

Social Mobility in the Countryside

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16 Social Mobility in the Countryside

IU. V. ARUTIUNIAN

A need for change is the preliminary and internal condition for mobility, while the actual movement is its external manifestation and implementation. Thus, we now shift our attention from the analysis of social needs to their realization by means of social mobility. Radical changes in the social structure of the population and the rapid increase in its professionalization are naturally accompanied by the intensive and large-scale social movement of both groups and individuals from one social stratum to another, from the collective farm-cooperative sector to the state sector, and so on. Social mobility is a matter of fundamental significance. People change not only their jobs and occupations, but their very mode of life, and this is sometimes accompanied by the restructuring of the whole social-psychological cast of the individual.

The processes of social mobility have their own peculiarities under rural conditions. They are simultaneously simpler and more complex than in urban areas. They are simpler to the extent that the socio-occupational structure of the countryside is not as multilayered as in the city. There are no social groups such as the creative, scientific-technical, and higher administrative intelligentsia. But at the same time the countryside has

Our title. From Iu. V. Arutiunian, Sotsial'naiia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR, "Mysl' " Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, pp. 304-333. Tables 1-14 below correspond to Tables 94-107 in the Arutiunian book. This is Chapter 8 of Arutiunian's volume and is entitled "The Realization of Social Mobility."

its own peculiarities connected with the existence of an additional social feature. That is, here we find a boundary between two forms of property, and classes associated with these forms of property. Here the collective farm peasantry interacts directly with the rural working class and intelligentsia.

Despite the existence of complex differentiation, the countryside is characterized by a large-scale shifting of population that promotes processes of integration. Mobility within the village proceeds unimpeded both between sectors and between social strata of the population.

Most important, the division between social spheres of employment of labor — between the collective farm-cooperative and state sectors — is becoming less and less clear-cut. The erasure of boundaries between these sectors is conditioned both by the organic inclusion of the collective farm-cooperative sector in the uniform system of national economy and by the steadily increasing similarity of the social, economic, and production foundations of collective farms and state enterprises. We have already mentioned the mass transfers — so familiar in the modern history of the Soviet countryside — from one sector to another, transfers of machine operators from machine tractor stations to collective farms in 1958-1959, of collective farmers to state farms in connection with the transformation of collective farms into state farms, and organized recruitment of individuals from collective farms for industry and construction projects. Such transfers in themselves suggest the provisional nature of interclass differences and the ease with which movements can occur between sectors.

The main direction of horizontal mobility (mobility not directly connected with a change in socio-occupational status) is from collective farms to the state sector — to state farms, industrial enterprises, and institutions. The collective farms appear most frequently as the system of diffusion, and the state sector as the system of absorption. Movements in the opposite direction are considerably less frequent. Population transfers to cities are a particular form of social mobility, where social mobility is combined with territorial mobility, or migration.

The peasantry is the principal social reservoir from which

Table 1

Role of the Peasantry in the Formation of Social Groups in the Collective
Farm-Cooperative and State Sectors of the Countryside
(individuals of peasant origin in % of total number in group)

Socio-occupational groups	Kalinin Region			Krasnodar Territory			Tatar ASSR		
	collec- tive farms	state sector		collec- tive farms	state sector		collec- tive farms	state sector	
		state farms	other en- terprises		state farms	other en- terprises		state farms	other en- terprises
Higher-level managerial personnel and specialists (A ₁)	50	47.1	71.4	55.1	44.0	n.a.*	91	57	67
Middle-level managerial personnel and specialists (A ₂)	60	63.6	55.7	88.0	52.0	52.6	83	50	n.a.*
Employees (B)	90.8	47.1	60.1	83.8	63.7	62.8	91	53	61
Machine operators (C)	88.6	54.9	57.9	80.0	58.3	53.1	96	58	77
Skilled workers and collective farmers (D ₁)	85.5	79.3	79.8	87.4	60.2	77.8	97	83	69
Common laborers (D ₂)	89.5	86.1	63.8	88.8	69.0	53.7	94	82	79
Total	87	78	63	87	63	64	95	77	n.a.*

* — not available.

the rural working class and intelligentsia, including all their component socio-occupational groups, are formed (see Table 1).

The role of the peasantry as a social source varies depending on the type of enterprise. While almost all collective farmers are hereditary peasants (85-90%), the latter group accounts for a smaller proportion (65-75%) of personnel in state farms and, particularly, nonagricultural enterprises. Although we may observe certain differences between the social origins of rural workers and collective farmers, they are not of great importance since in all cases these groups are the offspring of essentially similar classes. In the villages of Krasnodar Territory and the Tatar ASSR only 10-12% of the employed population are children of private peasants, while about 90% are children of working people in the public sectors — the state and collective farm-cooperative sectors. In the Kalinin Region, where the population is older, children of private peasants still comprise only about 20% of the employed population. Moreover, the proportion of children of private peasants does not differ much as between collective farms and state enterprises (see Table 2).

Essentially, the present generation of rural working people has not seen, and does not know, forms of conducting economic activity other than the currently existing public forms. This feature of the social biography of rural residents is important for understanding the social-political situation in today's Soviet village.

The role of the peasantry as a social source of recruitment is not the same among the different socio-occupational groups. The peasantry is somewhat more important among groups employed in manual labor, and less important among those in mental labor, especially skilled mental labor (see Table 1). Differences in modes of recruitment of the various socio-occupational groups from the peasantry are even more clear-cut.

