UPWARD SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE *

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That upward social mobility has a different effect on the political orientations of Europeans than of Americans is commonly accepted. Several scholars have concluded that upwardly mobile Europeans are less conservative than middle-class stables. The contrasting conclusion that in the United States upwardly mobile people become even more conservative than middle-class stables is based on a single study completed some years ago.

Here, this relationship is re-examined by analyzing data from five nationally-representative American samples over 14 years. In these samples, the upward mobiles are consistently less likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables and more likely to be conservative than the working-class stables. However, analysis of the joint effects of sex and social mobility indicates that American upwardly mobile males are more likely to approximate the politics of the class to which they have risen than are upwardly mobile females.

In recent years the conclusion that upward social mobility has a different effect on the political orientations of Europeans than Americans has become accepted by many as well-established. For example, a current introductory text on social stratification (Tumin, 1967:94) states without qualification, "In America, persons who move up into the middle class are more conservative than those born into it, whereas in European countries studied, the latter are more conservative than the former."

The evidence for this conclusion was originally presented by Lipset and Zetterberg in a pioneering article, "A Theory of Social Mobility," prepared for the Third World Congress of Sociology in 1956. Utilizing survey data, Lipset and Zetterberg contrasted the proportions of left-wing party supporters among middle-class men from divergent class backgrounds in Finland, Germany, and the United States. In the American sample presented, those middle-class men with fathers who were manual workers, i.e., the upwardly mobile, were 4% less "left-wing" (Democratic) in their 1948 party choice and 8% less so in 1952 than the middle-class respondents who had middle-class fathers. In contrast, the 1949 Finnish data indicated the upwardly mobile were 17% more left-wing than the middle-class stables, and the 1953 German sample showed a similar ordering with the upward mobiles 12% more leftist than those who were both raised in the middle class and presently located in it by occupational definition.

No explanations for this cross-Atlantic difference were offered in "A Theory of Social Mobility," but, when the same data were presented three years later in Bendix and Lipset's *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (1959) with the addition of consistent information from Swedish and Norwegian samples, it was set in the theoretical context of status striving and rejection. Here Lipset and Zetterberg suggest that the relatively greater tendency to take a left-wing orientation among the upward mobiles in Europe in contrast with the United States can be accounted for by factors forcing the upwardly mobile Europeans to retain links to the class of origin to a greater extent than upwardly mobile Americans. The authors hypothesize that greater class differences in life style and concern with an individual's

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class background in European society lead the socially mobile individual who has risen from a working-class background to experience status rejection and frustration. As a consequence, the upwardly mobile European is viewed as less likely to embrace the conservative political norms of the class to which he has risen than his American counterpart. Lipset and Zetterberg speculate that, since upwardly mobile Americans are less likely to suffer status rejection after rising to the middle class, there is relatively little pressure for the mobile individual to retain the left-wing political orientation of the working class from which he came. No suggestion is made by the authors, however, to account for the political "over-conformity" of upwardly mobile Americans to the political norms of their class of destination.

Other scholars, basing their research on the pioneering work of Lipset and Zetterberg, without further confirmation of their American results, have developed alternative interpretations to explain the apparently different political consequences of upward social mobility for Europeans versus Americans. For example, Anderson's (1963) sample of Swedish men and women showed, as did the earlier Swedish sample cited by Lipset and Zetterberg, that the upwardly mobile Swedish respondents did not adopt the political orientation of the class to which they had risen, but were politically intermediate in party choice between the more extreme positions of the class stables.

Rather than attributing differing political consequences of upward mobility to differential amounts of status rejection in Sweden and America, Anderson views political socialization as the key variable. Specifically, he argues that a greater degree of political socialization among Swedish workers than among American workers is the most likely reason upwardly mobile Swedes maintain the working-class party preference to a greater extent than their upwardly mobile counterparts in the United States. He points out that a complex organizational structure links the labor unions to the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, and grass-roots participation by workers and their families in politically-relevant educational, recreational, and economic activities is encouraged. Anderson contrasts the politically involved Swedish workers with what he considers the more politically apathetic blue-collar Americans, dominated by local political machines that discourage any involvement other than periodic voting for machine candidates.

Lopreato (1967) examines the differences between the political effects of upward social mobility on Europeans and Americans from a perspective which tests more directly the explanation offered by Lipset and Zetterberg. After presenting data from a sample of Italian male family heads showing that, in Italy as in the other European nations sampled, the upward mobiles were less likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables, Lopreato examines the influence of discrepancies in consumption styles and experienced status rejection on the political orientation of the upwardly mobile as suggested by Lipset and Zetterberg. His evidence indicates that the former variable is not a significant factor accounting for the difference in the political choice of the Italian middle-class stables and upward mobiles, for with level of consumption controlled, the latter remain proportionally more left-wing in political orientation than the former. However, status rejection is found to be a key variable in Lopreato's analysis, for those upwardly mobile Italians in his sample who perceived restrictions in social relations between the classes were significantly more likely to be left-wing in political orientation than those who did not perceive class relations as restricted. Furthermore, the latter group of upward mobiles does not differ politically from the middle-class stables.

