SOCIAL MOBILITY, NORMLESSNESS AND POWERLESSNESS IN TWO CULTURAL CONTEXTS *

MILES E. SIMPSON
Stanford University

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This study examines the effects of occupational and educational mobility in two Latin American countries, Costa Rica and Mexico, and in the United States. We hypothesized that the mobile person in Costa Rica or Mexico will experience more normlessness (anomia) than nonmobile persons from his class of origin and his class of destination; but in the United States, where mobility is said to be more commonly expected, the socially mobile person will experience no more normlessness than nonmobile persons in his class of origin or class of destination. Powerlessness was expected to be a function of occupational level and downward occupational and educational mobility.

We found some evidence that: (1) educational and occupational mobility produces intense normlessness in the more ascriptive societies but not in the United States; (2) downward educational mobility produces an intense sense of powerlessness in all three countries; (3) there are large differences between the United States and the Latin American countries in terms of both normlessness and powerlessness; and (4) a negative relationship between normlessness and occupational level appears in the United States but not in Latin America.

THIS paper focuses on certain "effects" of mobility in two cultural contexts: (1) in a more ascriptive system which Germani (1966:371) describes as a society in which mobility is not "expected and institutionalized," and (2) in an achievement oriented system where mobility is expected and institutionalized. We hypothesized that upward and downward mobility will have a different impact on "normlessness" and "powerlessness" in these two contrasting cultural contexts. In testing this hypothesis, we first examined the relationship between occupational position and normlessness and powerlessness in both an achievement oriented society and an ascriptive society; on the basis of these results, we sought to determine the impact of occupational and educational mobility on normlessness and powerlessness in both types of society.

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The Consequences of Occupational Mobility

The consequences of occupational mobility were discussed by a number of early sociologists, e.g., Durkheim (1897) and Cooley (1909). In their writing, they tended to emphasize the "negative" aspects of mobility. According to Sorokin (1927), occupational mobility increases mental strain and the probability of mental disease; increases superficiality and impatience; favors skepticism, cynicism, and "misoneism"; increases social isolation and loneliness; and facilitates the disintegration of morals. All of these consequences stem from the loss of investment in standards, values, and social objects associated with the mobile person's class of origin. The general proposition is that encountering new standards leads to no standards. And, if one severs ties with his class of origin, he may never again have meaningful ties with anyone.

Such extreme negative consequences, although foreign to the American experience, are consistent with research findings. Warner and Abegglen (1955) report extremely upwardly mobile executives to be socially isolated; Ellis and Lane (1963) find that "lower class" students at an exclusive school seem very socially isolated; Struckert (1963) finds that physical and occupational mobility reduces contact with family of origin.

However, neither Warner and Abegglen nor Ellis and Lane compare their mobile sample with class of origin members, and therefore neither study can determine whether social isolation is caused by mobility.

Although occupational and educational mobility may have "negative" consequences for some individuals under certain circumstances, it need not have "negative" consequences for all people under all circumstances. Blau (1956) identifies three consequences of mobility: social uncertainty, acculturation, and overconformity. Summarizing the literature on social mobility, Blau argues that occupational mobility creates a dilemma for the mobile individual which has consequences for his ". . . integrative social bonds" (1956:291). The upwardly mobile person must decide whether to sever social ties with his class of origin and seek social acceptance in his class of destination or to remain a part of his class of origin. If the upwardly mobile person is successfully integrated into the class of destination, he becomes acculturated and thereby adopts the standards and behavior which are compatible with his new companions' outlook. If he fails, and in the process loses his ties with his class of origin, he will become socially insecure. And, when the upwardly mobile person is partially accepted by his class of destination, he may overconform to what he takes to be the class of destination's standards and values.

Most studies of effects of mobility show the mobile person to have attitudes and behavior intermediate between the class of origin and the class of destination. This pattern implies Blau's acculturation. Berent (1952) reports that the upwardly and downwardly mobile average fewer children than the nonmobile lower class and more children than the nonmobile middle class. Voting behavior in Europe (Lopreato, 1967; Lipset and Bendix, 1954), union membership (Lipset and Gordon, 1953), prejudice (Hodge and Treiman, 1966), and authoritarianism and autonomy (Simpson, 1968), all show the mobile in a position intermediate to the class of origin and the class of destination.

