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Source: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1973), pp. 605-623

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/173550>

Accessed: 19-12-2019 11:28 UTC

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Social Mobility and Intergroup Antagonism

A SIMULATION

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This paper reevaluates certain aspects of Dahrendorf's conflict theory in relation to social mobility. Specifically, the relationship between the degree of openness or closedness of the mobility opportunity structure of society and the degree of intergroup antagonism is examined. A game simulation is initiated whereby the researcher is able to create simulated situations of varying mobility opportunity and observe, by means of pre- and posttest questionnaires, the relative antagonism between groups within the situation and the participants' latent antagonism outside the simulated situation. The findings provide support for Dahrendorf's hypothesis, but also indicate that further dynamics are involved in the structure of mobility systems.

In the classical writings of Simmel, Marx, Sorel, and others, conflict is seen as a basic process in the maintenance of group structures and of ongoing intergroup relationships. Gumplowicz argued, for example, that conflict between races was the major basis for social order and change. Ratzenhofer maintained that conflict was the basic social process, following the premise of Marx. The scope and depth of this perspective was drastically reduced during much of the twentieth century when emphasis was placed on functionalism, but it found a revival in the 1950s with the writings of Coser, Dahrendorf, and others. The inherent role of conflict in intra- and intergroup relations was again reaffirmed in sociological theory.

One important characteristic of recent conflict theories is the emphasis upon class conflict, following Marx, and upon the relationship between conflict and social mobility. Dahrendorf, for example, views this relationship as inverse—closed classes being related to increased intensity in class conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959: 222). This study is an attempt to assess empirically the usefulness of Dahrendorf's hypothesis, particularly in relation to the degree of structure within the mobility system.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17 No. 4, December 1973
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Although conflict and mobility opportunities can be seen to be inversely related, this paper will attempt to show that they are also directly (positively) related—the difference being accounted for by the behavior of particular segments of society which perceive fluctuations in mobility opportunities of the other segments. Specifically, during times of substantial upward mobility, status lines become threatened; while during times of little expansion within the status hierarchy, those attempting to move upward are blocked in their attempt—both conditions producing varying rates of intergroup conflict.

Conflict

Following the perspective of Simmel (1955), Marx (1910), and Sorel (1915), it can be stated that conflict is basic to any social system and that it is not created after the fact, but exists as part of the process of group formation, maintenance, and stability. Conflict continually exists within society as a consequence of the interrelation of the various social institutions and the incompatible needs and demands which they foster.¹

Dahrendorf (1959: 218-222), in discussing class conflict in society, also follows this perspective. His analysis of the various theories of class conflict (particularly Marx's) stresses the character of conflict as being a major positive social force rather than a destructive one.

Social mobility within society is seen as a force which affects the intensity of already existing class conflict. Dahrendorf speaks of mobility in the traditional sense of intra- and intergenerational types, this variation having further ramifications for class conflict. Societies can have classes which are "closed" or "open."² "Where allocation to authority positions is based on ascriptive criteria, we find closed classes. By contrast, open classes are recruited anew every generation" (Dahrendorf, 1959: 222). He further states that the flexibility of mobility opportunities within societies

1. Coser defines social conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1955: 8). In this study, the more immediate and less general form of conflict, antagonism, will be the operational concept. Antagonism may be defined as the activity or the relation of contending parties or conflicting forces. Although Coser never specifically defines antagonism, this meaning becomes clear through usage.

2. These terms refer to the relative opportunity structure within a society "Open" refers to relative ease of upward mobility and "closed" refers to lack of opportunities available at a given point in time.

also defines a scale of conflict intensity: "There is an inverse relation between the degree of openness of classes and the intensity of class conflict."

Societies are also viewed as being stable in their "open" or "closed" state. If open or closed structures are defined on the basis of ability of a system to allocate certain social positions, the open or closed state of a society can be seen to vary. For example, during periods of warfare, new and added positions within the military will arise, thus allowing for a greater number of promotions, salary raises, and the like. In times of peace, however, the number and degree of positions becomes narrowed, creating a void in recruitment, reenlistment, promotions, salary raises, and so on. (The former situation represents an open structure while the latter represents a closed structure.)

