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Abstract: Little is known about patterns of intergenerational social mobility in the former Soviet Union. Extant studies are unrepresentative or methodologically problematic. Using a new national sample from Russia, this paper examines absolute mobility rates for each sex, and relative rates for Russia in relation to Britain. It argues that, contrary to the conclusions reached by many Soviet sociologists during the communist era, Russia was not a 'remarkably open' society. Relative mobility rates were in fact rather similar to those found in Britain. This conclusion is little undermined when educational attainment is taken into account.

INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN COMMUNIST RUSSIA

Gordon Marshall, Svetlana Sydorenko and Stephen Roberts

Introduction

It is a sociological commonplace that we know almost nothing about patterns of social mobility in what was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For example, in his review of studies of social stratification in the state socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe up to the mid 1970s, Connor (1979: 112) reports as a 'glaring omission' the fact that 'no nationwide study of mobility has been conducted in the USSR (or if it has, it has neither been published nor even circulated in any accessible form)'. A decade later, an exhaustive search of the literature by Strmiska (1987: 144) proved equally fruitless, yielding no representative data for the largest communist state in the Western world. To this day, the Soviet Union has remained as Strmiska found it, largely a 'blank area' as far as the issue of social mobility is concerned. Most comparative analyses of soviet-type societies have perforce been restricted to such evidence as is available for the much smaller socialist republics of Central Europe.[1]

Despite this dearth of information, or perhaps because of it, Soviet scholars regularly argued that there were important differences in mobility patterns East and West. In the late 1960s, for example, Rutkevich

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and Filipov (1973: 235) concluded that, in a socialist society such as the USSR, 'as a result of fundamental changes in the social class structure, most of the real barriers to social mobility disappear'. This judgement appears to have been reached more through Marxist dogma than sociological research. No substantiating evidence is cited. Instead, the authors merely insist: 'there is no doubt that only Marxist dialectics and the materialist conception of history can provide a genuinely scientific basis for understanding the social structure of any society and all the processes of its change, including social mobility.' In the mid 1980s, Aitov (1986: 256, 270) conceded that 'socialist society does not yet enjoy full social equality', but concluded from his study of social mobility in the city of Magnitogorsk that 'socialist society is far more "open" than its capitalist counterpart'.

The rhetorical flourish with which some of the Soviet researchers substituted assertion for analysis has, of course, to be understood in the context of communist censorship. Fortunately, most Western sociologists have not had to work under these sorts of conditions, far less the threat that political incorrectness would lead to incarceration in the *gulag*. However, the empirical issue remains. Was the 'tremendous openness' of the USSR, to which researchers such as Aitov repeatedly alluded, an empirical reality or an illusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology? This is the question for which we shall attempt to provide at least a provisional answer in this paper.

Literature

A literature search will reveal that the Iron Curtain was occasionally drawn aside, during the post-war years, although only so far as to reveal a glimpse of social mobility processes in the heartland of communism itself. A few unrelated city-wide studies were conducted in the two decades following the death of Stalin. The social origins of rural employees in the Tatar Republic were investigated by Arutiunian (1973) in the mid 1960s. Shkaratan (1973a, b) reported on social mobility among employees in seven machine-building enterprises in Leningrad, an engineering firm with plants in four Soviet cities (Leningrad, Pskov, Porkhov, Nevel) and three cities in the Tatar SSR (Kazan, Almetevsk, and Menzelinsk). Kenkman and his colleagues (1986) studied educational and occupational attainment among a sample of those who graduated from secondary schools in the Estonian SSR in 1966. Aitov's own study was of intergenerational social mobility and educational attainment among 3,000 employees resident in Magnitogorsk in 1976. However, nothing resembling a reliable national survey ever emerged from Soviet sociology.

This is scant fare, when set against the well-documented national surveys that were conducted under communist regimes in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, it has proved difficult to construct a convincing general account of social mobility in the USSR, on the basis of the evidence available from the very diverse earlier studies. Cross-national researchers who have made the attempt have encountered insuperable technical problems. These are evident, for example, in Yanowitch's (1977: 100–133) comparison of three of the city studies, in Kazan, Ufa and Leningrad. The respondents to the first two of these were drawn from a sample of employees in each city. The figures for Leningrad are derived from a sample only of those employed in that city's machinery industry. In Ufa the interviewees were aged 25 or older. No age restrictions applied in the other cities. Social origins were variously indexed according to the occupational class of the father (Ufa) and the 'head of family' (Kazan and Leningrad). In any case, researchers have long been aware that city-wide studies offer an unreliable indicator of the national situation, because the confounding effects of geographical mobility tend to exaggerate social mobility rates. These and other difficulties notwithstanding, Yanowitch attempted to standardise the findings on four broad social categories (peasant, worker, lower-level non-manual employee and specialist), although it is by no means obvious that his *ex post facto* recoding achieves comparability across the studies in question.

Such shortcomings are then magnified if one attempts further to compare the findings from Soviet studies with those obtained for in-dustrialised societies elsewhere. The problems are well illustrated by Teckenberg's (1990) recent cross-national comparison of social mobility in the Soviet Union and what was the Federal Republic of Germany. Working from the tables published by Shkaratan and his colleagues, Teckenberg attempts to achieve broad comparability of data for the two societies, at a fairly high level of aggregation. However, the comparison is of limited value since (among other things) it excludes agricultural workers; equates self-employment in Germany with managerial positions in the USSR; and cannot distinguish between male and female respondents.

In so far as one can identify general patterns in the patchwork of earlier studies of intergenerational social mobility, these seem to suggest rather high rates of absolute or total mobility, although relative rates (social fluidity or mobility chances) have remained largely unexplored. For example, from his reconstructed data for the three cities, Yanowitch (1977: 108–21) notes that almost two-thirds of the current class of specialists (intelligentsia) in each locale were recruited from working-class and peasant families. 'Access to the specialists' stratum is', as he puts it, 'obviously not the restricted prerogative of a socially exclusive group.' At

the same time, however, this relatively large-scale recruitment of individuals from manual and peasant origins to fill higher-level non-manual positions is not associated with substantial downward mobility among the children of the intelligentsia. In each case, between sixty and eighty per cent of the children of specialists were themselves distributed to specialist occupations, while the proportion downwardly mobile from the intelligentsia to the skilled working class was only about twenty per cent. Downward mobility from the intelligentsia to the unskilled working class was so infrequent as to be negligible. Conversely, although somewhere between one-fifth and one-third of working-class sons and daughters arrived at specialist occupational destinations, approximately two-thirds were retained in the working class.