An exception has been noted by Lopreato and Chafetz (1970); they find that Italian skidders (downwardly mobile) are more "leftist" in political orientation than either their class of origin (nonmanual) or class of destination (manual). Although they do not present comparative data, Lopreato and Chafetz advance a "contextual" argument based on the Italian skidders' perceived "opportunity" for advancement.

While the upwardly mobile person who is not fully integrated into his class of destination may experience negative effects (Blau, 1956), the downwardly mobile person confronts stress under all conditions. If he maintains social ties with his class of origin, the invidious comparison between their economic position and power will be a continual "problem." If he affiliates with his class of destination, his past habits and attitudes will make it ". . . most difficult for him to accept them unequivocally and to become completely accepted among them" (Blau, 1956:294). Hence, downward mobility is almost invariably accompanied by stress and a low level of social integration. However, we have little evidence, other than Struckert's (1963) finding, that the level of social integration is lower for the downwardly mobile individual than that of his class of origin.

The Cultural Context of Occupational Mobility

If we assume that occupational mobility's consequences depend on the extent to which the mobile person is integrated into either his class of destination or his class of origin, then the social acceptability of the occupationally mobile person to the class of destination becomes critical for his social integration. Stress in social mobility can come from at least two sources: (1) the class of destination stigmatizes the class of origin, so that regardless of the upwardly mobile person's attempts to make himself acceptable, he cannot be socially integrated into his class of destination. (2) Stress occurs when the class of destination does not stigmatize the class of origin, but the subcultural differences between the two occupational classes are so great that mobile individuals have difficulty learning and internalizing the norms and mores of the class of destination (Durkheim, 1897; Sorokin, 1927).

Both forms of blockage can lead to conflicts in the interpersonal sphere. When an

upwardly mobile person encounters a member from his class of destination, their definitions of each other conflict. The occupationally mobile person (Ego) may see himself as a member of his class of destination, while Other may see Ego more as a member of Ego's class of origin. Conflict is inherent in this situation. As Bloombaum (1964) points out, occupational mobility is a special case of status inconsistency which, according to Sampson (1963), theoretically involves conflicts in expectations. In both cases, given that Ego and Other have difficulty anticipating the responses of each other, they will experience tension and mistrust.[1]

The sociological literature suggests that, in contrast to the United States and most industrial societies, in Latin America there is a strong cleavage or stigma between the "blue-collar" and the "white-collar" occupations. Whyte (1962) emphasizes the importance of this cleavage in Peru and concludes that men would work for much less money in a futureless white-collar position rather than work at a well-paying blue-collar job. Summarizing the evidence on Latin America, Beals (1953) concludes that the blue-collar/white-collar division is the main social cleavage in most racially homogeneous Latin American nations. The distinction between white-collar and blue-collar occupation is of extreme importance; therefore, mobility between working class and white-collar positions should produce the greatest distress.

Normlessness and Powerlessness

The most important disaffection variable in sociology has been Marx's alienation. Seeman (1959) expanded the concept to five subdimensions: powerlessness, normlessness, social isolation, meaninglessness, and self-estrangement. Dean (1961) developed scales for powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation. Waisanen (1963) regards the subdimensions of alienation as consequences of elements of a social system that an individual has failed to acquire; hence he must have as part of his self system: (1) familiarity with the system's rules, norms, and goals; (2) sentiments or affective ties with others; and (3) power or productivity for exchange within the system. If the person lacks familiarity with the system's rules and norms, he will suffer normlessness. If he lacks power for exchange, he suffers powerlessness. If he lacks affective ties, he suffers from social isolation. Seeman's and Waisanen's normlessness and Durkheim's anomia or anomy are overlapping concepts. While anomy goes under several labels, it represents disaffection from any normative order.