One objective of this study, in addition to assessing the effects of openness, is to examine whether the ensuing conflict is basically "universal class conflict," as Dahrendorf suggests. We may hypothesize that the conflict, or antagonism, may often be channeled to certain issues, as opposed to being global, and may also be one sided and not mutually initiated.

For example, Dahrendorf suggests that the greater the open state of mobility within a society (that is, the flexibility of the opportunity structure), the less the interclass conflict. It is also suggested here that an open system can and does lead positively to the intensity of conflict. The assumption is that in urban-industrial societies there exists a pervasive value system of upward mobility (Mizruchi, 1964). In this type of system, when extensive mobility is predominant, status positions which were formerly secure become threatened, which may produce antagonistic reactions. In another case, when the opportunities for mobility are structurally blocked (for example, through lack of jobs, economic recession, few new occupational positions emerging), given the value system of upward mobility, conflict is most likely to originate from those segments of society which are blocked and not from those segments which are secure. Not only, then, does the intensity of conflict vary according to the structural opportunity for mobility, but the origin of the conflict shifts as well. Dahrendorf's basic hypothesis may essentially hold, but the crucial issue may be the qualifications placed upon it by the conditions of who may or may not achieve mobility, and which positions as well as value systems may or may not be threatened by that mobility.

Mobility

In discussing mobility, emphasis is usually placed on the movement in and out of social positions. In situations which present the conditions for an open class system—i.e., increased demand as well as opportunity to fill desired and important positions—upward mobility will take place. However, the formerly stable status positions of the upper ranks (or the ranks which are being expanded) become threatened. Former power relationships, status claims, and perceived rank within the system are threatened by a relative decline of the position. Studies have suggested that right-wing extremism in the United States may be associated with the dimensions of class which are being challenged (Jackson, 1967; Bell, 1964; Vander Zenden, 1960; Rush, 1967). Political movements with issues of job insecurity and income are characteristic in times of general economic decline.

Likewise, when power or status is being challenged, movements concerning themselves with ideological issues arise. Here, the prevalent modes of expression are labeling and scapegoating. Movements of this type most often occur in times of rapid social mobility when those occupying the previous positions are threatened by the newcomers (Neumann, 1964; Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950; Killian, 1970).

In reference to insecurity, the concept of relative deprivation has relevance. Using relative deprivation to understand the relative loss of position experienced by those in previously secure positions, it can be seen on the basis of empirical study (Henry and Short, 1955) that a greater sense of loss is felt by those who, relative to other groups, decline more rapidly or increase more slowly (in terms of economic standing). The extent of antagonistic responses may be directly related to the perceived relative loss of position for those who were previously secure. Studies on the political orientation of “skidders” (Lopreato and Shafetz, 1970; Wilensky and Edwards, 1959; Blau, 1956), have indicated that behavior tends to correspond to the variables of this study, i.e., a tendency to act in ways which are antagonistic to outgroups. Thus, it is probable that antagonism will be more severe where status is threatened than where mobility is blocked. Further empirical evidence (Lipset, 1960) suggests that variations in religious affiliation, membership in extremist social movements or nativistic social movements, as well as political differences, can be explained, in part, by the variations in the dynamics of mobility opportunity.

Upward mobility here is defined as the movement either into newly

created positions or into vacant positions in traditional occupations within the hierarchy. Mobility may also entail the vertical interchange among positions, such as promotion and demotion within a bureaucratic organization (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956).

The status levels across which mobility is desired are extensive, but the manifestation of this value may be minimized at the very upper and the very lower status levels within the stratification structure. Gans (1962) has shown that those at the lowest extremes of social status do not generally subscribe to the pervasive values of achievement and upward mobility. Similarly, Vidich and Bensman (1958) find a lack of participation in community affairs on the part of those at the extreme lower levels of the social ranking system. At the other extreme, it is suggested that the very upper classes do not seem to perceive threat to their social position (Baltzell, 1966).