Aitov's (1986: 257) study of Magnitogorsk reports similar results. More than forty per cent of all respondents had moved out of the parental social group. Again, however, the proportion of sons and daughters distributed to the intelligentsia from different social backgrounds varied between specialists, nonspecialist employees, the working class and collective farmers (the percentages were 45, 22, 15 and 12 respectively). On the basis of their cohort study of the Estonian SSR, Kenkman and his colleagues (1986: 196–97) calculated indices of the links between respondents' social positions and their types of family background, and concluded that 'mobility is rooted in a succession of social position'. Unfortunately, however, the statistical and sociological meaning of the index scores themselves is not apparent from the text.

Teckenberg (1990: 43–47) alone seems to have considered the relationship between absolute mobility rates and relative mobility chances. He reports a variety of findings for the different areas within the USSR, notably in comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany, but unfortunately does so in rather sparse terms. (Neither the mobility matrices nor the models are actually reproduced.) For example, with regard to intergenerational mobility, it is simply recorded that mobility chances are poorer for unskilled and skilled workers in Germany than in the Soviet Union; that the Soviet intelligentsia is comparatively more closed than the intellectual stratum in the Federal Republic; that the 'manual versus non-manual' boundary is relatively more permeable in the USSR; and that there is no obvious proletarianisation of Soviet unskilled white-collar workers.

A shorthand way of summarising this material would be simply to say that it paints a fragmented and unfocused picture. It is difficult to formulate a precise image, either because of the lack of detail in relation to particular studies, or the impossibility of achieving comparability across the different analyses. Arbitration between competing accounts is therefore impossible. On the one hand there are those such as Kende (1987: 14) who suggest that the observed rates of intergenerational social

mobility in the USSR are, 'above all else', structurally induced. In other words, they are largely a consequence of such processes as economic growth, rural depopulation and the proportionate rise in the number of skilled non-manual jobs. Teckenberg's (1990: 47) general conclusion, on the other hand, is that 'in the Soviet Union . . . quantitative differentiations in material labour market opportunities, such as are typical of class societies, do not seem to be especially pronounced'. Soviet sociologists, as we have seen, made rather more aggressive claims for enhanced social fluidity in the USSR. How do our own data bear on these conflicting arguments?

Data

Our analysis is based on a new national survey of social mobility patterns in Russia, conducted during the months of October and November 1991, as part of a wider international study of 'Popular Perceptions of Social Justice'. Under the auspices of that larger project, occupational and employment data were collected in a standardised fashion across thirteen countries participating in the study, and it is those for Russia that form the basis for our argument.

The Russian interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis, in respondents' homes, by professional interviewers from the All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research. Respondents were selected from a sampling frame for present-day Russia, as against the former Soviet Union, although there is nothing in the literature to suggest (and no obvious reason to suppose) that Russian mobility patterns were substantially different from those in the USSR as a whole. Since our data deal with intergenerational social mobility, and were gathered at more or less the same time as the Soviet régime was collapsing, we are in effect charting the communist experience. The final sample was compared with census data for Russia and found to be representative of the population in terms of sex, age, region and type of (urban or rural) settlement. Respondents were aged sixteen and over. The total number of completed interviews was 1,734 – representing a response rate of a little over 76 per cent.[2]

We investigate social mobility in terms of the class *schema* devised by John Goldthorpe and his colleagues in the CASMIN Project. The theoretical and conceptual bases of the scheme are well known and have been explained in some detail by its authors.[3] The so-called Goldthorpe classes have of course been widely used in recent studies of class mobility. Interestingly, many earlier analyses of class and mobility in the USSR unconsciously (although crudely) mimic the Goldthorpe scheme, by distinguishing between the élite (or intelligentsia or specialist) non-

manual class of professionals, managers and administrators; routine white-collar employees; skilled and unskilled manual workers; and agricultural workers or collective farmers.

Goldthorpe classes are operationalised in the International Social Justice Project in a novel way. Anticipating problems of cross-national comparability, the various teams involved in the study agreed to collect occupational data in a standardised manner, and to code the information provided by respondents to both the International Standard Classification of Occupations for 1968 and a modified version of the German employment status (*Berufstellungen*) typology. The former was chosen because it is the one occupational taxonomy for which a standard codebook exists in all the major languages. It has also been in cross-national use for a quarter of a century, so that many national research agencies are now familiar with its principles and procedures. Unfortunately, since it tends to group occupations by industrial sector and without regard to employment status, it is particularly unsuited (if taken alone) to the task of generating Goldthorpe class categories. The German employment status codes, on the other hand, were selected precisely because they are especially sensitive to the distinction between managers, employers, self-employed and employees that is central to Goldthorpe's approach. The information from these variables was then combined in a series of specially designed algorithms which are unique to our data but preserve the integrity of the original class scheme.

In the analysis that follows, having examined the basic patterns of intergenerational social mobility we then introduce the issue of the relationship between class mobility and educational attainment, in order to investigate the claim that there was a trend towards increasing 'meritocracy' in the Soviet Union. Here too we exploit the earlier work of the CASMIN team by re-coding educational credentials to the sevenfold classification devised by König and his colleagues (1988) for cross-national comparative analysis of this issue. As in the case of the class categories themselves, the advantage to be gained by standardising data collection and codes in this way is that one can facilitate meaningful cross-national comparison of results, and greatly reduce the likelihood of methodological artefacts in the findings derived from comparative analyses.

Intergenerational Social Mobility

The distributions of origin and destination classes for our Russian respondents are shown in Table 1. Males and females are treated separately, since it is currently a controversial issue as to which is the appropriate unit in any class analysis (individual or household); and, if it

Table 1 Distribution of Russian Respondents, by Class of Origin and Destination, and by Sex (Percentage by Column), and Delta (dissimilarity index) Values for Origin and Destination Distributions

	MALE		FEMALE		ALL	
class	origin	destin.	origin	destin.	origin	destin.
I + II	23.9	36.4	30.5	48.3	27.5	42.9
IIIa	2.3	3.4	1.4	14.2	1.8	9.3
IVa + IVb	0.2	1.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.6
IVc	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.0
V	3.4	2.7	3.3	1.1	3.4	1.8
VI	25.5	25.9	21.7	8.5	23.5	16.4
VIIa + IIIb	31.6	27.2	27.1	23.6	29.1	25.2
VIIb	12.6	3.3	15.3	4.1	14.1	3.7

N = 1,150 (522 males, 627 females)

