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Old Debate, New Evidence
Class Mobility Trends in Israeli Society, 1974–1991

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This paper engages in the ongoing debate concerning the consequences of the industrialization process for social mobility. At the heart of this debate is the 'liberal thesis' which states that the industrialization process brings about not only more opportunity for social mobility, but also more equality of opportunity. This paper examines changes over time in social mobility in Israel. It also looks at Israel's mobility regime in a comparative perspective, and at the relationship between immigration and social mobility. Israeli society makes a good case study for the following reasons: Israeli society is a new society; Israeli society has experienced rapid economic and demographic changes; Recently collected data of high quality make it possible to follow the emergence of Israeli society and changes within it, and to relate them to social mobility. The sources of data in this study are the 1974 mobility survey (Matras and Weintraub, 1977), and the 1991 mobility survey in Israel (Kraus and Toren, 1992). To achieve comparability between the two datasets this paper uses the methodology adopted by the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) project to study intergenerational class mobility of Israeli men aged 25–64. It is found that social mobility in Israel is at a high level in a comparative perspective. At the same time, Israel's mobility regime is basically similar to other industrial nations' mobility regimes, and over time, Israel's mobility regime has changed very little. Any distinct mobility pattern in Israel (or change over time in this pattern) is explained by historical processes, specific institutional arrangements, and state interventions in the economy (particularly in the agricultural sector). Industrialization and social mobility are not found to be closely related in Israel, nor can we say that Israel's high level of fluidity is caused by immigration.

Introduction

It is an empirical fact that over the course of industrialization the economic and stratification structures of societies have changed rapidly. However, whether or not the industrialization process has consequences for social mobility is still debated among students of stratification. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by providing new empirical evidence on changes over time in social mobility in Israeli society. This study, then, is part of an ongoing tradition of national mobility studies. However, it is more than an Israeli replication of other studies. Israeli society makes a good case study of the consequences of industrialization for social mobility for three main reasons:

1. Israeli society is a new society;
2. Israeli society has experienced rapid economic and demographic changes; and
3. Recently collected data of high quality make it possible to follow the emergence of Israeli society and changes within it, and to relate them to social mobility.[1]

In the following paragraphs I shall review the main arguments that inform the debate about social mobility and industrialization, and I then present a review of Israeli society.

Six arguments form the debate concerning the consequences of industrialization for changes in

social mobility. On one side of this debate, there are two arguments that link the industrialization process with changes in social mobility, while on the other side of this debate there are four arguments that do not link the two processes. The main distinction that I make in the review of these arguments is along this line. However, presenting the various accounts of social mobility in such a way puts arguments about absolute mobility together with arguments about relative mobility. The distinction between absolute and relative mobility is theoretically important – thus the analysis will deal with each 'type' of mobility in turn. I assume in this paper an understanding of the now widely accepted distinction between these two concepts of mobility. Having made these preliminary clarifications let me begin with a review of the two arguments from the first side of the debate.

At the heart of the debate concerning the consequences of industrialization for social mobility is the so-called 'liberal thesis of industrialization'. This theory covers most aspects of social interactions in industrial and post-industrial society: from social mobility to geographical mobility, from social inequality to social justice, and from pluralism to social order (Parsons, 1954; Kerr *et al.*, 1964; Bell, 1974, Treimen, 1970). The implication of the 'liberal thesis' for social mobility can be summarized in three propositions. In industrial society compared to pre-industrial society:

- rates of social mobility are high (with upward mobility predominating over downward mobility);
- opportunities for mobility are more equal; and
- both mobility rates and the degree of equality of opportunity tend to increase.

Thus, according to the liberal thesis, absolute as well as relative rates of mobility increase with industrialization. This theory, moreover, assumes that the industrialization process has an inherent 'logic' – which is functionally consistent with the technical and economic rationality of industrial production – that promotes social mobility and fluidity (as well as a liberal form of society).

The second argument on this side of the debate was made by Marxists. In opposing the 'logic' of industrialization as proposed by the liberal thesis, Marxists argue that the division of labour in capitalist societies has had different consequences for mobility patterns and trends. However, in both the liberal and Marxists arguments, the new era – capitalism or industrialism – is expected to have major consequences for social mobility (and social order). As with the liberal thesis, Marx and Engels claim in the *Communist Manifesto* that with the development of new methods of production, more social mobility is expected (1848/1992: 11). However, contrary to the liberal thesis, Marxists argue that employment of all kinds tends to be deskilled and degraded in capitalist societies (Braverman, 1974). According to Marxists, then, absolute mobility increases with industrialization (capitalism), but more downward mobility over time is expected as the relative size of the less skilled classes increases. Having presented these two arguments, I move on to present four arguments from the opposing side of the debate.

