will fail to give a true picture of a subject's degree of striving and frustration.

This review has brought into clear relief some of the theoretical and methodological problems in the sociological and psychological studies of psychopathology. There has been little effort to utilize theoretical schemes to explain inconsistencies. Despite the methodological problems noted above, we are impressed with the agreement of the findings on the relationship between mobility orientation and mental disorder. This points to the importance of exploring social-psychological concepts as intervening variables. They can serve to further our understanding of the relationship between sociological variables and mental disorder and also help to explain apparent inconsistencies in the data.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA *

DANIEL KUBAT
Wells College

Direct and indirect forces intrinsic to a command economy have exerted themselves to slow down the rate of social mobility in Czechoslovakia, a country that possessed a mature industrial economy prior to becoming a totalitarian society. The regime's disapproval of success symbols as non-cooperative is a direct deterrent; this disapproval is implemented by an equalization of wages. Absence of the cumulative effect of private property makes education the only viable channel to upward mobility. However, the educational system indirectly discourages working-class youth from utilizing the available opportunities.

CAN a totalitarian society maintain the high rate of social mobility that brought the system itself to life? Apparently not, according to Inkeles and Bauer in their recent study of the Soviet system.[1] They point out that a differential opportunity for youth characterizes the Soviet system just as it characterizes "other industrial societies which stress the ideals of mobility and equality of opportunity." This paper attempts to bring forth additional evidence on the differential opportunity systems arising within a stable totalitarian society—Czechoslovakia.

The data are drawn from demographic and labor statistics and information found in Czech publications.[2] The insights into the mobility ethos were arrived at from a wide scanning of the Czech press. To limit the scope of the paper, we are focusing our discussion on the career patterns of industrial workers and their children. The farm population is not considered except as it supplies a labor force for industry. Neither is membership in the Communist Party as a vehicle of social mobility treated here because of lack of pertinent data.[3]

* Revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August, 1962.

[1] Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, esp. pp. 67–100.

[2] Statistical Yearbooks have been published since 1957. A population journal *Demografie* has been published since 1959. The press supplies a variety of items throwing light on attitudes toward social mobility.

[3] With the exception of the mass recruitment of 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has had members numbering about 10 or 11 per cent of the total population—1,559,082 members and candidate-members as of July, 1960. See *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa*, Prague: SNPL, 1961, p. 675. Although membership in the party is not explicitly considered in this paper, it is worthwhile to point out the significance of membership as a channel of upward social mobility. Judging from the social composition of the party leadership and the delegates to the party congresses, we can assume that at least 60 to 70 per cent of all members are men; 38 per cent of the members of the party were women in 1949. See *Sjezdy a konference Komunisticke strany Československa, 1921–1956*, Background Report, Munich: Radio Free Europe, June 16, 1958, mimeographed, pp. 42–3. The above calculation of the number of men in the party membership would mean that one million men are party members in a population of over four million men over 18—the age of admission to party membership; roughly then, every fourth adult male is a party member. If we consider the strength of the party membership in the individual branches of economic production, we see that, for instance, one-fifth of the employees of the coal industry are members of the party, whereas agricultural workers, trade employees, public servants, and personnel of

For almost 100 years industrialization has been localized in the Western part of Czechoslovakia, known as the Czech lands. Here were the urban centers replete with administrative apparatus, industry and a concentrated population. The remainder of Czechoslovakia, lacking an urban environment, largely stagnated. Today, however, more than 60 per cent of the total population derives a livelihood from industrial employment (see Table 1). This shift from local to national industrialization began under the impact of World War II.

The German occupation of the Czech lands (Slovakia, the eastern territory, became an independent state) radically uprooted the Czech industrial workers by making them migratory and urbanized.[4] In complex industrial centers of wartime Germany the young Czech worker became aware of the opportunities of an industrial work career and of getting ahead by "getting by" better. The scarcity of labor brought about by the war economy attenuated the class and status distinctions in Czechoslovakia as in any other industrial economy.

The rapid expansion of occupational opportunities in the post war years preceding the political *coup d'état* by the Communists (1948), coupled with radical social reforms, opened room at the top to social strata previously under-represented in non-manual occupations.[5] During those years there were several incentives for mobility: the heavy losses of the intelligentsia during the war; the removal of the bourgeoisie from the controlling economic posts after the war in the nationalization of industry; and the political reorganization establishing new administrative offices on all levels of the state administration (National Committees). The loss of some two million Germans through expulsion from the territory of Czechoslovakia vacated a number of skilled industrial jobs. By January, 1946, there was need for 230,000 industrial workers, mostly in glass, textile, stone and ceramics, and paper industries.[6] A host of vacated small craft shops, stores, and enterprises, particularly in the border region (Sudetenland), became open to new enterprisers.

