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## Two Transformations and Social Mobility

*Abstract:* This analysis compares effects of the political transformations in Eastern Europe, taking place in the 1950s and in the 1990s, on social mobility. The author examines absolute and relative mobility rates in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia based on data from national random samples of 1993–94. Loglinear models are applied to mobility tables for four periods of time: 1948–52, 1952–63, 1983–88 and 1988–93 to determine the change over these years in the strength of association between occupational categories. In search for effect of transition to communism I compare occupational mobility between 1948 and 1952 with occupational mobility between 1952 and 1963. In order to assess effect of transition from communism the mobility between 1983 and 1988 is compared with mobility between 1988 and 1993. It was definitely transition to communism in the late forties that released more intensive flows between basic segments of social structure than it occurred during an exit from communism in the 1990s. Using both diagonals and constant fluidity models, the author finds no evidence of increasing openness in postcommunist countries. Contrariwise, in the 1948–1963, some significant change occurred in relative mobility chances. The conclusion is made that the “first transformation” gave rise to some switch in social fluidity on the “genotypical level.”

We shall seek to assess dynamics of mobility rates in six East European nations in the two historical periods. First, in turn of the 1940s. Second, forty years later – in the turn of the 1980s. The ultimate concern of our study is comparison of effect of the two systemic breakthroughs on social metabolism. We establish whether transition from the quasi-capitalist, post-war, phase in the 1940s and, next, from the communist phase in the 1990s, transformed processes through which particular individuals were allocated to different positions in the division of labour. Patterns of social mobility follow own logic which need not necessarily respond to institutional transformations even if they are systemic in kind. As far as the latter really imprinted on mobility, we might reasonably expect to find evidence of this shift in the first half of the 1950s and of the 1990s.

Primarily, it could result from transformations of socio-occupational structures. In the years following Second World War the communist leaders in Poland, Hungary, and other countries which found themselves in a communist

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camp initiated major reconstruction of social order. What appeared crucial, then, was rapid industrialization, driven centrally by communist state, nationalization of manufacturing, transport, and majority of private firms in other industries, and starting from late 1940s – collectivization of private farms. These measures virtually forced transfer of manpower from agriculture to heavy industry, concomitant with a promotion of large numbers of workers and peasants to governmental and industrial bureaucracies.

We may recall implications of these structural changes for composition of specific classes in Poland. As of the early of the 1970s, men of farm and of working-class origins made up respectively 30% and 26% of non-manual workers (Zagórski 1978:132). As far as consequences of these mass transitions for fluidity between class segments are concerned, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992:101) showed that the two most rigid barriers – namely those separating intelligentsia from manual workers and farmers – were almost non-existent in Poland or clearly weaker than in any other 8 nations included in their study. Notably, both barriers were apparent in Hungary, which underwent a similar trajectory of socialist transformations in the early post-war era. Thus, it would appear that policies directed towards shaping new hierarchies and patterns of mobility were able to work in Poland, resulting in temporary weakening of social rigidities. Yet, at the same time, strict limitations were placed on private entrepreneurship and while private firms continued to exist they did so only in vestigial forms.

It is our task to determine how the reconstruction concomitant to emergence of the market society in the 1990s compared, in scope, with that taking place in the 1940s and 1950s. Of particular importance here was rapid expansion of private sector after 1989 which this should engender mass inflow to category of owners, prompting increase in overall volume of mobility. For example, in 1994, owners accounted for 10.4% of all actively employed in Poland. This proportion stood for only 4.3% in 1988, before a systemic upheaval. In our treatment of dynamics of mobility in post-communist societies, we will focus on an influx to owners, a phenomenon which is an important element of the formation of new social strata in this region.

The one widely held view is that the prime objective of comparative macrosociology must be to demonstrate differences in aspects of social structure and then to account for these differences through analyses in which nations serve as the basic units of observation. As regards studies on social mobility one can scarcely find systematic cross-national variation in, both, total mobility and its relative rates. To put it in other words, any variation that exists has been found hardly attributable to differences in, for example, the level of economic development or to democracy versus totalitarianism in political system (see Grusky and Hauser 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). The existence of such relationships, traced out in some studies (e.g. Tyree et al. 1979) was contested by recent national mobility enquiries that introduced higher standards of data comparability (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). And also in cross-time perspective, students of mobility emphasized the absence of trends of directional kind (Featherman and Hauser 1978; Ganzeboom and de Graff 1984; Payne 1993; Yamaguchi 1987; Jones et al. 1994).

The issue must arise of whether these results are applicable to post-communist societies. Bear in mind that all findings referred to above reported on

social mobility in stable societies which did not face systemic changes while the East-European countries have a distinctly different set of experiences. The pertinent question is whether mobility rates remarkably altered with the rise of the communist system, after its collapse and in an early stage of creation of a new social order. If they did, whether the trend is towards greater openness, particularly in respect of the increased flow into owners in recent years, rising "old middle class"?

Indeed, one cannot lose sight of duality between "phenotypical" level of actually observed mobility rates and "genotypical" level of the pattern of relative mobility chances that underlies these rates (see Featherman et al. 1975). If mobility is considered at the former level, changes can easily be anticipated – precisely because observed rates are greatly influenced by the structure of the division of labour and, in turn, by effects deriving from a range of economic, technological, and demographic circumstances, all of which are known to vary in time. Insofar as mobility is considered net of all such changes, the thesis of basic invariance of fluidity patterns in time also received empirical support also in communist societies. Namely, studies on long-term trends carried out in the 1980s, in Poland, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, and Russia proved that mobility regimes had not altered in a substantive way over recent decades and conformed to the patterns detected in the West (see Haller and Mach 1984; Andorka 1990; Boguszak 1990; Marshall et al. 1995; Marshall 1996).