Former peasants now employed in manual labor at enterprises of the state sector began work, as a rule, at collective farms, and only later shifted to the state sector. But for those who are now employed in mental labor, especially of the skilled kind, a state enterprise was generally their first place of employment. (1) This difference is of great importance. It reflects

Table 2

Class Origins of Collective Farmers, Workers,
and Employees in the Countryside
(in %)

Employed population	Krasnodar Territory			Kalinin Region		
	collective farmers	workers and employees		collective farmers	workers and employees	
		state farms	other enterprises		state farms	other enterprises
Parents						
Workers and employees in state sector	13	37	36	13	22	37
Collective farmers	77	53	60	56	58	51
Private peasants, others	10	10	4	31	20	12

the specific character and noncorrespondence of the social and production roles of the collective farm as a source of labor resources.

The structure of production in collective farms is not so developed that they can supply a sufficient amount of skilled labor, particularly mental labor, to the state sector. Therefore, those who shift from collective farms are chiefly individuals employed in manual labor, above all, low-skilled labor. The large-scale recruitment of these individuals by state farms was connected, in particular, with the transformation of some collective farms into state farms in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They are not simply collective farmers' children, but "the children of collective farms," production workers whose potential is determined by the production training they obtained in the economic unit.

In contrast to the traditional cadres of collective farms, we

find children of collective farmers who are employed in "job positions" requiring certain skills and who are the bearers of the social (as distinct from the production) "current" of the collective farm order. They are school graduates whose potential is not determined by production experience but depends on school and family training, on the immediate environment in which they are reared, on the social opportunities for growth, and these have been equalized relative to other social groups in the countryside. Children from a collective farm background have the same opportunities as all rural residents to realize their potential and to occupy leading positions in all social groups of the state sector in the countryside.

The social opportunities for collective farmers, relative to those for other village strata, have been equalized to the extent that they not only can move easily into the state sector in the countryside, but they also are in an equal position with individuals reared in the state sector of the village insofar as migrating to the city and thus acquiring urban occupations are concerned. It is true that in moving to the city, collective farmers' children continue their studies somewhat less frequently than the children of rural workers and employees (Table 3). But this difference is explained only by the somewhat more backward occupational structure of collective farmers, among whom there are fewer families with skilled individuals. It is no accident that the advantages of the offspring of families employed in the rural state sector disappear when we examine collective farmers and rural workers in similar socio-occupational groups. As a whole, the offspring of identical socio-occupational groups in different sectors of the countryside continue their studies to the same extent. The equality of mobility opportunities for those employed in the collective farm-cooperative and state sectors is particularly apparent from the data revealing the final results of mobility — the proportion of individuals employed in skilled mental labor. In this respect individuals reared in the collective farm-cooperative sector are not in the least bit disadvantaged compared to those reared in the rural state sector. However, in both sectors, and to an equal degree, significant differences exist in mobility opportunities depending on the skills of the parents.

Table 3

Children of Rural Residents in the City
(in % of total number of "emigrants" from the indicated socio-occupational group)

Socio-occupational groups of parents	Krasnodar Territory				Kalinin Region				Tatar ASSR			
	% continuing their studies upon arrival in city		% of rural "emi-grants" employed in skilled mental work in city (a)		% continuing their studies upon arrival in city		% of rural "emi-grants" employed in skilled mental work in city (a)		% continuing their studies upon arrival in city		% of rural "emi-grants" employed in skilled mental work in city (a)	
	total	of these, children of collective farmers	total	of these, children of collective farmers	total	of these, children of collective farmers	total	of these, children of collective farmers	total	of these, children of collective farmers	total	of these, children of collective farmers
Higher-level managerial personnel and specialists (A ₁)	75	100	53	100	60.0	100	71.4	100	73	58	n.a	
Middle-level managerial personnel and specialists (A ₂)	58	45.2	50	100	59.5	58.5	40.7	24.8	76	38	34	
Employees (B)	59	63.7	46	80.4	50.2	62.4	50.0	50	77	62	28	
Machine operators (C)	53	46.5	52	74	51.2	67.0	16.7	0	61	76	25	
Skilled workers and collective farmers (D ₁)	46	47.0	22	20.2	44.4	41.7	29.2	41.9	57	50	24	
Common laborers, others (D ₂₋₃)	32	27.7	26	34.1	34.4	27.9	21.1	24.5	45	36	17	
Total	41	35	29	39	39	33	24	29	54	40	23	

(a) Higher-level and middle-level managerial personnel and specialists.


Among the rural population, the rate of social advancement is affected not by class position but by socio-occupational status.

Thus, the collective farm as a social institution does not impede or restrict the opportunities for social advancement of collective farmers compared to other groups of the rural population. This situation also has its ethnic aspect. Since we know that in the national republics the collective farms contain chiefly non-Russian population, equalization of opportunities for the collective farm-cooperative and state sectors in the countryside promotes the equalization of mobility chances (social advancement) for the indigenous nationalities and Russian population in the countryside.

Large-scale mobility proceeds (see Chart I) not only between sectors (1), i.e., not only along horizontal lines, but also between social strata, intraclass groups (2), i.e., along vertical lines. Socio-occupational advancement is also frequently associated with changes in the sphere of employment, movement to another region, i.e., it proceeds as a combination of both vertical and horizontal mobility (3). This kind of mobility, of course, frequently has the most far-reaching consequences for the mobile population, particularly when it involves long distances.