Deltas: Male,   15
         Female,   31
         All,   24

Classes: I + II   – Salariat (Service class)
          IIIa   – Routine clerical workers
          IVa + IVb   – Petite bourgeoisie
          IVc   – Farmers, smallholders
          V   – Supervisors
          VI   – Skilled manual workers
          VIIa + IIIb – Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers
          VIIb   – Agricultural workers

is the latter, whether class positions should then be assigned to house-holds according to the position of the 'male head', economically-dominant partner, or according to some composite score embracing the employment standing of both partners.[4] We will return to this problem shortly. Here, we look at the class distributions of males and females in terms of their own employment, and in relation to that of their fathers when respondents were aged 15.[5]

Our results show the effects of the sectoral changes emphasised by commentators such as Kende, most obviously in the declining numbers involved in agriculture, and the expansion of non-manual work generally. The table also suggests, however, that there are certain distinctive features in Russian patterns of social mobility. One is the extent to which political intervention, resulting in social upheaval, has shaped the fate of certain classes. For example, the very small numbers of farmers in our origin classes, and reappearance of a few individuals in the *petite-bourgeoisie* destination class, would seem to testify respectively to the

collectivisation of Soviet agriculture under Stalin, and the limited revival of small businesses effected by post-communist economic reforms.

Second, and pursuing the same general theme, we might note the relatively high proportion of respondents with service-class backgrounds – 24 per cent of all men and 31 per cent of women – and the correspondingly high proportion of respondents distributed to service-class destinations (36 per cent and 48 per cent of males and females respectively). These proportions are somewhat larger (especially in the origin class) than those reported for other industrialised societies by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 193). It seems probable that this finding reflects the functional demands of the Russian planned economy, the need to manage the Soviet empire, and the general primacy of politics over economics. The Soviet bureaucracy offered tenure and other favourable conditions of employment, especially among the *nomenklatura*, to even relatively low-level clerical employees (who, outside the Soviet system, would certainly have been in an inferior labour market position *vis-à-vis* their bureaucratic superiors). The boundary between those doing routine clerical work and the salariat is then especially difficult to draw in the Russian context. Indeed, the figures also show that the proportion of respondents involved in routine clerical employment is correspondingly low (among both sexes), although it too has increased in line with the general shift to white-collar work. Perhaps, therefore, uniquely among advanced industrialised societies, we may expect the proportionate size of the Russian salariat to diminish somewhat in years to come, always providing of course that the transition to a mixed market economy is eventually accomplished.

Another distinctive feature of the Russian class structure is that, unlike the other state socialist societies of Eastern and Central Europe, more people are of working-class origins than have backgrounds in farming families. Russian agriculture was early to collectivise and mechanise. These processes produced economies of scale that are already evident in our table – where 'agricultural worker' is an origin class for a relatively small proportion (fifteen per cent) of respondents. The proportion of the workforce to be found in agriculture in our destination classes (four per cent) is on a par with that reported for Britain – which has a very small farming population in comparison to other western capitalist societies. Again, it is possible that this process will be reversed by the transformation of the Russian economy, as at least some of the agricultural collectives are dismantled and returned to family-sized holdings.[6]

Next, we may note the relatively large working class in Russia, comprising some 61 per cent of class origins among males in our sample, and 56 per cent of male class destinations. (The corresponding figures among females are 52 per cent and 33 per cent.) These are rather similar to the proportions found in manual origin and destination classes in the

advanced capitalist societies that were investigated during the CASMIN study. They are, in fact, closest (and almost identical) to those reported for British males. Unlike other late-industrialising capitalist (Sweden and France) or state socialist (Hungary and Poland) countries examined by Erikson and Goldthorpe, Russia has a manual working class which is shrinking as a proportion of the total class structure, reflecting shifts in the occupational structure that appear also to be found in deindustrialising Britain.

Finally, because we are able to distinguish males and females, we can see that there are some differences in social mobility across the sexes (where individuals are treated in terms of their own employment experiences). Probably the most obvious of these is in relation to skilled manual work, where more than 26 per cent of men, but barely nine per cent of women, are to be found. In the case of routine clerical work these relative proportions are more than reversed: some fourteen per cent of women but only three per cent of men are in this class. Given what is known about the sex composition of the Soviet bureaucratic élite and management,[7] our findings for the salariat appear to be surprising, but they are probably a consequence of the fact that we cannot reliably distinguish between its upper and lower echelons (classes I and II in the full version of the Goldthorpe scheme). It seems likely that at least part of the explanation as to why such a high proportion of women are in the salariat, and why rather similar proportions of each sex arrive there from working-class origins, is to be found in the fact that males and females are being distributed to different types of service-class jobs.

Taken together, these characteristics yield a distinctive mobility profile, apparently unique to the former Russian SSR. On the one hand, as in other European state socialist societies, our data point to a fairly rapid contraction of the agricultural classes. On the other hand, quite unlike other state socialist societies, communist Russia also has a shrinking industrial working class. In this regard it is rather similar to Britain. Lastly, and uniquely, the scale of the Soviet state apparatus resulted in a proportionately larger salariat than is to be found in even the advanced capitalist societies. The delta or dissimilarity index score for the Russian male table is in fact 15, which is in line with the CASMIN results for mature industrial societies such as Britain or West Germany; somewhat smaller than the delta for the late-industrialising societies of France and Sweden; and much smaller than that for the state socialist societies of Hungary and Poland.

This distinctiveness is further illustrated if we then decompose the total mobility rates that are derived from our 8x8 class mobility tables for Russian men and women (see Table 2). The ratio of vertical to non-vertical mobility is in the region of six-to-one.[8] This makes Russia an extreme outlier in relation to the nations studied in the CASMIN

Table 2   Decomposition of Total Mobility Rates (TMR) into Total
Vertical (TV) and Total Non-Vertical (TNV) Mobility, and of
Total Vertical Mobility into Total Upward (TU) and Total
Downward (TD) Mobility, by Sex (Russia)

Males TMR	TV	TNV	TV/TNV	TU	TD	TU/TD
65	56	9	6.2	37	20	1.9
Females TMR	TV	TNV	TV/TNV	TU	TD	TU/TD
66	56	10	5.6	39	17	2.3
All TMR	TV	TNV	TV/TNV	TU	TD	TU/TD
66	57	9	6.3	38	18	2.1

project – where the typical male TV/TNV mobility ratio is between 2.5
and three. For even the most 'mature' of industrial societies (England)
the corresponding figure is only 3.4. The Russian figure again reflects the
swollen salariat, expansion of white-collar employment generally, and
relatively large numbers of respondents mobile into the service class from
working-class and agricultural backgrounds. Furthermore, if the vertical
rate is broken down into upward and downward mobility, the ratio of the
former to the latter is around two. The figure for men (1.9) is in fact
identical to that obtained for English males by Erikson and Goldthorpe
(1992: 195). In other words, Russia appears (at least at this aggregate
level) to be a communist society of long standing, but one in which the
balance of upward as against downward mobility is similar to that found
in mature capitalist countries. In this respect, it is rather unlike other
(more recently industrialised) state socialist societies in Eastern and
Central Europe, where upward mobility among males more strongly
preponderates over downward (typically in the ratio of approximately
four-to-one). The pattern of social mobility in Russia therefore appears
to reflect the unique combination of a state socialist polity with a
relatively advanced industrial occupational structure.