Let us now take up consequences of both the "first" and "second transformation." Did they give rise to any change in dynamics of social mobility? Did mobility barriers open? Is it true that inflow into owners heavily imprinted on the transitions taking place after 1989? And, which of these two waves proved more intensive in terms of volume of transitions – certainly under provision that substantial switches in mobility which might have been attributed to transformation of the political system really occurred?

### Hypotheses: What Might Change?

Social mobility tables reflect both relative chances of movement and the constraints of occupational origins and opportunities. Sociologists have for some time recognized this duality and have attempted to distinguish total movements between socio-occupational categories – which include both, structural constraints and opportunities – from relative rates referred also to "circulation," "exchange," or "pure" mobility. The latter encapsulate mobility rates net of changing distributions of origin and destination categories. Analyses of either aspect address somewhat different theoretical and substantive issues. While total (absolute) rates can be used to map configurations of basic social distances as determined by all determinants of movements and "inheritance" of positions, relative rates refer to the openness of specific social strata and global social structure.

Previous cross-time mobility studies which covered long-ranged periods of time reported changes in total movements over decades (Glass 1954; Svalastoga 1959; Featherman and Hauser 1978). It was convincingly proved that these changes, as far as they took place, were "phenotypical" in kind that is they were mediated by a wide variety of economic, technological, demographic, and

political influences that were largely exogenous to the dynamics of social stratification *per se*. Above all, they derived chiefly from transformations of origin and destination categories. The driving force of occupational transformations in Western countries was the economic boom after the Second World War. Its counterpart in Eastern Europe was mass mobility associated with extensive industrialization, followed by a decline in total flows (Andorka and Zagórski 1980).

The decline was detected already in the 1960s, however the transformation in the economic and political systems might be expected to have occasioned a new growth of mobility. Since we intend to find effects of these institutional changes, a good referential base for the 1990s, is the period of the 1980s, immediately preceding period of communism. As such, this study will compare and contrast mobility rates in 1983–1988 and 1988–1993. As far as first transformation is concerned, we will compare mobility rates in 1948–1952 and 1952–1963.

One may expect that in the 1990s, total volume of mobility would increase as the outcome essentially of structural changes concomitant with systemic transformation, including the emergence of new jobs and skills. Development of capitalist market in post-communist societies carried expansion of the financial sector, banking, marketing, and a wide area of personal services. Ensuing demand gave rise to creation of occupational roles which had no counterparts in the communist economy. An example of a quite new sector of activity is the growth of private security firms, which, in Poland, employed 200,000 persons in 1996. In terms of numerical size, it was the third occupational category at the time, after teachers, and miners. There was also a rapid expansion in the category of private owners of businesses.

In studies on social mobility, changes in occupational distribution are referred to “demand” side of the rules governing flow of persons through the life cycle. Newly created positions tend to “attract” mobile persons. The “supply” side consists of relative advantages afforded to individuals by different class origins which may be thought of in terms of economic, cultural and social resources. In the interplay of supply and demand of the 1990s, the expansion of business may be attributed a decisive role. Representatives of intelligentsia, working class categories, and farmers witnessed tangible effects of growing opportunities to succeed in a business. After 1989, entrepreneurial orientations and possessive individualism found an outlet, that was blocked under communism by administrative obstacles.

New patterns of mobility might also result from the changing educational channels and new forms of training to jobs. The rules of capitalist market tend to convert the general knowledge received in schools into practical skills. From the beginning of the 1990s, in Hungary, Poland, and Czech society, new vocational courses have been developed that are based on Western models. These have provided individuals with new opportunities and encouraged them to enter new path of occupational careers. But as the newly emerging educational system has been the subject of a certain amount of experimentation and modifications, one can hardly elicit institutions mechanisms which might release greater flows. Nevertheless, educational restructuring is a fairly new element of changing context that should reshape the structure of opportunities in occupational system. At the same time, there has been an increase of

various arrangements of the *welfare state*, like new pension schemes or insurance system that differentiate life careers in the West. The same is true for bargaining strategies undertaken by trade unions with employers over wages, or licensing by unions recruitment to firms (see Esping-Andersen et al. 1993). In Eastern Europe, new mechanisms of the labour market started to consolidate and their effects on mobility slowly came into play.

As regards mobility rates we will test four hypotheses.

First, one may predict that an extent of total movements, as attributable to systemic changes, increased – these movements were higher in 1948–52 than in the maturing stages of the evolution of communist system. With respect to the second transformation we predict that 1988–93 saw more intense social mobility than in the period immediately preceding collapse of the communism. In brief, social mobility was higher on the verge of either transformation of the political system.

Second hypothesis says about relative weight of both transformations in that how big flows they produced. There are some reasons to expect that installation of the communist system brought about more mobility than its collapse in the 1990s. First of all, reshuffles in social structure in the turn of the 1940s were underpinned by deep changes in economy and occupational distributions. It seems that three paralleled processes – extensive industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and nationalization of major industries – released bigger flows than those which were prompted by privatization of economy in the 1990s. It was, in fact, privatization to be the only macrostructural counterpart of its three predecessors occurring four decades earlier. Next, the communist system was really “installed.” They applied strict administrative measures to create a new and new social order. The penetration of political and ideological criteria in channelling persons to educational and occupational system was overwhelming. On the one hand, the advancement of substantial portion of the working class and peasants were actively promoted while on the other hand serious careers disruptions occurred in case of intelligentsia and former bourgeoisie. The new macrostructural arrangements were implemented exogenously with respect to the logic of social stratification. Contrariwise, social changes as initiated after 1989 proceed smoothly, much more in evolutionary than in revolutionary pace. Finally, the mass shift of manpower, resulting from industrialization covered the largest segments of social structure – peasants and working class. It was unparalleled, in the scope, by social transitions brought about by privatization and new opportunities emerging with the rise of market economy. Actually, opening up new opportunities could only be exploited by those with superior cultural and social capital.

