix. This unexpected and rather peculiar result, Hungarian mobility being similar from the viewpoint of outflow mobility ratios and much higher from the viewpoint of inflow mobility ratios, is again *a consequence of structural factors and ultimately of the rate of economic development.* The national economy of Hungary and, in consequence, its occupational structure is at a lower level of development than that of the United States and England: the ratio of agricultural population still is much higher and that of the social groups of intellectuals, managers and other non-manuals much smaller. On the other hand, economic development and the change of occupational structure was probably faster in Hungary than in the United States and England in the period preceding the mobility surveys compared. Therefore, the rapidly growing intellectual and other non-manual social groups absorbed a large number of persons originating from the working class and agricultural population who constitute today the

majority of these social groups. The number of these mobile persons, however, was not so important compared to their original stratum because of the relatively smaller weight of their class of destination and greater weight of their class of origin. Similarly, the sons of the agricultural population who entered non-agricultural manual occupations constitute the majority of the working class today, while in the United States the exodus of peasants into industry and services influenced the composition of manual groups to a smaller extent, as farm population was already very small.

Some remarks on future mobility and problems of social policy concerning mobility

From the analysis of social mobility in the Hungarian society and from its comparison in historical perspective as well as with other developed countries it seems to be clear that *the main driving force of mobility was economic development*. It follows that future mobility will also depend, first of all, on future economic development. (Fertility differences of social classes decreased and are continuing to decrease, so that it is improbable that differential fertility will be a very important factor in bringing about social mobility.) If national income grows at the planned high rate (about 6 per cent a year), the number of people with university degree must grow rapidly (as a precondition and a consequence of economic development). Similarly, the number of high-level executive and manager jobs will increase. The doubling in one generation of the percentage of intellectuals with university qualification and of top executives implies an inflow of 50 per cent of persons originating from other social strata even in the case of total occupational inheritence of the children of intellectuals. If the extent of occupational inheritance of intellectuals and executives remains the same as in the period investigated by the mobility survey of the Demographic Research Institute, i.e. 56.5 per cent (see Table 1), the implied inflow will be more than 70 per cent. A higher rate of economic development would imply still higher inflow, an eventual lower rate of growth obviously a lower inflow of sons of workers and peasants into the social group of intellectuals and executives.

A high rate of social mobility, however, is also a precondition of a high rate of economic development. Therefore, a comprehensive social policy embracing, among other things, the fostering of the chances of social mobility by different means (e.g. educational policy, regional development policy, migration policy) is an important component of an overall economic policy for economic growth and social progress.

Annex

Definition of the social groups used in the article:

1. Intellectual and executive: all persons having a university degree *and* working in a job where a university degree is required, as well as all persons having a top executive position in enterprises (managers) and state administration (inclusive of leaders of village councils).

2. Other non-manual: all other people having a "white-collar" job.

3. Artisan, member of industrial cooperative: all self-employed persons outside agriculture, as well as the members of non-agricultural cooperatives. In the case of the fathers' social position (in 1938) only self-employed persons, as there were no cooperatives (compared to the present ones) at that time.

4. Skilled worker: persons having learned some skilled trade and having an adequate job, exceptionally also persons doing such a job without qualification.

5. Semi-skilled worker: persons having a job (mostly machine work) requiring a short learning, without learned skill.

6. Office attendant: all kinds of non-agricultural manual workers who cannot be classified into the other categories, e.g. office attendants, porters, messengers, etc.

7. Unskilled worker: persons in jobs where learning is not necessary.

8. Day-worker: persons without a regular job. At present it means probably deviant behaviour, in the past it was a regular form of employment.