Although Lopreato's analysis suggests that status rejection is the key variable distinguishing the experiences of the upwardly mobile in the United States and Europe, he points out that an absence of status rejection among upwardly mobile Americans in contrast to upwardly mobile Europeans can not account for the finding that the upwardly mobile are *more* likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables in this country. To account for this phenomenon, Lopreato suggests another variable, the "excessive" emphasis on success and achievement in American society. In response to this ethos, Lopreato speculates that the successful upward mobiles express their gratitude for a social order enabling them to rise by "over-

conformity" to the political norms of the middle class.

These examples indicate that the original findings reported by Lipset and Zetterberg have produced both rich and imaginative speculation attempting to account for the conclusion that the political behavior of the upward mobiles in the United States is different from that of their counterparts in Europe. Yet while a number of studies have presented evidence tending to verify the original finding that European upward mobiles are less likely to be conservative than those stable in the middle class, the single finding indicating that the upward mobiles are more likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables in the United States has not received similar confirmation.

Thus the primary purpose of this paper is to examine rather closely the evidence on the political orientation of the upward mobiles and middle-class stables in this country in an effort to determine the validity and reliability of Lipset and Zetterberg's original conclusion that American upward mobiles are more often Republican than the middle-class stables. This re-examination of the evidence will involve a review of some of the relevant literature as well as a presentation of more recent survey data relating social mobility to political orientation.

Contradictions in the Literature

Certain studies purporting to have examined the relationship between social mobility and political orientation in the United States are often cited. Taken as a set, they reveal the need for greater systematic empirical examination of the topic. Not only are serious problems of limited sampling and inadequate operationalization evident, but the contradictory findings further emphasize that the issue of the specific relationship between upward mobility and partisanship in the United States has not yet been settled.

One of the earliest attempts to survey the relationship between upward social mobility and political party choice is presented by Patricia West (1953). Working with what she states is a nationwide representative sample of nearly 10,000 college graduates, West examines the effect of social mobility on political orientation by contrasting the party identifications of "self-made men" and "privileged men." She defines the "self-made man" as a person who "had to earn the bulk of his way through college and has gone on to reach the top economic brackets." The "privileged man" has reached the same level of economic success, but did not have to earn any of his college expenses. To test for possible changes in the relationship as individuals grow older, West divides her sample into men over the age of 40 and under 40.

West concludes that the upwardly mobile "self-made men" do in fact differ in their political party choice from the "privileged men." She finds the upwardly mobile in her sample *less* likely to identify with the Republican party than the middle-class stables and *more* likely to withhold from party identification by choosing the "Independent" affiliation. However, finding that these differences are less in the older age group than in the younger, West reasons that as upwardly mobile men grow older they do tend to increasingly "forget" the social patterns and political habits that are widespread among those in their old economic stratum.[1]

The next study, explicitly comparing the politics of the upwardly mobile with that of the middle-class stables, is reported by Maccoby *et al.* (1954). Their sample was limited to young people: 339 respondents in Cambridge, Massachusetts, between the ages

[1] West's findings are cited by Blau (1956:291) to the effect that ". . . the upwardly mobile are more likely to vote Republican than people who have remained workers and less likely to do so than those who have originated in the middle class." Blau argues that these findings support his contention that political orientation follows the "acculturation" pattern whereby the behavior of both the upwardly and downwardly mobile is located intermediately between that of the two nonmobile categories, the stable middle class and the working-class stables. Blau also cites *Voting,* the landmark study of political behavior by Berleson *et al.* (1954), as furnishing evidence similar to that provided by West. However, a careful examination of the *Voting* material reveals that the analysis of social mobility and political orientation conducted therein does not permit such a definitive conclusion. Berelson *et al.* limited their analysis to a comparison of two groups: (1) those upwardly mobile *relative* to their fathers and (2) those whose occupations are the *same or lower* than those of their fathers. Not only are the downwardly mobile unsegregated from the class stables, but the relative measure of mobility employed fails to identify the present social position of the respondents in any fixed way.

of 21 and 24. The authors find that the upward mobiles in their sample are basically similar in political orientation to the middle-class stables and conclude that (1954:39) "young people who are socially upwardly-mobile tend to adopt the political behavior of the group into which they have moved." However, when the degree of willingness to make a definite party choice is examined, a difference is found between the two groups. The authors summarize that (1954:34) ". . . the mobile young people seldom consider themselves Independents: they seem to make a definite party choice more often than non-mobile people."