Thus, when the Communists came into power in 1948, they found themselves at the helm of an already expanding Czech economy. At first the new regime opened up even further avenues of social mobility. Persons from humble social origins, for example, could rise swiftly in the newly nationalized industries if they displayed political loyalty. Hence by 1949 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had 2.5 million members and candidate members—the highest number of members in proportion to population (one in five) in any country.

Besides creating these new opportunities, the Communists kept open the doors of upward mobility that were already forced ajar under the impact of industrialization. The blurring of the line between the manual and non-manual occupations, which began with the war boom, had advanced. Employment opportunities rose sharply in construction

scientific and artistic establishments are underrepresented among the party members. See H. Hajek, H. P. Kolar, J. Netik, *Report on Czechoslovakia: Background and Current Information,* Munich: Radio Free Europe, May 13, 1961, mimeographed, p. 20.

That party membership functions as a career mechanism for crossing the blue-white line can be illustrated by the following data. As of January 31, 1956, 36.3 per cent of the members of the party were workers, although according to the original occupation of the party membership, 59.5 per cent were workers. Thus some 32,000 workers were upwardly mobile by that data. (*Sjezdy a . . . loc. cit.*) At present the number is probably higher. However, in terms of admission of new members, non-manuals outnumber workers, the agricultural population remaining very much underrepresented; non-manuals prevail in metropolitan areas and administrative centers. Since, however, the full-time employees of the party apparatus, as well as the members of the armed forces and security organs are never included in the employment statistics (see Table 2), we do not have true figures estimating upward mobility through the party channels.

[4] Some 440,000 workers were transferred to the *Reich* to work in industrial centers there. At the same time, the German war economy required an increased industrialization of the Czech lands. Between 1937–1944 the labor force in Czech industry increased by 60 per cent; the workers in iron and steel production, metal industries, and chemical industries virtually doubled. See Vilem Brzorad, "Fuel, Power, and Producer Goods Industries," in Vratislav Busek and Nicolas Spulber, editors, *Czechoslovakia,* New York: Prager, 1957, p. 300.

[5] Jaroslav Opat, *"K základním problémům třídních vztahů a politiky KSČ v době upevňování únorového vítězství," Příspěvky k dějinám KSČ,* No. 6 (January, 1959), p. 10.

[6] Bohuslav Glos, *Plánovitá distribuce pracujících,* Praha: Ministerstvo informací, 1948, p. 21.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES OF SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CZECH POPULATION BETWEEN 1930 AND 1960 *

Social Groups	1930	1937	1950	1955	1960
Workers	53.9	55.1	56.5	60.7	61.9
Intelligentsia [1]	7.5	8.2	16.5	18.6	18.9
Members of agricultural collective farms	—	—	0.1	4.2	14.1
Members of non-farm collectives	—	—	—	1.6	1.9
Small farmers (independent)	22.8	22.3	19.6	14.0	2.5
Independent craftsmen	6.6	6.4	4.0	0.5	0.4
Capitalists [2]	9.2	8.0	3.3	0.4	0.3

* Source: Vladimír Srb, *"Problémy statistiky třídní a sociální struktury obyvatelstva," Statistický obzor,* 41 (December, 1961), p. 547.

[1] Persons and their dependents with a "managing function."

[2] Owners of means of production and, at present, former capitalists and their dependents who, although having no property, cannot be considered as members of other social groups.

(with attendant high wages) and in transport and communications. Engineering vacancies rose sharply. Professional opportunities rose from 6 per cent to 10 per cent of the total labor force, and in general employment rose faster than the population increased. This meant extraction of labor from agriculture (whatever was left) and in particular from heretofore dependent members of households. About one-half of all the Czech population was gainfully employed, and over 40 per cent of the labor force were women, not including those who helped in farm households or other family establishments. By 1960 about 25 per cent of the non-agricultural labor force was non-manual (the agricultural labor force is 25 per cent of the total labor force). The group most favored by the regime consisted of people with technological know-how. In industry and construction this group increased by some 37 per cent during the totalitarian decade (see Table 2).