   Against this general background we can now consider absolute rates in
outflow and inflow perspective. Table 3 shows the amount and pattern of
mobility experienced by men and women from the various origin classes.
Because of the small numbers in some of the classes, we have (in line
with established practice among the CASMIN researchers) collapsed the
petite-bourgeoisie and routine clerical employees (into an 'intermediate'
class), supervisory and skilled manual workers ('skilled manual' class),

Table 3 Goldthorpe Class Distribution in Russia, by Sex (Percentage by Row)

| | | MALES destinations | | | | | |
		SAL	INTER	SM	UM	AW	Total
	SAL	57	6	22	14	0	100 (125)
	INTER	46	0	31	23	0	100 (13)
origins	SM	32	3	36	27	3	100 (151)
	UM	30	4	27	36	3	100 (165)
	AW	22	9	26	31	12	100 (68)
N = 522							

| | | FEMALES destinations | | | | | |
		SAL	INTER	SM	UM	AW	Total
	SAL	64	15	5	14	2	100 (191)
	INTER	44	11	11	33	0	100 (9)
origins	SM	48	14	15	21	3	100 (157)
	UM	42	14	10	31	3	100 (170)
	AW	29	16	10	32	13	100 (100)
N = 627							

Notes: 1. Percentages may not sum exactly because of rounding.
2. Classes are: SAL = salariat (Goldthorpe classes I and II); INTER = intermediate (Goldthorpe classes IIIa, IVa, IVb); SM = skilled manual (Goldthorpe classes V and VI); UM = unskilled manual (Goldthorpe classes VIIa and IIIb); AW = agricultural workers (Goldthorpe classes IVc, VIIb).

and farmers or smallholders and agricultural labourers ('agricultural worker' class).

Our results confirm that intergenerational class mobility was a common experience in communist Russia. Although much of this was short-range, for example between the skilled and unskilled elements of the urban proletariat, long-range mobility from the working (and even the agricultural) classes to the salariat was relatively common. The general outflow patterns observed in the earlier studies of specific Soviet organisations, cities and regions are readily apparent on the national scale. Some 57 per cent of sons and 64 per cent of daughters from salariat backgrounds were themselves to be found in salariat destinations at the time of our study. Approximately one-third of those from unskilled working-class backgrounds were socially immobile in intergenerational terms. Fewer than fifteen per cent of male and female respondents having salariat class backgrounds were downwardly mobile to the unskilled working class. Among those hailing from unskilled manual origins, thirty

per cent of men and over forty per cent of women had arrived at salariat
destinations, as indeed had slightly higher proportions of those with
skilled manual backgrounds. Only thirteen per cent of those having
agricultural workers as parents actually stayed on the land: forty per cent
were intergenerationally mobile to white-collar work while the rest (not
much short of one-half) moved into manual employment. Women from
every origin class were much more likely than corresponding men to
arrive at intermediate – in fact routine clerical – destinations.

Considered as inflow rather than outflow percentages, that is in terms
of class composition rather than class distributions (see Table 4), these
figures suggest that some sixty per cent of those presently to be found in
the salariat are first-generation arrivals in the class. The skilled and
unskilled manual classes are also relatively demographically immature.

Table 4 Goldthorpe Class Composition in Russia, by Sex (Percentage
by Column)

| | | MALES destinations | | | | |
		SAL	INTER	SM	UM	AW
	SAL	37	33	19	13	0
	INTER	3	0	3	2	0
origins	SM	25	17	36	29	24
	UM	26	25	30	42	29
	AW	8	25	12	15	47
		100	100	100	100	100
		(190)	(24)	(149)	(142)	(17)
N = 522						

| | | FEMALES destinations | | | | |
		SAL	INTER	SM	UM	AW
	SAL	41	31	15	18	15
	INTER	1	1	2	2	0
origins	SM	25	24	38	22	15
	UM	24	26	28	36	19
	AW	10	18	17	22	50
		100	100	100	100	100
		(303)	(90)	(60)	(148)	(26)
N = 627						

Notes: as for Table 3.

Each comprises only one-third to two-fifths of individuals who are at least second generation in their classes of origin. By comparison, agricultural workers are more likely to have been recruited from the same class of origin, with almost half of those presently on the land hailing from agricultural backgrounds. In general terms the class composition patterns appear to be broadly similar within each sex.

This last observation brings us back to the issue of how one conceptualises class mobility. More particularly, it raises the question of whether or not patterns of social fluidity (or relative mobility chances) are different for men and women, and in this way reintroduces debate about the unit of class analysis and to whom (or what) one assigns a class location.

One obvious way to address this problem is via a loglinear analysis of the raw mobility data, in order to test the so-called common social fluidity model, which proposes that relative mobility chances are the same for each sex. The results of our analysis are shown in Table 5. These appear to confirm that the hypothesis of common social fluidity among the sexes in Russia is sound. As was suggested by the earlier cross-tabulations, there is a significant association between sex and destination, showing that women and men are to some extent distributed to different classes. There is also a strong association between class origins and class destinations, but this does not itself vary by sex. The ODS interaction is not significant. In other words, women are distributed to different class destinations to men because they are women, not because the relationship between origins and

Table 5 Results of Testing the Model of Common Social Fluidity against Data on Intergenerational Mobility for the Sexes in Russia (Goldthorpe Class of Individuals Determined by Reference to Own Employment)

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. O + D + S	40	233.67	0.000	—	17.75
2. O + DS	36	135.29	0.000	42.1	13.22
3. DS + OD	20	15.73	0.733	93.3	3.70
4. CSF model	16	9.68	0.883	95.9	2.45
5. UNIDIFF model	15	9.33	0.860	96.0	2.36

UNIDIFF parameter estimate: -0.1188 (men set at zero).