Perhaps the first to suggest that social mobility does not relate to the industrialization process was Sorokin (1959), who discusses absolute vertical mobility. According to Sorokin, the surge in vertical mobility in the modern era need not necessarily be linked to the industrialization process. Sorokin, who argued from a historical perspective, asserted that movements in social mobility show no more than 'trendless fluctuation' (1959: 142, 152).

The second argument on this side of the debate regarding a trend in social mobility over time makes a 'special' link between industrialization and social mobility. More or less contemporaneously with the development of the liberal thesis, Lipset and Zetterberg (1959) formulated their hypothesis (hereafter the LZ hypothesis), which explicitly addresses the issue of absolute mobility. The LZ hypothesis envisages a discontinuous linkage between the industrialization process and social mobility: 'social mobility of societies becomes relatively high once their industrialization, and hence their economic expansion, reaches a certain level' (1959: 13). Beyond this unspecified level, it is argued, the mobility rate of society is constant over time. Thus, according to Lipset and Zetterberg, the industrialization process would have a 'threshold effect' on social mobility, such that in the take-off stage of industrialization mobility rates increase, but after a 'certain level' of industrialization mobility rates are constant.

Since its formulation, the predictions of the LZ hypothesis have been falsified by most studies (cf.

Miller, 1960; Jones, 1969; Grusky and Hauser, 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*). However, the LZ hypothesis is of great value for its implicit and explicit stand in opposition to the liberal thesis. To begin with, Lipset and Zetterberg do not see the increase in social mobility that characterizes industrial societies as following from some inherent 'logic' in the industrialization process. Instead, they argue very clearly that the trigger for social mobility is psychological – the individual motivation towards mobility (1959: 61–64). Secondly, Lipset and Zetterberg do not link social mobility to equality of opportunity (i.e. relative mobility): 'There may be more mobility in one country than another, and yet less equality of opportunity' (1959: 27). The first serious attempt to reformulate the LZ hypothesis was made, some twenty years after it was formulated, by Featherman, Jones, and Hauser (1975) (hereafter the FJH hypothesis).

The FJH hypothesis brings to the fore the important distinction between absolute and relative mobility. Accordingly, absolute mobility may be altered by effects that are 'exogenous' to the stratification process. However, the stratification process – that is, the transmission of social advantage and disadvantage between generations – is 'endogenous' to the stratification structure, and is similar in capitalist societies. As the authors of this hypothesis put it: 'the genotypical pattern of mobility (circulation mobility) in industrial societies with a market economy and a nuclear family system is basically the same' (1975: 340). Although the FJH hypothesis is concerned primarily with cross-national similarity in relative mobility, it pays attention to the issue of changes in relative mobility over time. As Featherman, Jones, and Hauser stated: 'it seems that once structural mobility has been taken into account, circulation mobility has been nearly constant over time' (1975: 339–340). The implication of the FJH hypothesis for this study is very clear; and indeed many students have made a use of this hypothesis to address the question of trends over time in relative mobility (cf. Erikson, 1983: 167; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 87; Jones, Kajima, and Marks, 1994). Given its importance, the FJH hypothesis has been subjected to many empirical tests and revisions.[2] Grusky and Hauser (1984), for example, argue that the FJH hypothesis should also include 'non-capitalist societies', about which the original hypothesis could only speculate. A more serious revision of the FJH hypothesis, however, is offered by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992*a*). Thus, the fourth argument from this side of the debate is this latter revision of the FJH hypothesis.

Erikson and Goldthorpe point to a discrepancy between the verbal formulation of the FJH hypothesis that (across nations and over time) social fluidity is basically similar, and the formal test of the hypothesis, by a log-linear model which states that social fluidity is identical. In other words, the FJH hypothesis is wrongly interpreted and tested in a rather strict way – even by its own authors. More importantly, those who tested the FJH hypothesis at this level of strictness found an impressive communality in the association between origins and destinations across nations. For example, Grusky and Hauser state that, their 'results make it quite clear that the cross nationally common element heavily dominates over the cross-nationally variable one' (1984: 26). Erikson and Goldthorpe arrive at a similar conclusion in the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) project, where they study the class mobility process in 12 European industrial nations and three non-European industrial nations (the USA, Australia, and Japan). Thus, Erikson and Goldthorpe's points of departure in their revision of the FJH hypothesis are two:

- the fluidity patterns of industrial societies *do* share widespread common properties; and
- the fluidity patterns of industrial societies *may* vary between societies and over time.