With this in mind, we shall examine that part of a social structure characterized by upward mobility and those who are affected by the actual and perceived opportunities for mobility.

In sum, then, we may hypothesize:

- (1) The greater the status threat, the greater the intergroup antagonism.
- (2) The greater the mobility blockage, the greater the intergroup antagonism.
- (3) Antagonism is more likely to be displaced in the direction of institutionally scapegoated groups than expressed directly at those within the conflict situation.
- (4) Greater antagonism will be exhibited by those members of groups which are status threatened than by those groups which are mobility blocked.

Method

THE USE OF SIMSOC

Data were obtained through the use of the game simulation, SIMSOC (Gamson, 1969). Students were randomly assigned to one of four groups which represented small regions within a society and reflected many of the mechanisms which occur in the "real" world. These represented experimental conditions within the game. Trade is instituted, political power is gained and lost, regions may become economically strong or fail, wars may be started, internal social control agencies started, and so forth.

Utilizing SIMSOC the researcher sets up conditions within the regions

to simulate certain elements of social mobility within a society. Mobility was stressed by the researcher (in the experimental groups) as extremely important and desirable—achieving mobility was seen as a condition for the successful outcome of the exercise. Social mobility in this experiment consisted of relatively improved social conditions of the individual groups, as measured by the positive change of the national indicators (within the simulation, the indicators were number of deaths, unemployment, absentees, investments in industry and in research and conservation, and welfare services). In order to motivate the participants to achieve mobility for their group, the researcher offered to those successful groups (regions in the game context) a grade of “A” for the exercise, while those who were members of unsuccessful regions would receive correspondingly lower grades for the exercise.

The emphasis on mobility of the group over the individual is twofold. Conceptually, although the theories are not specifically limited to group mobility (as opposed to individual mobility) within the system, the general interpretation and studies of mobility emphasize group over individual mobility, in terms of the ultimate consequences to society (Blau and Duncan, 1967). Secondly, in order to control for the possibilities of strategies employed by individuals to maximize their own mobility over that of the groups, specific rules were stated which tended to channel individuals into group-centered action. Although there were opportunities to change groups, few individuals tended to do so (only six of 140 actually changed groups during any of the sessions.)

Given this situation, the experimenter simulated the condition of an open or closed mobility opportunity structure. This was done by setting the “level of scarcity” within the societies. Scarcity was instituted by making available to the total society a number of subsistence and travel tickets which covered relatively smaller proportions of members. Subsistence and travel tickets were needed in the game for members of one region to travel to another (to transact business) and to remain as contributing members of the total society. In a high-scarcity condition, 25% fewer of the tickets were given to the society. The distribution of these tickets was the responsibility of specifically selected members of specifically selected groups (or regions of the society). Therefore those groups (or regions) which had “selling agents” for the travel and subsistence tickets were thought (by the participants) to be at a distinct advantage in controlling the affairs of the society.

A scarce condition within this simulation would represent a closed system for mobility opportunity—without the subsistence or travel tickets,

a region stood much less chance in achieving the goal of mobility. Potential threat to the high-status groups was created by making more tickets available to lower-standing groups. Blocked mobility of the groups at the lower end of the strata was created by holding back the number of tickets given to them.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The type of experimental design employed in this study is the Before/After with four experimental groups and one control group. In Experimental Condition 1 (E1) the subject groups were exposed to status threat. Their social position within the experimental situation was in jeopardy from those groups below. The dimension of blocked mobility was tested on E4 (the lowest group, being thwarted in attempts at upward mobility). E2 and E3 acted as "controls" within the experimental contexts. That is, while not directly experiencing status threat or blocked mobility as do E1 and E4 respectively, they generally respond in more of an antagonistic fashion than the control group.