Greenstein and Wolfinger (1958) consider social mobility to be among the factors which may possibly influence change in party loyalty. They hypothesize that upwardly mobile individuals conform to the political norms of the class they have joined in order to gain security and recognition of their new social position. However, they state that their data did not provide support for this thesis, for they found that "suburbanites who were objectively upwardly mobile . . . were more Democratic than were 'stable' suburbanites who were at the same occupational levels, suggesting that these individuals tend to adhere to familial party loyalties" (1958:479). From these data, the authors conclude that "we found no association between 'objective' upward mobility and Republican allegiance . . ." (1958:481).

The contradictory nature of the findings in the literature on upward social mobility and political orientation in the United States is illustrated in Chart 1. The summarized conclusions there show that in addition to the view that upward mobiles are more likely to be conservative than middle-class stables in the United States, other findings exist to argue that the two groups are politically indistinguishable or that the upward mobiles are even less likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables.

Thus this brief review of the literature cautions against a ready acceptance of the widely disseminated view that in the United States there are a greater proportion of conservatives among those who have made an upward change in class than among those who have remained stable in the middle class. In fact, the only conclusion that seems warranted by the evidence developed until now is that *no* consensus has been reached by scholars who have touched on the subject of upward social mobility and political orientation in the United States. An examination of more recent national samples seems imperative in this circumstance.

The Evidence from National Samples

The data for the following analyses are taken from nationally representative samples of the American electorate drawn by Michigan's Survey Research Center. To form the social mobility categories employed here, respondents were first placed in manual and

Chart 1. Conclusions Concerning the Relative Conservatism of Upward Mobiles and Middle-Class Stables in the United States.

Study	Sample	Upward Mobiles Relative to the Middle Class Stables Are--
West, 1953	Male college graduates, early 1950's	Less likely to be conservative while young Similar when older More likely to be independent
Maccoby et al., 1954	Cambridge youths between 21 and 24, 1952	Similar in conservatism (while young) Less likely to be independent
Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956	National, males, 1952	More likely to be conservative
Greenstein and Wolfinger, 1958	Suburbanites, 1952	Less likely to be conservative

nonmanual occupational categories according to the nature of their usual job or, if the respondents were housewives, according to that of the head of the household. Unemployed and retired respondents were classified according to their usual occupation or that job held prior to retirement. Farmers, students, and those failing to provide occupational information were eliminated from this study.

After being classified on the basis of their present occupationally defined class, respondents were also categorized on the criterion of whether the father's occupation was manual or nonmanual when the respondent was growing up.[2] Those in the sample who failed to give information on their fathers' occupations or who had farming fathers were excluded from this analysis. Thus the category of "middle-class stables" in this study consists of those respondents who both currently hold middle-class jobs and were raised as children in middle-class homes. The "upward mobiles" are those who now hold white-collar positions, but were raised in homes where the father was a blue-collar worker. Finally, the "working-class stables" are those in the samples who are both blue-collar in origin and also presently hold blue-collar jobs.

Unfortunately, information on the occupation of the respondent's father has often been omitted from questionnaires in the past. The 1952 study conducted by the Survey Research Center at Michigan appears to be the first nationally representative American sample which taps all the variables necessary for the formation of occupationally defined categories of intergenerational social mobility. However, respondents in the 1952 samples were not only questioned on their party preferences in regard to the then upcoming presidential election between Stevenson and Eisenhower, but were also queried about the party they had supported four years earlier during the Truman-Dewey contest for the presidency. Although such long-term recollections are of dubious validity as indicators of past behavior, the remembered party preference for the 1948 election is included in this analysis to extend the time span covered to as early a date as possible.

Figure 1 presents in graphic form the proportions in each social mobility category indicating a Republican party preference for six elections extending from 1948 to 1966. Thus it indicates both an absolute level of political conservatism within the mobility categories over time and also permits a comparison of the proportion of conservatives among the upward mobiles relative to that among the middle-class stables and the working-class stables. The most striking finding to be drawn from these data is that, despite the different candidates and issues involved in the various contests, in none of the six elections do the upward mobiles ex-

FIGURE 1: PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TWO-PARTY CHOICE, BY SOCIAL MOBILITY CATEGORY, 1948–1966



The number of voters on which these proportions are based are, for the middle-class stables, upward mobiles, and working-class stables, respectively: 1948: 180, 128, and 213; 1952: 211, 145, and 249; 1958: 187, 161, and 222; 1960: 264, 189, and 315; 1964: 193, 187, and 241; 1966: 110, 103, and 126.

