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John H. Goldthorpe

On economic development and social mobility*

ABSTRACT

The proposition that social mobility increases with economic development has been widely accepted. However, it is one that can be construed in a number of quite different ways, which call for different kinds of empirical test. The comparative mobility data used in most tests thus far made have been seriously defective. More recent research, based on data of greater reliability, suggests that the proposition in all its versions should be viewed with some scepticism.

It is a widely held belief among social scientists that economic development and social mobility are positively associated: the more economically developed a society, the higher the rates of social mobility that it will display. However, when this proposition is examined at least three difficulties arise.

(i) Taken as it stands, the proposition is excessively imprecise: both 'economic development' and 'social mobility' are terms which require a good deal of explication. For example, in the case of economic development, one can distinguish between different historical eras, analytical phases or overall models; and likewise, in the case of social mobility, between different types, aspects or components. When such explication has been carried out, what appeared at first sight to be a rather simple and straightforward proposition proves in fact to decompose into a whole range of alternative versions.

(ii) These different versions of the original proposition are not necessarily all consistent with, or supportive of, one another; and when, therefore, they come to be tested against relevant data, there can be no assumption that they will all stand or fall together. It is entirely possible that some will be supported while others are rejected. Thus, the validity or otherwise of the proposition that 'economic development and social mobility are positively associated' will depend, in the first place, on which version of the proposition it is that is being considered.

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(iii) Even supposing that some versions, at least, of the original proposition may be accepted as valid, they will not of course in themselves say anything about how the association between economic development and mobility is actually brought about. They can be no more than statements of empirical regularities which are capable of being given quite different theoretical interpretations. For example, the direction of causation may be seen as running from mobility to development, or from development to mobility, or again to mobility and development alike from some third factor or set of factors.

In what follows, I aim first of all to illustrate the above points by reference to some fairly well-known arguments in the sociological literature. I then turn directly to the question of the empirical validity of different versions of the claim that social mobility increases with economic development; and I suggest that a far more sceptical attitude is here called for than that which is usually displayed — especially by American authors. In particular, I seek to argue that most of the research which has up to now been specifically addressed to this proposition has been of doubtful value as a result of its severe methodological deficiencies. In the second part of the paper I put forward some ideas for a new methodological approach — which have to some extent already been implemented; and I discuss a number of recent research findings which point towards the need for an understanding of the relationship between economic development and social mobility significantly different from that which has been in the ascendancy over recent decades.

One of the most explicit arguments linking economic development and social mobility is that presented by Kingsley Davis.¹ In Davis's analysis, the association comes about because relatively high rates of social mobility — specifically or intergenerational occupational mobility — are a *precondition* for the development of a society from a pre-industrial to an industrial level. Davis sees this transition as requiring the breakdown of the pre-industrial social structure and culture, and increased mobility as being in this respect the essential agency — creating new opportunities, new motivations and new ideologies. However, if Davis thus makes his position clear concerning the direction of causality, his argument is in need of some amount of glossing in at least two other respects. First of all, it would seem that what Davis really wishes to claim (although he does not directly say so) is the existence of a 'threshold effect' — a level of mobility that must be achieved before development can 'take-off' — rather than a more continuous relationship between mobility and development which would still, for example, be in evidence among 'mature' industrial societies. And second, while Davis does not distinguish, as would now be usual, between absolute and relative mobility rates, the logic of his argument would seem to require that it should be taken as referring primarily to the latter: that is, to the underlying degree of

fluidity or openness or equality of opportunity that characterizes a society, and not simply to the amount of mobility which is *de facto* observable. In sum, then, one could express Davis's hypothesis as follows: industrial societies will be more fluid than ones less economically developed because a certain degree of fluidity has to be achieved before the process of industrialization can begin and be sustained.

A further argument on economic development and social mobility which has had very wide currency is that of Lipset and Zetterberg.² Like Davis, Lipset and Zetterberg concentrate on intergenerational occupational mobility and see this as increasing with industrialization. But, on examination, their argument proves to differ significantly from that of Davis in its actual content. To begin with, Lipset and Zetterberg do not regard high rates of social mobility as being a precondition for industrialization, but rather a *consequence* of this process having reached a relative advanced stage. Some kind of threshold effect again appears to be supposed; but what is claimed is not that a certain rate of mobility must prevail before industrialization can begin, but rather that, once a certain stage of industrialization has been attained, mobility rates will increase to a new historic level. High rates of social mobility are, in other words, to be regarded as a generic property of industrial societies. They are a concomitant of the inherent dynamism of the economies of these societies, which continuously transforms their occupational structures. Furthermore, Lipset and Zetterberg come closer than does Davis to making the distinction between absolute and relative mobility rates, and the emphasis that they place on structural change makes it clear that their argument again differs from Davis's in that it is on absolute rates that their interest centres. Lipset and Zetterberg recognize that levels of mobility and of equality of opportunity need not co-vary, and they do not actually claim that industrial societies are more fluid or open or offer a greater equality of opportunity than do pre-industrial ones: only that in industrial societies greater mobility between occupational levels will in fact be displayed in response to a far more rapidly changing *pattern* of opportunity.

A third argument which should be noted here is one of a yet more ambitious and comprehensive kind than either of those previously considered. It can be found in the work of institutional economists, such as Clark Kerr and his associates, and of economic historians, such as Landes, as well as in that of sociologists: for example, Blau and Duncan and Treiman.³ This argument sees economic development and social mobility as being positively associated not because one directly produces the other, but rather because in the modern period both have been promoted by, and are expressions of, the same fundamental reorientation in the values and normative standards guiding social action: in Weberian terms, the shift from traditionalism

to rationality; in Parsonian terms, that from particularism to universalism. It is this shift, it is claimed, which, on the one hand, is the ultimate source of the dynamism of industrial economies, and in turn then of the ceaseless generation of mobility through structural change; and which, on the other hand, further encourages mobility by transforming processes of social selection so as to give overriding importance to talent rather than to birth, to achievement rather than to ascription. What has then to be recognized about this argument is that it goes beyond those advanced by Davis and by Lipset and Zetterberg in two important ways. First, it does not postulate any kind of threshold effect, but rather an open-ended relationship between economic development and social mobility — which would, for example, be expected to prevail throughout the successive stages of industrialization and indeed into the post-industrial era. And secondly, the argument relates to absolute and to relative rates of mobility alike: as societies become more economically developed, higher rates of social mobility should be observed as a result of both more rapid structural change *and* the greater fluidity, or equality of mobility chances, that follows from more open selection procedures.

I should by now have said enough to illustrate my initial point, namely, that the proposition that social mobility increases with economic development is one which can be construed in a number of quite different ways. I turn next therefore to the question of how far the different possible versions of the proposition can claim empirical validity. The authors I have already referred to as arguing for a link of some kind between economic development and social mobility did not for the most part aim to produce systematic evidence in support of their hypotheses. On their own accounts, they either were attempting a quasi-deductive theoretical exercise or else were engaged in speculation which was prompted by, rather than rigorously tested against, empirical data. But, in the sequel, a good deal of effort has in fact been expended in trying to provide confirmation or disconfirmation of their arguments by investigators who have been able to draw on the results of new mobility inquiries and also to utilize various advances in analytical technique. However, the position that I wish to take in regard to this body of work is a disobliging one. I do not believe that it has provided a basis on which the issues that it addresses can now be decided; nor in fact that it has advanced our understanding of these issues to any appreciable extent.