9. Agricultural: farmers, agricultural labourers, members of agricultural cooperatives.

References

1. Glass, D. V. (ed.): Social mobility in Britain. London, 1954.
2. Carlsson, G.: Social mobility and class structure. Lund, 1958.
3. Svalastoga, K.: Prestige, class and mobility. Copenhagen, 1959.
4. Lipset, S. M.—Bendix, R.: Social mobility in industrial society. Berkeley—Los Angeles, 1959. Univ. of Calif. Press.
5. Miller, S. M.—Bryce, H.: Soziale Mobilität, wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Struktur. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Socialpsychologie. Sonderheft 5. 1961. In Glass,D. V.—König, R. (eds.) Soziale Schichtung und Soziale Mobilität. pp. 303—315.
6. Cutright, P.: Occupational inheritance: a cross-national analysis. American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 73. No. 4. 1968. pp. 400—416.
7. Eckstein, A.: National income and capital formation in Hungary 1900—1950. In Kuznets, S. (ed.): Income and wealth. Vol. V. International Association for the Research of Income and Wealth. London. 1955. Bowes-Bowes.
8. Bródy, A.: Gazdasági növekedésünk üteme 1924-től 1965-ig. (Rate of growth in Hungary, 1924—1965.) Közgazdasági Szemle. Vol. 14. No. 4. 1967. pp. 417—431.
9. Berend, T.—Ránki, Gy.: Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19—20. században. (Economic development in Central East Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.) Budapest, 1969. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. 416 p.
10. Klinger, A.—Szabady, E.: A társadalmi átrétegződés és demográfiai hatásai. I. Budapesten és a városokban. (Social mobility and its demographic effects. Part I:

In Budapest and in the towns.) Publications of the Demographic Research Institute, Central Statistical Office. No. 7. 1965.
11. ANDORKA, R.: A társadalmi átrétegződés és demográfiai hatásai. II. Magyarországon. (Social mobility and its demographic effects. Part II: In Hungary.) Publications of the Demographic Research Institute, Central Statistical Office. No. 30. 1970.
12. 1930. évi népszámálás. VI. Végeredmények összefoglalása. (Population census 1930. Part VI: Summary of results.) Budapest, 1941. Central Statistical Office. pp. 168—175.
13. 1949. évi népszámálás. 6. kötet. Foglalkozásstatisztikai eredmények. (Population census 1949. Vol. 6. Occupational statistics.) p. 88—89. — 7. kötet. A foglalkozásstatisztika országos eredményei. (Vol. 7. National results of occupational statistics.) Budapest, 1950. Central Statistical Office., pp. 182—191.
14. ILLYEFALVI, I. L.: A munkások szociális és gazdasági viszonyai Budapesten. (Social and economic conditions of workers in Budapest.) Budapest, 1930. Central Statistical Office. pp. 705., 726—727.
15. LACKÓ, M.: Adalékok a budapesti munkásság összetételéhez az 1920-as évek végén. (Contributions to the composition of workers in Budapest at the end of the twenties.) Budapest, 1958. Akadémiai Kiadó.
16. RUPP, K.: A magyarországi társadalmi mobilitás tendenciáinak néhány kérdése. (Some problems of the tendencies of social mobility in Hungary.) Thesis for the Scientific Club of Students of the Economic University, Budapest, 1971. Manuscript. 56. p.
17. OSSOWSKI, S.: Social mobility brought about by social revolutions. Fourth Working Conference on Social Stratification and Social Mobility. Geneva, 1957.
18. SZABADY, E.: A társadalmi-foglalkozási átrétegződés Budapesten és a vidéki városokban. (Social-occupational mobility in Budapest and in country-side towns.) Valóság. 1966. No. 12. pp. 19—28.
19. ANDORKA, R.: Az intragenerációs mobilitás vizsgálatának néhány kérdése. II. Statisztikai Tudományos Konferencia. Budapest, 1967. (Some problems of intragenerational mobility.) In Mrs. MÓD, A.—SZABADY, E. (eds.): Korszerű statisztikai törekvések Magyarországon. (Modern statistical endeavours in Hungary.) Budapest, 1968. Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 493—502.
20. Mrs. MÓD, A.—Mrs. FERGE, S.—Mrs. LÁNG, GY.—KEMÉNY, I.: Társadalmi rétegződés Magyarországon. (Social stratification in Hungary.) Budapest, 1966. Statistical Periodicals. No. 11.
21. FERGE, ZS.: Társadalmunk rétegződése. (Stratification of Hungarian society.) Budapest, 1969. KJK.
22. LAKY, T.: Községi tanácsi vezetők intragenerációs mobilitása. (Intragenerational mobility of village council leaders.) Budapest, 1970. Publication of the Sociological Research Group, Hung. Acad. Sci.
23. FÜGEDI, E.: A 15. századi magyar arisztokrácia mobilitása. (Mobility of Hungarian aristocracy in the 15th century.) Budapest, 1970. Library of the CSO.
24. KEMÉNY, I.: A mobilitás társadalmi összefüggései. (Social interrelations of mobility.) II. Statisztikai Tudományos Konferencia. Budapest, 1967. In Mrs. MÓD, A.—SZABADY, E. (eds.): Korszerű statisztikai törekvések Magyarországon. (Modern statistical endeavours in Hungary.) Budapest, 1968. Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 502—508.
25. BLAU, P. M.—DUNCAN, O. D.: The American occupational structure. New York, 1967.
26. MILLER, S. M.: Comparative social mobility. Current Sociology. Vol. 9. 1960. No. 1. 1—89. Reprinted in HELLER, C. S. (ed.): Structured social inequality. New York, 1969. pp. 325—340.