Notes: 1. rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 for model 1.
2. delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
3. O = class of origin, 5 levels (as per Table 3).
4. D = class of destination, 5 levels (as per Table 3).
5. S = sex.
6. CSF model = OS + DS + OD.

destinations varies by sex. Relative class mobility chances are broadly the same for men and women.

Of course, the common social fluidity model offers only a global or generalised test of underlying relative rates, so that small but nevertheless sociologically interesting specific differences in mobility chances can easily be overlooked. A more powerful means of assessing social fluidity in comparative analyses is provided by the so-called uniform difference (or UNIDIFF) model developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 90–92) during the CASMIN study. This has an added advantage over the standard loglinear approach in that the UNIDIFF test addresses the further issue of whether or not two sets of odds ratios display a monotonic trend in one particular direction. More specifically, it tests for the possibility that the different sets of odds ratios relating to competing pairs of class origins and destinations move uniformly (though not by a constant amount) either towards or away from unity in one mobility table as compared to another, which would suggest (in this particular case) a slight but important difference in underlying relative rates for the sexes.[9]

In fact this more stringent test fails to give a significant improvement in fit over the model of common social fluidity. The deviance in the latter is barely reduced for the sacrifice of one additional degree of freedom. It seems that there is indeed no significant difference in the overall social fluidity régimes for Russian men and women. It is true that the uniform-change parameter points to slightly greater fluidity among females as a whole: if the parameter for men is set at zero, the estimate is negative, indicating a slight decrease in the odds ratios (and therefore marginally greater social fluidity) among women. However, the modest size of this effect, and failure of the uniform difference model to return a significant improvement in fit, is consistent with the findings reported by Erikson and Goldthorpe themselves (1992: 246) – who found marginally higher fluidity among women, as compared to men, in only three of the five nations they investigated (and even here they describe the difference in underlying relative rates 'if it exists at all, as very slight indeed').

In this respect, at least, communist Russia – the first and longest established Western industrial communist state – would appear to be indistinguishable from its capitalist counterpart. As Marshall and his colleagues (1988: 107–8) have shown in the case of Great Britain, the pattern of absolute social mobility rates is different among British men and women, but here too this is attributable to sex segregation in employment rather than differential class mobility rates. The model of common social fluidity across the sexes fits well in both countries. The argument that women are as divided by class processes as are men is no less applicable in Russia than it is in Britain.

Those who advocate a 'conventional' approach to class analysis, maintaining that the household is generally the most appropriate unit of class

analysis and that class can be attributed to households according to the standing of their male heads,[10] might at this juncture cite the evidence of similar relative mobility rates among Russian men and women as further support for their arguments. However, since our purpose here is merely to present some basic findings about hitherto largely unexplored patterns of intergenerational social mobility in communist Russia, there seems no need to take a strong stance on the unit of analysis issue in the present context. Our principal interest is in assessing the truth of claims made by some earlier (especially Soviet) sociologists to the effect that patterns of social mobility in the USSR show it to be substantially more open than any of its capitalist counterparts. Thus far, we have demonstrated that communist Russia was not an egalitarian society, if by this it is meant that equality of opportunity prevailed among the different social classes. In fact, chances of social mobility varied appreciably for individuals coming from different social backgrounds, as a calculation of the odds ratios for Table 3 will show. However, it has rarely been claimed that the USSR was an equal society, only that it was 'more equal' than its capitalist neighbours. To what extent do our new data support this argument?

One way of addressing this issue of relative openness is to compare intergenerational mobility patterns in the oldest and most mature communist and capitalist societies respectively – in other words Russia and Great Britain. We have therefore examined the results shown above in relation to equivalent data that were collected during the British survey for the International Social Justice Project.[11] Specifically, we are here interested in fitting the model of common social fluidity across the two countries, so testing the hypothesis that patterns of social fluidity or relative mobility chances are the same in Russia and Britain. Table 6 shows the results of our analysis for males and females separately. In fact, as can be seen from the table, a model proposing common social fluidity provides a sufficient fit in both cases. This tells us that, as one would expect, the distribution of origin and destination classes is different in each society (because of their different occupational structures). However, by including only the further association between origins and destinations we can provide an adequate fit to the data, and one in which the ODN interaction term is not required. On the face of it, therefore, the association between social origins and class destinations does not seem to vary much between the two countries. In other words, Russia would not appear to be in aggregate terms a more open society (from the point of view of intergenerational class mobility) than is Britain, since the differences in mobility patterns between the two countries seem largely to be explained by their very different occupational structures. Social fluidity – relative mobility chances or the degree of openness in the class structure – is more or less the same in the most mature of state socialist and democratic capitalist societies.

Table 6 Results of Testing the Model of Common Social Fluidity
Against Data on Intergenerational Mobility in Russia and
Great Britain, by Sex (Goldthorpe Class of Individuals Deter-
mined by Reference to Own Employment)

males

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. Independence model	32	139.20	0.000	—	14.48
2. CSF model	16	13.23	0.656	90.5	3.84
3. UNIDIFF model	15	10.73	0.772	92.3	3.13

UNIDIFF parameter estimate: 0.3246 (Russia set at zero).

females

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. Independence model	32	139.98	0.000	—	12.50
2. CSF model	16	25.36	0.064	81.9	5.35
3. UNIDIFF model	15	21.20	0.130	84.9	4.14

UNIDIFF parameter estimate: 0.4467 (Russia set at zero).

Notes: 1. rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 on Independence model.
2. delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
3. Class of origin, 5 levels (as per Table 3).
4. Class of destination, 5 levels (as per Table 3).
5. Nation, 2 levels.
6. Independence model = ON + DN.
7. CSF model = ON + DN + OC.

Again, however, we can take the further step of applying Erikson and
Goldthorpe's uniform difference model to these data. In this case, we are
interested in the possibility that the odds ratios defining the association
between classes of origin and destination tend to move uniformly away
from unity in one society (Britain) as compared to the other (Russia),
suggesting slightly less social fluidity under the capitalist than the
communist regime.

In fact, the UNIDIFF model does not improve significantly upon
the fit obtained by the model of common social fluidity in the case of
males, although there is a significant (though rather small) improvement
observed among females. Among men, the uniform difference model
reduces the deviance by only a further 2.5 for one degree of freedom
(p = > 0.10), although the parameter is positive – which could suggest
that, given a much larger sample, mobility chances might be found to be
significantly more unequal in Britain than in Russia. In the case of
women, the improvement in fit obtained by the UNIDIFF model does

just reach statistical significance (the reduction in the log likelihood ratio statistic here is 4.2, for one degree of freedom, $p = <0.05$), and (especially on these relatively small numbers) this does point to somewhat greater inequality of opportunities among British women than among their Russian sisters – since here, too, the uniform difference parameter shows evidence of a systematic increase in the odds ratios, as one moves from considering the Russian data to those for Britain.