The first attempts at systematic empirical testing were focused on the hypotheses put forward by Lipset and Zetterberg, and thus related to absolute mobility rates. The results produced were not encouraging. Using a basic sample of twelve nations, Miller and Bryce and Fox and Miller were unable to find any clear evidence of a positive association between economic development, as measured by per capita GNP, and rates of *upward* (i.e. manual to nonmanual)

occupational mobility between generations; and, furthermore, mobility in the reverse direction proved to be, if anything, *negatively* associated with GNP.⁴ Unless, therefore, it could be held that all countries in the sample were already some way past the 'threshold', the idea that at a certain stage in economic development a historic increase in mobility rates occurs had to be regarded as unsupported. In addition, these analyses reinforced those earlier presented by Miller in challenging the further suggestion of Lipset and Zetterberg that among relatively advanced industrial nations a *uniformly* high level of 'mass' mobility would prevail.⁵

Later work has tended to concentrate, though not exclusively, on the relationship between economic development and relative mobility rates. Thus, Cutright claimed to have produced evidence in favour of Davis's thesis in that, in a sample of 13 nations, the propensity for occupational inheritance net of structural effects was lower, the higher the level of economic development, as measured by energy consumption. Further, total, absolute mobility was found to rise with energy consumption, thus providing some grounds for a rehabilitation of the Lipset-Zetterberg argument.⁶ However, Hazelrigg and his collaborators were unable to corroborate Cutright's principal result. Working with a larger sample of 17 nations — and using the same national mobility data as Cutright in only one case (see Appendix) — they concluded in effect that economic development and social fluidity (or openness) were *not* associated; and furthermore, contrary to what would be expected from the arguments of Blau and Duncan and of Treiman, these later authors were chiefly impressed by the *similarities* in relative mobility rates — or in 'endogenous mobility regimes' — that persisted across nations at quite different levels of development.⁷ Then again, in a study based on a sample of twenty-four nations and using data-sets which only partially overlap with those of Hazelrigg and his colleagues (see Appendix), Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge present findings which have, they believe, yet other implications. They report a positive correlation between relative mobility rates and economic development as measured by per capita GNP, but present further analyses which suggest that this is a largely spurious effect: when appropriate controls are introduced, they argue, social fluidity appears to increase not with the level of economic development, but rather with the degree of economic and social equality that a nation has attained.⁸

Other results of comparative studies of *prima facie* relevance could here be cited but not ones, I believe, that would serve to make the picture any clearer.⁹ I have, therefore, to regard as excessively brave the assessment offered by a recent American author, Albert A. Simkus. After surveying the literature in question, Simkus avers that

while this series of cross-national studies has tested only the

grossest implications of the industrialization-mobility arguments, and while the data involved such problems of comparability that the parameters are undoubtedly imprecise, the general conclusions reached have been consistent. Total mobility, upward mobility, total circulation, and openness between the nonmanual and manual strata all seem to be positively associated with indicators of industrialization and economic development.¹⁰

To the contrary, I would wish to maintain that the results produced should be described not as 'consistent' but, rather, as confused and uncertain. Moreover, while this can in part be explained in terms of differing approaches to the specification and testing of hypotheses, it is also, I would argue, the outcome of methodological problems which are not simply ones likely to reduce the precision of the parameters that are estimated but, rather, ones which mean that these parameters can have little claim to credibility at all.

In the papers that I have referred to, and in others of the same *genre*, there is invariably a passage in which methodological problems and, in particular, problems of the comparability of cross-national data are discussed and acknowledged to be grave. But then, this ritual having been completed, the analysis of the data goes ahead, even if with a variety of *caveats*. The possibility that seems not to be contemplated, however, is that the degree of unreliability in the data is such that analyses should simply *not* be undertaken; that rather than such analyses being of some value as 'preliminary' studies, which may subsequently be improved upon, they are in fact no more likely to have some approximate validity than they are to give results that point in entirely the wrong direction.

In the ritual passages on methodology which I have mentioned, a good deal is usually said about the difficulties that arise of achieving cross-national comparability in such respects as the timing of inquiries, population definitions, sample design, questionnaire wording, and quality of fieldwork and data preparation; and no one at all familiar with the data in question would wish to minimize the problems that are here involved.¹¹ But there is one further source of unreliability in the comparative analyses under review which appears to have been quite inadequately appreciated, and which would in itself be sufficient to make one doubt if anything of substantive value can be expected from them. I refer to the coding and categorization of occupational and related information.

The problem here is typically seen as resulting from the fact that in different national mobility inquiries, different occupational — or associated class or status — categorizations have been used which, if taken in their full detail, are not commensurate. And the 'solution' which has then been typically adopted has been to collapse the categories of the different national inquiries until some 'lowest

common denominator' is reached: that is, in effect, either a simple twofold, nonmanual/manual (or white-collar/blue-collar) division or, at best, a threefold, nonmanual/manual/farm one. But it may be questioned if this is any solution at all. For what is produced in this way is a purely *nominal* comparability, without any assurance, or even indication, of the degree of real comparability that has been attained: that is, of the degree to which the two or three categories that are distinguished are comparable in their actual content — in the actual occupations that they comprise. Moreover, there are good grounds for suspecting that the degree of real comparability could be quite unacceptably low. The nonmanual/manual division, in particular, is one that can be interpreted in widely differing ways. Consider, for example, such groupings as foremen and supervisors, junior technicians, lower-grade service workers, self-employed artisans and small working proprietors. A quite plausible case can be made out for treating them (within the constraints imposed by a twofold schema) as either nonmanual or manual. Consequently, then, it is not surprising to find — as is documented in the Appendix to this paper — that in the collapses of different national categorizations that have been made, these various groupings end up sometimes on one side of the division and sometimes on the other, or in other cases still are split between the nonmanual and manual categories. Now if these groupings were numerically quite small, the difficulty that arises here could be regarded in turn as being only a minor one: as one, indeed, which might reduce the precision of the results of quantitative analyses but which would not destroy their credibility altogether. However, the groupings in question are *not* numerically small: in fact, taken together, they may be estimated to account for *a fifth to a quarter* of the total workforce of the majority of the societies for which nationally-based mobility data are available — the exceptions being mainly eastern European ones in which the numbers of self-employed workers are low. Consequently, when mobility tables are formed for comparative purposes by the collapsing of categories in the way described, it can be taken that underneath the apparent, nominal, comparability of the nonmanual/manual/farm division, a large measure of real non-comparability persists. And certainly the variation in mobility rates and patterns from this source alone could well be of a similar magnitude to any genuine differences that one might expect to discover on the basis of tables of an acceptably comparable kind.¹² In such circumstances, I would argue, analysis of the data becomes problematic, in that it may just as well mislead as enlighten. Thus, however tempting it may be to acknowledge the difficulties that exist and then press on regardless, self-denial would seem to mark the true path of sociological wisdom.¹³