ОБЩЕСТВЕННАЯ МОБИЛЬНОСТЬ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ РАЗВИТИЕ В ВЕНГРИИ

Р. АНДОРКА

В литературе можно встретиться с различными положениями о факторах, определяющих величину общественной мобильности. Одни считают «открытый характер общества» важнейшим определяющим фактором, другие придают решающее значение уровню или темпу экономического развития.

Исследование общественной мобильности, проведенное Демографическим институтом при ЦСУ, позволяет проверить эти противоположные гипотезы на опыте Венгрии. Переписи населения 1930 и 1949 года, а также обследование положения будапештских рабочих 1929 года содержат некоторые данные о мобильности, которые можно использовать для цели исторического сравнения.

На протяжении истекших 25 лет в Венгрии имел место крупный экономический прогресс, параллельно с которым произошло изменение структуры занятости и общественной структуры. Это структурное преобразование являлось важнейшей движущей силой роста общественной мобильности.

Основным направлением общественной мобильности был переход из слоя сельскохозяйственного населения в слой несельскохозяйственных рабочих. Примерно половина нынешних рабочих происходит из крестьянства. Более двух третей нынешнего слоя интеллигенции и руководящих работников и более четырех пятых остальных работников умственного труда происходили из семей работников физического труда.

Крупную роль в процессе мобильности играл переход из одного общественного слоя в другой слой в ходе собственной трудовой деятельности, например, переход рабочих в группу интеллигенции и руководящих работников, переход крестьян в ряды рабочих.

Общественная мобильность была тесно связана с получением более высокого школьного образования. Рост потребности в квалифицированной рабочей силе, — в результате ускорения экономического развития, — имел настолько крупные масштабы, что все лица, получившие более высокое школьное образование, почти без исключения получали соответствующую новую должность.

Доля лиц рабочего и крестьянского происхождения в группе интеллигенции и руководящих работников, а также во всем слое работников умственного труда в настоящее время существенно больше, чем в 1930 и 1949 годах. Аналогичным образом существенно возросла доля лиц крестьянского происхождения внутри рабочего класса. Это связано с тем, что в период между двумя мировыми войнами экономическое развитие в Венгрии было весьма медленным, а после социалистического переустройства темп экономического прогресса чрезвычайно ускорился.

Сопоставление венгерских и зарубежных коэффициентов мобильности опровергает положение американских социологов Липсета и Бендикса, согласно которому масштабы общественной мобильности в экономически развитых странах являются примерно одинаковыми. В Венгрии доля лиц рабочего и крестьянского происхождения в группе интеллигенции и руководящих работников и работников умственного труда вообще, а также доля лиц крестьянского происхождения среди рабочих существенно выше, чем в западных странах, обследованных упомянутыми выше авторами. Это опять-таки можно объяснить структурными факторами и более быстрым темпом экономического развития.

На основании анализа общественной мобильности можно сделать вывод, что важнейшим фактором последней и в дальнейшем будет являться экономическое развитие. Социальная политика, расширяющая различными средствами возможности собственной мобильности, (школьное образование, региональное развитие, миграция населения) тоже является одной из препосылок быстрого экономического прогресса.