The control group (C) was necessary, as exposure to the various dimensions of social mobility was not controlled by the experimenter. While social mobility was greatly stressed in the four experimental conditions, its importance was diminished in C. Therefore, in C, the social mobility opportunities were not manipulated and were not stressed by the experimenter. It is then possible to make the comparison of various measures of intergroup antagonism, on the basis of the effects of the independent variables alone (status threat and mobility blockage).

The original *n* was 140. That is, 140 participated in the game simulation throughout the nine sessions. The analysis, however, is based upon an *n* of 72. The difference occurred because some subjects who did not take both the pre- and posttests. This large sample was randomly distributed throughout all groups and therefore does not constitute a patterned bias in the analysis. This was determined by *t*-tests for differences of means for a

TABLE 1
EXPOSURE TO EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES

Variable	<i>Experimental Conditions</i>				<i>Control Group</i>
	<i>E1</i>	<i>E2</i>	<i>E3</i>	<i>E4</i>	
Status threat	yes	no	no	no	no
Mobility blockage	no	no	no	yes	no

random selection of items on appropriate pre- or posttests of those who completed both. T-tests were all not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Questionnaires were administered one week before the start of the simulation. Scales for the independent variables were constructed from items taken from the Anomie Scale (Srole, 1956) and the Authoritarian Scale (Adorno et al., 1950). The dependent variable scale items were a modification of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (1959). The posttest was administered after the final sessions of the simulation were completed.

MOBILITY BLOCKAGE

Blockage is defined conceptually as involving structural inhibitions to the attainment of upward mobility. Theoretically, it is in closed rather than open systems that blockage is highest. In this experiment, blockage was manipulated through the dispensing of varying quantities of "travel tickets" and "subsistence tickets." These tickets were necessary for individuals to travel to other regions to conduct business, and to contribute to the maintenance of the society and their own regions.

Blockage was manipulated in that E4 had the least number of power positions (tickets and so forth) of the experimental groups. This was not changed throughout the experimental sessions. The experimenter adjusted the situation so that while other groups were able to obtain power positions and higher ranking, those in E4 were generally unable to do so. Their ranking remained low, with the prospect of achieving a low score for the exercise.

The scaled items, having five alternatives of agree to strongly disagree, were

- (1) There is little chance for advancement unless a person has connections.
- (2) Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.
- (3) The future looks very dismal.

Blockage was validated by the experience of being thwarted, as expressed by persons in the posttest.³ As indicated in Table 2, the mean value in the posttest expressed by persons in E4 is 4.86, by comparison to

3. Items were scaled in a Guttman-type analysis (1950). The reproducibility of the blockage scale is .90 (Mer = .70). Mer-maximum error reproducibility substitutes the sum of the nonmodal responses for the sum of the responses in the denominator of the conventional Cornell technique

TABLE 2
MEAN SCORES—BLOCKAGE SCALE

<i>Experimental Conditions</i>	<i>Pretest</i>	<i>Posttest</i>	<i>D (post-pre)</i>	<i>n</i>
1 (threat)	14.20	8.33	(-) 5.87	17 ^a
2	13.08	11.54	(-) 1.54	13 ^a
3	15.00	14.26	(-) .74	10 ^a
4 (blockage)	3.50	4.86	(+) 1.36	9 ^a
Control (all groups of regions)	23.26	17.61	(-) 5.65	23 ^a
Total				72

a. T-test for difference of means:

- E1 $t_{(32 \text{ df})} = .156$ N.S.
 E2 $t_{(24 \text{ df})} = .33$ N.S.
 E3 $t_{(18 \text{ df})} = .11$ N.S.
 E4 $t_{(16 \text{ df})} = 1.59$ $.10 < p > .05$
 C $t_{(44 \text{ df})} = 1.33$ N.S.

a mean of 3.50 in the pretest. One-tailed t-tests for difference of means were used to determine the degree of statistical significance and to indicate an ability to reject the null hypothesis at an acceptably high level, as well as the direction of change. In comparison to the other experimental groups (and control group), the tests do indicate that people in the high blockage condition were more likely to feel thwarted.