Occupational Class and Normlessness (Anomia)

Previous research with the various measures of anomia show a constant but weak relationship between anomia and measures of social class (Meier and Bell, 1959; Mizruchi, 1963; Srole, 1956; Dean, 1961; Simpson and Miller, 1963). This research was done in the United States, where, as we noted before, achievement and mobility are emphasized. According to Merton (1957), one form of anomie[2] results from a discrepancy between socially approved norms and goals and the socially structured capacity of a society's members to strive in accord with socially approved means. When expectations are out of line, adaptation to the resulting "anomie" usually takes the form of deviance—new goals or means. Applying this scheme to the American scene, Merton noted a discrepancy between the Horatio Alger ethic—"strive and succeed" —and the capacity and resources of the lower class person to achieve his goals. Mizruchi (1963) makes a similar point: a lower class person holds the mobility goals, or at least the consumptory part of the goals (houses,

[1] Unfortunately, the two types of blockage, stigma and subcultural cleavage, create an "identification problem" (Blalock, 1967). Both predict similar results in that, given a wide subcultural cleavage, both schemes will predict blocked social mobility into the class of destination. We have no data with which we could discriminate between stigma and cultural cleavage.

[2] Anomia is the individual variant of anomie. Anomie refers to cultural or normative confusion within a group or society and, therefore, is the property of the group. Anomia refers to the normative confusion within an individual and, therefore, is a property of the individual.

cars, etc.), but he does not possess the means (knowledge and skills, usually) to reach these goals. In summary, American society has created a discrepancy by emphasizing ". . . material success and (by failing) to emphasize the means of attaining this goal" (Mizruchi, 1963:50).

Anomia, according to the Merton and Mizruchi notion, stems from frustration of ambitions. Two research reports substantiate this view. Meier and Bell (1959) found that anomia was high when a person had both high subjective social class standing and low objective social class standing, even after controlling for objective social class. Wilensky (1966) reports that persons who attempted "moving up" and failed (blocked) were more anomic than persons who either did not attempt mobility or made a successful attempt. Here we have direct evidence for Germani's (1966) assertion that the person feels stress when mobility is expected but does not occur.

Will the relationship between social status and anomia, as observed in the United States, hold in a more ascriptive society where people less frequently expect mobility, believing it either illegitimate or not possible? As most "developing societies" are confronted with modern technology and more modern achievement oriented values, Smelser (1964) posits a clash between the more traditional agrarian status system and values, and modern industrial-commercial values. This clash, independent of occupational mobility, should produce a high level of anomia. If we assume that the upper and middle classes will be involved more with modern technology than the lower classes will, the least anomic, or the most "eunomic," segment of an ascriptive society should be the bottom segment. Therefore, in a more ascriptive society, we do not expect the negative correlations between social status and anomia (normlessness) that others (Simpson and Miller, 1963; Mizruchi, 1963; and Meier and Bell, 1959) observed in the United States; instead, within ascriptive societies we expect a positive correlation between social status and anomia.

Occupational and Educational Mobility, Normlessness and Powerlessness

Our major hypothesis, broadly conceived, is that in an ascriptive society occupational and educational mobility leads to normlessness. Our assumption is that in ascriptive societies upward social mobility will not follow upward occupational mobility. Although the occupationally mobile person may see himself in terms of his highest rank, his occupational class of destination, others—in particular, persons with high ascriptive status—tend to see the mobile person in terms of his class of origin. This results in partially blocked mobility which Germani (1966) links with anomia. Therefore, for normlessness and upward occupational mobility we expect that: *in ascriptive oriented societies, upwardly mobile individuals will experience more normlessness than nonmobile individuals.* Because the system will respond less to his achieved and more to his ascribed statuses, the person will find that he confronts conflicting standards and expectations. Socially, he desires, and sees as just, social acceptance by those whose positions equal his, but instead they socially respond to him according to his past statuses —statuses which he cannot control.

We expect quite different results in an achievement oriented society, where the class of destination is less likely to block the social mobility that normally ensues with occupational mobility. We hypothesize that: *in an achievement oriented society, upwardly mobile individuals' experience of normlessness will be a monotonic function of the level of normlessness felt by nonmobile members of their class of origin and class of destination.* Therefore, $Y_{up} = f(CO, CD)$, where Y_{up} = normlessness experienced by an upwardly mobile person; CO = his class of origin; and CD = his class of destination. This normative conflict experienced early in life should have some carry-over into adulthood, and normlessness must be unlearned after entering the class of destination.