[2] Since father's occupation can vary over time, it is important to note the specific timepoint for measurement selected in a given study. For the purposes of this study, father's occupation "when the respondent was growing up" is a pertinent reference point, since it pinpoints the most likely time of social-class socialization influences on political behavior. However, other studies may ask for father's "main" or "last" occupation. The use of such different reference points could lead to variation in the assignment of certain cases to mobility categories, and this type of variation may be a source of some of the disparate findings in mobility studies.

hibit a greater proportion of conservatives than do the middle-class stables.

Although the evidence for five of the six elections indicates a somewhat minor difference between the upward mobiles and the middle-class stables in the proportion of two-party support going to the Republicans, the tendency for a greater proportion of conservatives to be found among the middle-class stables than among the upward mobiles is a consistent one. In the 1964 sample, however, the upward mobiles actually exhibit a pattern of party support closer to that of the working-class stables than to that of the middle-class stables.[3]

Viewed in terms of a *rank-ordering* of the three social mobility categories on the dimension of political conservatism, no variation is found over the six election years for which evidence is presented. In each case examined here, the middle-class stables have the greatest proportion of conservatives; the working-class stables, the smallest proportion of conservatives, and the upward mobiles hold an intermediate rank-order position between the two other categories, even though they generally are closer in political tendency to the stable middle class. Thus these data indicate that the upward mobiles in the United States do not differ as markedly in political orientation from their counterparts in Europe as has been assumed.

How then are these data to be reconciled with those presented by Lipset and Zetterberg upon which the "European-American" difference in the effect of social mobility on political orientation was based? It will be noted that the major difference between this analysis and the one conducted by Lipset and Zetterberg is that in this analysis both men and women have been included in the sample, whereas Lipset and Zetterberg utilized only male respondents. Thus an examination of the relationship between social mobility and party choice with a further breakdown by sex of respondent should prove to be useful.

FIGURE 2: PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TWO-PARTY CHOICE OF MALE VOTERS, BY SOCIAL MOBILITY CATEGORY, 1948–1966



The number of voters on which these proportions are based are, for the middle-class stables, upward mobiles, and working-class stables, respectively: 1948: 73, 70, and 109; 1952: 92, 77, and 138; 1958: 100, 77, and 143; 1960: 108, 87, and 181; 1964: 91, 79, and 132; 1966: 53, 50, and 59.

When an examination of the political orientations of voters by social mobility categories is conducted for male respondents alone, a far more complex picture emerges than that seen in Figure 1 utilizing all respondents. In contrast to the invariably smaller proportion of conservatives among the upward mobiles relative to the middle-class stables seen there, Figure 2 shows that in three of the six elections the upwardly mobile males were slightly *more* likely to be Republican than the nonmobile members of the middle class. Yet in the 1952, 1964, and 1966 elections the upward mobiles show a lower level of support for the Republican party than do the middle-class stables, although only in the 1964 election is the level of conservatism of those who had moved up into the middle class significantly lower than that of the middle-class voters born and raised in that class.

Since Figure 2 shows fluctuation from election to election in the relative proportions of Republicans among middle-class stable and upwardly mobile men, it would seem useful

[3] Any attempt to account for the exceptional political behavior of the upward mobiles in 1964 has as its necessary point of departure the fact that the 1964 election had an unusually one-sided outcome. Perhaps in a year when Republicans were to go down to an overwhelming defeat, the middle-class individuals whose class backgrounds did not predispose them to vote Republican, i.e., the upward mobiles, were particularly sensitive to the unpopularity of the Republican cause.

to examine the political difference between the two mobility categories when the data for the six elections are aggregated. Among male voters, the difference in proportions supporting the Republican party over the six elections between upward mobiles and middle-class stables has been only an insignificant 2%, with the upwardly mobile men exhibiting only a slightly smaller proportion of conservatives than the stable men in the class to which the mobiles have risen.[4] Thus our samples seem to demonstrate that, among American men, upward mobiles tend to be politically indistinguishable from middle-class stables and much more Republican as a group than are the working-class stable men.

Figure 3 shows that the political orientations manifested by the upwardly mobile females in the samples under study differ rather markedly from those of upwardly mobile males relative to the class stables. Contrary to the findings in Figure 2, in none of the six elections do upwardly mobile women indicate a proportion of support for the Republicans greater than that of the women who were both raised, and remain, in the middle class.