STATUS THREAT

Status threat is defined conceptually as that perception of the incumbents of a social position that their status, or other dimensions of the position, is being challenged. Threat is operationally defined in the context of open or flexible mobility systems, thus creating the situation of high mobility for some and insecure positions for those formerly in secure levels of the ranking structure.

Status threat was measured by a Guttman-type scale of items related to relative security in a social position. The questions again had five

$$\left(1 - \frac{\text{error}}{\text{total responses}} \text{ versus } 1 - \frac{\text{error}}{\text{nonmodal responses}} \right)$$

Relative strength of an item is assessed by the frequency of agreement which is scored according to the complement of the frequency. Thus, the frequency becomes the metric which converts an ordinal to an interval scale (Abrahamson, 1959).

alternatives ranging from agree to strongly disagree. The reproducibility of this scale is .90 ($Mer = .70$). The threat scale consisted of the following items:

- (1) There is just so much money for the average working person; what one group gets is at another's expense.
- (2) Many more people would be willing to increase opportunities for minority groups if it would not threaten their own position.
- (3) Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.
- (4) People don't only want to get ahead for the sake of it, but really want to do better than others.

Threat was experimentally manipulated by varying the power distributions to the four experimental conditions. Initially, the region which was to receive the conditions of status threat was given the largest number of power positions. This total number was to be related to the ranked outcome of the various groups at the end of the exercise. However, the researcher indicated to the participants that the ranking changed. The reported change had the region with the most power positions occupying a lower rank and thereby producing a lower potential grade for the exercise.

An analysis of Table 3 indicates that the scale scores are indeed valid in that the degree of threat, as measured by the mean difference scores of the pre- and posttest questionnaires, varies in the predicted direction. E1

TABLE 3
MEAN SCORES—THREAT SCALE

<i>Experimental Conditions</i>	<i>Pretest</i>	<i>Posttest</i>	<i>D (post-pre)</i>	<i>n</i>
E1 (threat)	79.12	120.00	(+) 40.88	17 ^a
E2	91.15	93.85	(+) 2.70	13 ^a
E3	135.56	122.78	(-) 12.78	10 ^a
E4 (blockage)	76.00	73.00	(-) 3.00	9 ^a
Control (all groups of regions)	132.39	146.74	(+) 14.35	23 ^a
Total				72

a. T-test for difference of means:

- E1 $t_{(32 \text{ df})} = 2.32$ $p < .025$
 E2 $t_{(24 \text{ df})} = 1.004$ N.S.
 E3 $t_{(16 \text{ df})} = .47$ N.S.
 E4 $t_{(18 \text{ df})} = .78$ N.S.
 C $t_{(44 \text{ df})} = .81$ N.S.

TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLES: EXPERIMENTAL VERSUS INDIVIDUAL
EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Est. of Variance</i>	<i>F</i>
(a) Blockage				
Total	5,325	48	111	
Explained	735	3	245	2.402
Unexplained	4,590	45	102	
p < .10 eta = .28				
(b) Threat				
Total	128,918	48	2,686	
Explained	27,289	3	9,096	4.03
Unexplained	101,629	45	2,258	
p < .05 eta = .40				

indicates a higher rise in the mean difference scores than any of the other experimental and control conditions, as well as statistical significance only in the group predicted to have received and demonstrated status threat.

The predicted increase should occur in the experimental conditions, which were hypothesized to experience the structural conditions relating to status threat.

There are two conditions which deviate from the hypothesis. E2 increased by 2.70 points. However, by comparing this increase with the magnitude of the increase within E1, the positive nature has minimal effect. C also increased in terms of threat. Ideally, C should have either stayed the same, or decreased. However, the fact that the increase is very small, as compared to the increase of E1, suggests that the experiment indeed tapped the threat dimension.

Analysis of variance tests of these independent variables (Table 4) show statistically significant relationships indicating that the experimental effects are indeed operating more effectively than individual effects.

INTERGROUP ANTAGONISM

Intergroup antagonism is conceptualized as the struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, or resources where the aim is to injure, eliminate, or otherwise harm the opponent, as well as the activity-con-

flicting forces. It is the more immediate form of the general term conflict.