As opposed to upward mobility, Blau (1956) argues that men who are downwardly mobile tend to cling to aspirations that they cannot reach and hold onto values and attitudes that they do not share with members of their class of destination. Furthermore, their interaction with their class of origin should be painful, due to their incapacity to meet exchanges; hence: *within both ascriptive and achievement oriented societies, the*

downwardly mobile person will experience more normlessness than will the nonmobile person. Downward mobility in both cultural contexts should result in a higher sense of normlessness.

Powerlessness, as opposed to normlessness, should not vary in its relationship to occupational mobility from one culture to another. Instead, it should be a function of the amount of socioeconomic power the individual possesses in relationship to the amount of power held by others in his frame of reference. Cross-nationally downward mobile persons, due to their knowledge of the socioeconomic power held by their class of origin, will tend to experience more powerlessness than nonmobile men in their class of destination; hence: *in all societies, downwardly mobile persons will experience more powerlessness than nonmobile persons.*

Methodology

Sample: The sample was drawn from the "Five Nations Study," a coordinated research project conducted in the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Finland and Japan. For this analysis, Finland and Japan are excluded. Both the United States and the Costa Rican samples were national probability samples of the adult civilian population over 21 years old; the United States sample has 1,528 cases; Costa Rica, 1,040. These samples were selected in such a manner that as a group they constitute a close approximation (within sampling tolerance) of the adult civilian population.

Unlike the United States and Costa Rican samples, the Mexican sample was a stratified sample which oversampled urban areas. The findings are based on 1,126 persons who constitute a close approximation to the population of Mexico living in urban areas of 2,500 persons or more, and a rural subsample which includes 288 cases, with all rural samples located within 15 miles of an urban area.

Although our present sample is too small for a detailed analysis of mobility, three occupational levels can be used. In addition to the white-collar/blue-collar split, we will include a blue-collar skilled and blue-collar unskilled distinction (a similar breakdown for white-collar positions would result in cells with too few cases for analysis).[3] This breakdown allows both a meaningful division as well as sufficiently large n's for each cell for both head of household and socializer.[4]

For the cross-national comparison of occupational level we will include a fourth category, rural occupations, which includes farmers (big), farm managers, small farmers or renters, fishermen, hunters, lumbermen, and similar occupations. Our educational mobility analysis will involve a three level classification scheme: 0–5 years, 6–8 years, and 9–20 years.[5]

Because women's experience of mobility may differ from men's—in particular when mobility occurs through marriage to men who are not mobile but from a higher socioeconomic family—we will run a separate analysis controlling for sex. Unfortunately, when the sex analysis is performed, education and occupation must be collapsed to two levels: 0–8 and 9+; and white-collar and blue-collar.

The measures for this study consist of two-item scales, with each item selected on the basis of pretests using a larger pool of items.[6]

The normlessness items are: (1) I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.

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[3] White-Collar: a. professionals and technicians; b. managers, officials, administrators, public officials, small proprietors and dealers; c. office workers; d. salesmen. Blue-Collar Skilled: (1) farmers (big) and farm managers; (2) craftsmen and factory workers; (3) special workers—chauffeurs, technical assistants, etc.; (4) service workers and similar. Blue-Collar Unskilled: (1) small farmers or renters, fishermen, hunters, lumbermen, etc.; (2) miners, etc., manual and day laborers; (3) persons who have not worked before, i.e., female heads of household without occupational history, but excluding unemployed and pensioners.

[4] Head of household refers to the chief income earner in the household. We reason that the status of the members of a household is determined by the status of the head. Socializer refers to the head of household when the respondent was growing up. The socializer is usually the respondent's father, but this is not true in every case.

[5] No cross-national comparison of educational level will be made; instead we will concentrate on the mobility hypotheses—that is, hypotheses which relate movement within one national context.

[6] After samples of American and Costa Rican college students took the full alienation scale, the items which best identified the top 25% on the subscale were included, and the items that best discriminated the bottom 25% were selected.

(2) People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll ever have anything to depend on. The powerlessness items used are: (1) Sometimes I have the feeling that other people are using me. (2) There is little chance to get ahead in this life unless a man knows the right people.