On the basis of these facts one might hastily conclude that a command economy is conducive to an open society—that is,

TABLE 2. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION (IN PERCENTAGES) OF THE CZECH LABOR FORCE, 1948–1960 *

Branches of Economy	1948	1955	1960
Industrial Production	29.57 (27.5)[1]	32.80	37.72 (37.6)
Construction	4.56 (6.7)	6.73	8.26 (12.3)
Agriculture	40.37 (52.1)	32.45	25.22 (52.6)
Forestry	1.66 (49.5)	1.58	0.69 (49.6)
Commerce & Restaurants including bulk buying and industrial supplies	7.91 (35.6)	8.02	7.92 (69.5)
Health & Welfare	1.64 (60.0)	2.60	2.93 (73.5)
Education, Entertainment & Propaganda	2.48 (49.8)	3.91	3.74 (60.2)
Science and Research, Housing, and Utilities & Services	1.88 (39.9)	2.59	4.20 (50.0)
Administration & Judiciary, Finance & Insurance, Mass Organizations, Unclassified Activities	4.85 (40.3)	3.60	3.23 (43.6)
Total in absolute numbers [2] (in thousands)	5,545 (37.8)	5,956	6,059 (42.7)

* Source: *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Tables 5–1, 5–3, adjusted.

[1] The numbers in parentheses indicate the per cent of women employed in the respective branches of economy.

[2] The employment figures are not complete: figures on the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense, and the figures on the police and security forces of the Ministry of Interior are not included. Further, the full time employees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are not included. The figures include persons in contractual employment, members of farm and non-farm collectives, and independent entrepreneurs and with them permanently working members of their households. Women who work only in their households or who help out (particularly on farms) are not included. Apprentices are not included.

one marked by high rates of upward social mobility. To accept this is to neglect an underlying *counter*-trend that derives from the inherent features of a command economy. Indeed several investigators have noted a general slowdown of mobility and the emergence of a new system of stratification, dominated by a group Djilas calls "the new class."[7] This situation is brought about in a command economy by several forces—*directly* by those forces resulting from direct administrative commands and *indirectly* by those forces which result in voluntary occupational choices, choices which limit chances for mobility.

A command economy, then, has several built-in traits which directly discourage mobility. One of these is the playing down of class differences; this means a discrediting of a social mobility ethos, which, being competitive, runs counter to the conceptions of a socialist morality, which is cooperative. An ideology of individual success is incompatible with the ideology of soviet Marxism, which is oriented toward the collective man. There is small wonder, then, that the literature and the mass media play down the success stories of the achievers in society. The party leadership, of course, is acclaimed as having risen from humble origins; but party leaders are workers at heart and would be the last to encourage the industrial worker to leave his shop. Success stories like those on which the American Dream was based are non-existent. The lack of individual aspirations and employment morale, on the other hand, are publicly criticized.[8]

Another means of direct discouragement of a mobility ethos is the disapproval by the regime of status symbols. Although the appearance of durable goods on the market is hailed as a sign of socialist achievement, the accumulation of durable goods as status symbols is constantly berated by the press. The bourgeois mentality lurking behind each acquisition, the conspicuous display of a car, for instance, is seen as an enemy of socialist man.[9]

The leveling off of income differences between manual and non-manual work is another way by which the regime directly discourages a mobility ethos.[10] The differential rewards for work which made the statuses of individual occupations quite pronounced at the outset of the Czechoslovak command economy (the Stalinist period) have been reduced so that the average earning capacity of the entire labor force is about equal. The three major wage categories of industrial occupations rank as follows: engineers and technological workers, who earn about 20 per cent more than workers; skilled and semi-skilled workers; and the white-collar administrative staff (clerical), who earn about 20 per cent less than workers. This gap of monetary rewards has been continually narrowing; thus there are few incentives to leave manual occupations (see Table 3).

The regulation of occupational choices and of labor turnover is largely centralized and is part and parcel of the command economy; such regulation is another way the command economy directly discourages mobility. Our data on occupational movements in industry and construction suggest a general slowdown in administrative transfers from non-manual to manual categories and vice versa. There was a steady decline in administrative transfers within plants both from non-manual to manual and from manual to non-manual occupations; more, however, traversed the blue-white line in the upward direction, which corresponds to our information on occupational stratification in industry and construction. Nonetheless, the decline was from 5 per cent in 1953 to 2 per cent in 1960 of workers being transferred (promoted) to non-manual occupations within industry and construction. Those downwardly mobile (transfers from non-manual to manual) declined from about 3 per cent to 1.5 per cent (see Table 4). Of course, with wages for low level non-manuals being what they are, it is uncer-

[7] See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class,* New York: Praeger, 1957.