If, then, the comparative analyses in question do suffer from the crippling methodological deficiency that I have indicated, what is the

alternative to them, given that we still wish to bring hypotheses on the relationship between economic development and social mobility to some kind of empirical test? I would argue as follows. The first requirement of a satisfactory alternative approach is that it should take problems of the comparability of data seriously. In turn, then, this must mean abandoning what has hitherto been the standard practice of basing comparative mobility research on the published, or otherwise pre-existing, results from national inquiries. Instead, such research should be based on tables that are derived *from the secondary analysis of the original data sets of these inquiries*. That is to say, rather than comparative analysts being content with obtaining merely nominal comparability in occupational — or other — categorizations by the collapsing of categories specific to different inquiries, they must seek to achieve some acceptable degree of real comparability by going back to the data of national inquiries in their ‘unit record’ form and recoding these data to categories that they themselves have devised with their own comparative purposes in mind. These categories need not then be restricted to the very crude ones which are produced by collapsing. Such an approach does not, of course, guarantee that all problems of comparability will be overcome. But it does enable such problems to be tackled far more effectively than before; and, I would suggest, it is *only* if it is adopted that any grounds can exist for claiming that comparative work may, despite its unavoidable imperfections, still be of at least some ‘preliminary’ value.¹⁴

The feasibility of such secondary analysis has been demonstrated in a comparative study of class mobility in England, Sweden and France;¹⁵ and the secondary analysis of mobility (and related) data from a dozen or so national inquiries now forms the basis of the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) project currently in progress at the University of Mannheim.¹⁶ Moreover, there are indications that the number of students of comparative mobility who are persuaded of the necessity of secondary analysis is steadily growing.¹⁷ I will shortly turn to the kinds of result that are emerging from this alternative approach; but first, it is important to note some of its disadvantages or at least costs and limitations.

To begin with, it is extremely time-consuming and hence expensive. The task of recoding detailed occupational and related information is not only one which can be technically very tiresome but one which calls for a great deal of painstaking effort in order to understand both the original coding systems *and* the occupational structures to which they are intended to relate. Furthermore, not all national mobility inquiries will prove suitable for inclusion in a programme of secondary analysis. For example, the data required by the categories that have been constructed for comparative purposes may not be available, or may not be recodable even at unit-record level; or again

the codebooks and other documentation of some inquiries may simply not exist, or at least not in any publicly usable form. On account, therefore, of problems of either expense or suitability, some rather sharp restriction is in practice likely to fall on the number of national cases that can be included in a comparative mobility study based on secondary analysis. Thus, even in the rather generously endowed CASMIN-project, it will not be possible to match the sample sizes of twenty-plus countries which have been attained in the more recent comparative mobility studies based on already published data. Finally, then, implications also follow for the style of comparative work that may be essayed. In particular, with only small numbers of cases, it would seem questionable to proceed by taking nations as the units of analysis in multivariate statistical exercises of the kind which, for example, have thus far been standard in attempts at testing hypotheses on economic development and mobility. Despite the advantages of this approach in principle, other strategies would appear likely to be needed in practice: ones in which inferences may have to be more indirect but in which, on the other hand, the evidential basis from which they start is both more refined and more secure.

What, then, are the main findings that have thus far been obtained from comparative mobility research which is based on secondary analysis; and what is their significance for the different versions of the claim that increasing social mobility is associated with economic development? Since in the earlier literature the focus has been on the intergenerational mobility of males, this same focus will be retained in what follows. It may, however, be remarked that in more recent work far more attention is given than previously to mobility viewed in intragenerational or worklife perspective and to the occupational and marital mobility of women.¹⁸ For present purposes, there are three sets of findings which seem to me of greatest importance, and these I shall treat in turn.

First of all, it has been discovered that, in whatever conceptual context mobility is studied — a class structure, a status hierarchy etc. — relative rates are far less variable than absolute ones, both cross-nationally and over time, and indeed display a rather remarkable degree of constancy. Featherman, Jones and Hauser have suggested a reformulation of the Lipset-Zetterberg thesis, which claims a basic similarity in absolute mobility rates among industrialized societies, so that what would instead be hypothesized is a basic similarity in relative rates — or in patterns of social fluidity — *among all societies with market economies and nuclear family systems*.¹⁹ And this reformulation can at all events be said to accord better than the original thesis with the empirical results that are currently available. What is then of major interest in the present context is that in so far as Featherman, Jones and Hauser are correct, their argument must contradict that

which sees social fluidity as *increasing with* economic development. It has, though, to be acknowledged that, up to now, the evidence of a large commonality in patterns of social fluidity has been confined to societies which are all of a highly advanced kind — the USA, Australia, Canada, the UK, France and Sweden;²⁰ and it would thus be necessary to show that the basic similarity in relative rates extends also to less advanced nations before cross-national comparisons could create really serious problems for the claim that economic development and social fluidity are positively associated.

However, such problems would appear to arise from the discovery that, from nation to nation, relative rates show considerable stability over time. It is true that one would again need more results from societies in the early stages of development in order to test Davis's argument that relatively high fluidity is a precondition for take-off into industrialism. But more ambitious and comprehensive arguments of the kind put forward by Kerr, Landes, Blau and Duncan or Treiman must surely be called into question by such findings as the following: (i) that in many advanced societies, relative mobility rates appear not to have changed at all substantially over recent decades and, in some cases, not for half a century or more; (ii) that in cases where movements towards greater fluidity can be detected, these are not only slight but also seem more often episodic than continuous; and (iii) that instances may occur of the trend of change in relative rates being, if anything, in the direction of *reduced* fluidity.²¹

Where those theorists who have expected a steady increase in fluidity have gone wrong, one might suggest, is in their overestimation of the functional need for 'rationality' in the selection processes of modern industrial societies, and in their underestimation of the resistance to a genuine equality of opportunity that can be, and frequently is, presented by more privileged groups and strata. In particular, it appears not to have been appreciated that while in the course of economic development education may well become increasingly important as a *channel* of mobility (and, perhaps within the context of an increasing total volume of mobility), this still does not mean that the expansion of educational provision or a greater reliance on educational attainment in social selection will in themselves serve as agencies through which greater social fluidity is created.

Given, then, that relative mobility rates show only rather limited variability, across nations and over time, it must follow that if total mobility, as measured by absolute rates, does increase with economic development, this must be largely the result of structural effects. However, as several authors have observed, such effects are exerted in different ways.²² Most obviously, intergenerational mobility is created to the extent that, between generations, change occurs in the 'shape' of the structure within which mobility is being observed — whether this is the occupational structure, the class structure or whatever. But,

in addition, mobility rates will also be affected by the shape that this structure has at any one time. Different components of the structure — occupational groupings, classes, etc. — may be assumed to have different inherent propensities for immobility (or for types of mobility),²³ and thus total mobility will in part reflect the relative sizes of these components. That is to say, other things being equal, mobility will be greater, the smaller those groupings or classes with a high propensity for immobility and the larger those with a low propensity. In considering structural effects on total, absolute mobility, we may therefore usefully distinguish between what may be termed ‘shift’ (or ‘discrepancy’) effects, on the one hand, and ‘compositional’ effects, on the other.²⁴ The second and third sets of recent findings to which I wish to refer pertain to structural effects of these two different kinds.