Third, relative mobility during both political breakthrough remained basically unchanged. Therefore growth in absolute rates resulted from changing occupational distributions as implied by rising size of some socio-occupational segments and decrease of the others.

Fourth, as regards transformation from communism into the market-like society, inflow to private business might be expected to exceed the inflows to other occupational strata. This possibility will be considered in the context of the theoretical debates in the sociological literature regarding the class and strata formation.

### Data and Variables

The data to be analysed come from national surveys carried out in six countries as a part of the international project *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989*. Using a questionnaire common to all countries, national probability samples were surveyed in 1993 in Bulgaria (N=4907), Czech Republic (N=5621), Hungary (N=4285), Russia (N=4732), Slovakia (N=4876), and in 1994 in Poland (N=3520). More detailed information about the project and methodology can be found in Treiman (1994).<sup>1</sup>

In seeking the effect of systemic transformation on rates of mobility, we use the following strategy. In order to assess whether transition to communism gave rise to massive flows we utilized the data on father's occupation, comparing occupational mobility between 1948 and 1952 with occupational mobility between 1952 and 1963. In search for effect of outgoing from communism, we compared the career mobility of respondents between 1983 and 1988 with their mobility between 1988 and 1993. If the first hypothesis is correct there should be more mobility between 1948 and 1952 than between 1952 and 1963 and more mobility between 1988 and 1993 than between 1983 and 1988. If the second hypothesis is correct, there should be more mobility between 1948–52 than between 1952–63 but little or no difference between 1983–88 and 1988–93. It is the matter of further debate to what extent these potential changes may be affected by transformations in the political and economic systems, or derive, simply, from “endogenous” logic of social structuration. Certainly, if any disruption in occupational careers occurred, there should be no difference between either pair of mobility matrices.

In our treatment of mobility in an earlier period of 1948–63, we had to restrict our analysis to 5 countries, excluding Russia. It was due to a large number of unreported data in Russian and cases on father's occupation for 1948 and 1952. Two-way (6 × 6) EGP categorizations for 1948–52 yielded only 83 men in Russia and for 1952–63 matrix we obtained 163 cases which made reliable estimations impossible.

There are two technical problems with the earlier comparison. First, a sample of fathers is not a representative sample of the 1948–52 or 1952–63 population – we can only acknowledge this problem but it should not stop us going ahead. The second difficulty is that the 1948–52 period covers four years while the 1952–63 period covers 11 years, so just through normal process of social metabolism we would expect more mobility in the latter table. The obvious solution is to exponentiate the 1948–52 transition matrix to its third power, which would give the expected 1948–60 table on the assumption that the 1948–52 pattern continued without change (see Hodge 1966). We did so, obtaining a 12 year period to compare to the 11 year transition from 1952–63, which is close enough to warrant comparison.

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<sup>1</sup> The project was initiated in the United States by Ivan Szelenyi and Donald J. Treiman, both of the University of California – Los Angeles, who became principal investigators. The project was funded with grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (SES 9111722 and SBR 9310395), The U.S. National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research (806-29) and the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO). In addition, various grants supported the research in individual countries.

We restrict to inspection of mobility for men. This provides commonly used reference point bearing in mind that most substantive conclusions under issue have been reached, by now, through analysis of transitions in the population of males. The women's mobility might be of interest insofar as meaningful modifications were necessary to the findings that we revealed on the basis of data referring to men alone. In fact, we replicated the same analyses to mobility tables of women. Because it shows up that in each country the configuration of intergenerational mobility barriers in population of women fits closely the patterns for men we will not discuss women separately on the assumption that what we found for men basically represents social mobility patterns in overall.

There is no obvious and uncontroversial way which set of categories should provide the basis of our empirical work. We adopted the class schema proposed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portorarero in various publications (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) and utilized by many students of social stratification in recent years. In the most expanded version EGP consists of eleven class categories. What we are clearly forced to recognize, however, is that the size of some categories from the original schema proves too small to allow statistical analyses, which particularly applies to proprietors with employees, proprietors working on its own, and farmers. Bearing this in mind, the EGP version adapted in this study includes six class categories. The division was made between: (1) higher-grade professionals, administrators, officials, managers in large industrial establishments and large proprietors (referred, interchangeably, to *intelligentia*), (2) other non-manuals, i.e. lower-grade professionals, administrators, officials, higher-grade technicians, managers in small industrial establishments, and routine non-manual employees in administration, commerce, sales and service, (3) small non-agricultural owners with and without employees, (4) skilled workers, (5) unskilled workers, and (6) farmers and agricultural workers.

### Mobility Rates

#### Total rates: slight effect of transition

In order to directly address the question whether mobility rates increased we compare two set of figures: the percentage of movers in 1983–1988 and in 1988–1993 and, separately, percentage of mobile men in 1948–1952 and 1952–1963, as reported in Table 1. The percentages reported there were calculated on the basis of  $6 \times 6$  matrices of transitions between occupational categories for the periods 1948–52 (exponentiated to third power) and 1952–1963. In analogous way, we established the mobility rates for 1983–88 and 1988–93 (1994 for Poland). Hence, rates of mobile persons are simply percentages of men in our national samples found in cells off main diagonal of the  $6 \times 6$  mobility matrices; or in other words, the percentage of men whose “destination” category was different from their category of “origin.”