[8] Abandoning the Third Five Year Plan after two years was due to serious shortcomings in planning as well as in the morale of labor. See *Ústřední výbor Komunistické strany Československa, O výhledech dalšího rozvoje naší socialistické společnosti,* a supplement to *Rudé Právo,* August 14, 1962, p. 8.

[9] George Karnet, "The Pathetic Chariots," *East Europe,* 10 (June, 1961), pp. 12–15.

[10] Daniel Kubat, "Soviet Theory of Classes," *Social Forces,* 40 (October, 1961), pp. 4–8.

TABLE 3. OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION IN INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION, 1948–1960 (IN THOUSANDS) *

Index	1948	1953	1955	1960
Industry employment [1]				
Total	1,535	1,871	1,957	2,302
Directly in Plants	—	1,821	1,909	2,227
Workers [2]	1,290	1,444	1,501	1,776
Engineers and technicians	—	184	211	252
Administrative staff	—	142	141	138
Others (unclassified)	—	51	56	61
Construction employment				
Total	204	324	313	353
Workers	173	263	247	276
Engineers and technicians	14	29	32	40
Administrative staff	7	18	19	21

* Source. *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Tables 7–16, 8–6, adjusted.

[1] Employees of industrial enterprises are divided into those directly engaged in production and those who work in the maintenance departments of the individual plants, as well as those who work in the central administrative units, research institutes, sales and promotion departments, etc. Apprentices are not included.

[2] Taking the wages of the workers as a base for 1953 and 1960 respectively, in industrial occupations engineers-technicians realized 130 and 124 per cent respectively of workers' wages, whereas the administrative staff earned 88 and 87 per cent respectively. In construction, comparing the wages for the years 1948 and 1960, engineers-technicians earned 178 and 129 per cent of the workers' wages respectively, the administrative staff 100 and 84 per cent respectively.

tain whether the designation of upward or downward social mobility across the blue-white line is of great significance. On the other hand, we can assume some political compensation for those promoted.

Although the state assumes complete authority in labor recruitment and transfers, there is a certain leeway at the bottom of the job-desirability-scale where the workers frequently quit in disregard of all regulations of labor recruitment. This is true in heavy industry and mineral extraction, semi-skilled and unskilled labor in mines and foundries in particular. Even though the wages are quite good, the work in these branches of the economy is quite often considered as punishment and there is a constant shortage of labor. Despite possible sanctions against workers who quit their jobs without authorization, 5.9 per cent of the workers in 1959 left their jobs arbitrarily. The largest number of cases of arbitrary departures occurred among coal mine workers (14.2 per cent); foundry and ore mine workers ranked second (11.6 per cent).[11] Short of forced labor, which was abolished after the Stalinist period ended (1953), the regime does not have any control of this section of the labor force.

How can we explain the high turnover, accentuated by the high percentage of those who quit their jobs although they forfeit forever any chance for occupational advancement? The rapid increase of non-manual occupations during and immediately after World War II raised the aspirations of the workers, especially since there was still a carry-over of the idea of status connected with non-manual employment. In 1949 there were 5 per cent fewer workers in the producing branches of the economy than in 1937, but 37 per cent more administrative employees.[12] The political power of the trade and labor unions, which had a great tradition in the Czech lands, was lost to the government controlled amalgamated Revolutionary Trade Movement. The constant shortage of food and consumer goods (although never as acute as in other soviet states) made the promises of the incumbent regime illusory. On the whole, instituting of a command economy with its apparatus based on direct

[11] *Hospodářské noviny,* July 29, 1960. Absenteeism is a milder form of frustration; it rose by 37 per cent in the first quarter of 1949. V. Chalupa, *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State,* Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1959, p. 202.

[12] 90,000 clerical workers were transferred into industrial manual positions in a de-bureaucratization drive in 1949. *Ibid.,* p. 200.