However, considerable fluctuation over the six-election period is manifested in the degree to which the upwardly mobile women approach the pattern of party choice of the class-stable females. At one extreme, in the 1952 sample the upwardly mobile women were virtually indistinguishable in their distribution of party preference from women stable in the working class—differing by only one percentage point—yet during the 1966 congressional elections, only three per cent less of the upwardly mobile women chose the conservative party than did the middle-class stable women. But when the evidence from all six elections is considered, it is clear that upwardly mobile women tended toward a pattern of partisanship intermediate between that typically exhibited by middle-class and working-class women who have remained in the classes in which they were raised. During the time examined here, the upwardly mobile women were, in the aggregate, less Republican (differing by 14 percentage points) than the women who were stable in the middle class and more conservative (by 13 percentage points) than working-class stable women voters.

FIGURE 3: PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TWO-PARTY CHOICE OF FEMALE VOTERS, BY SOCIAL MOBILITY CATEGORY, 1948–1966



The number of voters on which these proportions are based are, for the middle-class stables, upward mobiles, and working-class stables, respectively: 1948: 107, 58, and 104; 1952: 119, 68, and 111; 1958: 87, 84, and 79; 1960: 156, 102, and 134; 1964: 102, 108, and 109; 1966: 57, 53, and 67.

Thus, in examining the relationship between social mobility and political partisanship, sex of respondent emerges as a highly influential variable. Among the class stables, whether they be nonmobile in the middle class or the working class, men and women do not differ markedly in their political orientations when the results from the six elections studied are aggregated. Among the working-class stables, women are slightly more Republican than men, 31% to 30%, while the same relationship holds among the voters stable in the middle class, 58% of the women being Republican compared to 57% of the men. But among the upward mobiles, the females are less Republican

[4] Since the 1964 election survey results differ from the others markedly, calculations were also conducted with data from this survey eliminated. However, little difference was found in the overall results, for upwardly-mobile and middle-class stable men diverged even less politically (by only one percentage point) in the five-election aggregate.

than men over the six elections, 44% in contrast to 55%.

The differing effects of the sex of respondent on political orientation for the various social mobility categories can also be viewed in absolute terms. A majority of both men and women middle-class stables support the conservative party over the six elections, while a majority of both male and female working-class stables support the Democratic party when all six surveys are considered. However, the sexes display a divergent degree of conservatism among the upward mobiles. Over the six elections for which data are available, a majority of the male upward mobiles indicate a conservative political choice, but a majority of the female upward mobiles demonstrate a liberal political orientation in party choice.

The inclusion of sex as a third variable in the analysis of the relationship between social mobility and political orientation does to some extent explain the discrepancy between the findings concerning this relationship in the United States presented here and those offered by Lipset and Zetterberg in 1956. Whether the sample of upward mobiles is confined to males alone or contains respondents of both sexes has an important bearing on the inferences which the researcher is likely to draw about the relationship between social mobility and political orientation. At the same time, the fact that in political orientation upwardly mobile males tend to resemble the male voters in the middle class to which they have risen, while upwardly mobile females tend much more to occupy a political orientation intermediate between those of class-stable females, should not obscure the conclusion reached in this paper that the upward mobiles in the United States exhibit no tendency toward being the social mobility grouping having the highest proportion of support for the more politically conservative party, contrary to what has hitherto been assumed for the American case.

Another problem suggested by the literature on the political behavior of the upward mobiles remains for closer examination. Previously reported findings were contradictory regarding the question as to whether the upward mobiles are more or less "Independent" in their political orientation than the class stables. This question is interesting from a theoretical viewpoint, for cross-pressure theory suggests that the upward mobiles are more likely to be subject to political cross-pressures than the class stables and, hence, should be expected to respond to these cross-pressures by failure to make a party choice to a greater extent than class stables. Thus, cross-pressure theory leads to the hypothesis that a larger proportion of the upward mobiles will indicate an "Independent" political orientation than the class stables.

To test this hypothesis, we are forced to select a dependent variable, as an indicator of political orientation, different from the one utilized up to this point in the analysis. In the United States, the voter is essentially offered a dichotomous choice at the polling place, with very little means of expressing an "Independent" political orientation in the vote. But if the respondent's subjective partisan identification is utilized as the indicator of political orientation, rather than his vote intention or recollection, then we have a measure of the extent to which the mobiles versus the class stables think of themselves as "Independents," rather than as "Democrats" or "Republicans."