Chart I

Direction of Social Mobility of the
Collective Farm Population



- Mobility:
1. horizontal 2. vertical 3. combined

The collective farm-cooperative sector, whose social structure is simpler than that of the state sector (for example, many public and state institutions are absent in the former), provides fewer opportunities for advancement in social status within the sector itself. That is why cases of combined mobility are most frequent: movement from the collective farm-cooperative sector to the state sector and, simultaneously, an advancement in socio-occupational position (see Table 4).

Collective farmers continue their socio-occupational advancement more actively outside the collective farm-cooperative sector. As the data in Table 4 show, that part of the population which was not mobile in socio-occupational terms was most likely to remain permanently in the collective farms. As for the mobile part of the population, some 50% shifted to the state sector in the course of their work activity. More precisely, they moved on to employment in mental work in various rural institutions.

The intensity of vertical mobility, or to be more accurate, the consequences of vertical mobility, are demonstrated by the highly varied social origins of the socio-occupational groups in the village (see Table 5).

As Table 5 shows, only a few rural residents with skills are "repeating" the status of their parents. This is understandable. Many currently existing types of occupations were unknown to the previous generation in the countryside. The socio-occupational structure of the contemporary village has been largely created anew. Only among common laborers is a high degree of self-reproduction typical. All other social groups of the population are recruited primarily from "alien" groups. "Hereditary" occupations are rare. The major characteristic and result of this process is the predominance in all groups of the descendants of individuals in primarily unskilled and low-skilled manual labor. Today's rural intelligentsia is the flesh and blood of the people, drawn from the very depths of the people, and organically connected with them through its whole past.

Intensive vertical mobility is equally characteristic of the different ethnic groups of the rural population whom we investigated. More than one-quarter of the Tatars (26%) and Russians

Table 4

Distribution of the Population by Sectors and Forms of Production in the Process of Work Activity (in % of number in each mobile and stable group) (a)

Forms of production	Krasnodar Territory				Kalinin Region				Tatar ASSR			
	occupation-ally mobile		occupation-ally stable		occupation-ally mobile		occupation-ally stable		occupation-ally mobile		occupation-ally stable	
	DC-BA	DC-DC	DC-BA	DC-DC	DC-BA	DC-DC	DC-BA	DC-DC	DC-BA	DC-DC	DC-BA	DC-DC
	N = 212		N = 973		N = 186		N = 816		N = 230		N = 1,419	
	at start of work career	at time of survey	at start of work career	at time of survey	at start of work career	at time of survey	at start of work career	at time of survey	at start of work career	at time of survey	at start of work career	at time of survey
Collective farms	54.8	40.6	62.5	42.0	45.4	20.3	57.4	37.0	62	33	77	63
State farms	13.4	26.4	15.9	51.0	2.5	26.6	3.4	40.2	10	12	10	21
Enterprises, construction projects	20.4	12.7	13.2	3.4	29.3	20.5	13.1	14.6	20	6	7	7
Service sphere	2.3	4.1	1.0	1.3	4.3	11.4	5.9	4.5	3	9	1	3
Institutions	2.1	14.7	0.3	1.0	5.5	20.1	0.5	2.8	3	38	1	4

(a) Mobile refers to individuals shifting from groups in manual labor (D, C) to groups in mental labor (B, A); stable refers to those remaining in manual labor.

Table 5

Composition of Socio-Occupational Groups by Social Origins (Father's Employment)
(in % of each group of respondents)

Socio-occupational status of respondents	Kalinin Region				Krasnodar Territory				Tatar ASSR			
	intelligentsia	employees	machine operators	common labor-ers and others	intelligentsia	employees	machine operators	common labor-ers and others	intelligentsia	machine operators	employees	common labor-ers and others
Higher-level managerial personnel*	25	4	11	50	15	5	5	75	27	13	-	60
Middle-level managerial personnel*	25	2	2	69	21	6	13	60	21	10	5	64
Higher-level specialists*	30	9	17	46	27	14	8	51	21	18	5	56
Middle-level specialists*	28	9	9	60	14	6	12	68	23	7	6	64
Employees	20	7	7	66	19	12	10	60	12	10	9	69
Machine operators and others in industrial labor	14	8	9	70	8	7	19	66	8	5	10	77
Skilled workers in nonindustrial labor	4	6	4	86	15	4	12	69	3	3	7	87
Low-skilled workers in manual labor	6	3	3	88	9	5	13	73	2	5	6	87
Common laborers	5	4	2	89	7	4	7	82	4	4	2	91

*In Kalinin Region the totals presented by Arutiunian for these groups diverge from 100% by more than can be accounted for by rounding.

Table 6

Increase in Socio-Occupational Status of Tatars
and Russians in Comparison with Parents
(number of times greater) (a)

Socio-occupational groups	Tatars	Russians
Higher-level managerial personnel and specialists	2.01	1.85
Middle-level managerial personnel and specialists	1.42	1.40
Employees	1.36	1.25
Machine operators	1.34	1.19
Common laborers and others employed in primarily un- skilled, manual labor	1.13	1.05
Total	1.16	1.12

(a) Socio-occupational status is measured by taking account of three indices: earnings, education, and influence in the producing enterprise. Data pertaining to these factors are the basis for assigning each status position a certain rank. An approximate step corresponds to the interval between middle-level and higher-level specialists. For greater detail see the Appendix [not included in the present volume]. An increase in status among individuals in primarily unskilled labor occurred as a result of certain changes in skills within this group.