As regards shift effects, it is of course beyond question that they are often generated by economic development and are in turn often the major source of observed increases in absolute mobility rates. However, what does at the same time emerge from recent research is that even among societies at comparable levels of economic development, the importance of shift effects in producing mobility can vary widely. For instance, the difference between the occupational or class distribution of a sample of the French population in the early 1970s and the distribution of their fathers would be much wider than the same difference in the case of a British sample. Or again, present-day Norway or Sweden would display a greater intergenerational difference — and hence a larger shift effect — than would Denmark.²⁵ The extent of the discrepancy that exists between the distributions of the two generations will of course be chiefly a function of the rate of structural change over the decades immediately prior to the time at which mobility is investigated. But what should be noted is that there are no grounds for supposing *either* that shift effects on mobility will steadily increase with economic development *or* that their importance will be closely correlated in the short- or medium-term with prevailing rates of economic growth as measured by, say, GNP per capita.

For example, economic and social historians would now seriously question whether the period of ‘industrial revolution’ — or, of ‘take-off’ into industrialism — in western nations was at the same time one of rapid change in their occupational and class structures and, for this reason, one of sharply rising rates of mobility.²⁶ Or again, to concentrate for a moment on the British case, it is of interest to find that while the first four decades of the twentieth century saw of course a considerable amount of economic growth, in the study of mobility directed by Glass in 1949 — and which therefore looks back over this period — *no* major shift effects are present: the distribution of sons by occupational status level proves to be much the same as that of their fathers, a result broadly consistent with the relevant Census data. The

further period of sustained growth from the 1940s through to the early 1970s *was* accompanied by major changes in the occupational and class structures and, in turn, by strong shift effects on mobility. But then, over the last ten years, in which economic growth in Britain has been slight, such structural effects on mobility have remained prominent — in large part as a consequence of ‘de-industrialization’.²⁷

If, then, it is accepted that shift effects on mobility do not have any simple or straightforward relationship with economic development, difficulties are indicated both for the Lipset-Zetterberg hypothesis of a structurally determined threshold in the course of this development, at which mobility rates reach a new historic high; and also for the apparent supposition of Blau and Duncan and others of a steadily increasing rate of structural transformation in societies that are dominated by the values of universalistic rationalism. It would, rather, seem necessary to recognize that even in advanced industrial or post-industrial societies, structural changes of a kind capable of creating significant shift effects in observed mobility patterns will occur at *fluctuating* rates — periods of rapid transformation being interspersed with ones of at least relative stasis.

Among American students of mobility, especially, too great an influence, one may suggest, has been exerted by either social-evolutionary theories implying unilinear modernization or convergent industrialism, or by purely economic theories of sectoral development, such as those of Clark or Kuznets. Thus, the impact on occupational and class structural change of the supposed exigencies of technological and economic rationality has been overestimated, while insufficient weight has been given to the large variations in the speed, rhythm and phasing of such change which can derive from other factors — in particular, from the international political economy and, domestically, from direct governmental intervention.

To take the most obvious example, it is certainly the case that in the course of economic development the agricultural sector, and in turn agricultural occupations and agricultural classes, show a long-run tendency to decline. But it is no less clear that the actual pattern of this decline and of its association with other structural changes — for instance, with the growth of the services sector — has varied widely across nations, and that prominent among the causes of this variation are international trading relations and the presence or absence of policies of agricultural protectionism. It is, then, for this reason that if, say, one seeks to explain differences apparent in the observed rates of occupational or class mobility in contemporary British and French society, to which differences in the timing and speed of the contraction of agriculture still clearly contribute a great deal, two essential starting points will be the following: in the British case, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the eventual devastation of British agriculture in the face of competition from first eastern Europe and

then the USA; and, in the French case, the steady rise of agricultural protectionism from the 1880s onwards, culminating in the Méline tariff law of 1892.²⁸

As regards, next, the compositional effect of structural change, it should be noted that these have in fact received little more than passing mention from authors who have represented structural change as a major process linking economic development and rising mobility.²⁹ This may be judged somewhat ironic, in that if there are any ways in which it could be said that structural change, following directly from economic development, *has* worked quite regularly and consistently to increase mobility, it is through compositional effects. Where in recent mobility research investigation has been made into the inherent propensity for immobility associated with different occupational groupings or classes, a quite universal finding has been that by far the highest such propensity — in the sense of the strongest tendency towards intergenerational stability net of shift effects — is located among agricultural proprietors.³⁰ Consequently, the secular decline in agriculture that accompanies economic development — with whatever tempo or phasing it occurs — must serve to push up observed, absolute mobility rates, even though relative rates remain unaltered. That peasants and farmers etc. should display this high propensity for immobility is not difficult to understand, since in their case the clear possibility exists for ‘occupational inheritance’ in a strict sense: that is, *via* the actual handing on of property in production from one generation to the next. By this same argument, then, one would also expect to find relatively high propensities for immobility associated with other kinds of proprietorship, even where property is of a less ‘fixed’ kind — for example, among the small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, etc. who constitute the urban petty bourgeoisie. And indeed, this expectation is largely borne out by the relevant research. Hence, in so far as petty-bourgeois groupings have also diminished in their relative size in the course of economic development, an increase in mobility will again have been promoted.

However, in the same way as with the shift effects of structural change, one must caution against any supposition that compositional effects, when taken overall, will work always and continuously in favour of greater mobility. To begin with, it is evident that in the more advanced industrial societies the contraction of the agricultural sector has by now reached a stage at which its remaining quantitative importance is quite slight, so that the compositional effect on total mobility of any further reduction in the number of agricultural proprietors will be close to negligible. And again, as regards the urban petty bourgeoisie, it must be recognized that the declining trend which could be observed in most western nations up to the middle decades of the twentieth century would appear now to have slowed, or even in some cases to have been reversed, in the context of the

radically changed political economy of the west since the early 1970s.³¹ Further still, one must in this connection take note of a powerful trend within modern industrialism — or post-industrialism — which will produce compositional effects that are likely, if anything, to *depress* observed mobility rates: that is, the steady growth of salaried professional, administrative and managerial groupings or of what I would term the service class. For there is again fairly consistent evidence that the higher echelons at least of this expanding salariat constitute another area of the class structure within which a high propensity for intergenerational immobility prevails. In this case, the underlying process is the transmission not of property in production but rather of ‘cultural capital’ — backed, perhaps, by exclusionary strategies of ‘credentialism’; and while inheritance cannot in this way be achieved with the same certainty as where capital in the more conventional sense is handed on, it would none the less appear that the relative chances of intergenerational succession can still be maintained at a high level.³²

The main points of the argument that I have advanced in this paper may, then, be recapitulated as follows:

(i) The general proposition that a positive association exists between economic development and social mobility has received wide support among social scientists; however, it is one which, on inspection, proves to decompose into a number of different and quite separate hypotheses.