Figure 4 presents this information in graphic form. It shows that over the period

FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS CHOOSING "INDEPENDENT" AMONG THOSE MAKING CHOICE OF PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION, BY SOCIAL MOBILITY CATEGORY, 1952–1966



The number of respondents on which these proportions are based are, for the upward mobiles and class stables, respectively: 1952: 174 and 594; 1958: 264 and 657; 1960: 245 and 740; 1964: 236 and 572; 1966: 164 and 458.

for which data are available, the hypothesis that upwardly mobile citizens are more "Independent" in political orientation than class stables is generally supported. Even though the difference between mobiles and class stables in proportion of "Independents" is statistically significant in the 1958 and 1960 samples only, the rank ordering of the two groups of respondents is invariant on this dimension in the five samples drawn over a 14-year period. In those five samples the proportions of respondents identifying themselves as "Independents," rather than as partisans of either of the two major parties, average five percentage points greater among the upward mobiles than among the class stables.

These data, then, support both cross-pressure theory and West's (1953) finding that those who move upward are more likely to be "Independent" than the class stables. Correspondingly, they contradict the disparate finding by Maccoby *et al.* (1954) that upwardly mobile youths are less likely to be Independent.

Summary of Findings and Implicattons

This study set out with the primary purpose of re-examining the proposition that upward mobiles in the United States are even more likely to be conservative in political orientation than middle-class stables. The material presented here appears to contradict this contention. In the first place, findings in the literature on social mobility and party choice are sharply divergent, thus lending no consistent support to the proposition. In the second place, the evidence developed from the six elections from 1948 to 1966 indicates a slight tendency for American upward mobiles to exhibit a lower level of support for the more conservative party than the middle-class stables. While this finding was seen to be primarily attributable to the females making up the national sample, analysis of the male subsample failed to disclose any strong or constant support for the view that male upward mobiles are more likely than male middle-class stables to be conservative in political orientation.

A number of implications would seem to follow from the new findings presented here. First, the attempt to link differences between certain aspects of European and American society to differential political effects of upward social mobility is obviously premature if the gross differences between the politics of upwardly mobile Americans and Europeans that had previously been assumed do not exist. Of course, prior to Lopreato's effort, theoretical explanations for the presumed cross-Atlantic difference in the effect of upward mobility on political behavior focused on reasons for the greater liberality of European upward mobiles, rather than the greater conservatism of American upward mobiles. However, Lopreato's application of the concepts of "excessive" emphasis on achievement and a "cult of gratitude" to the American scene completed the theoretical work begun by Lipset and Zetterberg, who had emphasized the political potency of status discrepancy and rejection of the upwardly mobile in the European setting. Thus Lopreato's work even more pointedly built on the assumption that upward mobiles in the United States are more likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables of this country, an assumption that now appears in doubt.

But even if the rank ordering of the conservative support—proportionally given by upward mobiles, middle-class stables, and working-class stables—is invariant in all the nations where such data exist, whether they be European or American, more subtle differences may well be found in the politics of the mobiles in various countries. It follows, then, that the cross-national analysis of social mobility and political orientation should be characterized by more refined measures of the political variable than has been the case until now. For example, the degree to which the intermediate rank-order position of the upward mobiles departs from the rank-order positions of the class stables could be expressed on a standardized scale and reported in future research on the topic. Possibly, European upward mobiles would be found to rank closer to the working-class stables than American upward mobiles on such a scale.

In addition to developing more discriminating measures of the political orientations of mobiles relative to the class stables, this analysis suggests the usefulness of utilizing a number of samples as the basis for general-

ization. To this time, most speculations on mobility and politics have been based upon one or, at best, two samples from a given nation. Yet, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the party choice of the mobiles relative to the class stables shows considerable variation from year to year within the United States. It is not unlikely that this range of variation would be found in other nations as well. Thus theories developed on the basis of data from only one sample are likely to be misleading.

Another conclusion which would seem to follow from this analysis is that the political orientation of the upward mobiles should be compared not only with that of the class to which they have risen, but also with the party choice of the class which they have left behind. Indeed, it may well be that the tendency of those doing research on social mobility and politics to concentrate their attention on a comparison only of the politics of the upward mobiles and the middle-class stables has led to confusion in the attempt to sort out the causal factors that influence political change.

Causal complexity is introduced by the fact that these two groups diverge on more than one dimension. Not only have the upward mobiles experienced social-class change while the middle-class stables have not, but also the two groups are distinguished by their disparate class origins. Thus any differences between the two groups cannot without further analysis be attributed exclusively either to factors associated with class change versus class stability on the one hand, or to influences stemming from divergent class backgrounds on the other hand. In each case, there is a failure to control for the potential influence of the other type of variable.

The difficulties which can arise from focusing attention exclusively on one of these two sets of factors when comparing upward mobiles with middle-class stables is illustrated by conclusions drawn by various sets of researchers whose reports have been reviewed previously. For example, Greenstein and Wolfinger found that the upward mobiles were less likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables in their sample. Concentrating only on class background differences for an explanation of this finding, they concluded that early political socialization of the mobiles exercised an over-riding influence on their adult political orientation and that, therefore, upward mobility had no effect on partisan allegiance.