These items were cross-translated between English and Spanish in an attempt to make them cross-culturally equivalent. While various ways to cope with the problem of conceptual equivalence have been suggested (Almond and Verba, 1963; Phillips, 1959–1960; Anderson, 1967), the problem of "comparative meaning" remains unresolved. In part, we are protected by the complex nature of our hypotheses: the interactive effects of three variables within a single culture. Whatever the source of mobility effects in Costa Rica, it is not differences in the meaning between the Spanish or English form of the items. Only Smelser's (1964) hypothesis, which involves a direct cross-national comparison of the levels of normlessness and powerlessness, requires that concepts be strictly equivalent.

Method of Analysis

Mobility effects, status inconsistency effects, and structural effects have raised a number of methodological problems (Hyman, 1966; Lenski, 1964; Blau, 1960; and Blalock, 1967). These constructs involve a "statistical interaction," or an effect which is due to a nonlinear combination of two independent variables; therefore, such "effects" must be examined after the main additive effects have been removed. Duncan (1966) demonstrates the perils of treating a "mobility effect" as a main effect, or dividing the sample into nonmobile, upwardly mobile, and downwardly mobile. Three possible solutions are available: dummy regression, factorial analysis of variance, and a multiplicative model which may be tested for goodness of fit (Jackson and Burke, 1965). In every case, systematic variation in cell size is a problem, in that the larger cells will be overrepresented and the small cells underrepresented. In my opinion, a satisfactory method for testing hypotheses must compare cells' mean, median, or whatever measure, without regard for cell size, except in determining overall significance. The method of unweighted means (Winer, 1962) is such a method and is employed in this study.

The hypotheses call for an unusual double comparison. For example, we predict that upwardly mobile persons experience more normlessness in ascriptive societies than nonmobile persons in either the class of origin or the class of destination. This means that our hypothesis fails if either the class of origin or the class of destination has as high or the same level of normlessness. If our mobility cell is higher than the cells for the nonmobile class of origin and class of destination, we will call this a *mobility effect*. And, if the contrasts between a "mobility cell" and the nonmobile cells in *both* the mobility cells' *column* and *row* are statistically significant ($p < .05$), we will call this a *significant mobility effect*. In testing significance, we used the t-test.

Results: Occupational Level, Normlessness and Powerlessness

Our findings show that citizens of the United States experience less normlessness and powerlessness than Costa Ricans or Mexicans (see Table 1). This is consistent with Smelser's (1964) contention that "transitional" societies are in normative conflict due to the clash between traditional and modern culture and the social structure. However, normlessness could be a product of a transitional society where behavior outside of "loyalty" groups may be poorly defined, and traditional societies may reflect their "traditional base." But this hypothesis cannot be tested by our data.

As hypothesized, in the United States normlessness correlates negatively with occupational level, but normlessness does not correlate negatively with occupational level in Costa Rica and Mexico. Instead, the relationship appears nonlinear, with the least "normless" group being rural occupations in Mexico and the blue-collar unskilled in Costa Rica.

Powerlessness appears to be negatively related to occupational level when urban occupations are examined, but, with the excep-

Table 1. Normlessness and Powerlessness by Head of Household's Occupation and Country

Occupation	Normlessness		
	United States	Mexico	Costa Rica
White-Collar	5.61 (560)	8.06 (359)	7.58 (239)
Blue-Collar Skilled	6.33 (614)	7.91 (391)	7.91 (258)
Blue-Collar Unskilled	7.01 (185)	8.07 (287)	7.11 (345)
Rural Classes	6.45 (163)	7.52 (377)	7.53 (198)
	Powerlessness		
White-Collar	5.13 (560)	7.07 (359)	5.96 (239)
Blue-Collar Skilled	5.84 (614)	7.41 (391)	6.69 (258)
Blue-Collar Unskilled	6.58 (185)	7.60 (287)	6.77 (345)
Rural Classes	5.93 (163)	7.01 (377)	7.07 (198)

tion of Costa Rica, rural workers show less powerlessness than unskilled urban workers. The higher powerlessness experienced by urban workers may represent a "proletariat" effect. Urban workers may experience more situations where power is exercised over them, while the rural worker, no matter how poor, may possibly determine his own work schedule and therefore exercise power over himself and his family.

The higher normlessness and powerlessness in Latin America is congruent with Almond and Verba's (1963) finding that trust in others is higher in the United States than in Mexico and Italy. Almond and Verba conclude that a lack of trust has powerful consequences for the degree of participation in the political life of the country. Whatever the consequences, if our measures are comparable and not subject to some form of response bias, United States citizens have more of a sense of effectiveness and a deeper trust in the predictability of others than do Latin Americans.