(31%) had higher social status than their parents. However, if we consider not only the overall frequency of mobility but the distance moved, the Tatars have an advantage. Given the less advanced initial positions of the Tatars, they have traveled a longer distance in their social growth. The comparative rates of social advancement of Tatars and Russians in the village may be seen in Table 6.

The fact that Tatars are improving their status more rapidly than Russians in all cases is also confirmed by data on intra-generational mobility (changes in social status in the process of work activity, i.e., between the start and completion of a work career). In this connection, not only the rates but also the scale of mobility are greater among Tatars.

This situation may also be characteristic, to one degree or another, of other national minorities among the rural population. Since they frequently started from a worse position than the Russians, they naturally had to travel a relatively longer distance in the course of their work careers. The great majority of individuals in every ethnic and socio-occupational group occupy better social positions than their parents. Moreover, they achieve a higher status in the course of their own work activity, and this obviously promotes the social optimism of these most influential social groups of the population, who determine the situation in the village (see Table 7).

Chart II brings together indices of intergenerational and intra-generational mobility. It shows us what proportion of individuals in the various occupational groups were already ahead of their parents at the start of their work careers, and to what degree their final advantage was due not to their initial positions but to advancement in the course of their work activity. The one group that was most frequently ahead of its parents even at the start of its members' work careers was that of higher- and middle-level specialists. This is understandable. Prolonged studies lead directly to intelligentsia-type occupations. Jobs as agronomists, livestock specialists, and engineers are frequently the first ones appearing on an individual's service record. This stems from the special manner in which socio-occupational groups of specialists are recruited. Only a certain proportion (approximately 1/3 to 1/2, judging by our figures) move into this category in the course of their own work activity. In this respect specialists are sharply distinguished from managerial personnel who, like members of other socio-occupational groups, move into their positions step by step during their work careers rather than as a result of completing studies at an educational institution. About 80-90% of higher-level managerial personnel and 96%

Table 7


Proportion of Individuals in Various Socio-Occupational Groups
Attaining Higher Status than Their Parents
(in % of each socio-occupational group)

Socio-occupational groups	Krasnodar Territory		Kalinin Region		Tatar ASSR	
	total	at start of career in course of work	total	at start of career in course of work	total	at start of career in course of work
Managerial personnel						
higher-level	95	13	91	5	87	7
middle-level	79	0	86	0	79	0
Specialists						
higher-level	90	34	84	23	89*	53
middle-level	86	30	72	26	77	36
Employees (a)	60	46	74	25	77	20
Machine operators (a)	67*	17	69	21	75	22

(a) The status of employees and machine operators is treated as being the same.

*There is a misprint in these series of figures. The components do not add up to the total.

Chart II



of middle-level managerial personnel in the countryside began their work careers in other socio-occupational groups, predominantly in those of lower status. (2)

The social position of managerial personnel, as well as of middle-level specialists, employees, and machine operators, is not primarily the result of specialized training but of work experience, and quite possibly this leaves its imprint on the psychological characteristics of these groups.

The emergence of new strata of skilled personnel from a rural population which had previously been occupationally and culturally quite homogeneous is evidence of the socio-occupational differentiation of this population. Thus, the dialectics of development toward a homogeneous society is a complex process. The village is moving toward unification via differentiation. This is a progressive process, for it signifies the material and cultural advancement of newly emerging groups of the rural population, and thus the gradual approximation of the latter to the urban population.

Intraclass, as well as interclass, differentiation is not absolute in nature. New strata which emerge from the people do not lose their ties to the people. The large number of socially mixed families, for example, is evidence of social unification (see Table 8).

Above all, the figures in Table 8 reveal the socially mixed nature of the rural intelligentsia, in one-half of whose families either the husband or wife is employed in manual labor. In the intelligentsia category, relatively homogeneous families are found only among higher-level specialists. These families are often formed outside the village, in urban circumstances. One can understand that individuals in manual labor are less likely to marry outside their group. They marry members of the intelligentsia infrequently, if only because the number of the latter in the countryside (and thus the possibility of marrying them) is limited.

Not only the boundary lines between socio-occupational groups, but also those between workers and collective farmers associated with different forms of property, frequently disappear within the family unit. Moreover, the higher the socio-occupational

Table 8

Proportion of Wives (Husbands) Employed
in Manual Labor
(in % of total number of families, by
socio-occupational groups)

Socio-occupational groups	Krasnodar Territory	Kalinin Region	Tatar ASSR
Higher-level managerial personnel	48.4	25.0	46
Middle-level managerial personnel	49.9	50.9	65
Higher-level specialists	34.5	34.3	27
Middle-level specialists	61.7	58.3	51
Employees	60.1	60.5	54
Machine operators	79.8	60.0	85
Skilled and low-skilled workers and collec- tive farmers	83.8	86.4	91
Common laborers	83.4	87.4	96

status of a group, the more frequent are socially mixed marriages. In families of the collective farm intelligentsia (according to data for the Tatar ASSR), almost 1/2 of the spouses are employed at enterprises and — even more frequently — state institutions, while in families of machine operators the figure is 1/4, and in families of common laborers — 1/7. These ratios correspond to the dialectics of the general trend of social development. With each step up the occupational ladder, the existence of common occupational traits among identical groups of both the collective farm-cooperative and state sectors is increasingly apparent. These traits are associated with similar levels of general and specialized training and education, similar levels of material compensation, and so on. Thus class differences, which are eroded as individuals advance occupationally from

group to group, become less and less clear-cut. And this factor, in particular, is also reflected in the social composition of collective farm families.