These assumptions do not appear to contradict the original FJH hypothesis. Erikson and Goldthorpe then argue that the task of the researcher is first to establish the existence of this basic similarity and then to show how and why a particular nation deviates from this pattern (cf. Müller, 1990).

Thus, as a first step, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992*a*) have specified this basically similar pattern of fluidity in a model of 'common pattern of fluidity' – which they have labelled the 'core model' – and show that this model captures the large common element in the fluidity patterns of the 15 nations of the CASMIN study. More importantly, it appears impossible to 'explain away' the deviation from this core pattern by including macro variables in the analysis, such as economic growth, level of

industrialization, or political regime. Furthermore, they show that any temporal shift in the fluidity pattern of each nation simply oscillates around this standard pattern of fluidity. In this respect, Goldthorpe (1995) argues that, *ceteris paribus*, these oscillations will tend to shift closer to the core level over time.[3] Finally, Erikson and Goldthorpe argue, as does Sorokin, that historical and political factors do play a role in altering a society's fluidity pattern, but that these alterations would only result in variations, within a close range, around a common pattern of fluidity that industrial nations share. Similarly, the power of these nationally specific features to alter society's fluidity pattern over time is very limited, and would result only in oscillations around the core level of fluidity. Put another way, Erikson and Goldthorpe would appear to replace Sorokin's argument of 'trendless fluctuation' in absolute mobility, with an argument of 'constant flux' in relative mobility.

It is clear from this discussion that both empirically and theoretically, disagreements outweigh agreements as to the changes (over time) in social mobility in industrial nations. This is in spite of the fact that this subject has been intensively studied in recent decades – by researchers covering many nations and various time periods. One explanation commonly used to explain these conflicting findings is the use of dubious data in many of these studies (cf. Hout, 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*). I would add to this that most studies have examined societies in which the industrialization process, and other 'exogenous' effects, took place in a period that is not fully covered by their data (but see Hout, 1989). The incremental effect of these problems may damage the conclusions of these studies – no matter how sophisticated their analyses.

I offer in this paper an acceptable solution to these problems. On the one hand, I pay special attention to data quality. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, I analyse a (complex) society as it establishes itself. In summary, my data, which are of high quality, cover the period in which Israeli society emerged, and immense 'exogenous' effects altered its class structure. Thus I can reliably relate these changes to social mobility, and in so doing, more decisive conclusions can be reached regarding the merit of the arguments I am assessing. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next two sections provide an account of Israeli society and the data used in this analysis. These are followed by sections examining changes over time in absolute rates of mobility, relative rates of mobility, and the pattern of fluidity.

Israeli Society

The last 100 years or so have seen many changes in Israeli society. At the beginning of the Zionist enterprise in 1882, the country was, as it had been for centuries, poor and underdeveloped. The 'industrialization process' in Israel began with the economic boom of the 1930s and especially during World War II (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974: 477). After the state of Israel was established, the process intensified, and the structure of the Israeli economy changed dramatically (Kraus, 1992*a*). In particular, there was a sharp decline in the proportion of the labour force engaged in the agricultural sector, with a corresponding increase in the proportion engaged in the service sector. Attendant on these shifts were changes in the occupational composition of the labour force. In 1955 about 17 per cent were employed in agricultural occupations; by 1990 this figure was only 3.8 per cent. By contrast, the percentage of those working in technical and professional occupations more than doubled over the same period: from 10.4 to 25.1 per cent (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 1987: 306–7, Table XII/10; CBS, 1991: 340–1, Table 12.16). The industrialization process is also characterized by a move from the countryside to the city (Treiman, 1970). This ecological trend can be seen in Israel, although the majority of the Israeli population has always been urban. Thus, in the early 1950s, 75 per cent of the Jewish population resided in urban settlements, while by 1990 this figure had increased to 90.4 per cent. A similar trend can be seen for the Arab population: in the early 1950s, only 26 per cent resided in urban settlements, but this figure had increased to 90.8 per cent by 1986 (CBS, 1987: 48–9 Table II/10; CBS, 1991: 62–3, Table 2.12). Finally, a major signal of the industrialization process is economic growth (Wrigley, 1972: 226). Figure 1 shows that, for the most part, Israel has experienced sustained economic growth since it was established. The GDP

per capita has increased from 5,000 new Israeli shekels (NIS) in 1950 to about 24,000 NIS in 1992. This trend can be broken down into one period of extremely high rates of economic growth – from 1967 to 1973; and two periods of economic recession – from 1951 to 1953, and from 1965 to 1967.