(ii) The attempts that have been made at testing these hypotheses empirically have, until recently, tended to produce inconsistent and confused results — an outcome which would appear in some large part attributable to the fact that a satisfactory standard of cross-national comparability has not been achieved in the mobility data utilized (although other potential sources of inconsistency and confusion can certainly be identified).

(iii) A new approach to the problem is then called for — and is in fact already under way — which gives prime importance to the problem of the comparability of data, and which seeks to overcome this problem through the recoding of the original data of national mobility inquiries to categories specifically devised for comparative purposes.

(iv) This new approach has its own difficulties, especially ones of a practical kind, which are likely to mean that studies based on it will be restricted to a smaller number of countries than have been covered in earlier investigations, with consequences for the styles of comparative analysis that may be appropriately essayed. None the less, from work already undertaken, findings have emerged which provide a sounder evidential basis than has previously been available for examining the

different versions of the claim that in the course of economic development an increase in social mobility occurs.

(v) In whatever version it is presented, this claim does not in fact fare very well in the light of the new evidence. On the one hand, analyses that have concentrated on relative mobility rates — or, in other words, on levels and patterns of social fluidity — have revealed a high degree of both temporal and cross-national stability, suggesting therefore that a broad commonality in such rates may prevail over a wide range of societies at differing levels of economic development. And shifts towards a greater fluidity that are detectable may not be continuous. On the other hand, where attention has been turned to structural effects — as evidently the major source of variation in absolute mobility rates — two conclusions have been widely reached: that while structural effects may well represent the most important way in which economic development does exert an influence on the level and pattern of mobility, there are no grounds for supposing that this influence must serve to increase mobility in any systematic or constant fashion; and that, in any event, economic development is only one of several sources from which structural effects on mobility derive.

To end with, then, one further question may be raised. In view of the generally negative implications of the findings that have been reviewed for hypotheses linking mobility to economic development, are we in fact being forced back to the apparent antinomianism that was displayed in regard to long-run trends in mobility by Pitirim Sorokin in his classic text of 1927? In arguing against current ideas of a ‘perpetual trend’ towards increasing mobility — ideas which may be reckoned as the intellectual forerunners of those examined in this paper — Sorokin suggested that while belief in them was encouraged by ‘the dynamism of our epoch’, they had in fact no very sound theoretical or empirical basis. Their supporters focused attention on barriers to mobility that were declining but failed to recognize the new ones that were being raised in their place; and they assumed, rather than demonstrated, that pre-modern societies were generally characterized by high immobility. Historically, Sorokin contended, no evidence was to be found of any consistent, directional movement in mobility rates of any kind — only evidence of continuous ‘trendless’ change; and, sociologically, no good grounds existed for supposing that this state of affairs should alter.³³

In his rejection in principle of theories of mobility trends of an evolutionary or otherwise historicist cast, Sorokin is, in my view, entirely correct.³⁴ And his remarks on the dangers of being carried away by the dynamism of a particular epoch seem especially apt in regard to theories of modernization and industrialism of American provenance which were rather evidently inspired by the years of the long boom and of American hegemony in the west after the Second

World War. However, this is not to say that mobility trends can only be treated as a matter of what ‘history shows’, and are not amenable to *any* theoretically-grounded understanding. The implication is rather that what, as sociologists, we should aim to do — and here exponents of the ‘new economic history’ give a valuable lead — is to develop and apply theory so as to *illuminate* the historical record, instead of engaging in vain attempts to transcend it.

If we accept such a goal, then so far as the better understanding of long-run mobility trends is concerned, there are, in my view, two rather obvious tasks that stand directly before us. The first is that which was pointed to by Hauser and his associates in the pioneering paper in which they revealed the temporal constancy of relative mobility rates in twentieth-century American society. Sociologists, they noted, have long recognized that structural factors importantly affect mobility patterns, but, in comparative work especially, they have often regarded such effects as merely a nuisance factor to be controlled and set aside. However, if it is the case that major change and variation in observed, absolute mobility rates are unlikely to derive from the underlying pattern of relative rates, it then follows that the attempt to comprehend the sources of structural transformations — in economic development *and* in other processes — must take on a new centrality in comparative mobility research.³⁵ Since Hauser and his colleagues wrote, interest in this issue has undoubtedly increased, and some promising work is in train;³⁶ none the less, the matter must still be regarded as outstanding business on the research agenda. The second task is yet more obvious. It is, of course, to arrive at some understanding of the constancies and commonalities that relative mobility rates display, and also of how it comes about that these may at certain times and places be disrupted. Here too some preliminary efforts have been made — at possible descriptions of ‘constant’ or ‘common’ patterns of social fluidity, and at developing conceptual and analytical strategies for further inquiry.³⁷ But, again, all the real work remains to be done.

The tasks in question are not, then, easy ones. But they are, one would hope, attractive: they are relatively well-defined and, if accomplished, they promise a high sociological yield. And, as compared with attempts to capture the relationship between economic development and social mobility within simple unilinear formulae, they must surely constitute what philosophers of science would call a ‘progressive problem shift’.

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APPENDIX

The Implementation of the Nonmanual/Manual Division in Comparative Mobility Studies

As noted in the text, where comparative studies of social mobility have relied on the published results of national inquiries, the diversity of the detailed occupational and related categories used in these inquiries has required that cross-national analyses should be based on a radical collapsing of categories to those simply of nonmanual/manual or, at best, nonmanual/manual/farm. However, in this way only a nominal comparability is achieved: there is no assurance that such collapsing will produce an acceptable degree of real comparability. Furthermore, the strong likelihood that, in the case of the nonmanual/manual division, it actually fails to do so is capable of demonstration.

Table I indicates the nations covered and the data sources utilized in the three cross-national mobility studies which were referred to in the text, and which in fact represent the main successive advances in constituting comparative data sets from published material. Taken together, the three studies draw on 35 different sources, a number of which are rather obscure or not easily accessible. For present purposes, it has proved possible to examine 27 of the 35, which account between them for 44 out of the total of 54 references given in Table I. From this examination the following points emerge.

TABLE I: *Nations covered and data sources utilized in three cross-national mobility studies*¹

Nation	Study		
	Cutright	Hazelrigg & Garnier	Tyree <i>et al.</i>
Data sources utilized			
Denmark	Svalastoga	Allardt & Uusitalo	Svalastoga
England & Wales	Glass/Miller	—	Glass/Miller
Finland	Miller	Allardt & Uusitalo	—
France	Desabie	INSEE ('64)	INSEE ('64)
Hungary	Baum & Ypsilantis/Miller	Andorka ('62-4)	Andorka ('62-4)
Italy	Lopreato	Lopreato & Hazelrigg	Lopreato & Hazelrigg
Japan	Nishira	Tominaga	Nishira

TABLE I/contd.