TABLE 4. OCCUPATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF WORKERS IN INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION BETWEEN 1953/4 AND 1960 (IN THOUSANDS) *

	1953/4	1957	1960
Gross total entering the work force	895	667	596
Free recruitment [1]	614	461	433
Organized recruitment [2]	142	90	97
Administrative transfers	86	63	36
Transfers from non-manual occupations within the plants	53	53	30
Gross total leaving the work force	900	626	537
Natural losses	69	53	51
Organized recruitment	518	368	337
Unauthorized terminations	59	51	34
Leaving for military service, training, and public offices	71	45	44
Administrative transfers	101	63	32
Transfers into non-manual occupations within the plants	82	46	39

* Source: *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1960,* Tables 7–24, 8–8; *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Tables 7–22, 8–8, adjusted.

[1] The data from industry are for the year 1953, for construction for 1954, in the first column. The category "Organized Recruitment" refers to the recruitment drives of the Bureau of Labor, and includes entrance of apprentices into full employment. The same category under "Leaving the Work Force" refers to authorized terminations of employment resulting (in some instances) in employment in administratively preferred assignments (e.g. mining). Administrative transfers refer to individuals or work groups moving from one position within the industry to another on the same occupational level (moves resulting from reorganization of the production).

[2] Example: "This year the Slovak regions should provide 20,900 workers for preferential sectors. Most of these workers, 8,650, are to reenforce the Ostrava-Karvina region, 2,950, the foundries, 5,700, the building industry, particularly in the Ostrava, Usti and Labem, and Karlovy Vary regions. 500 are to go to the chemical industry, and 2,700 to the coal mining districts in Slovakia." *Praca,* June 3, 1959.

or indirect coercion produced an anti-climax to a decade or more of continuous social change and raised aspirations. From studies of industrial workers elsewhere we know that an arrestment of an initially rapid promotion results in frustration on the part of the workers.[13] In the case of the Czechoslovak industrial workers, we saw a rapid increase in chances to get ahead and improve one's social and financial standing from the onset of the war boom up to a year or so after the *coup d'état.* Even though we cannot validate statistically the claim that a frustrated working class exists in Czechoslovakia, there are certain indications of group and of individual actions which would warrant the assumption of such frustration. There were strikes and protests of workers in industrial centers of Czechoslovakia in 1951 and 1953, which were group actions.[14] With the lessening of coercive surveillance of the population on the part of the state, we can infer that the unauthorized labor turnover (heaviest in the least desirable industries) reflects frustrated behavior of individual workers who have really nothing to lose, since the labor shortage functions as a tenure mechanism. The existence of low morale among the workers is most noticeable in the Ostrava region,[15] the fastest growing Czechoslovak industrial complex.

Around other more stable industrial complexes, a pattern of behavior characteristic of marginal labor has been observed. Workers' families with access to small plots of arable land are entering miniature farming directly in opposition to the state's policy against small plot farming.[16] Undoubtedly the failure of the command economy to supply the population regularly with sufficient food reinforces the characteristic of marginality among the working population. Such marginal labor is not likely to be occupationally mobile.

Another aspect of the demographic situation discourages complete urbanization of the industrial worker. The growth of metropolitan centers has been very slow during the last decade, migration into the old established main cities being discouraged by lack of

[13] William F. Whyte, *Men at Work,* Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1961, p. 212.

[14] Chalupa, *op. cit.,* p. 241.

[15] The recent reports on the fluctuation of labor in the Ostrava region (mining and metallurgy) indicate that in 1961, 54,000 new workers reported for work but 50,000 left. *Nová svoboda,* January 28, 1962. This north-Moravian region concentrates 17 per cent of all industrial workers in Czechoslovakia. *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Table 22–7. We can estimate some 11 per cent of the labor as migrating in and out of the region.

[16] *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa,* Praha: SNPL, 1961, p. 634.

housing. On the other hand, towns under 10,000 population are the fastest growing in the country [17] (relatively speaking, since the population growth is minimal). This means that villages surrounding industrial plants serve as bases for commuting to work and at the same time offer the privilege of a small garden plot. More than 30 per cent of the labor force in the Czech lands commute to work; [18] this fact is corroborated by the increased use of common carriers by a greater number of passengers for short distance trips of about 15 miles.[19] Such commuting is not comparable to commuting the same distance in Western market economies because of the lack of automobiles and because of the general inadequacy of the common carriers. The question then arises as to whether this sizable proportion of commuters could not influence the housing authorities to construct living units closer to work, or whether the commuters prefer to remain in their rural environment within reach of the miniature farm, which offers a kind of security against the failure of the command economy to supply necessary foodstuffs. If it is true that the workers prefer the village living with access to the miniature farming in spite of the arduous commuting involved, such re-ruralization can be used as an argument against a favorable mobility climate.