Application of this more stringent test does lead us, therefore, to qualify our stark conclusion of common social fluidity in the class mobility régimes of Russia and Britain. In the case of women, there is evidence that communism tended to reduce inequalities of opportunity slightly; as far as men are concerned, Marshall (as a Scot) reserves the right to return a verdict of 'not proven'. However, for both sexes, it has to be recognised that the difference in underlying relative rates in the two countries is (to echo Erikson and Goldthorpe) very slight if in fact it exists at all.[12]

Unfortunately, it is not possible to push our cross-national comparative analysis of intergenerational mobility much further than this, because of the relatively small size of the Russian sample. We simply lack the numbers to test more complex models such as (for example), the 'core model' developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe during the CASMIN project. What we can conclude is that, contrary to the claims made by many earlier commentators, Soviet Russia was not 'much more open' than its Western capitalist neighbours. It may have been marginally more so among women, but for men the evidence (at least thus far) does not favour arguments for greater equality. Clearly there are differences between the régimes, as can be seen from the deviance remaining after the uniform difference model has been applied, but we can do little more with our particular national samples than confirm that these are not differences in *overall* social fluidity.

Merit and Mobility

Another useful way of pursuing the issue of openness is to consider the role of education in the Soviet system. Historically, the educational system in the USSR has been charged with two policy objectives; namely, the promotion of economic growth on the one hand, and of social homogeneity (via social mobility) on the other. As Yanowitch (1977: 60–61, 79) has noted, there were almost always tensions and compromises between the allocating and egalitarian functions, since access to education was a scarce resource. Economic efficiency called for the distribution of appropriately (and unequally) educated individuals to economic roles in an increasingly differentiated occupational structure.

Social homogeneity required the pursuit of equality in educational attainment among children from different social backgrounds, particularly equality in the relative shares of children from working-class and intelligentsia homes in access to advanced levels of schooling, indeed took such equality to be one of the principal indicators of social progress and the steady transition to full communism.[13]

The relative influence of these two orientations has in fact varied throughout Soviet history. Unravelling their effects on educational policies and the history of access to schooling in the USSR is, therefore, a complex matter that need not be pursued here. However, it is worth noting that some commentators have been inclined to stress one or other of these functions at the expense of the other, in order to sustain rather large claims about the nature of Soviet communism. Aitov (1986: 259, 266), for example, paints a picture of the educational system as a harbinger of equality, increasingly accessible to all, and so successful in diminishing disparities in educational attainment that, together with migration from the countryside to cities, this is one of the 'two basic factors' explaining almost three-quarters of all social mobility. Western observers have, on the whole, been more sceptical. For example, Yanowitch (1977: 66) concludes that the many complexities and tensions within Soviet education make it impossible to characterise in simplistic terms (as élitist or egalitarian), and that the system is best summarised as an 'extended process that simultaneously reproduces social inequalities and offers the prospect of social mobility to considerable numbers of working-class youth'.

Class differentials in educational attainment in the USSR are reasonably well documented – certainly more so than is class mobility itself.[14] Our interest here is in the more general problem of how educational achievement is related to class mobility. The social advancement of children from manual and agricultural working-class backgrounds was one of the declared goals of the Soviet system. Positive discrimination was often practised in favour of these individuals since the demand and support for education tended to be higher among families of intellectuals and managers. This measure of egalitarianism apart, however, the prevailing ethos governing the relationship between the educational and occupational systems was meritocratic (Kende 1987: 14). In theory, therefore, the association between origins and destinations that was observed in the previous section ought to have been mediated largely by educational attainment. That is, class background should not have substantially influenced a person's opportunity to achieve or maintain an advantaged class position, over and above its effects on his or her educational attainment. Certainly, if claims about the relative openness of the Soviet system are to be upheld, social origins ought to exert less of an influence than in the advanced industrial societies of the capitalist West.

Table 7 Intergenerational Mobility and Educational Attainment in Russia and Great Britain

Russia

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. O + D + E	54	538.59	0.000	—	27.46
2. OE + D	45	417.91	0.000	22.4	25.15
3. OE + ED	36	59.42	0.008	89.0	6.34
4. OE + ED + OD	27	26.19	0.508	95.1	3.60

Great Britain

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. O + D + E	54	385.98	0.000	—	29.63
2. OE + D	45	304.86	0.000	21.0	26.28
3. OE + ED	36	72.38	0.003	81.2	9.34
4. OE + ED + OD	27	26.76	0.477	93.1	4.55

Notes:
1. rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 for model 1.
2. delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
3. O = class of origin, 4 levels (salariat, intermediate, working, agricultural).
4. D = class of destination, 4 levels (as per origins).
5. E = education, 4 levels, corresponding to CASMIN category 1 (general elementary and basic vocational qualification); CASMIN category 2 (intermediate vocational and intermediate general qualifications); CASMIN categories 3a and 3b (maturity examination and lower-level tertiary certificate); and CASMIN category 3c (upper-level tertiary certificate). See König *et al.* (1988: 58–59).

We have pursued this issue by examining the pattern of association between class origins, class destinations and educational attainment. In particular we wish to test the model of meritocracy itself. This assumes perfect mobility conditional upon education. That is, if Soviet citizens were finding their places in the occupational order according to meritocratic principles (and in the absence of ownership and inheritance of private property this was held to be the case), then the impact of class background should not be apparent in class destinations, except as this is mediated by educational credentials. The results shown in Table 7 in fact suggest that the meritocracy model (model 3) provides a rather poor fit to our Russian data (p = 0.008 and more than six per cent of all cases are misclassified). When the OD association is fitted (model 4), the G^2 is reduced significantly, and the model then provides an acceptable fit to the observed data (p = 0.508). A reduction of more than 95 per cent of the deviance in the baseline independence model is achieved and the proportion of misclassified cases falls to 3.6 per cent.