Nation	Study		
	Cutright	Hazelrigg & Garnier	Tyree <i>et al.</i>
Data sources utilized			
Netherlands	van Tulder	—	van Tulder
Norway	Rokkan/ Miller	Allardt & Uusitalo	Rokkan/ Miller
Sweden	Carlsson	Allardt & Uusitalo	Carlsson
USA	Bureau of Census ('62)	Blau & Duncan	Blau & Duncan
West Germany	DIVO/ Janowitz	Kleining	Kleining
Yugoslavia	Milić	IISR	Milić
Australia		Broom & Jones	Broom & Jones
Belgium		Delruelle	Delruelle
Bulgaria		Atanasov & Mashiak	—
Malaysia (West)		Hirschmann	—
Philippines		Bacol	Bacol
Spain		FOESSA	FOESSA
Brazil (Sao Paolo)			Hutchinson
Canada			McRoberts <i>et al.</i>
Chile (Santiago)			Raczynski
Colombia (Bogotá)			Simmons
Israel			Matras & Weintraub
Mexico (Mexico City)			Kahl
Puerto Rico (territorial)			Miller
Poland (three cities)			Zagorski

¹ For full details of sources, see the studies by Cutright, Hazelrigg and Garnier, and Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge, cited in notes 6, 7 and 8.

(i) In one or two instances, the collapsing supposedly undertaken would seem scarcely possible in principle as a means of achieving comparability, since the original coding did not actually incorporate a distinction between nonmanual and manual occupations or did not do so consistently. For example, in the Finnish data presented by Miller and used by Cutright, the categorization of fathers is in terms of *their*

sons' perceptions of their class — as 'white-collar, working-class or farmer'; and in the Yugoslavian data of Milić, used by Cutright and by Tyree *et al.*, data on respondents' social origins and on their present position were apparently not categorized in commensurable ways.

(ii) Although it is usually the case that the published reports on national mobility inquiries do themselves utilize the nonmanual/manual division, these reports quite frequently fail to supply any clear or detailed information on how this division was actually understood and operationalized. This means, therefore, that often when the authors of comparative studies have collapsed the original categories of national inquiries to this division, they have — quite literally — not known what they have been doing, *and could not have known* (with the possible exceptions of the one or two instances in which personal communications with individuals associated with the original inquiries are reported).

(iii) In the case of those national inquiries where it is possible to obtain a reasonable amount of information on how the nonmanual and manual categories were formed — that is, on their more detailed occupational content — it turns out, not very surprisingly, that this content differs considerably from one inquiry to another. In the text, five occupational groupings were noted as ones which could well be regarded as either nonmanual or manual, given that they had to be allocated to one or other of these categories. These were: (1) foremen and other supervisors — especially of manual workers; (2) junior technicians — e.g. laboratory assistants, samplers and testers, design assistants and tracers, telecommunication maintenance and repair men; (3) lower-grade service workers — e.g. caretakers, shop hands, waiters, various kinds of attendants, collectors etc; (4) self-employed artisans; and (5) small working proprietors — e.g. shopkeepers, garage and cafe proprietors, owner-drivers of taxis, lorries etc. In Table II an attempt is made to show how in 16 of the better-documented national mobility inquiries these occupational groupings were treated as regards the nonmanual/manual division. It can at once be seen that no unanimity exists and, indeed, that only in the case of one grouping, small proprietors, does a majority view emerge — i.e. to the effect that they should be categorized as nonmanual. Furthermore, variation seems just about as marked between different studies carried out in the same country — or between different analyses of the same data — as it is among studies carried out in different countries. In other words, then, where information *is* available on how the nonmanual/manual division is implemented in particular national inquiries, it serves only to underline the need, so far as comparative work is concerned, for recategorization aimed at establishing some common pattern. And since, as was emphasized in the text, the occupational groupings of Table II are not ones of

TABLE II: *Allocation in various national mobility studies of (1) foremen and supervisors (2) junior technicians (3) lower-grade service workers (4) self-employed artisans and (5) small proprietors according to the nonmanual/manual division (?NM or ?M = probably NM or M; X = split; ? = unclear)*

Study	1	2	3	4	5	Other sources used
Australia (Broom & Jones)	M	?	M	?M	NM	
Belgium (Delruelle)	?	NM	X	NM	NM	
Denmark (Svalastoga)	NM	NM	?M	M	X	
(Allardt & Uusitalo)	NM	NM	X	NM	NM	
England & Wales (Glass/Miller)	X	NM	NM	?	NM	Oppenheim ¹
France (Desabie)	M	?	?NM	NM	NM	
(INSEE)	M	X	X	M	NM	Garnier & Hazelrigg ²
Italy (Lopreato)	M	?M	M	M	M	
(Lopreato & Hazelrigg)	M	?M	M	NM	NM	
Netherlands (van Tulder)	?M	?M	M	M	M	Miller ³
Norway (Allardt & Uusitalo)	NM	NM	X	NM	NM	
Sweden (Carlsson)	NM	NM	NM	M	NM	
(Allardt & Uusitalo)	NM	NM	X	NM	NM	
USA (Blau & Duncan)	M	NM	X	M	NM	
West Germany (DIVO/Janowitz)	M	?M	NM	NM	NM	
(Kleining)	NM	?	X	NM	NM	

¹ A. N. Oppenheim, *Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement*, London, Heinemann, 1966.

² Maurice Garnier and Lawrence Hazelrigg, 'La mobilité professionnelle en France comparée à celle d'autres pays', *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 15, 1974.

³ S. M. Miller, 'Comparative Social Mobility', *Current Sociology*, vol. 9, 1960.

negligible size, it is clear that the three cross-national studies considered, in simply taking over the nonmanual/manual divisions of their source inquiries, have failed to compare like with like to a serious extent.

In sum, it would seem reasonable to maintain the following: that if across the various national inquiries referred to in Table I, the allocation of occupational groupings to the categories of nonmanual and manual, whether documented or not, had been different to what it was (while still, as the largely arbitrary nature of the exercise would allow, being no less defensible) the results of the comparative analyses reported by Cutright, Hazelrigg and Garnier or Tyree *et al.* could in turn have been different to what they were and, perhaps, quite substantially so. And if this point is accepted, what must then follow is that *pro tanto* these results have themselves to be regarded as arbitrary or indeed as aleatory. The actual degree to which this is so cannot be precisely determined. But this does not alter the fact that good prudential grounds exist for questioning even the 'preliminary' validity that these studies would claim.

NOTES

* An early version of this paper formed the basis of a lecture given in the Department of Sociology of the University of Helsinki in October, 1984. Erik Allardt, Seppo Pöntinen and Hanno Uusitalo provided helpful discussion and information. A later version of the paper benefited from comments by Robert M. Hauser.

1. Kingsley Davis, 'The Role of Class Mobility in Economic Development', *Population Review*, vol. 6, 1962.

2. S. M. Lipset and Hans L. Zetterberg, 'A Theory of Social Mobility', *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, vol. 3, London, International Sociological Association, 1956, and 'Social Mobility in Industrial Societies' in Lipset and Reinhard Bendix (eds), *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959. Cf. also Lipset, 'Social Mobility in Comparative Perspective', Stanford University, 1983.

3. Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960; David Landes, *The Unbound*

Prometheus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972; P. M. Blau and O. D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, New York, Wiley, 1967; Donald J. Treiman, 'Industrialisation and Social Stratification' in E. O. Laumann (ed.), *Social Stratification: Research and Theory for the 1970s*, Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill, 1970.

4. S. M. Miller and H. J. Bryce, 'Social Mobility and Economic Growth and Structure', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 13, 1961; Thomas G. Fox and S. M. Miller, 'Economic, Political and Social Determinants of Mobility', *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 9, 1965, and 'Occupational Stratification and Mobility: Inter-Country Variations' in R. Merritt and S. Rokkan (eds), *Comparing Nations*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.

5. S. M. Miller, 'Comparative Social Mobility', *Current Sociology*, vol. 9, 1960.

6. Phillips Cutright, 'Occupational Inheritance: a Cross-National Analysis', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 72, 1968.

7. Lawrence M. Hazelrigg and Maurice Garnier, 'Occupational Mobility in Industrial Societies', *American Sociological*

Review, vol. 41, 1976; Melissa Hardy and Hazelrigg, 'Industrialisation and the Circulatory Rate of Mobility', *Sociological Focus*, vol. 11, 1978.

8. Andrea Tyree, Moshe Semyonov and Robert W. Hodge, 'Gaps and Glissandos: Inequality, Economic Development, and Social Mobility in 24 Countries', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 44, 1979. But see also the critique of this paper in William L. Urton, 'Mobility and Economic Development Revisited', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 44, 1981.

9. For example, the data-set assembled by Hazelrigg and Garnier (but minus Bulgaria — see n. 11 below) has been reanalysed by McClendon and by Grusky and Hauser. But these authors then disagree on the major issue of whether cross-national variation in relative mobility rates is substantial (McClendon) or rather slight (Grusky and Hauser). Since the data are in this case the same, the source of the difference must lie in the way in which the analysis has been undertaken. Grusky and Hauser's criticisms of the model applied by McClendon are cogent. See McKee J. McClendon 'Structural and Exchange Components of Occupational Mobility: a Cross-National Analysis', *Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 21, 1980; and David B. Grusky and Robert M. Hauser, 'Comparative Social Mobility Revisited: Models of Convergence and Divergence in 16 Countries', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, 1984.

10. Albert A. Simkus, 'Comparative Stratification and Mobility', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 22, 1981, p. 225.

11. For example, it may be noted that the Bulgarian data utilized by Hazelrigg and Garnier refer to both men and women (while all the other inquiries on which they draw are limited to men); and that six of the inquiries utilized by Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge (those carried out in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Puerto Rico and Poland) differed from the rest in not being based on national samples (see Appendix, Table I).

12. In a further critical comment on the work of Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge,

Raftery notes several errors that these authors make in collapsing tables from their source inquiries. One such error is claimed in the case of the Hungarian data where 'office attendants', who are treated as manual in the original inquiry, are categorized by Tyree *et al.* as non-manual. Whether this is 'implausible', as Raftery suggests, or even in fact an error, could be disputed; but the important point for present purposes is that if 'office attendants' are restored to the manual category, then, as Raftery shows, a not entirely negligible change occurs in the measure of relative mobility that Tyree *et al.* employ. And 'office attendants' represent only 2.2 per cent of the sons and 1.2 per cent of the fathers in the Hungarian sample. See Adrian E. Raftery, 'Comment on "Gaps and Glissandos. . ."', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, 1983.

13. I should perhaps make it clear that I am here referring to analysis that has primarily *substantive* concerns. It is of course entirely possible that the data-sets which I regard as being of very doubtful value could be used as, so to speak, test-beds for promising new analytical models and techniques: cf. Grusky and Hauser, 'Comparative Social Mobility Revisited'. Again, there is nothing to prevent analyses of the data in question from being associated with the presentation of stimulating theoretical conjectures: for example, that of Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge on the relationship between inequalities of opportunity and inequalities of condition — or Grusky and Hauser's directly contrary speculation. But at the same time, of course, it should be said that such methodological or theoretical contributions could in principle be made quite independently of the data.

14. I am, of course, leaving out of account here the ideal possibility of cross-national mobility data that have been collected through a single cross-national inquiry. The only approximation to this ideal of which I am aware is the study by Pöntinen of social mobility in the Scandinavian nations. But even in this case the data come from an inquiry (the Scandinavian Welfare Survey, 1972) which was not planned specifically for the study of mobility and the sample

sizes are rather small. See Seppo Pöntinen, *Social Mobility and Social Structure: A Comparison of Scandinavian Countries*, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1983. The practical obstacles in the way of cross-national studies designed primarily to investigate mobility rates and patterns are, in my view, likely to remain insuperable for the foreseeable future.

15. See Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne Portocarero, 'Intergenerational Class Mobility in Three Western European Societies', 'Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations' and 'Intergenerational Mobility and the Convergence Thesis', *British Journal of Sociology*, vols 30, 33 and 34, 1979, 1982 and 1983.

16. The Working Papers of the CASMIN-project are available on request from Wolfgang König, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Mannheim, Tattersallstr.1, D-6B00 Mannheim 1, Federal German Republic.

17. See, for example, Alan C. Kerckhoff, Richard T. Campbell, and Idee Wingfield-Laird, 'Social Mobility in Great Britain and the United States', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 90, 1985; Michael Hout and John A. Jackson, 'Dimensions of Occupational Mobility in the Republic of Ireland', Trinity College, Dublin, 1984; and Utrecht Mobility Seminar, 'Stratification and Mobility in Sweden, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the 1970s', Utrecht State University, 1984.

18. See, for example, Wolfgang König, 'Bildungs- und Beschäftigungssysteme als Determinanten beruflicher Mobilität von Männern', University of Mannheim, 1981; Max Haller and Bogdan W. Mach, 'Structural Changes and Mobility in a Capitalist and a Socialist Society: Comparison of Men in Austria and Poland' in Manfred Niessen *et al.* (eds), *International Comparative Research: Social Structures and Public Institutions in Eastern and Western Europe*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1984; Lucienne Portocarero, 'Social Mobility in Industrial Nations: Women in France and Sweden', *Sociological Review*, n.s. vol. 31, 1983, 'Social Fluidity in France and Sweden', *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 26, 1983 and 'Social Mobility in France and

Sweden: Women, Marriage and Work', *Acta Sociologica*, vol. 33, 1985; Robert Erikson and Seppo Pöntinen, 'Social Mobility in Finland and Sweden: a Comparison of Men and Women' in Risto Alapuro *et al.* (eds), *Small States in Comparative Perspective*, Oslo, Norwegian Universities Press, 1985.

19. David L. Featherman, F. Lancaster Jones and Robert M. Hauser, 'Assumptions of Social Mobility Research in the US: the case of Occupational Status', *Social Science Research*, vol. 4, 1975.

20. Featherman *et al.*, 'Assumptions of Social Mobility Research in the US'; H. A. McRoberts and K. Selbee, 'Trends in Occupational Mobility in Canada and the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 46, 1980; Erikson *et al.*, 'Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations'; Erikson and John H. Goldthorpe, 'Are American Rates of Social Mobility Exceptionally High? New Evidence on an Old Issue', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 1, 1985.