As regards transition from communism, one can see that in all six countries total mobility increased. In population of men, rates of movers were in 1988–93 higher than in 1983–88. In turn, in case of maturing stage of communism in the 1950s, rates of mobile men firmly declined. It was during the initiation and the



Table 1  
**Total mobility rates. Percentages of mobile men in 1948–1952  
 and 1952–1963, and in 1983–1988 and 1988–1993**

|                | 1948–52 | 1952–63 | 1983–88 | 1988–93 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Bulgaria       | 21.1    | 12.3    | 12.2    | 17.2    |
| Czech Republic | 38.4    | 20.9    | 8.1     | 23.6    |
| Hungary        | 38.1    | 22.4    | 13.4    | 19.5    |
| Poland         | 27.1    | 12.2    | 9.7     | 20.0    |
| Russia         | n.a.    | n.a.    | 11.2    | 15.1    |
| Slovakia       | 38.8    | 25.5    | 8.8     | 19.7    |

n.a. – not available

infant period of communist system, in 1948–52, when dynamics of movements between basic socio-economic strata mostly intensified.

Our predictions of Hypothesis 1 are therefore confirmed. The two fundamental breakthroughs in the political history of East-European countries were paralleled by traceable increase in volume of flows in social structure.

We asked, then, which of the transitions released more mobility. The second hypothesis concerned relative weight of the systemic breakthroughs for transformation of mobility barriers.

The dynamics of mobility proved most intensive during the first transformation. In all 5 countries it peaked in 1948–52 with as much as 38–39% of men in Czech, Hungarian and Slovak societies changed their occupational category. Poles and Bulgarians remained relatively more attached to the socio-occupational position at the time. In next years mobility evidently slowed down. The total rate of moving men halved in Poland and Czech society in 1952–63 as compared to 1948–52. Three other societies witnessed decrease by at least one third of the gross rate of movements.

It we turn to mobility in the period of transition from the communist system, one can compare its speed up in 1988–93, as referred to 1983–88, with pace of its decline in the 1950s, aftermath the most intensive flows. Differences between the two periods marked in the total volume of transitions. The collapse of the communism was accompanied with much the same pace of rise in career mobility as that which occurred in the period of transition to this system but on the verge of emerging capitalism in the post-communist world mobility rates became of lower extent than in time of enforced industrialization, nationalization, and collectivization of agriculture.

In which country, dynamic of mobility shows up most intensive? In the turn of the 1980s Czech society found itself on the lead again with 23.6% of moving men between 1988 and 1993. The transitions intensified also in Slovakia and Poland. Instead, mobility rose to lowest extent in Russia. Three countries in the 1990s – i.e. Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia – featured relatively highest total mobility rates. These were lower in Bulgaria and Russia. One could sum up dynamic of men's mobility in a synthetic scale of uneven intensity of movements. On its one pole were Czechs, on the opposite – Russia.

These are the first conclusions. Paralleling systemic changes in Eastern Europe, mobility between basic segments of social stratification increased. It

might result from mutual reinforcement between restructurations in the social space and changing economic and political structures although this was not necessary link. Anyway, mobility barriers opened more during the first transformation than during the second.

### Openness: the Constant Flux

Strictly speaking we did not established yet whether the openness increased. What has been established in the foregoing section is that there were was a fairly systematic cross-time and cross-country pattern of change in absolute mobility rates, as determined via our class schema. One may infer from this that the underlying cause of this has been shifts in the occupational structure in 1948–63 and in 1983–93. Thus now, we are naturally led to the question of how mobility trends would appear if they could in some way be assessed for “independently of” this changing structural context. In studies on social mobility, these net rates, “allowed for” changing occupational distributions, are regarded as more direct estimations of openness of the social structure. Attention will therefore focus now on a detailed examination of the set of relative mobility chances – the mobility regime as Hauser (1978) has termed it.

In dealing with this question sociologists have followed different approaches. However all of them rest on distinction made between “structural” (or “demand” or “forced”) mobility and “exchange” (or “circular” or “pure” or “relative”) mobility. The former is defined as that part of total observed mobility which is directly attributable to changes in the structure of objective mobility opportunities, and the latter as that part which is unassociated with such changes. I will rest also on this conceptual distinction.

Several writers offered approach to the problem of “allowing for” structural changes which drew on application of log linear models to analysis of multivariate contingency tables (see Goodman 1972; Hauser 1978; Hout 1980; Ishii-Kuntz 1994). Here, in comparing mobility between 1948–52 and 1952–63, and, separately, between 1983–88 and 1988–93, we employ, in particular, two models applied in former mobility studies.

First, diagonals model. Simplest constrained diagonals model specifies a single parameter for all diagonal cells of the mobility table, testing the proposition that immobility exceeds what would be expected on the basis of perfect mobility by the same proportion in all occupational categories (see Goodman 1972: 661–671; Hout 1982: 28). The diagonals model refers to state in which change is occurring only in occupational distributions but neither in structural mobility nor in exchange mobility – self-recruitment in six occupational strata accounts for all association in mobility tables. First, for both 1948–52 and 1952–63. Second, for both 1983–88 and 1988–93 in each country. Goodness of fit for this model should cast much light on the question of openness of stratification systems since we are comparing transitions taking place over very short periods of time. It seems unlikely that radical changes in opportunities of movements over fifteen (1948–63) and ten years (1983–93) emerged. One may hypothesize then, that it is self-recruitment rather than circulation which shaped occupational careers during this time.