The number of “wars” or arrests by police forces which were initiated between the various regions were used to reflect the degree of intergroup antagonism—at an action, rather than at an attitudinal level—while a modification of the Bogardus social distance scale was used to measure the extent of (displaced) antagonism toward various selected social categories.⁴ The items in this scale were:

- (1) How would you feel if a brother or sister of yours were to marry someone who was:
- (2) How would you feel about introducing your best friend to someone who was:
- (3) How would you feel about allowing to come to dinner at your home someone who was:
- (4) How would you feel about allowing to enroll in your school someone who was:
- (5) How would you feel about allowing to move into your neighborhood someone who was:

Findings

Within the simulation situation there are several examples of generated antagonism within the predicted experimental conditions. A comparison of the arrest records of the experimental and control conditions follows. Arrest operationally defines antagonism within the game situation. A notable fact is, that of all police forces created by the players, only one was of a cross-regional composition.

Two comparisons made are: the arrest ratio representing the total number of arrests to the total number of existing police forces; and the arrest record, of number of arrests for each experimental and control group.

Here it can be seen that there is a higher ratio of arrests to police forces in the experimental groups than in the control groups, illustrating, in part, the antagonistic forces operating in the experimental context.

4. The specific ethnic categories were not represented in any systematic way in the simulation situation itself, but were selected to observe the variations in and the direction of antagonistic attitudes toward outgroups. Presumably the patterns of blockage and of threat would not only account for variation of antagonism within the simulation but would account for variation of antagonistic orientations of a displaced nature.

TABLE 5A
ARREST RATIO (overt antagonism of groups)

Number of Police Forces (experimental groups)	= 4
Total Number of Arrests (experimental groups)	= 5
Arrest Ratio = 1.25:1	
Number of Police Forces (control group)	= 6
Total Number of Arrests (control group)	= 2
Arrest Ratio = 1:3	
n = 140	

TABLE 5B
ARREST RECORD (experimental groups)

	<i>(Threat)</i>			<i>(Blockage)</i>
	<i>E1</i>	<i>E2</i>	<i>E3</i>	<i>E4</i>
Experimental Conditions				
Number of police forces	2	0	0	2 = 4
Total number of arrests	3	0	0	2 = 5
Control Conditions				
Number of police forces			= 6	
Total number of arrests			= 2	
n = 140				

Here it can be seen that the conditions of threat and blockage are operating. In those conditions most affected by threat and blockage (E1 and E4, respectively), the consequence appears—arrests (or overt antagonism) to the other parties within the total situation.

Within the control group, there were only two arrests, indicating a much lower level of antagonism in the control group than within the experimental groups.

Although none of these findings in this particular section is conclusive, due to the lack of substantial numbers, the general direction and differences in patterns do, in part, confirm the hypothesis of threat and blockage being positively related to antagonism.

Another measure of antagonism in this study looks at the relationship between the closeness one feels toward particular outgroups and the structural condition hypothesized to produce antagonism. Based on the previous theoretical discussion of Dahrendorf, it is assumed that varying

degrees of openness or closedness relating to mobility within the society lead to varying degrees of antagonism. Within the experimental situation here, it would be assumed that those regions exposed to the variable of blockage (E4) or of threat to existing positions (E1) would exhibit the greatest degree of antagonism. Also based on previous literature, it is hypothesized that this antagonism would be directed outward to traditionally scapegoated groups within the society.

In order to test this hypothesis, the Bogardus Social Distance Scale is employed. If antagonism is being generated, perceived social distance should increase, and if there is no antagonism within a particular social situation, then perceived social distance will decrease or stay the same.

Three ethnic groups were used based on their relative social distance as reported by Bogardus (1959). Canadians had the lowest Racial Distance Quotient (RDQ), ranking second of thirty sampled; Jews had a moderate RDQ, ranking sixteen of thirty groups; and Blacks had the greatest RDQ (of the three in this sample), ranking twenty-seven out of thirty in the Bogardus study. The results are shown in Table 6.