Yet other scholars, when faced with the problem of explaining differences in the politics of the upward mobiles and middle-class stables, have concentrated exclusively on explanatory factors associated with the individual's experiences *after* undergoing class change. Lipset and Zetterberg's status rejection explanations, Anderson's speculations about the continuing political influence of labor unions, and Lopreato's investigation of perceived restrictions on inter-class social relations have all presumed that the crucial variables influencing the politics of the mobiles are factors operating while the mobile respondent is an adult. They have ignored the potential influence of class background factors and the possibility that the political differences found between mobiles and stables were determined *before* class change ever took place.

Thus the analysis of causal factors underlying the social mobility and political orientation problem would be greatly advanced if the political orientations of the upward mobiles were not only compared to those of the middle-class stables, but were also compared to those of the working-class stables. In addition, a further aid to causal analysis would be the examination of longitudinal data on the partisan choice of mobiles and stables. While the independent variable, class change, in the relationship is treated in a manner which allows for analysis of change over time, the dependent variable, political orientation, commonly is not. But since we do not know at what point in the individual's life political changes have taken place, we cannot estimate with any degree of confidence the relative influence of pre-adult versus post-childhood factors which might be at work influencing the political orientations of the socially mobile persons.

This lack of longitudinal data plagues even the most ingenious efforts to unravel the causal factors involved in the class change and party choice research problem that have been made so far. For example, even Lopreato's skillful and imaginative testing of components of Lipset's "status rejection" theory suffers from a lack of longi-

tudinal data on the political variable. Although he finds that perception of class restrictions is associated with political orientation among upward mobiles in his Italian sample, in the absence of information on political change, his inference from that finding remains problematical.

Instead of concluding that those upwardly mobile Italians who did not perceive class restrictions tended to change to a conservative political orientation, while those who subjectively experienced such restrictions tended to retain a left-wing partisanship, it is equally possible that his independent and dependent variables can be reversed. That is, the relationship may be interpreted by inferring that those upwardly mobile Italians who are of Marxist or left-wing orientation are more likely to perceive class relations as closed because of their political orientation than are the upward mobiles who are conservative to begin with. In this interpretation, political change need not have taken place among the upwardly mobile Italians to produce the finding Lopreato presents.

Interpretation of Findings

In the absence of adequate longitudinal data on the political orientations of American mobiles and class stables, the explanations for the findings presented here on the political differences between male and female upward mobiles can only be suggestive. However, plausible alternative frameworks for interpretation can be developed.

Turning first to the possibility that factors coming into play after the experience of upward social mobility produce political effects, it is evident that men and women differ markedly in the likelihood that such factors will be politically potent for them. First of all, a large component of the women in the samples analyzed here are housewives and derive their statuses from the manual or nonmanual nature of their husbands' occupations. Being upwardly mobile by marrying a man who is in a social class higher than that of her father may well produce quite different political attitudes in a woman than climbing up to a nonmanual position in the occupational stratification system does in a man.

These differences might be due to the fact that women who "marry up" are able to avoid some of the influences pressing toward a conservative political orientation that middle-class men typically experience. Such factors as the conservative political influence of some forms of professional training, the middle-class male's concern with family financial management, and the greater salience of politics as a discussion topic among men's work and recreational groups leading to a heightened awareness of middle-class political norms are all influences more likely to produce political conservatism among upwardly mobile men than women.

Even a sense of appreciation, or "cult of gratitude," toward the social order for providing the setting in which the mobile individual was able to achieve is more likely to result in political conservatism among men than among women who have been upwardly mobile. The woman who marries up is more likely to explain her upward mobility in terms of chance operating in mate selection or in terms of her personal charms, while the upwardly mobile male seems far more likely to translate his experiences into conservative politico-economic maxims.

But instead of attempting to account for the differing degrees of conservatism among male and female upward mobiles, in terms of differential forces pushing them toward the political right, the phenomenon might be explained in terms of unequal forces holding the mobiles to the presumably more leftist political orientation of their youth. Status rejection, the experience of being rejected from full membership in a higher status because of class of origin, is such a force. Status rejection theory assumes that the desire to emulate the behavior of the higher status groups is so strong that it is, in effect, a constant in all advanced societies. Thus variation in the degree to which mobiles adopt the political orientation of the middle-class stables is to be accounted for by factors such as status rejection negating the effect of this pervasive desire.