The ramified social ties which promote close contacts and intermingling among the population are naturally supplemented by, and interwoven with, ties between ethnic groups. The facts show that the increasingly sharp national self-consciousness of the intelligentsia, and of other social groups as well, does not impose barriers which separate national groups from each other and does not lead to their isolation. The current mode of life requires contacts and interaction, and independently of the wills of people, this objectively promotes the multiplication of ties between ethnic groups, including family ties. Working in the same enterprises and economic units, associating with each other in regional and urban centers, Tatars and Russians form friendships and increasingly enter into mixed marriages. Naturally, the number of such marriages is greater in multinational villages (with Tatar and Russian populations) than in those containing a single national group. Of the surveyed residents in multinational villages, 10% had entered into mixed marriages, and more than 25% responded that they had relatives who were married to an individual of a different nationality. In Tatar villages there were practically no nationally-mixed families.

Ties with other ethnic (as well as social) groups are particularly noticeable among occupationally advanced groups, especially those who have frequent contact with other nationalities. While less than 1% of Tatar common laborers had entered into mixed marriages with Russians, among the intelligentsia the figure was 4-5%. The situation was approximately the same among Russians. Similarly, about 1/3 of the Tatar intelligentsia and the same proportion of Russian intelligentsia answered that they had relatives who were married to individuals of a different nationality, while among common laborers the corresponding proportion was no more than 1/6.

Ties between ethnic groups are greatly facilitated by the creation of a common international cultural foundation which promotes mutual understanding between people and draws them closer together. It is no accident, for example, that almost 20%

of Tatars who are fluent in Russian are married to Russians, while among those who are not, the figure is no more than 1%.

The operation of processes of integration and high rates of mobility of ethnic and social groups are evidence of the rapid and intensive social development of society. For a considerable proportion of the rural population the improvement in conditions of life is experienced not only as an objective fact but also as a subjective phenomenon. This ensures the viability and healthy functioning of the social organism.

The available data, however, do not permit us to conclude that opportunities for social mobility have been fully equalized among the different socio-occupational groups. We have already seen (Table 5) that the largest proportion of individuals — 50% at the very least — in all social groups, including the intelligentsia, come from families of common laborers. But this does not mean, for example, that common laborers have the same opportunities as others to attain membership in all social groups of the rural population. Inasmuch as common laborers comprise a majority (and the intelligentsia — a minority) of the population in the countryside, even a small proportion of the children of common laborers may be sufficiently numerous to constitute a significant fraction of the intelligentsia. Therefore, to obtain a more precise picture of the relationship between the occupations and educational levels of parents and their children, we must recalculate the data in Table 5. First of all, let us determine whether a relationship exists between the education of parents and that of their children (see Table 9).

As the reader can see, the relationship is quite significant. The proportion of children obtaining a higher education is 3.4% for those whose parents are illiterate, 8-9% for those whose parents have up to six years of schooling, 10% for those whose parents have seven to ten years of schooling, 44% for those whose parents have a specialized secondary education, and 64% for those whose parents have a higher education.

Under the conditions of socialism, where skill — as appraised by the state — rather than property is the most important factor in the social position of the individual, education operates as the decisive condition for social advancement. According to specially

Table 9
 Relationship Between Educational Level of Parents and Children,
 Data for Tatar ASSR (in %)

Education of father	Number of respondents	Education of respondents, in %*					higher education
		illiterate, barely literate	less than 4 grades	4-6 grades	7-9 grades	10 grades	
Illiterate	1,029	18.3	18.5	21.1	27.3	5.0	3.4
Less than 4 grades	358	2.4	13.3	18.7	31.8	14.1	9.0
4-6 grades	253	2.8	7.9	17.4	39.5	14.6	8.3
7-9 grades	62	3.2	4.8	6.4	38.7	21.0	9.7
10 grades	40	2.5	—	2.5	22.5	27.5	10.0
Secondary specialized education	16	—	—	—	6.3	12.5	43.7
Higher education	22	4.5	—	9.0	—	18.2	63.8

*The sums of the percentage figures in the first five rows differ from 100% by more than can normally be accounted for by rounding.

calculated coefficients of determination, the educational level of parents predetermines the educational level of children to the extent of 50%.*

We would naturally expect a similarly close relationship to prevail between the socio-occupational status of parents and children. The data presented below (see Table 10) do, in fact, confirm such a relationship.

As Table 10 shows, only 8% of the children whose fathers were common laborers became members of the intelligentsia, while about 50% of those whose fathers were higher-level specialists did so. The remaining population groups — with some degree of variation — are distributed between these two extreme "parental poles." The coefficient of determination between the social status of parents and that of children (with respect to the initial place of work and type of job) is 53.5%, i.e., in more than 50% of the cases the social position of the children at the start of their work careers was determined by the status of their parents. It is interesting to observe that the mother has a greater influence on both the educational level and socio-occupational status of the child than the father. An increase in the mother's education by 1.0 units (from the 1st grade to the 4th, from the 5th grade to the 8th, etc.) is associated with an increase in the child's education by 0.58 units, and a rise of 1.0 units in the mother's socio-occupational status is associated with a 0.69 unit increase in the child's status (with respect to the initial place of work); the corresponding figures for the father's influence are 0.47 and 0.42.**

Although rural residents frequently shift from one social group to another during their work careers, the positions attained in one's youth exercise an influence on one's ultimate status. The coefficient of determination between the "final" socio-occupational status of village residents and that of their

*The calculations underlying this conclusion are found in the Appendix to the Arutiunian book, which has not been included in this volume.