Comparing the difference scores, one can see that there is a definite pattern in the direction of the stated hypotheses. Looking at the Black category, there is a net increase in their social distance scores within E1 and in E4, while there were net decreases in all other experimental situations as well as in the control group (comprising all regional distinctions). Following the hypothesis, it was predicted that the members of these two experimental conditions (E1 and E4) would, indeed, increase their social distance perceptions, indicating greater overt antagonistic attitudes toward these groups. Among the Jewish social grouping, although there was no change in the difference scores within E1, there was an increase in E4, with negative differences within C and within E3. Within that social grouping which served as a control, the Canadian, there was only one moderate increase (within the E1) and the rest were negative.

The apparent interpretation is that social groups which had relatively high racial distance quotients, and which could be considered to be recurrent scapegoat groups, are, within the simulation situation, again the focus of antagonism. The more-accepted social group, however, sustains no such antagonism. This supports the literature and the hypothesis which suggests that outward antagonism (as well as antagonistic attitudes) is repeatedly focused in the direction of scapegoated groups. The structural situation might produce antagonism, but the way of expressing this antagonism is clearly institutional.

In addition, the high positive changes toward the Blacks (+10) and Jews

TABLE 6
 MEAN BOGARDUS SOCIAL DISTANCE SCORES OF ANTAGONISM
 TOWARD SELECTED ETHNIC CATEGORIES BY SPECIFIC EXPERIMENTAL
 AND CONTROL GROUPS

	<i>Experimental Conditions</i>				
	<i>(Threat)</i> E1	E2	E3	<i>(Blockage)</i> E4	<i>Control</i> (all 4 groups)
Blacks					
Pre	95.9	105.4	115.6	95.6	103.8
Post	105.9	98.5	104.4	98.9	100.0
D	+10.0	-7.9	-11.2	+3.3	-3.8
Jews					
Pre	89.4	89.2	97.8	77.8	102.6
Post	88.8	88.7	93.3	85.6	91.3
D	0	0	-4.5	+7.8	-11.3
Canadians					
Pre	83.5	88.7	96.7	85.6	89.1
Post	84.7	82.3	93.3	81.1	85.2
D	+1.2	6.4	-3.4	-4.5	-3.9
All					
Pre	89.6	94.4	103.4	86.3	98.5
Post	91.4	89.8	97.0	88.3	92.2
D	+1.8	-4.6	-6.4	+2.2	-6.3
n=					
Total=	17	13	10	9	23

NOTE: Mean and difference scores are multiplied by a factor of ten. All differences less than 1 are scored as 0.

(+7.8) occur in those regions which experienced different experimental effects. It might be interpreted that the Blacks are institutionally perceived as potential threats to others' positions within the society and the Jews as representing a force which, in part, deprives others from achieving upward mobility. This tends to be borne out by the data, which show the highest degree of antagonism toward Blacks in that condition in which residents experienced the greatest perceived threat to their social position. In contrast, the other highest degree of antagonism showed up against the Jews in that condition which was exposed to the experimental condition of mobility blockage. In no case did the Canadian social group experience an increased focus of antagonism.

In order to demonstrate the experimental effects present in this simulation, it is necessary to show the degree of antagonism (based on the

social distance measure) for all the individuals without reference to the experimental condition. Antagonism measures are first given for all subjects with reference to the various social groupings (Table 7A). This is followed by antagonism measures for all social groupings together (Table 7B).

