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SOCIAL MOBILITY AND IMMIGRANTS
 OR IMMIGRANTS AND
 SOCIAL MOBILITY*

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Raftery raises three issues in his comment. First, we got some of our four-fold tables wrong—including farm fathers when we said we didn't. He seems to be right—and for two populations, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, our errors are consequential. Our Canadian error turns out not to be so. The difference between his and our collapsing of the Hungarian data can well be seen as a matter of honest disagreement—one on which we are willing to yield if he sees the matter as important. For reasons he does not indicate, he also gets a different value for mobility in Yugoslavia. In general our measures and his are in agreement and, as he reports in his equations 1 and 2, one gets rather the same results with one set as with the other.

The second issue Raftery raises has to do with an additional variable: we did not talk about immigration. He is not entirely correct here. We devoted two columns of text to two asides noting that the four countries with the most circulatory mobility have histories of providing permanent homes to unusually large numbers of immigrants relative to their sizes. We presented zero-order correlations between structural variables and percent foreign born and speculated about their interpretation.

We did not pursue the matter in the article because we could not plausibly include immigration or percent foreign born in a causal logic promoting differences in circulatory mobility. We saw immigrants not as a given that influences how a social order functions, but as people attracted differentially to countries. In this context the dependent variable of our original article, circulatory mobility, is inde-

pendent, a characteristic of a social order that may attract or repel prospective international migrants.

For most of the countries in the small sample Raftery and we share, the percent foreign born lies between 1 and 7 percent. The only prevailing theory by which such a small body of people could be a major determinant of social mobility argues that persons at any one point in time will be ranked socially by their arrival temporally, with first comers on top, late comers below. This mobility is structural, not circulatory. This kind of immigration, understood by this theory, cannot explain any variance at all in circulatory mobility.

That immigration can influence rates of circulatory mobility, we, with Raftery, suspect is true. We do not think in general the effect is powerful. We do not regard Raftery's equations as evidence on the matter. Immigration is only another way to "reproduce" a population. Its effects on mobility must depend on the status of the positions the immigrants occupy—and this varies substantially across countries.

That people thinking of emigrating regard some destinations as more attractive than others is incontrovertible: they say so to journalists, to friends, to us. Their freedom of choice is hardly absolute.

The less than voluntary aspect of international migration has received extensive notice. The mid 19th century emigration from Europe was essentially a Malthusian evacuation of the area. The decline of colonialism meant the repatriation of colonists, especially French, Belgian, Spanish, and English. The attainment of independence by previously colonial countries and changes in their governments since have prompted extensive displacement of peoples, often across the nearest friendly border. Wars predictably produce refugees.

Just as emigration is not always voluntary, immigration has its constraints. The various U.S. Quota and Immigration Acts restricting access to the United States have their counterparts in the immigration laws of other countries.

One need not subscribe to a view of migratory freedom to suspect some countries are more attractive than others to migrants and this is reflected in the size of immigrant populations. Surely one facet of attractiveness is an immigration policy liberal enough to permit entrance. Another is likely to be an emigration policy permitting departure if the move turns out an unhappy one.

What else might make one potential destination more attractive than another to an international migrant is a matter puzzling students of international migration. In the context of

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Table 1. Zero-Order Correlations Between Specified Variables and Percent Foreign Born and Standard Form Equations Predicting Percent Foreign Born

Variables	r	Equations				
		1	2	3	4	5
GNP/capita	.540	.405	.419	-.294	.238	-.318
Income to Top 5%	-.469	-.246			-.044	
Gini Coefficient	-.450		-.217			
Midocc	.725			.976		.879
Mobility	-.601				-.405	-.156
R		.578	.569	.741	.626	.746

responding to a comment, we shall refrain from reviewing the issues, but limit ourselves to the variables Raftery uses. We shall, however, draw arrows in different directions, putting variables on different sides of our equations than he does in his.

We accept all of his data—where his and our measures differ, we take his. We also join him in dropping Israel from the sample, as he does in the first part of his comment. Israel exhibits the most intergenerational circulatory mobility of the original 24 populations; it has the lowest income inequality, but, most important, over 60 percent of its labor force is foreign born. We also want to drop Israel on theoretical grounds. We allow that social mobility in a country so largely immigrant as Israel is consequent to a widespread reduction in force of social origins created by the Holocaust and the airlifts of Middle Eastern and North African Jewry. Here we agree with Raftery: immigration makes for social mobility. For the rest of the sample we view immigrants not as generators of mobility, but as people with choices—limited choices, but choices.

In Table 1 we present zero-order correlations with percent foreign born of GNP per capita, the three structural variables, and the indicator of circulatory mobility. We also present estimates of some equations predicting percent foreign born. The logic informing our calculations is that both the affluence of a country and the shape of its income and occupational structures, distributing and giving access to that affluence, influence immigration. In equations 1, 2, and 3, it appears GNP/capita is more important than the shape of income distributions, but less important than the shape of occupational structures. Indeed, in equation 3 the effect of GNP/capita is negative. A glissando of social positions is more important for international migrants than is relative income equality.

The reason we see the shape of either occupational or reward structures as influential to migrants is their potential consequence for mobility. We suspect it is not so much afflu-

ence that attracts immigrants as the availability of a social ladder made up of many little rungs, a social ladder which, relative to others, is a glissando. A strategy of plodding, one step before the other, can only work when there is something to stand on.

When mobility is added to the equations, both affluence and income inequality lose force to it (eq. 4). What is attractive about affluent places and those with relative income equality is the amount of social mobility that occurs in them. Adding mobility to affluence and the occupational variable (eq. 5) leads to a different conclusion: mobility takes little away from the overwhelming importance of the shape of the occupational structure.

We originally regarded the indicators of income distributions and occupational structures as alternative, flawed indicators of how closely a society approximated a social glissando. In predicting social mobility they behaved as such. Here they behave differently. With so few cases and multicollinearity so prevalent, we are not inclined to put both indicators in one equation, as Raftery has done in his Comment.

Raftery's third issue is about linearity. He argues that the effects of everything in his equations are different for more and less developed countries. This is another way of saying (1) the effect of GNP/capita is nonlinear and (2) all other effects interact with GNP/capita. He may well be right; we simply cannot tell. His equation 3 includes 5 variables with an $n=13$; his equation 4 has the same 5 variables and an $n=7$.

Even before Raftery split the sample in two for his calculations, we and he and anybody else interested were holding a debate on little evidence. The cases, nations, are few. The numbers about each are suspect. That nations are meaningfully equal units of analysis is implausible. This should be kept in mind. This is an area where equations are not the test of an argument, but an argument the test of equations.

Contributors (Continued from p. iv)

ing Life Plans: Race, Gender and Career Decisions (with Wolfgang Frese), was published in 1982. WOLFGANG FRESE is Associate Professor of Sociology, Mississippi State Univer-

sity and the Mississippi State Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station, and is currently researching the residential mobility and preferences of southern youth as well as the structure of agriculture and crime in the South. He is coauthor of *Making Life Plans*.

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