Mobility and Normlessness

We hypothesized that upwardly mobile individuals would exhibit more normlessness than nonmobile individuals in ascriptive societies, and in all societies downwardly mobile individuals would exhibit more normlessness than nonmobile individuals.

Table 2 shows that Costa Rica has strong "mobility effects" between the blue-collar and white-collar classes. These significant mobility effects accompanied by a highly significant interaction lend strong support to both our normlessness and mobility hypotheses.

Mexico presents weaker effects. When both males and females are taken together, occupational mobility produces no significant mobility effects. On the other hand, the interaction is significant, and four nonsignificant mobility effects appear: two for upward mobility and two for downward mobility.

In the United States, while the statistical interaction is significant in the occupational analysis (see Table 2), no mobility effects appear. This supports our upward mobility hypothesis; that is: in achievement oriented societies, upward mobility will not produce normlessness higher than that experienced by either class of destination or class of origin. However, we find no support for our interpretation of Blau's (1956) downward mobility hypothesis. Although downward mobility may increase "social insecurity" in the United States, according to our data it produces no more normlessness than that experienced by the class of destination.

To analyze sex differences in the effects of mobility, we will analyze males and females separately (see Table 3). To do so, we must combine the two blue-collar categories and make a blue-collar/white-collar comparison. Costa Rican men and women show a similar pattern of normlessness. Although the interaction is not significant, both upward and downward mobile cells produce a mobility effect. The pattern with Mexico in Table 2 now becomes apparent: the nonmobile females from white-collar backgrounds evidence a very high level of normlessness, and for Mexican women the effects of class of origin and class of destination appear additive. Why do Costa Rican and Mexican nonmobile white-collar women differ so radically?

Table 2. Mean Normlessness by Occupation of Head of Household (OHH) and by Occupation of Socializer (Head of Household in Which Respondent Grew Up), Unweighted Means Analysis.

OHH (A)	Costa Rica			Mexico			United States		
	Occupation of Socializer (B)			Occupation of Socializer (B)			Occupation of Socializer (B)		
	BCU†	BCS	WC	BCU	BCS	WC	BCU	BCS	WC
WC	7.51* (156)	8.52** (27)	7.30 (56)	7.99 (75)	8.09* (132)	8.07 (152)	6.36 (31)	5.90 (303)	5.46 (226)
BCS	7.69 (211)	8.02 (64)	8.81** (26)	7.89* (179)	7.70 (356)	8.02 (83)	6.99 (90)	6.34 (583)	5.68 (138)
BCU	7.17 (454)	7.93 (28)	7.89* (18)	7.69 (256)	7.93* (130)	8.33* (51)	7.25 (32)	7.14 (97)	6.06 (28)
	F=5.81, p<.01, (B) F=7.71, p<.001, (AB)			F=2.92, p<.05, (AB)			F=14.52, p<.001, (A) F=15.64, p<.001, (B) F=10.22, p<.001, (AB)		

†BCU=Blue-Collar Unskilled, BCS=Blue-Collar Skilled, WC=White-Collar

*Cell mean is in predicted direction but does not meet mobility criterion.

**Cell mean meets mobility criterion and therefore is significantly different (p<.05) from both diagonal means in its column and row.

This question cannot be answered with either the data available or with our present understanding of social life in these countries.

Another anomaly occurs in the United States data: while no statistical interaction appears for either United States females or males, occupational mobility has a differential sex effect on normlessness. For men, normlessness is a simple function of head of household's occupation (white-collar/blue-collar), but for women the two independent variables (head of household's and socializer's occupations) contribute about equally to normlessness. These data support the

Table 3. Mean Normlessness by Sex (C), and Head of Household's (A) and Socializer's (B) Occupation, Unweighted Means Analysis.