**Arutiunian notes here that the details underlying these calculations appear in the Appendix to his work.

Table 10
 Relationship Between Socio-Occupational Status of Parents
 and Children, Data for Tatar ASSR
 (in % of number of children in each socio-occupational group)

Socio-occupational status of father	Number of children	Socio-occupational status of children at start of work career, in %								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Higher-level managerial personnel (1)	23	—	4.4	4.4	17.4	4.3	8.7	—	8.7	52.1
Middle-level managerial personnel (2)	48	2.1	4.3	10.6	10.6	14.9	14.9	8.5	—	34.1
Higher-level specialists (3)	35	—	3.0	36.5	12.1	6.0	9.1	3.0	3.0	27.3
Middle-level specialists (4)	31	—	—	25.0	17.8	7.2	7.2	7.2	—	35.6
Employees (5)	96	—	—	16.6	7.8	18.9	7.8	4.5	6.7	37.7
Machine operators and others in industrial labor (6)	76	—	—	8.2	5.5	13.7	24.6	9.6	6.9	31.5
Skilled personnel in nonindustrial labor (7)	112	—	—	5.9	4.9	8.8	10.8	11.8	7.8	50.0
Low-skilled personnel (8)	86	1.2	—	7.2	8.3	11.9	5.9	—	17.8	47.7
Common laborers (9)	1,044	0.1	0.9	4.3	3.0	3.3	6.0	2.6	5.7	74.1

Chart III

Intergenerational Mobility*



*The social groups that Arutiunian designated by A, B, C, D are shown in Tables 1 and 3.

parents is rather high (0.5).

Chart III reveals the direction and results of social mobility of the rural population of the Tatar ASSR.

It is apparent from this chart that although low-skilled socio-occupational groups "send" a rather modest proportion of their offspring into skilled occupational groups, these offspring account for a significant proportion of the more skilled groups. Thus, the group engaged in predominantly unskilled labor (D — parents) "sent" only 14.9% of its children into the intelligentsia, but these children accounted for 59.8% of the relatively small category of rural intelligentsia (A — children).

How do we explain the influence of the socio-occupational status of parents on the fates of children? It is obvious that this is a matter of the unequal and dissimilar economic and cultural circumstances in the immediate environment surrounding the child.

In most cases the intelligentsia is concentrated in relatively large population centers which provide favorable opportunities for the development of individuals' capacities and potentials. The children of the more well-to-do and more educated parents begin to work later than others. Almost 75% of the children whose parents were employed in unskilled labor began to work before the age of 16, both because of material considerations as well as because of underestimation of education as a social value. The point at which children embark on their own working lives varies rather systematically with the educational level and — to a certain extent — the socio-occupational status of their parents (see Table 11).

Among those employed in unskilled manual labor, the bulk (from 2/3 to 3/4) began to work before the age of 16, while among specialists — particularly higher-level specialists — there were relatively few who did so, no more than 17%. As for managerial personnel, in this respect they differ from the intelligentsia and are closer to the great mass of working people. Personifying the leading role of the working class, their biographies, so to speak, reveal a close link with the fate of the broad masses of people.

Personnel in specialized mental work begin their work careers at a later age, and thus settle down into married life at a later age. In the Tatar ASSR, 22% of the immobile population group were married before the age of 20, while the figure for the mobile group was 14%. The corresponding proportions in Krasnodar Territory were 21% and 12%, and in the Kalinin Region — 21% and 9%.

Starting a family, particularly the appearance of children, frequently operates to obstruct the socio-occupational advancement of women, and this is reflected in the overall indicators of mobility. Of particular importance in stimulating mobility are the immediate surroundings, above all the cultural atmosphere and

Table 11

Proportion of Rural Residents Who Began
to Work Before the Age of 16
(in % of each socio-occupational group)

Socio-occupational groups	Krasnodar Territory	Kalinin Region	Tatar ASSR
Common laborers	66	83	79
Low-skilled workers in manual labor	66	76	78
Skilled workers in non-industrial activity	54	62	72
Machine operators and others in industrial labor	56	52	66
Employees	36	37	44
Middle-level specialists	28	16	16
Higher-level specialists	17	11	11
Middle-level managerial personnel	51	46	55
Higher-level managerial personnel	29	41	40

general climate in the family, especially the extent to which the family knows and uses Russian. More than 60% of the individuals in the mobile population group of the Tatar ASSR are fluent in Russian or in both the Russian and Tatar languages, while in the immobile group the corresponding figure is about one-half as great — 34%.

It is important, from a practical standpoint, to determine at what stage in the socio-occupational advancement of an individual the favorable impact of the advantages available to the highly-skilled groups makes its appearance. Or, to put it differently, what is the barrier, the obstacle, to the socio-occupational advancement of the low-skilled groups of the rural population?

In order to clarify this problem we analyzed the social

background of pupils in the secondary schools of one of the surveyed districts of the Tatar ASSR.