Secondly, I will fit constant fluidity model (CFM). In this case, as the label implies, the effects of origins and destinations vary in time while the

association between them is constant. We thus have variations in absolute mobility between 1948–52 and 1952–63 but constant relative mobility. Or, alternatively – changes in structural mobility account for all changes in total, observed mobility. The same is hypothesized for 1983–88 and 1988–93.

Let us see then if post-communist societies became more fluid at the beginning of the 1990s parallelling increase in the total mobility rates? Whether also in terms of relative flows, Czech society was ahead and, whether in the 1990s rigidities in Russia proved outstanding? And generally – whether mobility regimes changed in effect of the systemic transitions, especially during the first political upturn, taking place in the late of the 1940s. Where it occurred, if substantial changes really took place? In fact, it would be unprecedented finding, bearing in mind that relative mobility rates appeared basically constant in time. This is what results of cross-time mobility studies carried out in various countries suggest.

Table 2

**Results of fitting models to three way men's tables of origin category by destination category by time (1948–52 and 1952–63)**

|                      | Model <sup>a</sup> |       |               |             |                     |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|
|                      | O D T              | OT DT | OT DT<br>DIAG | OT DT<br>OD | BIC for<br>OT DT OD |
| Bulgaria             |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 2754               | 2541  | 180           | 66          | –120                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 1.3   | 93.0          | 97.4        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .01         |                     |
| Czech Republic       |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 2629               | 2539  | 264           | 97          | –96                 |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 3.4   | 90.0          | 96.3        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .01         |                     |
| Hungary              |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 2798               | 2768  | 301           | 95          | –108                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 1.1   | 89.2          | 96.6        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .01         |                     |
| Poland               |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 2447               | 2445  | 177           | 83          | –102                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | .9    | 92.8          | 96.6        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .01         |                     |
| Slovakia             |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 940                | 922   | 124           | 36          | –130                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 2.3   | 97.0          | 99.1        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .05         |                     |
| df for all countries | 60                 | 50    | 49            | 25          |                     |

<sup>a</sup> O – category of origin in 1948–1952 and 1952–1963 tables;

D – category of destination in 1948–1952 and 1952–1963 tables;

T – time (1 = 1948–1952, 2 = 1952–1963);

DIAG (1 = off-diagonal cells; 2 = diagonal cells)

Table 3  
Results of fitting models to three way men's tables of origin category by destination category by time (1983–88 and 1988–93)

|                      | Model <sup>a</sup> |       |               |             |                     |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|
|                      | O D T              | OT DT | OT DT<br>DIAG | OT DT<br>OD | BIC for<br>OT DT OD |
| Bulgaria             |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 5288               | 5219  | 161           | 36          | –162                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 1.3   | 97.0          | 99.3        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .05         |                     |
| Czech Republic       |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 6498               | 6233  | 197           | 45          | –159                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 4.1   | 96.7          | 99.3        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .03         |                     |
| Hungary              |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 4543               | 4478  | 139           | 34          | –162                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 1.4   | 96.9          | 99.3        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .10         |                     |
| Poland               |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 4231               | 4176  | 202           | 52          | –140                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 1.3   | 95.2          | 98.7        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .00         |                     |
| Russia               |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 4903               | 4871  | 141           | 21          | –176                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | .6    | 97.1          | 99.6        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | >.10        |                     |
| Slovakia             |                    |       |               |             |                     |
| G <sup>2</sup>       | 6060               | 5920  | 181           | 52          | –151                |
| rG <sup>2</sup>      | –                  | 2.3   | 97.0          | 99.1        |                     |
| p                    | .00                | .00   | .00           | .00         |                     |
| df for all countries | 60                 | 50    | 49            | 25          |                     |

<sup>a</sup> O – category of origin in 1983–1988 and 1988–1993 tables;

D – category of destination in 1983–1988 and 1988–1993 tables;

T – time (1 = 1983–1988, 2 = 1988–1993);

DIAG (1 = off-diagonal cells; 2 = diagonal cells)

The results of applying these models are set in Table 2 for the first transformation and in Table 3 for the second. We consider our six countries separately, and in each case fit, both, the diagonals and CFM models to a three-way table which comprises the six categories of origin, six of destination and two transitions (that of 1948–52 and 1952–63, and 1983–88 and 1988–93). In Tables 2 and 3 I also report the results of applying two other models. The first test the hypothesis of the conditional independence of class origins and destinations. Usually this model is employed to serve as a useful baseline, the reference to which we can assess how much of the total association between class of origin and class of destination the diagonals and CFM models are able to account for. The calculated G<sup>2</sup> statistics

are given in first row of each country's cell and the diagnostic  $rG^2$  statistics ( $0 < rG^2 < 100$ ) are provided in the second row for each country. The  $rG^2$  refers to "coefficient of multiple determination" as implemented to log-linear modelling by Goodman (1972). The statistics of fit for conditional independence model are shown in first column of the Tables. In the second column I report statistics for the model which assumes that occupational distributions for origin and destination were changing between 1948–52 and 1952–63 (Table 2), and 1983–88 and 1988–93 (Table 3), while it still maintaining that categories of origin and destination were independent.