A command economy, then, directly discourages mobility by its disavowal of a mobility ethos and by its control of labor assignment and turnover. Since private property is subject to progressive taxation and since private enterprise is totally out of the picture, the only legitimate channel of social mobility is education. The command economy stresses the need for formal education. Even party careerists need formal schooling; the old communists of worker background are being replaced, being no longer useful for executive jobs requiring training in economics.[20] Since access to education is theoretically equalized and dependent on intelligence only, it seems that career opportunities should be open to anyone interested, and that higher education should be a welcome channel for workers' children to advance occupationally. As a matter of fact, the proportion of college students claiming worker parentage is more than 30 per cent.[21] Diversification of occupational choices, however, is underdeveloped because service (tertiary) industries and occupations show little or no growth. Thus in Czechoslovakia only industrial and administrative alternatives are available (and agriculture, of course) because of the stress on basic heavy industries.

The ideology of the workers' state makes justified assertions about the chances of workers' children to move into non-manual occupations. Studies of mobility in the Soviet Union show that quite a substantial percentage of manual workers' children find access to higher education.[22] A theoretical equality of opportunity has been established through a uniform primary and secondary school system, through minimization of the cumulative effects of private wealth and property, and through near equalization of wages and salaries. On the other hand, several factors tend to destroy the equality effect of the totalitarian social system with a mature economy like Czechoslovakia's and thus indirectly to discourage mobility. The first of these factors is the need for early decision on an occupational career. After the eighth year [23] of compulsory schooling the student must make a choice between pre-academic and vocational training. This makes the influence of the parents' attitudes and their understanding of the value of education decisive; consequently, differential cultural traditions are reinforced. A second influence indirectly limiting equal access to education is a financial one. The need for supporting income seems more pronounced to manuals

[17] Vladimir Srb, *"Vývoj obyvatelstva v československých městech za kapitalismu a socialismu," Demografie,* 1 (March, 1959), p. 144.

[18] Václav Lamser, *"Pohyb obyvatelstva mezi venkovem a městem," Demografie,* 2 (April, 1960), p. 140.

[19] *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Table 11–6.

[20] *Pravda,* August 16, 1959.

[21] *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Table 16–21.

[22] Robert A. Feldmesser, "Aspects of Social Mobility in the Soviet Union," Harvard University unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1955, p. 226, notices greater upward social mobility into intelligentsia occupations in the USSR than in the USA. Also David Granick, *The Red Executive,* New York: Doubleday, 1960, p. 26: "The myth of social mobility in Russian society . . . tends to be partially self-fulfilling prophecy."

[23] With the 1961–1962 school year, compulsory schooling was extended through the ninth grade.

because they lack a pattern of deferred gratification to provide strong motivation. The chance of purchasing some of the scarce and expensive durable goods finally on the market depends on the concerted effort of all potential wage earners in the family. The importance of this desire for consumer goods is corroborated by the proportion of women working in various occupations. Women in industry comprise 37 per cent of the labor force and in agriculture 50 per cent (see Table 2).

A third influence discouraging mobility through education is that educational careers are closely linked with formalized ideological identification (membership in the Czech Youth Federation and later on preferably in the Communist Party). To workers constantly indoctrinated with the idea of their intrinsic value to Marxism *as* workers, educational careers are less attractive than they are to those who because of broader perspective reject such indoctrination. Finally, the concerted drive of the regime to assure a sufficient supply of labor for key industries, necessitates making manual careers as attractive as possible. The school reform of 1958, which aimed at a closer link between "the school and practical life," meant in essence that the regime wants "all young people, after leaving school, to do practical work either in agriculture or in industry for at least five years." [24] A return to school after five years of manual occupation demands a stronger commitment to the intrinsic value of higher education than most manuals' children have.