It appears that the proportion of children in all grades of the incomplete and complete secondary school whose parents are employed in unskilled labor remains unchanged and corresponds to the share of this group of working people in the district's population (see Table 12). District organizations now keep records of each child of school age, and nonattendance at school is regarded as an extraordinary event — the district department of public education is held responsible for each child not attending school. There are even special reporting procedures in effect to determine the number of children not attending school in the district. According to these records only 38 of 2,103 children (7 to 15 years of age) were not attending school in the Almetevsk District.

Secondary education is now available to rural residents in practically the same degree as it is to urban residents. This is evident from data in statistical reports (see Table 13).

After finishing the incomplete secondary and secondary school, approximately the same proportion of students in cities and villages continue their studies in the system of general and secondary specialized education. Moreover, there are no differences between the graduates of Tatar rural schools and Russian schools in this regard. Judging by the data for the Almetevsk District (Table 12), the proportion of Tatar pupils at all levels of the secondary school corresponds to their share of the population. A very slight decline in their relative share may be observed only in the Russian and mixed schools (32% of the pupils in the 5th-6th grades were Tatars, and 24.8% in the 9th-10th grades were Tatars), which is apparently connected with difficulties in mastering the Russian language. After completing secondary school, 20.7% of the graduates in Tatar districts enter higher educational institutions and technicums, compared to 19.4% of graduates in predominantly Russian districts. A distinct difference may be observed only in the distribution of those secondary school graduates in Tatar and Russian districts who begin to work after completing school. We find a more clear-cut agrarian orientation among Tatars. In the Tatar districts, 19%

Table 12

Social and National Composition of Pupils in Secondary Schools
of Almetevsk District, 1967-1968 (a)

Grades	Russian and mixed schools			Tatar schools			All schools		
	number of pupils	children of unskilled workers and collective farmers (in %)	Tatar children (in %)	number of pupils	children of unskilled workers and collective farmers (in %)	Tatar children (in %)	number of pupils	children of unskilled workers and collective farmers (in %)	Tatar children (in %)
5-6	1,742	50.2	32.5	1,174	65.2	100	2,916	56.3	59.7
7-8	1,579	46.2	31.5	962	66.7	99.7	2,541	54.2	57.3
9-10	1,705	53.9	24.8	894	60.5	99.9	2,599	56.2	50.6
Total	5,026	50.3	29.5	3,030	64.3	99.9	8,056	55.6	51.0

(a) Data were collected for each school by using a standardized form. The data were gathered with the assistance of the Department of Public Education of the Almetevsk District Executive Committee.

Table 13
Distribution of Graduates of Rural and Urban Schools
of the Tatar ASSR, 1967-1968, in % (a)

Activities of graduates	Rural schools			Urban schools			Total for republic		
	all grad-uates	8th grade-uates	10th grade-uates	all grad-uates	8th grade-uates	10th grade-uates	all grad-uates	8th grade-uates	10th grade-uates
Continued their studies	71	83	37	71	89	39	71	86	39
At higher educational institutions	3	—	10	8	—	23	5	—	17
Began to work	27	16	60	26	9*	55	27	13	57
In industry	6	2	16	18	7	39	12	4	28
In agriculture	17	12	31	2	4	4	10	7	17

(a) The data were brought together by districts. In addition to the division into rural and urban localities, the data were grouped separately for Tatar and Russian districts, as well as for districts adjoining Kazan and suburban districts as a whole (including districts adjoining Kazan).

*This figure is probably a misprint. It is less than the sum of those who began to work in industry and agriculture.

of the graduates begin to work in agriculture, whereas 11% of those in Russian districts do so.

Both the Tatar and Russian rural populations undergo substantial "losses" in the transition to higher education. Only about 10% of the graduates of rural secondary schools go on to higher educational institutions, compared to some 20% of the graduates of urban schools. Thus, while collective farmers are represented in secondary schools approximately in proportion to their share of the population (about 30%), within the city limits their opportunities for receiving a higher education (as well as the opportunities of the rest of the rural population) are diminished. (3) True, this does not apply to an agricultural education, for collective farmers predominate in this system of higher education. Thus, the proportions of collective farmers at all higher schools and technicums in 1967-1968 were 17.9% and 23.8% respectively, while at agricultural higher schools and technicums they were 72.8% and 63%.

The enrollment of collective farmers and their children at the University and at technical higher educational institutions is particularly small. They constitute 11% of the students at Kazan University, 7% at the Aviation Institute, and 17% at all higher schools of the Tatar ASSR. This situation is also typical of other higher educational institutions. Among Moscow higher schools it is only at the Agricultural Academy that the proportion of collective farmers (and their children) approximates their share in the population (26% in 1964), while at all other institutions it is considerably lower (6% at Moscow State University, 3% at the Moscow Higher Technical School, 4% at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute).

These figures testify to the relatively low quality of training received by pupils in rural secondary schools in comparison with that of urban schools. The actual level of secondary education in the countryside does not correspond to the formal requirements (as specified in official documents), although the gap between formal requirements and actual education, between rural and urban education, is narrowing significantly as time passes. (4)

The preparatory departments of higher schools, which have

Table 14

Proportions of Russians and Tatars at Different
 Stages of Education, Tatar ASSR
 (in %)

Stage of education	Tatars	Russians
Graduate study	27	56
Specialists with higher education	35	55
Higher educational institutions	37	56
Agricultural institutions	76	24
Secondary specialized schools	38	54
Agricultural schools	63	27
Rural secondary schools	60	40
Population of republic	60	40


recently been established by decision of the Party and government for working youth, demobilized soldiers and rural residents, are expected to have a considerable impact on equalizing opportunities for rural youth to gain admission to higher educational institutions.