The existence of a significant association between class origins and destinations, net of the associations between origins and education and

education and destination, tells against the thesis of meritocracy.[15] Inspection of the residuals under the meritocratic model suggests that the process at work is one of class discrimination rather than affirmative class action. For example, the largest residuals occur at middling levels of educational attainment, pointing towards the difficulty of circumventing meritocratic principles where educational credentials are either negligible or very good (university degree level or equivalent). However, where there is evidence of but modest educational attainment (at secondary school or lower tertiary level), the probabilities of social mobility vary according to the class background of the individuals concerned. At these levels of attainment, children from salariat backgrounds are over-represented in salariat destinations, and under-represented among manual workers. Thus, under the meritocracy model, children of what we have termed medium (level 2) educational attainment, and from salariat backgrounds, should be distributed to the various class destinations (salariat, intermediate, working, agricultural) in the ratio 42:9:47:2. In our sample the actual distribution was 48:15:37:0. Similarly, at the lower tertiary level (level 3), the predicted proportions 21:16:59:4 can be compared with the observed proportions 34:16:50:0. The obverse pattern tends to prevail among those from manual backgrounds. At these middling educational levels, children of manual workers are more likely to be found in the working class and less likely to be found in the salariat, than would be predicted from the meritocracy model.

Interestingly, as Table 7 also shows, this pattern of results is again similar to that found in Britain. In the British case, the meritocracy model (model 3) likewise fails to provide a satisfactory fit to the data, and the OD association is also required (model 4). In other words, there is nothing here to suggest that education in the Russian SSR offered a markedly wider avenue of opportunity to children from less privileged class backgrounds than it did in Britain, despite the periodic efforts of Soviet policy makers to weaken, by positive discrimination, the links between class background and educational attainment.[16]

Furthermore, if we then analyse our data on social mobility and educational attainment but broken down by cohort, there is no evidence to suggest that communist Russia was becoming more meritocratic over time (see Table 8). Unfortunately, the size of our sample constrains us at this juncture to consider mobility between three classes of origin and destination (white-collar, working and agricultural) in only two cohorts (individuals born before 1950 and those born in 1950 or later), although we maintain the same four levels of educational attainment as in the previous analysis.[17] The best-fitting model (model 6) shows a number of expected results. The OE association confirms that the educational attainments of children from different social backgrounds vary. The further association between education and destination (ED) confirms that

Table 8 Class Origins, Class Destinations (First Job), and Educational Attainment, by Cohort (Russia)

Model	df	G^2	p	rG^2	delta
1. O+E+D+C	63	810.40	0.000	—	30.26
2. OE+D+C	57	631.75	0.000	22.0	28.80
3. OE+ED+C	51	310.62	0.008	61.7	19.03
4. OE+ED+OD+C	47	254.12	0.008	68.6	17.67
5. OED+C	35	244.01	0.000	69.9	17.47
6. OE+ED+OD+CE	44	51.94	0.192	93.6	6.84
7. OE+ED+OD+CD	45	227.65	0.000	71.9	16.67
8. OE+ED+OD+CE+CD	42	47.72	0.252	94.1	6.65
9. OE+ED+CE+ODC	36	36.91	0.426	95.4	5.52

Notes: 1. rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 for model 1.
2. delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
3. O = class of origin, 3 levels (white-collar, working, agricultural).
4. D = class of destination, 3 levels (as per origins).
5. E = education, 4 levels (low, medium, lower tertiary, higher tertiary, as per Table 7).
6. C = cohort, 2 levels (born before 1950, born 1950 and after).

differently qualified individuals go to different class destinations. There is also a significant association between cohort and educational attainment: those born in the post-war period from 1950 onwards tend to be more highly qualified than those born in previous years. As before, the association between origins and destinations is significant, and must be included in the model in order to obtain a satisfactory fit to the data; but note that, as the comparison with model 9 shows, the association between class origins and destinations does not itself seem to vary substantially across the two cohorts. The three-way ODC interaction term just fails to improve significantly upon the fit of the simpler model.

Conclusion

We would not wish to be guilty of reading too much into our findings. There is no reason to suppose the Russian sample is unrepresentative but (in mobility terms at least) it is relatively small, and for that reason we have been unable either to investigate the fine details of intergenerational mobility or to test more sophisticated models such as those to be found in the CASMIN project. We must therefore issue the disclaimer that ours is a fairly crude analysis of a rather limited number of cases. Despite its limitations, however, the study has a number of advantages over earlier investigations of social mobility in the USSR. Most obviously, the

sample is representative (at least of contemporary Russia) and the data have been coded in a standardised fashion that permits meaningful comparison with other countries.

We have identified a number of distinctive features in Russian patterns of social mobility. The peculiar combination of a state socialist polity and mature industrial economy has resulted (for example) in a relatively large salariat, small and shrinking agricultural population, and large (though diminishing) working class – a unique mobility profile among advanced nations. What apparently is *not* unique to Russia is the mobility régime that underlies these absolute rates of inflow and outflow. Our results suggest that, like many other advanced industrial societies, communist Russia exhibited similar relative mobility rates for men and women. Furthermore, although we can find some evidence that Russian women were more equal in their relative mobility chances than are women in Britain, there are no real grounds for applying that same conclusion to men. Russian males appear to have been almost as class divided as their British counterparts.

Of course, that is a tantalising 'almost', and it points again to the relatively small size of our sample. There are hints, in the case of our findings for men, that the mobility régime among Russian and British males has not literally been identical. However, we can surely conclude, even on the basis of our rather limited sample, that earlier commentators (notably Soviets themselves) who argued that rates of social mobility in the USSR made it 'much more open' than its capitalist neighbours were in fact mistaken. It is difficult to agree with those such as Aitov (1986: 270) who have argued that Soviet society showed 'tremendous openness', increasing rates of social mobility and only 'residual social inequality', when compared with advanced capitalist states. Rather, we find ourselves inclined to conclude with Markiewicz-Lagneau (1987: 390) that the apparent successes of socialism in promoting social mobility owe little to the distinctive nature of Soviet ideology, and much to the exigencies imposed by forced industrialisation under the guidance of a massive and far-reaching state. Readers may recognise in this conclusion a tacit endorsement of Ossowski's (1957) long-suppressed thesis that the effect of socialist revolutions in increasing mobility would come from the stimulus they gave to industrialisation rather than any transformation of values. With the demise of communism in Russia itself it is at last possible to investigate seriously the accuracy of this argument. The early evidence is that Ossowski's diagnosis was sound.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. Connor's study is the most inclusive, citing data from the 1960s and early 1970s for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Strmiska's analysis relies on what are, in fact, largely the same surveys. As both authors freely admit, their cross-national findings can only be described as comparable in the loosest sense, since the data are derived from incompatible samples drawn at different times, and embrace a wide range of occupational descriptions and labels coded to broad class categories identified in a variety of ways. In their well-known attempt to transcend these issues of incompatibility, Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) compiled 149 intergenerational class mobility tables from 35 countries, but included (admittedly more recent) data for only a few state socialist societies – although, of course, none from the Soviet Union. The more rigorously comparative CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) Project, led by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), reports reliable data from the mid 1970s, but only for Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, among the formerly communist states.