The regime has difficulty with labor scarcity not only in manual occupations but also in positions of expertise. The pressing needs of heavy industry demand a constant supply of manual workers. An equally pressing, and perhaps even more important need exists in management and planning fields, which in the long run should have priority of supply. The shortage of managerial talents is in part due to political considerations in personnel recruitment. At present 21 per cent of all jobs are non-manual. Only 3 per cent of these positions are filled by college or university trained people, whereas 7.7 per cent are filled by persons with only an elementary education. Of these the majority were given to their incumbents, we assume, for their political loyalty in the past. On the other hand, there are still some 6 per cent of the college educated population working in manual jobs.[25] Most of these were undoubtedly political undesirables with non-technological skills. During the last decade (1950–60) the number of professionally trained employees (college trained or less) doubled, although the proportion of non-manuals with members of their families (including retired persons) in the population increased by only 2.4 per cent.[26] These figures suggest that the increased number of non-manual vacancies are being filled by family members of the non-manual group, formerly not employed, to the exclusion of other occupational groups.

These figures raise the question of how the process of a high proportion of the non-manual group replenishing itself within its own ranks is accomplished. Between 1955 and 1960 the number of students enrolled in colleges rose from 48,000 to 65,000.[27] In the college enrollment of 1960, 35 per cent were children of workers; 9 per cent children of farmers; and 56 per cent children of non-manuals. Since the worker figure probably includes a number of former non-manual parents, it is safe to assume that the number of students whose parents have non-manual backgrounds and attitudes probably exceeds 56 per cent.[28] The alternate success routes

[24] From the speech of Antonín Novotný, president of the republic, on Radio Prague, May 9, 1962. As quoted in *East Europe,* 11 (July, 1962), p. 38.

[25] *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Tables 5–9, 5–10, and 5–15. In 1960, 157,000 with university training and 631,000 with professional training below university level held jobs. On the other hand, only 147,000 university trained and only 251,000 with professional training (junior college) and 330,000 with professional-vocational training, performed jobs of non-manual character (low white collar excluded).

[26] Pavel Machonin, *Cesty k beztřídní společnosti,* Praha: SNPL, 1961, p. 169.

[27] *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Table 16–21; also *Statistická ročenka Republiky Československé 1957,* Praha: Orbis, 1957, Table 15–19.

[28] Our assumption is corroborated by the fact that there are about 10,000 persons with university education and about 50,000 with an equivalent of junior college education working in manual jobs; we would assume that the downwardly mobile population—in particular should the downward mobility be involuntary—subscribe to education as a central life interest. Their children would potentially be college material. For data, see footnote 25.

for workers' children are via various branches of vocational and semi-professional education, where the proportion of non-manuals' children is only about 40 per cent as compared to 46 per cent of workers' children in 1960.[29] From the graduates of these technological schools comes the rather well paid group of technologists whose number in industry and construction has increased handsomely during the totalitarian decade.

The rather high drop-out rate among students in institutions of higher education is further evidence that higher education provides only a limited channel of social mobility for workers' children. The planned admission system does not over-enroll to provide for drop-outs. Enrollment is restricted, being especially selective in fields of the humanities and law and to a lesser extent in medicine and natural sciences. The engineering colleges, on the other hand, especially agricultural colleges, have fewer applicants and their selection is not very rigorous.[30] The overall figure for "academic mortality" is 30 per cent, not unduly high by American standards. But part-time students show a drop-out rate of over 50 per cent.[31] The majority of part-time students are probably enrolled in technological courses and are of working class background.[32] Further, workers' children enrolled as full daytime students are most numerous in colleges of education (girls) and technological colleges, the latter having the highest attrition rates. This is a picture not unlike the success and failure of the American college student body. On the whole, then, it is reasonable to conclude that the ratio of 35 per cent of students from working class background becomes substantially diminished in the upperclass levels.

An additional variable which may function as a mobility deterrent is the requirement of ideological conformity appended to all educational programs. Patience and a degree of subterfuge are needed to endure the dull party propaganda and to pass examinations in it. And it is clear that children of professionals have an advantage from their cultural background of being more skilled at manipulating the abstractions of soviet Marxism than their working-class counterparts. Working-class youth would be more liable to frustration and discouragement at the requirements of ideological training. Predictions of such behavior comes from information on membership in the Czech Youth Federation, which at present serves as a career mechanism for non-manuals' children to get into college. The very bureaucratization of this youth organization deters the working class youth, who often seeks a moderate compensation in non-violent gang activities and in contempt of the official socialist morality.[33]

Although theoretically education is available on an equal basis to all and should therefore provide a channel of social mobility, the built-in mechanisms of selection favor disproportionately the children of non-manuals. Thus, indirectly, mobility is discouraged despite educational opportunities.