What, then, can we learn from the content of Tables 2 and 3? The results do not signify historical precedent but only with respect to dynamics of mobility in the period of decay of the communist system, followed by its collapse and emergence of the new social order. In accord with the findings of previous studies, mobility barriers in East-European countries basically remained as opened (or closed) in the 1990s as they did in preceding decade. As regards mobility during transition to communism, rather unexpectedly, constant fluidity model does not reproduce core fluidity satisfactorily in all five nations.

The second model, which examines the hypothesis that occupational distributions changed in the two consecutive decades, produces values of  $G^2$  which in each of six countries are significant. It explains no more than 1–4% of the total association as one can see in the second column of the Tables. Even so,, it improved the fit to the significant degree. The result is direct support for the thesis that in the turn of the 1940s and in the beginning of the 1990s, occupational distributions underwent significant transformations. In an Appendix Tables A1–A5, I report occupational distributions for 1948, 1952, 1963, 1983, 1988, and 1993 which make apparent in which direction followed occupational structures in East-European countries.

Turning to the diagonals model, we see that it performs fairly well. While it does not fit the observed data in each country according to the conventional .05 criterion, statistical significance is not only guide to substantive sociological significance. Allowing for constant immobility in 1948–63 and in 1983–93, which exceeds what would be expected on the basis of perfect mobility, accounts for no less than 89–93% percent of all associations referred to what implies complete independence. It must have been that self-recruitment prevailed over mobility both in 1948–63 and in 1983–93. Nevertheless, the reduction in  $G^2$  proved not satisfactory which indicates that there have been circulation between six categories, apart from strong tendency to remain in them.

It is appropriate, therefore, to consider whether constant fluidity model, which assumes that circulation took place, will improve the fit. From the fourth column of Table 3, in which results of fitting the CFM are presented, it is apparent that circulation between six occupational strata remained basically intact in 1983–93: the CFM almost entirely reproduces observed data. For each country it accounts for around 99–100% of association between class of origin and class of destination. Statistically significant deviations are present only for Czech society, Slovakia, and Poland. The caveat must be that in these countries some significant portion of the discrepancies between observed and expected values pertain to circulation, which more detailed analysis could reveal.

Nonetheless, even in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia circulation rates appear to be largely captured by the core model of constant fluidity

through time in the turn of the 1980s. Stability predominated insofar as we are concerned with openness of social structure. It seems reasonable to suppose that the collapse of communism and re-birth of capitalism in Eastern Europe had to imprint on occupational system to relax rigidities and closures in social space. Yet, no support for this presumption could be found in the current data. Even the transformations of the political and economic system, with their concomitant institutional changes, did not suffice to make class barriers more fluid. Actually, it did not suffice by the middle of the 1990s. Certainly, delayed potential for growth in circulatory rates mobility exists. It might have been kept dormant at the time to reshape life-careers in coming years.

Thus, unaltered openness of social structures paralleled a slight increase in total movements after 1988. The sources of the ascendant trend resided in changing occupational distributions – it has already been shown that it the class of proprietors demonstrated a particularly rapid growth in the 1990s in all six societies. The shift towards greater total mobility gives support to our third hypothesis: that rising flows in the 1990s resulted from macrostructural changes, enforced chiefly by economic transformations that created new positions in the division of labour. The mobility regimes remained stable.

But it comes to be true more for transition from the communist system. Fluidity patterns did not come to be a sociological constant in the time when this system was installed. Surely, in all five countries the  $G^2$ s returned for constant fluidity model account for no less than 98% of the  $G^2$  returned by the independence model. Nevertheless, these results show up significant deviations for the core, unchanging fluidity pattern.<sup>2</sup> It is true that deviations are small and do not lead us to abandon the idea of basic continuity in time: stability in patterns of opportunity, rather than dynamics, predominated also several decades ago. Nonetheless the overwhelming stability, implementation of the communism slightly opened social structure.

### Inflow to Business

The upturn of the total mobility in the 1990s may be exclusively attributed to transformations of occupational structures. In this respect, the *differentia specifica* of an exit from communism became numerical expansion of private

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<sup>2</sup> The statistics of fit for the models are shown in the third lines of the Tables 2–3 – for each country separately. As regards mobility in 1948–1963, the CFM model produces satisfactory fit only for Slovakia, by conventional standards, i.e. as indicated by p values. This exceptional case of Slovakia can be explained in terms of relatively small number of men in mobility tables for 1948–52 and 1952–63 for this country – 357 and 368 for each of them respectively. In the last column of both Tables BIC statistics were displayed (only for the CFM model) which are not sensitive to the number of cases employed in analysis. BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) is the statistic of a model fit that is independent on sample size and is especially recommended for selection between models if the number of cases in analysis is very large, that is when large N makes it almost impossible to get satisfactory fit according to standard criteria (statistical significance of  $G^2$ ). The rule for BIC is that the best model is the model with smallest BIC (see Raftery 1987). If applied for Slovakia the fit of the CFM model actually falls short of significance for mobility tables in the 1948–63 likewise four remaining countries.

business. Let us check whether, in fact, resulting rise in inflow to this category from the other strata accounted for an increase in total mobility in this period. Table 4 displays the proportions of men across our six nations who in 1988 and 1993, found themselves in an occupational category other than in which they were located five years previously. They give the inflow rates to intelligentsia, lower non-manuals, owners, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and agricultural categories in 1988 and 1993.

From inspection of Table 4 the general impression gained must be one that in the 1990s owners took clearly highest proportion of newcomers relative to the other categories. It was the most transitory strata at the time. Over the whole period 1983–93, the class of lower non-manuals – clerical workers, teachers in elementary schools, technicians, shops assistants, receptionists, etc. – was also a significant external recruiter of labour. This category had the highest inflow rates in 1983–88, to be replaced in the next five years by owners.