A \ B	Costa Rica				Mexico				United States			
	Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female	
	BC	WC	BC	WC	BC	WC	BC	WC	BC	WC	BC	WC
WC	7.73* (91)	7.61 (31)	7.60* (92)	6.92 (25)	8.07* (86)	7.75 (65)	8.04 (121)	8.30 (87)	5.55 (166)	5.47 (102)	5.88 (168)	5.46 (124)
BC	7.48 (374)	8.09* (23)	7.35 (383)	8.81** (21)	7.91 (357)	8.16* (44)	7.68 (564)	8.13 (90)	6.42 (400)	6.17 (66)	6.67 (402)	5.85 (100)
	No Significant Effects		p<.01 (AB)		No Significant Effects		p<.05 (A) p<.05 (B)		p<.001 (A)		p<.001 (A) p<.001 (B)	

*Cell mean is in predicted direction but does not meet mobility criterion.

**Cell meets mobility criterion and therefore is significantly different (p<.05) from both diagonal means in its column and row.

socialization (Simpson and Miller, 1963) theory of anomia (normlessness); instead of being a direct response to normative conflict (Merton, 1957; Mizruchi, 1963), the level of normlessness is a subcultural phenomenon and is transmitted from generation to generation unless resocialization occurs. Mobile men in the work world are forced into interactions which expose them to the orientation of their class of destination. These interactions result in resocialization. On the other hand, women have fewer compulsory interactions with the class of destination and, therefore, have less exposure to their class of destination's subculture. Thus, while a woman's class of destination will have an effect on her level of normlessness, it will not have as intense an effect as it will on the male's level.

The educational mobility data produce these results (see Table 4): (1) In Mexico, the upwardly mobile (persons who have 9+ years of education and whose parents have 0–8 years of education) show a mobility effect. This runs counter to the Mexican occupational mobility analysis, where only men evidence mobility effects. (2) In Mexico, short range downward educational mobility (socializer, 9+ years—head of household, 6–8 years) produces an increase in normlessness, but the very few (n = 22) long range downwardly mobile evidence a "reversal," that is, a lowering of normlessness. In itself the "reversal" finding has little significance, but when we couple it with the fact that this reversal effect also occurs for Costa Rican long range downward mobility (n = 7), the effect becomes theoretically important. The reversal could reflect some social idiocy effect. Men and women who fall far short of their parents' educational attainments may be either socially retarded or socially incompetent. Another similarity appears when we look at short range downward educational mobility. In both Costa Rica and Mexico, short range downward mobility produces a strong normlessness effect. On the other hand, there is only one nonsignificant upward mobility effect in Costa Rica. Again, no mobility effects appear for the United States in the mobility data.

We can hardly claim strong support from our educational data, but the critical fact still remains: In the United States, normlessness

Table 4. Mean Normlessness by Education of Head of Household (EHH) and by Education of Socializer, Unweighted Means Analysis.

EHH (A)	Costa Rica Education of Socializer (B) 0-5†	6-8	9+	Mexico Education of Socializer (B) 0-5	6-8	9+	United States Education of Socializer (B) 0-5	6-8	9+
9+	7.63* (63)	7.96 (23)	7.58 (24)	8.27* (66)	8.14* (70)	7.55 (44)	6.00 (112)	6.47 (531)	5.51 (445)
6-8	7.71 (129)	8.14 (51)	9.44** (9)	7.93 (422)	8.00 (249)	9.00** (18)	6.41 (120)	6.45 (216)	6.18 (30)
0-5	7.37 (713)	7.57 (21)	6.14+ (7)	7.63 (479)	8.05* (64)	6.00+ (2)	7.23 (52)	6.68 (17)	5.71 (5)
	F=7.02, p<.001, (AB)			F=5.39, p<.01, (AB)			F=3.35, p<.05, (A) F=9.14, p<.001, (B) F=3.62, p<.01, (AB)		

†Years of Schooling

*Cell mean is in predicted direction but does not meet mobility criterion.

**Cell mean meets mobility criterion and therefore is significantly different (p<.05) from both diagonal means in its column and row.

+Cell mean is in wrong direction.

is a negative function of head of household's and socializer's achievements. In Costa Rica and Mexico, whatever else appears, this well-established relationship does not hold. Although significant mobility effects do not appear consistently in the Latin American data, they nevertheless are present. When contrasted with the United States, where not one mobility effect was found, the Latin American data provide strong evidence for our conception of the interrelationship among normlessness, mobility and cultural context.