If this explanation for the political behavior of upward mobiles is valid, we are led to the hypothesis that, among the upward mobiles, women are less likely than men to adopt the conservative political orientation of the middle class because they suffer status rejection to an appreciably

greater extent than do males. There appear to be no obvious grounds for accepting or rejecting this notion. But even if women are more sensitive to status considerations than men, and that in consequence upwardly mobile females experience greater status rejection than upwardly mobile males, it is implausible that the consequences of this experience would take a political form. It seems unlikely that politics is of such salience to American women that experienced status rejection would lead upwardly mobile females to reject the conservatism of the middle class in favor of the more leftist partisanship of their class of origin.

Finally, none of the foregoing may be important in influencing the politics of male and female upward mobiles. It may well be that the differences in political orientations of the upwardly mobile men and women are to be accounted for by factors operating before the experience of upward social mobility rather than after.

For instance, it is likely that those offspring of working-class families who are to become upwardly mobile differ significantly *before* experiencing class change from those working-class children who will remain in their class of origin. Selective recruitment may result in an "over-selection" of conservatively-oriented individuals among the men who become upwardly mobile, with no significant degree of political change taking place among them subsequent to the mobility experience. A cluster of values may be held by some working-class boys such as an emphasis on individual responsibility, achievement, etc., associated both with heightened chances for upward social mobility and a greater tendency toward a conservative political orientation.

The same factors involved in the process of selection for upward mobility may not, however, produce a group of upwardly mobile women who are conservative to the same degree that upwardly mobile men are. This might be due to the fact that the combination of conservative political and social values is not as influential in determining the chances for upward social mobility through marriage as it is for mobility through the occupational sphere. If this is the case, the differences in the political orientations of male and female upward mobiles would not be due to changes in their politics as a consequence of social mobility, but would be due to preselection of a certain "mix" of political types for subsequent mobility.

The great number of plausible explanations for the differing degree of conservative party support found among upwardly mobile men and women in this discussion is an indication of how little work has been done so far in sorting out the causal factors that influence the politics of the socially mobile persons. Thus, perhaps the major conclusion of this paper is that the variables involved in a comprehensive analysis of the topic are likely to be both more numerous and more complex in their interactions than had been previously assumed. If this is so, then only by utilizing measures of partisanship which can identify *when* in an individual's life political change takes place, and by adopting more sophisticated multivariate analytical techniques to study the problem, can major advances be made in understanding the causal relationships involved in the connection between social mobility and political orientation.

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FUNCTIONS OF CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE STRATIFICATION SYSTEM

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The purpose of this study has been to examine children's perceptions of the stratification system and to consider the possible consequences of these perceptions for the larger social order. There has been an attempt to extend one aspect of Davis and Moore's classical stratification theory by exploring the status attitudes requisite for an adequate number of children to strive toward prestigious, socially-important occupations. A sample of 1,917 black and white children from grades 3–12 from Baltimore City were interviewed. Findings indicate that young children have developed a type of status consciousness that should facilitate such occupational striving: that is, a clear awareness of occupational prestige differences as early as third grade (based on a comparison with 1963 adult North-Hatt ratings), and a continuing optimism about their own opportunities to achieve desirous occupations. In addition, several mechanisms are noted that appear to be dampening anger against the class system among the disadvantged school children.

ACCORDING to the functionalists' classic theory of stratification, occupational prestige and income differentials are vital in motivating persons to sacrifice the time and energy required to train for complex jobs functionally indispensable to the society (Davis and Moore, 1945). Stratification rewards are necessary to motivate persons to assume key occupational positions. Although Davis and Moore have not been explicit in this regard, their theory is particularly applicable to the motivation of school-age children. For obviously it is during the school years that the individual makes the decisions and formulates the aspirations and plans that propel him toward an ultimate occupational choice. It is the age group that has not yet made an occupational commitment to which this aspect of Davis and Moore's theory appears most relevant.

The mere *existence* of a system of unequal rewards and privileges is not, however, sufficient in itself to induce children to acquire the training and utilize the talents necessary for ultimate occupational functioning. Certain status and class perceptions and attitudes are also required in order to bring about the necessary motivation. The present analysis seeks to extend Davis and Moore's theory (1) by considering some status perceptions and class attitudes requisite for children to be motivated toward socially functional occupations, and (2) by describing the extent to which such attitudes are present in a representative sample of urban school children of various ages and social backgrounds. Other consequences of these children's attitudes for the maintenance of the class system will also be considered.

Systems which are important to society may very well require that individuals be socialized for them at an early age. Hyman's work (1959) indicates that political attitudes developed early are likely to persist; and similarly, one might predict that deep-rooted attitudes toward the stratification order formed in the early school years would be particularly likely to have later effects. For

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