For example, in Poland, the inflow rate to lower non-manual occupations stood for 77.1% in 1988 and in Russia it amounted to 86.4%. Although in the 1980s the inflow to lower non-manuals ranged from 77% to 86% in five of the six nations, it had decreased greatly by 1993 several times – except again Slovakia, where it actually increased. Simultaneously, the rate of inflow into ownership was generally either maintained or increased: Bulgaria being the only exception by experiencing a reduction of ten percent. In consequence, owners remained at the beginning of the 1990s the most transient category. They took the highest influx in the Czech Republic and Slovakia where only 10% of owners found themselves in 1993 on the same positions as in 1988. Intelligentsia, lower non-manuals, manual workers, and farm categories were self-recruited as much as 78% (in Slovakia) or more.

So far as volume of mobility is concerned, it addresses the issue of class formation. To discuss question of homogeneity of different strata in their recruitment patterns, is simply another way of treating the degree of their “demographic identity” (Goldthorpe 1987): that is, a degree to which they have formed as collectivities of individuals and families identifiable through continuity of their association with sets of strata positions over time. From this standpoint there are certain contrasts in self-recruitment of owners across nations. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, owners seem the least homogeneous category in terms of job experience in business. Nine in ten of owners in 1993 recruited themselves from another 1988 category of origin among men. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, on the other hand, this proportion did not exceed one-half. Given such heterogeneity of origin, one can hardly predict in what direction formation of owners into socio-cultural entity might proceed. In Slovakia and Czech society they made up an amalgam of various social circles. In fact, quite new category comes on the scene, composed of social background, orientations, styles, and value systems originated in different strata. Mobility into business, which derives from systemic transformations, led to disintegration of this category as a class (see Slomczynski and Shabad 1997). So far as the consequences of social mobility for class formation in post-communist countries are concerned, far-going heterogeneity of owners seem most striking by-product of the systemic changes.

Table 4  
Men's inflow rates to intelligentsia, lower non-manuals, owners, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and farm categories

| Socio-occupational categories       | Bulgaria |         | Czech Republic |         | Hungary |         | Poland  |         | Russia  |         | Slovakia |         |
|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
|                                     | 1983-88  | 1988-93 | 1983-88        | 1988-93 | 1983-88 | 1988-93 | 1983-88 | 1988-94 | 1983-88 | 1988-93 | 1983-88  | 1988-93 |
| Higher professionals-intelligentsia | 9.1      | 17.1    | 8.2            | 16.1    | 16.7    | 16.5    | 7.2     | 13.1    | 8.1     | 15.7    | 8.1      | 20.0    |
| Lower non-manuals                   | 79.3     | 15.3    | 80.6           | 19.9    | 79.4    | 12.6    | 77.1    | 1.3     | 86.4    | 11.0    | 17.0     | 21.4    |
| Owners                              | 65.0     | 55.7    | 55.0           | 90.2    | 40.8    | 40.6    | 50.8    | 59.1    | 35.8    | 67.6    | 70.0     | 89.5    |
| Skilled workers                     | 10.8     | 11.1    | 8.0            | 11.0    | 7.9     | 11.0    | 11.5    | 8.6     | 10.0    | 11.3    | 6.4      | 8.0     |
| Unskilled workers                   | 8.7      | 14.7    | 8.9            | 13.6    | 12.2    | 12.3    | 14.7    | 11.4    | 11.4    | 15.1    | 8.5      | 15.5    |
| Farmers and farm workers            | 14.1     | 15.6    | 11.7           | 19.1    | 16.5    | 26.4    | 19.7    | 10.0    | 8.5     | 12.3    | 4.3      | 20.5    |



### Conclusion

What can be learn from our findings on mobility that is of relevance to our central concern?

The several years starting aftermath the second World War saw fundamental transformations in economy and political systems of East-European countries. These changes come to reply in the 1990s. The aim of this study was to establish mobility rates in both critical periods. The total rates appear higher in the 1990s than in a preceding decade. As far as our findings added to comparative macrosociology, it was something that one might expect. Six national economies started to switch over mechanisms dictated by the rules of capitalist market and democratization of a public life, removed formal blockades of access to prominent positions in politics and private business.

Which of these transformations gave rise to bigger disruptions in the barriers of occupational mobility? According to our data, it was definitely transition to communism in the late forties that released more intensive flows between basic segments of social structure than it occurred during the exit from communism in the 1990s. Social mobility in Eastern Europe responded to institutional transformations in a way predicted by Sorokin (1958).

If one turns to mobility into specific social strata, we find – not surprisingly – that class of owners faced highest influx in the 1990s. Due to a mass privatization, free space in social space was made, that have been filled up by applicants to a business. So they did.

From the standpoint of international regularities it of interest to mention that in the 1990s mobility rose mostly in Czech society – and the least in Russia. Bear this in mind, no matter of generally low variation between our six nations in the upturn of movements, the same pattern – with the lowest social metabolism in Russia, and with Czech society being found on the opposite pole – fairly replicates also in other aspects of changes in occupational system. Also relative size of owners mostly increased in the Czech Republic. Consequently, this category faced the highest influx in the 1990s throughout all six nations. The second most transient strata of owners appeared in Slovakia. In Russia, though, self-recruitment in business was the highest – its social composition least changed in comparison to the five societies. Since we seek for consistency between transformation of economic system and dynamics of mobility, there are certain grounds in our data to regard lower mobility in Russia as indicative of a lower pace of social changes in overall. Conversely – Czech society. It looks that social upheaval in this country has been the most critical.