21. See on (i) Natalie Rogoff-Ramsøy, *Sosial Mobilitet i Norge*, Oslo, Tiden, 1977; Keith Hope, 'Trends in the Openness of British Society in the Present Century', *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol. 1, 1981; Claude Thélot, *Tel père, tel fils ?*, Paris, Dunod, 1982; John H. Goldthorpe and Clive Payne, 'Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility, 1972–1983', Nuffield College, Oxford, 1985; on (ii) Albert A. Simkus, 'Changes in Occupational Inheritance under Socialism: Hungary 1930–1973', *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol. 1, 1981 and 'Structural Transformation and Social Mobility; Hungary 1938–1973', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, 1984; John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne Portocarero, 'La mobilité sociale en France, 1953–1970: nouvel examen', *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 22, 1981; Robert Erikson, 'Changes in Social Mobility in Industrial Nations: the case of Sweden', *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, vol. 2, 1984; Erikson *et al.*, 'Intergenerational Class Mobility and the Convergence Thesis'; and on (iii) John H. Goldthorpe (with Catriona Llewellyn and Clive Payne), *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon

Press, 1980. The best evidence of a fairly continuous, if still very slight, long-run tendency towards greater fluidity may presently be accumulating for the USA, despite the earlier analyses suggesting an essential stability found in Robert M. Hauser *et al.*, 'Temporal Change in Occupational Mobility: Evidence among Men in the United States', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40, 1975. Note further David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, *Opportunity and Change*, New York, Academic Press, 1978; Michael Hout, 'Status, Autonomy and Training in Occupational Mobility', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 89, 1984; and also work in progress by David Grusky, based on historical sources.

22. See Judah Matras, 'Differential Fertility, Intergenerational Occupational Mobility and Change in the Occupational Distribution: Some Elementary Relationships', *Population Studies*, vol. 15, 1961; McClendon, 'Structural and Exchange Components of Occupational Mobility'; Erikson *et al.* 'Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations'; Simkus, 'Structural Transformation and Social Mobility'.

23. Cf. John H. Goldthorpe, 'Social Mobility and Class Formation: on the Renewal of a Tradition in Sociological Inquiry', CASMIN-project Working Paper, No. 1, University of Mannheim, 1984.

24. Still other kinds of structural effects on mobility may be identified, though probably ones of less theoretical and/or quantitative importance. For example, Simkus ('Structural Transformation and Social Mobility') additionally distinguishes 'concentration' and 'within-stratum compositional' effects. The former relate to the effects on mobility of the degree of concentration, or conversely of evenness, in the distributions of individuals across origin and destination categories; the latter to the effects of within-category heterogeneity.

25. See Erikson *et al.*, 'Intergenerational Class Mobility in Three Western European Societies' and Pöntinen, *Social Mobility and Social Structure*.

26. Cf. Franklin F. Mendels, 'Social Mobility and Phases of Industrialisation', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 7,

1976; Jürgen Kocka, 'The Study of Social Mobility and the Formation of the Working Class in the 19th Century', *Le mouvement social*, no. 111, 1980; Hartmut Kaelble, 'Eras of Social Mobility in 19th and 20th Century Europe', *Journal of Social History*, vol. 17, 1984.

27. See D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, London, Routledge, 1954, pp. 189–92; Goldthorpe, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, ch. 2; Goldthorpe and Payne, 'Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility, 1972–1983'.

28. Again, mobility rates and patterns currently observable in eastern European nations, such as Hungary and Poland, still reflect the 'late development' of their economic and social structures — for example, their 'prolonged feudalism' — and this in turn must be understood in the context of their economic relations with the more rapidly developing nations of western Europe from the early nineteenth century onwards. On the Hungarian case, see the extended analysis in Kálmán Kulcsár, *Contemporary Hungarian Society*, Budapest, Corvina, 1984. In some present-day 'third-world' societies it is evident that significant changes in occupational structure associated with increasing bureaucratization are financed less by economic growth than by aid or by favourable shifts in world commodity prices — notably, of course, in the price of oil. I owe this point to Percy Cohen.

29. See Lipset and Zetterberg, 'Social Mobility in Industrial Societies', p. 59; Blau and Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, p. 41.

30. See McClendon, 'Structural and Exchange Components of Occupational Mobility'; Erikson *et al.*, 'Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations'; Simkus, 'Structural Transformation and Social Mobility'; Grusky and Hauser, 'Comparative Social Mobility Revisited'; and Robert V. Robinson, 'Reproducing Class Relations in Industrial Capitalism', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 49, 1984.

31. Cf. Suzanne Berger and Michael Piore, *Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980; John H. Goldthorpe, 'The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies in Modern Wes-

tern Societies' in Goldthorpe (ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985.

32. Cf. John H. Goldthorpe, 'On the Service Class: its Formation and Future' in A. Giddens and G. Mackenzie (eds), *Social Class and the Division of Labour*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

33. See Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1959, pp. 152–60. (First edition published as *Social Mobility*, New York, Harper, 1927.)

34. Cf. John H. Goldthorpe, 'Theories of Industrial Society', *Archives européennes de sociologie*, vol. 12, 1971. Furthermore, at an empirical level, Sorokin's views on mobility in pre-modern societies would appear to receive much support from more recent historical research. How exactly mobility levels in such societies would match with those of present-day industrial societies is difficult, if not impossible, to say — partly because of the lack of sufficiently extensive and detailed information but also because of the conceptual problems involved in comparing mobility in societies with fundamentally different forms of stratification. However, what is now well enough established is that pre-modern societies cannot be regarded as uniformly immobile but, on the contrary, often experienced quite substantial *changes* in their rates and patterns of mobility — in consequence of economic, but also of

political and military events. As two illustrative English studies, see Lawrence Stone, 'Social Mobility in England, 1500–1700', *Past and Present*, vol. 33, 1966; and W. G. Runciman, 'Accelerating Social Mobility: the Case of Anglo-Saxon England', *Past and Present*, vol. 104, 1984.

35. Hauser *et al.*, 'Temporal Change in Occupational Mobility'.

36. See, for example, Joachim Singelmann and H. L. Browning, 'Industrial Transformation and Occupational Change in the US, 1960–70', *Social Forces*, vol. 59, 1980; Singelmann and Marta Tienda, 'The Process of Occupational Change in a Service Society: the Case of the United States, 1960–1980', University of Duisberg, 1983; Giorgio Gagliani, 'Long-Run Changes in the Occupational Structure', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 1, 1985.

37. See, for example, Erikson *et al.*, 'Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations'; Grusky and Hauser, 'Comparative Social Mobility Revisited'; Richard Breen, 'Operationalizing Concepts in Mobility Analysis; Resources, Desirability and Barriers to Movement in Class Mobility', Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, 1984; Hout and Jackson, 'Dimensions of Occupational Mobility in the Republic of Ireland'; F. Lancaster Jones, Susan R. Wilson and Yvonne Pittelkow, 'Modelling Mobility: the Use of Simulation to Choose between Near-Equivalent Models', Australian National University, 1984.