SUMMARY

The rate of social change in Czechoslovakia seems to have slowed down during the last decade of the command economy. Although social mobility has not come to a complete halt, factors adverse to social mobility and believed intrinsic to a command economy have been in operation. The ideology of soviet marxism does not further a mobility ethos; rather, it seeks to foster conditions where distinctions between occupations are minimized. The need for manual labor makes blue-collar employment quite secure and the wages paid do not encourage movement into low echelon white-collar occupations. The absence of small business careers as alternatives to manual employment are non-existent, leaving education as the only major vehicle of mobility. The educational process, however, is made unpalatable to workers' children by insistence on verbalization of ideological commitment to the regime and is fraught with the difficulties facing working-class youth in any industrial society.

[29] *Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1961,* Table 16–21.

[30] The humanities departments admit 20–30 per cent of their applicants, whereas engineering and agricultural colleges admit 70–80 per cent. *Rudé právo,* January 4, 1960.

[31] *Rudé právo,* September 16, 1960.

[32] *Lidová demokracie,* October 15, 1959. 32 per cent of freshmen in Czechoslovak colleges in the fall of 1959 came from non-academic high schools and "schools for workers."

[33] "Juvenile Delinquency in Eastern Europe," *East Europe,* 9 (June, 1960), pp. 3–13.

The trend toward a tightening of upward mobility chances which has been observed in other soviet states undergoing faster industrialization than Czechoslovakia seems to be more pronounced in this already industrialized country. We would thus hazard a conclusion—however tenuous because of the inaccessibility of many data—that the command economy of totalitarian societies discourages processes of social mobility once the rank order of the social structure has been set.

PRESTIGE VS. EXCELLENCE AS DETERMINANTS OF ROLE ATTRACTIVENESS*

EUGENE BURNSTEIN
Michigan State University

ROBERT MOULTON
University of California, Berkeley

PAUL LIBERTY, JR.
University of Texas

The excellence demanded by an occupational role and the prestige that it confers are positively related to its attractiveness. However, when relevant aspects of the motivational structure of role system members are examined, it is found that individuals high in achievement motivation and in achievement values prefer occupational roles which demand high excellence relative to the prestige they confer while individuals low in achievement motivation and in achievement values prefer those which confer high prestige relative to the excellence demanded. Because the effect of prestige inequalities on role attractiveness depends on the psychological properties of members of the role system, such inequalities may not be a functional prerequisite for the division of labor.

An occupational role requires a certain level of excellence, and the role incumbent who meets that level accrues a certain amount of prestige. According to Davis and Moore,[1] when the amount of prestige conferred is incommensurate with excellence required, marked variations must occur in role attractiveness. Their theory would predict that the direction of variation will depend on whether prestige is high or low relative to the labor, skill or talent demanded by the activity. When prestige is high relative to the demands of the role, attraction to the role should be strong; when role prestige is low relative to demands, attraction should be weak. But, we will here argue, the validity of this hypothesis for any given role system depends on the motivational structure of the members. Just as motives other than prestige may determine performance once one occupies a role,[2] motives other than prestige may also determine the attractiveness and, thus, the choice of a role. The key question is: Are there motives which make prestige unnecessary or relatively unimportant in attracting a sufficient number of individuals toward arduous but functionally important roles?

McClelland, Atkinson, French, Strodtbeck, and Rosen [3] have investigated the motivation

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[1] Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review,* 10 (April, 1945), pp. 242–249.

[2] Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A Critical Analysis," *American Sociological Review,* 18 (August, 1953), p. 390; Dennis H. Wrong, "The Functional Theory of Stratification: Some Neglected Considerations," *American Sociological Review,* 24 (December, 1959), pp. 772–782.

[3] For example, see David C. McClelland, John W. Atkinson, Russell A. Clark and Edgar L. Lowell, *The Achievement Motive,* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953; David C. McClelland, "Risk Taking in Children with High and Low Need for Achievement," in John W. Atkinson, editor, *Motives in Fantasy, Action and Society,* Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1958; John W. Atkinson, "Motivational Determinants of Risk-Taking Behavior," *Psychological Review,* 64, (November, 1957), pp. 359–372; Elizabeth G. French, "Some Characteristics of Achievement Motivation," *Journal of Experimental Psychology,* 50, (October, 1955), pp. 232–236; Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Family Interaction, Values, and Achievement," in David C. McClelland, Alfred L. Baldwin, Urie Bronfenbrenner and Fred