It is evident that the dependent variable, antagonism toward outgroups, is dramatically present when the experimental effects are present. Within the experimental groups, there is just a slight decrease in social distance (antagonism) and a greater decrease within the control group. Looking at

TABLE 7
BOGARDUS SOCIAL DISTANCE SCORES BY ANTAGONISM TOWARD
SELECTED ETHNIC CATEGORIES BY EXPERIMENTAL AND
CONTROL GROUPS

	<i>Exp. Cond.</i> <i>(all exp. groups)</i>	<i>Control Group</i>
(A) Social Groupings^a		
Blacks		
Pre	103.1	103.8
Post	101.9	100.0
D	-1.2	-3.8
Jews		
Pre	88.6	102.6
Post	89.1	91.3
D	0	-11.3
Canadians		
Pre	88.6	89.1
Post	85.4	85.2
D	-3.2	-3.9
n=	49	23
Total=		72
	<i>Exp. Groups</i>	<i>Control Group</i>
(B) Social Groupings' Scores on Pre- and Posttests by Experimental and Control Groups		
Pretest	93.4	98.5
Posttest	92.1	92.2
D	-1.3	-6.0
n=	49	23
Total=		72

a. All totals are multiplied by a factor of ten for comparative purposes.

the results in Table 7A, the social distance is similar to that of Table 7B, decreasing (or in one case, remaining the same) in relation to the specific social groupings in the experimental and in the control group. Comparing these findings with those previous, which show the antagonism as related to the specific experimental condition, it is seen that the experimental effects are indeed operative.

The hypothesis predicting that antagonism will be more severe where status is threatened than where mobility is blocked is dealt with in Table 6. If this hypothesis is supported, then E1 will indicate greater antagonism than E4. Looking at the scores of the conditions for all social groupings, one can see that the antagonism score is, indeed, lower for E1 than for E4. However, when we control for social grouping, the antagonism score for E1 within the Black grouping is much higher than for E4 in that grouping. Again, this is not the case with reference to the Jewish category. The control factor, Canadian, illustrates though that E1 does in fact increase over E4. Referring to the previous interpretation concerning the difference in direction of antagonism, it can be readily seen that E1 exhibits greater antagonism toward those social categories which might be perceived as institutional threats to status position. The hypothesis, then, tends to be confirmed—that it is more severe to be status threatened than to be mobility blocked.

Discussion and Conclusions

The results of this study support the original contention that the proposition stated by Dahrendorf concerning the relationship of the openness of a society and the degree of conflict, is only partially complete. While the data showed support for this theory, they also showed that the theory was lacking in further breadth and clarity. The proposition that increased openness of classes is related to the decreased intensity of conflict is conditionally supported. The additional condition of decreased openness of classes as being related to increased intensity of conflict was also shown.

Perhaps the most important implication of this research is that while both propositions are true, the essential factor is the point of origin of the ensuing conflict. The origin of conflict shifts, depending upon the structural condition present within a society at any given time. With increased openness in the mobility structure, the conflict originates at the point at which there is most to lose—the formerly secure status positions

throughout the stratification-ranking structure. With decreased openness in the mobility structure, the conflict originates at that point at which frustration is greatest—those unable to achieve that which is highly valued within the society. Although the simulation pointed out the different origins of intergroup antagonism, it must be stressed that in a noncontrived situation, i.e., real society, these status groups occur at all levels. Thus status threat occurs not only in the upper ranks of the stratification system, but at the middle and lower ranks as well; and mobility blockage occurs not only at the lower, but at the middle and upper-middle ranks. The implication is that intergroup conflict is not only a result of fluctuations in, for example, the economic sphere or the political sphere, but will occur at all status points and within all time periods in society. As the control group in this study pointed out, one way to reduce the intensity and the origin of conflict at all levels is to try to alter the value system and potential goals within a society. The ramifications of this might be themselves far too disrupting for a society to even consider. However, once the nature of intergroup conflict is understood and the conditions under which it takes place are more fully known, then steps may be taken toward regulation of that conflict.

The findings related to the direction of other studies on discrimination and scapegoating (Neumann, 1964; Adorno et al., 1950; Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950; Lenski, 1966). To restate, the findings in this study showed that there is a strong tendency to direct antagonism in the direction of institutionally scapegoated groups rather than to those groups which are not viewed as recurrent scapegoats. In the same vein, it was shown that status threat (or downward mobility—skidding) is a condition which is likely to produce greater antagonism (and other dysfunctional consequences) than is mobility blockage.

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