Mobility and Powerlessness

In all three national samples the predicted educational mobility effects appeared (see Table 5). For the educationally downward

Table 5. Mean Powerlessness by Head of Household's Occupation and Education, and Socializer's Occupation and Education, Unweighted Means Analysis.

Occupation of Head H'hold (A)	Occupation of Socializer (B) BCU	BCS	WC	Education of Head H'hold (A)	Education of Socializer (B) 0-5	6-8	9+
Mexico							
White-Collar	7.17 (75)	7.13 (132)	6.97 (152)	9+ Years	7.42 (66)	6.87 (70)	6.00 (44)
Blue-Collar Skilled	7.28 (179)	7.25 (356)	7.04 (83)	6 - 8 Years	7.44 (422)	7.02 (249)	7.83** (18)
Blue-Collar Unskilled	7.29 (256)	7.71* (130)	7.53* (51)	0 - 5 Years	7.29 (479)	7.70** (64)	4.00+ (2)
	F=2.84, p<.01, (AB)				F=10.24, p<.001, (AB)		
Costa Rica							
White-Collar	5.96 (156)	6.44 (27)	5.71 (56)	9+ Years	5.86 (63)	5.39 (23)	4.46 (24)
Blue-Collar Skilled	6.85 (211)	6.14 (64)	6.65** (26)	6 - 8 Years	6.32 (129)	6.41 (51)	6.56* (9)
Blue-Collar Unskilled	6.91 (454)	6.57 (28)	7.28* (18)	0 - 5 Years	6.85 (713)	7.24* (21)	5.89 (7)
	F=5.21, p<.01, (A) F=3.50, p<.01, (AB)				F=5.43, p<.01, (A) F=7.29, p<.001, (B) F=5.07, p<.001, (AB)		
United States							
White-Collar	5.33 (31)	5.22 (303)	4.94 (226)	9+ Years	5.70 (112)	5.60 (531)	4.94 (445)
Blue-Collar Skilled	6.16 (90)	5.87 (583)	5.38 (138)	6 - 8 Years	6.63 (120)	6.13 (216)	6.23* (30)
Blue-Collar Unskilled	7.08 (32)	6.63 (97)	4.90+ (28)	0 - 5 Years	7.19 (52)	7.59* (17)	8.00** (5)
	F=12.35, p<.001, (A) F=13.64, p<.001, (B) F=10.81, p<.001, (AB)				F=19.75, p<.001, (A) F= 5.65, p<.001, (B) F=13.57, p<.001, (AB)		

** Cell meets mobility criterion and therefore is significantly different (p<.05) from both diagonal means in its column and row.

* Cell mean is in predicted direction but does not meet mobility criterion.

+ Cell mean is in the wrong direction.

mobile person, there is a more intense sense of powerlessness than that experienced by one who is nonmobile. The Mexican sample does have a reversed cell, long range downward educational mobility, and again this is a very small cell ($n = 2$). Also, both Costa Rica and the United States have powerful main effects, but in the case of Mexico neither main effect is significant. Occupational mobility produces no mobility effects in the United States, and weak ones in Costa Rica and Mexico. In all, educational downward mobility produces some mobility effects in each nation, which in part supports our hypothesis that downward mobility produces more intense powerlessness than that experienced by nonmobile persons in the class of destination or the class of origin.

Summary

Initially, we attempted to show that occupational mobility has a different impact on the mobile individual in different cultural contexts. Despite the weaknesses of the measures used, we find some evidence that occupational mobility in more ascriptive societies, where mobility is not commonly expected, leads to a higher level of normlessness than that experienced by the nonmobile members of the class of destination or the class of origin. In a society where mobility expectations are more common, no such mobility effects appear. Hence, our upward mobility hypothesis is confirmed and our downward mobility hypothesis holds only in the ascriptive countries.

Our analysis also reveals other cultural context effects. The relationship of normlessness with occupational prestige level in Latin America differs from that in the United States. The lower levels of the socioeconomic ladder tend to experience less normlessness than the upper and middle levels. This contrasts sharply with the mass of evidence in the United States. It would seem that the Mizruchi's (1963) and Merton's (1957) "Horatio Alger myth" explanation—that is, that the lower level holds achievement goals but not the necessary means—does not hold up for Latin America. An entirely different set of dynamics is operative there.

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