2. Further technical details of the Russian survey are available from the authors on request.

3. The most recent account will be found in Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: chapter two). Because of its complex genealogy (which need not concern us here), the class scheme has variously been described in the literature as the Goldthorpe, Erikson-Goldthorpe, EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero) and CASMIN typology. In Britain, the conventional terminology is 'Goldthorpe classes', and at the risk of offending Goldthorpe's collaborators we have followed this usage here.

4. For an informative overview of the now extensive literature surrounding these issues see the exchange between McRae and Dex in Clark (1990: 117–56).

5. Some might argue that, in a country where women have had high employment rates for a considerable time, the use of fathers' occupations to indicate origin classes should also be seen as problematic. Unfortunately, occupational information on mothers was not collected, so it is not possible to pursue alternatives to the strategy here adopted.

6. The relatively small proportion of agricultural workers in our tables perhaps also reflects, to a lesser extent, a genuine ambiguity in the coding of some rural occupations. Many Russian collective farms are so large that they support a variety of manual and nonmanual jobs in what are, effectively, 'offices and factories in the countryside'. The coding of these occupations

into Goldthorpe classes raises the issue of whether the sectoral or hierarchical elements of the situation should be emphasised. The Russian survey agency tended to stress the latter.

7. See, for example, Armstrong (1959), Heitlinger (1979) and Littlejohn (1984: chapter six).

8. The Goldthorpe class *schema* is of course not undimensionally hierarchical. On the distinction between vertical and non-vertical mobility in this context see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 195). Our results for Russia are based on the hierarchical effects matrix provided by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 124) and are therefore comparable with those reported for countries included in the CASMIN project.

9. The same test appears also to have been developed independently by Xie (1992) who refers to it as the 'log-multiplicative layer effect model'.

10. Erikson and Goldthorpe have also recently proposed an alternative means of operationalising the conventional approach. This involves the principle of 'dominance' in attributing heads to households. Here, the class of the household is determined by giving priority to the conjugal partner whose labour-market participation may be regarded as dominant, in terms of employment status and level of economic activity. In practice, this means that employment takes priority over non-employment, full-time employment over part-time, and higher-level employment (judged according to the criterion of an appropriate class schema) dominates lower-level employment (see Goldthorpe 1983, Erikson 1984 and Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: chapter seven). However, this approach is less helpful, in the context of investigating cross-national similarities in class mobility régimes, than is the strategy of separating the sexes, since differences in the fit of the various loglinear models across countries are only partly substantive. Because of the way in which dominant 'heads of household' are identified, the findings are arguably also partly artefactual, being affected by (for example) the proportion of class homogeneous households, of female rather than male heads of household, and the extent both of sex segregation in labour markets and of differences in the overall shape of the class structure (as expressed in the destination marginals of the mobility table). For this reason we have confined our analysis to the separate treatment of males and females (but see note 12 below).

11. The British study was conducted by face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1,319 respondents, representing a response rate of 71 per cent, during the months of May to July 1991. Coding and other technical conventions are comparable with those for the Russian survey.

12. For the sake of completeness, we have repeated our analysis using Erikson and Goldthorpe's dominance criterion to allocate class standing to households in Russia and Great Britain, but the results do not lead us to any different conclusions. Using this approach, the common social fluidity model also provides an acceptable fit to intergenerational mobility data for the two countries ($G^2 = 22.88$, df $= 16$, p $= 0.116$, delta $= 4.26$), although the UNIDIFF test again provides a significant but slight improvement on this model (reducing the G^2 by a further 6.31, for one degree of freedom, p $= <0.05$, delta $= 2.76$). The UNIDIFF parameter estimate is 0.4323 (Russia set at zero). In other words, the fit provided by the CSF model is improved upon by the model of uniform change, and the estimate shows evidence of a monotonic tendency for the odds ratios in Britain to increase as compared to those for Russia. The point is, however, that the increase is

small and in no way justifies Soviet claims that social mobility patterns in communist Russia showed it to be 'substantially more open' than capitalist neighbours such as Britain. Our reservations about the use of the dominance approach in this context are stated in note 10 above.

13. Wesolowski and Mach (1986) argue that these two functions need not necessarily be in conflict. In their view, it is possible in a socialist society to reconcile the functions of legitimating the political system and encouraging economic efficiency if one distinguishes two types of social mobility; namely, collective class-type mobility (relevant to political legitimation) and individual-occupational type mobility (an incentive for economic growth).

14. Many of the relevant studies are summarised in Yanowitch (1977: chapter three) and Lane and O'Dell (1978: chapter seven).

15. Although there is nothing in the meritocracy thesis about differences between the sexes (the argument is about inequalities of class), introducing a control for sex does nothing to salvage the meritocratic case. The best fitting model shows the associations of OE + SED + OD ($G^2 = 51.02$, df = 75, delta = 6.47). Nor does the last of these associations itself vary by sex. (Fitting the interaction term ODS reduces the deviance in the model by only a further 5.06 for 12 degrees of freedom, p = 0.000, delta = 5.90.)

16. There is a problem of comparability here, since the British tables (unlike the Russian) include significant numbers of *petite bourgeoisie*, for whom educational credentials are probably a less important mechanism for the attainment of class privilege than is inheritance of property. Yet omitting this social class from the analysis does not substantially alter the results. The actual figures for the meritocracy model are now $G^2 = 70.84$, df = 36, p = 0.001, $rG^2 = 80.8$, delta = 9.09. Those for the model which includes the association between class origins and destinations are $G^2 = 30.01$, df = 27, p = 0.314, $rG^2 = 91.9$, delta = 3.67. Similar results, with the same implications for arguments about meritocracy, are reported in Heath *et al.* (1992) and Marshall and Swift (1993).

17. The significance of 1950 is simply that, in general terms, the earlier decades saw rather more vigorous intervention to promote the education of manual and agricultural workers via positive discrimination. The decades since have characteristically placed more emphasis on 'meritocracy'. Because our interest here is in the relative mobility chances of two (admittedly very broad) cohorts, the destination class is indicated by the respondent's first (rather than current) job, in order to control for length of time in employment.

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