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## Appendix

Table A1

**Distributions of the father's EGP socio-occupational strata in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Men**

| Socio-occupational categories    | Bulgaria |       |       | Czech Republic |       |       |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|
|                                  | 1948     | 1952  | 1963  | 1948           | 1952  | 1963  |
| Higher professionals             | 5.8      | 7.5   | 10.6  | 14.7           | 15.8  | 21.7  |
| Lower non-manuals                | 3.8      | 3.4   | 3.7   | 5.6            | 5.9   | 3.7   |
| Proprietors                      | 8.1      | 5.3   | 3.7   | 4.3            | 1.1   | .2    |
| Skilled workers                  | 8.9      | 11.0  | 15.7  | 25.1           | 27.0  | 30.0  |
| Unskilled workers                | 17.4     | 18.9  | 25.2  | 28.5           | 32.7  | 32.2  |
| Farmers and agricultural workers | 56.8     | 53.9  | 41.0  | 21.9           | 17.5  | 12.2  |
| Total                            | 100.0    | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0          | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table A2

**Distributions of the father's EGP socio-occupational strata in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Men**

| Socio-occupational categories    | Hungary |       |       | Poland |       |       | Slovakia |       |       |
|----------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|
|                                  | 1948    | 1952  | 1963  | 1948   | 1952  | 1963  | 1948     | 1952  | 1963  |
| Higher professionals             | 8.4     | 10.0  | 12.2  | 5.6    | 8.5   | 11.2  | 9.5      | 10.2  | 15.8  |
| Lower professionals              | 5.5     | 5.7   | 5.0   | 2.5    | 2.6   | 3.3   | 4.2      | 5.1   | 4.6   |
| Proprietors                      | 10.0    | 7.1   | 5.6   | 7.7    | 6.3   | 5.0   | 2.5      | 1.4   | .7    |
| Skilled workers                  | 17.4    | 20.9  | 26.7  | 13.8   | 17.9  | 22.2  | 19.3     | 22.8  | 28.8  |
| Unskilled workers                | 14.9    | 18.9  | 24.5  | 15.7   | 17.3  | 19.3  | 26.5     | 28.0  | 29.7  |
| Farmers and agricultural workers | 43.7    | 36.6  | 26.0  | 54.7   | 47.4  | 38.9  | 38.1     | 32.6  | 20.4  |
| Total                            | 100.0   | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0    | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table A3  
Distributions of the EGP socio-occupational strata in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.  
Men

| Socio-occupational categories    | Bulgaria |       |       | Czech Republic |       |       |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|----------------|-------|-------|
|                                  | 1983     | 1988  | 1993  | 1983           | 1988  | 1993  |
| Higher professionals             | 8.6      | 8.0   | 7.7   | 13.4           | 14.2  | 11.4  |
| Lower professionals              | 14.1     | 13.0  | 12.7  | 17.0           | 17.1  | 16.8  |
| Proprietors                      | 1.1      | 3.7   | 9.4   | .5             | 1.2   | 14.3  |
| Skilled workers                  | 28.9     | 29.1  | 27.2  | 34.2           | 34.1  | 28.5  |
| Unskilled workers                | 34.4     | 35.5  | 31.2  | 29.2           | 28.0  | 24.4  |
| Farmers and agricultural workers | 12.1     | 12.6  | 11.3  | 5.6            | 5.4   | 4.6   |
| Total                            | 100.0    | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0          | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table A4  
Distributions of the EGP socio-occupational strata in Hungary and Poland. Men

| Socio-occupational categories    | Hungary |       |       | Poland |       |       |
|----------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
|                                  | 1983    | 1988  | 1993  | 1983   | 1988  | 1993  |
| Higher professionals             | 10.5    | 9.8   | 8.8   | 11.7   | 10.1  | 14.2  |
| Lower professionals              | 12.1    | 12.3  | 13.9  | 12.5   | 11.9  | 11.8  |
| Proprietors                      | 2.6     | 5.3   | 12.0  | 3.7    | 6.1   | 13.8  |
| Skilled workers                  | 39.0    | 37.9  | 35.5  | 32.4   | 33.0  | 29.6  |
| Unskilled workers                | 24.3    | 24.1  | 21.2  | 27.2   | 26.4  | 22.2  |
| Farmers and agricultural workers | 15.4    | 14.8  | 15.1  | 8.6    | 8.3   | 7.6   |
| Total                            | 100.0   | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0  | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table A5  
Distributions of the EGP socio-occupational strata in Russia and Slovakia. Men

| Socio-occupational categories    | Russia |       |       | Slovakia |       |       |
|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|
|                                  | 1983   | 1988  | 1993  | 1983     | 1988  | 1993  |
| Higher professionals             | 21.4   | 20.9  | 19.9  | 11.7     | 10.1  | 14.2  |
| Lower professionals              | 11.4   | 12.6  | 12.1  | 15.3     | 14.7  | 14.8  |
| Proprietors                      | .7     | 1.9   | 5.6   | .4       | 1.1   | 9.6   |
| Skilled workers                  | 34.8   | 34.4  | 33.2  | 40.6     | 41.2  | 38.0  |
| Unskilled workers                | 21.9   | 21.3  | 21.6  | 24.8     | 23.8  | 21.8  |
| Farmers and agricultural workers | 9.7    | 8.8   | 7.6   | 6.0      | 6.1   | 5.1   |
| Total                            | 100.0  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0    | 100.0 | 100.0 |