The factors that we have been considering here affect the formation of a national intelligentsia in a number of the country's regions. Those national groups which reside primarily in rural localities naturally have less opportunities for social advancement than the more urbanized national groups. It is no accident, for example, that the relative share of primarily "urban" national groups in the student body is disproportionately high (Russians, Armenians, Estonians, Latvians), while the share of most predominantly rural national groups (Kirgiz, Moldavians, Tadzhiks, etc.) is disproportionately low. (5) Moreover, the more advanced the level of professional training, the more apparent are the differences associated with the extent of urbanization of national groups (see Table 14).

The dominant element in the problem of mobility of nationality groups clearly shows through in Table 14. Its solution is connected

Chart IV

Probability of Employment in
Mental Labor for Different
Social Groups of the Rural
Population of the Tatar ASSR*



* The social groups designated by Arutiunian as A, B, C, and D are shown in Tables 1 and 3.

with the overall development of the countryside to the level attained by the city. This is precisely the means by which the equalization of socio-occupational opportunities for different nationalities must proceed, and is actually proceeding.

Inasmuch as the formation of the rural intelligentsia proceeds through the system of "urban" higher education, it is understandable that those employed in rural unskilled labor lose out to individuals in skilled labor — above all to individuals in mental labor — precisely at the urban "zigzag" of their careers. The relatively small number of rural intelligentsia have comparatively great opportunities for social advancement. The pyramid of social structure and the pyramid of opportunities are, so to speak, inversely related to each other (see Chart IV above,

based on the data in Table 10).

It is precisely in the city that the decisive influence of family background is manifested. The greater opportunities for social advancement open to children whose parents are employed in relatively skilled labor stem from their greater utilization of the possibilities for mobility afforded by the city.

What are the prospects for social mobility in the future? In essence, two contrasting trends are possible. Abstractly speaking, we can conceive of the possibility that mobility opportunities for low-skilled population groups will diminish as a result of the growth in numbers of the intelligentsia who, having additional opportunities for advancement, will increasingly satisfy the demand for skilled labor. Such a conclusion is incorrect, however, inasmuch as the tendency for the intelligentsia to reproduce itself is more than offset by other processes. The main trend in social mobility is determined by the general extension of education and the steadily increasing similarity between the intelligentsia, on the one hand, and the working class and peasantry, on the other. The new five-year plan should be a significant stage in this process. The plan provides for a decline in the use of manual, heavy, and unskilled labor in all branches of the economy, as well as for completing the transition to universal secondary education. As the materials presented above have shown, we have already reached the point where children of low-skilled parents do not drop out of the incomplete secondary school, and their drop-out rate is very low at the complete secondary school. Some differences in the educational opportunities of different socio-occupational groups are found only at the secondary specialized and higher levels of education. The diffusion of universal secondary education will alter the situation fundamentally. In order to see this, let us turn again to the regression coefficients. Not only do they reveal the influence of parents' education and social status on children's opportunities, but also the declining impact of this influence,* i.e., among more skilled and educated families, status differences have a

*Arutiunian refers here to the Appendix to his volume, which we have not reproduced.

steadily weaker influence on the statuses of children.

In other words, differences in opportunities for children of common laborers and employees — groups which are one status rank apart — are considerably greater than those for children of middle-level and higher-level specialists, who are also separated by one status rank.* This is extremely important inasmuch as we are moving in the general direction of equalizing educational levels of the population, of reducing and then eliminating the least skilled types of labor. Thus we can expect that the boundaries of the pyramids of opportunity for different social groups will become increasingly similar, not primarily because of special measures which facilitate the access of low-skilled strata to specialized and higher education, but chiefly because of the narrowing of the very foundations of the social pyramid, i.e., changes in the social structure of society. Inevitable and increasingly strong integrating tendencies constitute the basis upon which processes of social and national integration and unification will develop.

Notes

1) In the Tatar Republic, for example, only about 20% of the higher-level managerial personnel and specialists employed in the state sector (who are of peasant origin) began their work careers at collective farms, while almost all (more than 80%) of the low-skilled and unskilled workers first worked at collective farms.

2) According to data for the Tatar ASSR, only 12.5% of higher-level managerial personnel and 7.4% of middle-level managerial personnel began their work careers in positions of equivalent status, i.e., as specialists.

3) See also D. L. Konstantinovskii and V. N. Shubkin, "Personal Plans and Their Realization," Voprosy filosofii, 1970, No. 7.

4) The lagging quality of education in rural schools is mainly

*See the note to Table 6 for Arutiunian's method of assigning a rank to occupational positions.

accounted for by the comparatively poor quality of teachers. In 1967, for example, about 50% of the teachers in the 5th-11th grades of rural schools in the Almetevsk District had a higher education, while in urban schools the figure was 86%. Some years earlier the gap between rural and urban teachers' training was considerably greater.

5) The proportion of Russians in the country's population in 1959 was 56%, while the proportion of Russians among students was 61%. For Armenians the corresponding figures were 1.4% and 1.66%, while for Moldavians, on the other hand, they were 1.1% and 0.5%, and so on.