Industrialization is not the only process to affect the Israeli stratification structure. Demographic changes have also played a major role in altering the Israeli stratification structure. First, successive waves of Jewish immigrants have entered the region since the Zionist movement was established in 1882, and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 encouraged growing numbers of Jews to enter the country. Thus, from 1948 to 1990 some 2,031,800 immigrants (the majority of whom are Jewish) entered the country (CBS, 1991: 43, Table 2.2). The consequences of immigration for social mobility will be addressed in a separate paper.[4] It is important, however, to emphasize the effect of this influx of immigrants on the Israeli stratification structure. Thus, the immigration waves of the 1920s and 1930s brought with them some 347,000 immigrants who included a relatively large proportion of professionals and proprietors (Kraus and Hodge, 1990: 19). This marked the establishment of the petty bourgeoisie in Israel. After Israel was established, an influx of Jews from Asia and Africa (Sepharadi-Jews) entered the country. These immigrants came handicapped by poor education, large families, and little exposure to modernity (Kraus and Hodge, 1990: 21), and thus became part of the lower strata of Israeli society.

Secondly, after the Six Day War of 1967 the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip entered the Israeli economy in growing numbers, and by the end of the 1980s accounted for 7 per cent of the total labour force. Non-citizen Arabs, moreover, entered the labour market with a heavy concentration in the least desirable occupations – e.g. agriculture and construction (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986).[5]

As well as demographic changes, it is important to recognize the role of the Zionist movement and government interventions in the development of Israel's economy. To begin with, the Zionist movement was an ideological movement that aimed to establish a new, modern, Jewish society in Palestine (Eisenstadt, 1967: 23), and emphasized the 'return to the soil' of Jews in Palestine. By returning to the soil they meant to establish an agricultural basis for the Jewish community in Palestine (Eisenstadt, 1967: 4). Indeed, within the first 50 years of the Zionist enterprise new agricultural settlements were established in Palestine. After Israel was established, the state took over the tasks of the Zionist movement. A policy of 'decentralization' was adopted in which a large part of the population was settled on the periphery of the country, mainly in settlements with an agricultural infrastructure (Kipnis, 1990). And, for primarily ideological reasons, new entrants to



Figure 1. *GDP Per-Capita in Israel (in 1990 NIS)* Source: CBS, 1991: 187 Table 6.1

agriculture were offered tax relief, and agricultural settlements were offered capital and other resources (Hanaki, Rabushka, and Plesner, 1989).

At the same time, the establishment of the state of Israel (1948) marked a historical turning point for the Israeli Arabs of Palestinian society, who became a subordinate minority sub-population in Israel. Prior to 1948 there were twice as many Arabs as Jews in Palestine – the majority of whom were peasants and agricultural labourers. Soon after the war of 1948, only 150,000 Arabs remained in the newly established Jewish state, accounting for only 12 per cent of the Israeli population in 1950 (Rosenfeld, 1978: 386). What is more, the new Jewish state confiscated some 40 per cent of the land owned by Arabs, which left most Israeli Arabs landless. This, in turn, contributed greatly to the proletarianization of Israeli Arabs – which had begun in the 1930s (cf. Rosenfeld, 1978). Thus, in addition to the effect of industrialization on the Israeli agricultural sector, two conflicting processes have shaped this sector. On the one hand, the Zionist ideology and government interventions pulled Israeli Jews into agriculture, while, on the other, state manipulations forced Israeli Arabs out of agriculture.

Although most mobility studies in Israel have been dominated by the status attainment approach (cf. Semyonov and Kraus, 1983; Smooha and Kraus, 1985; Kraus and Hodgh, 1990) few studies have taken the tabular approach. A comparison between the results of studies based on data from the 1960s and 1970s on absolute mobility in Israeli society would appear to indicate that over time a trend for increasing upward mobility characterizes the Israeli mobility pattern. However, most of these studies offer an incomplete analysis of Israeli society, based on somewhat dubious data. Thus, for example, Matras (1963) based his analysis on a survey of married Jewish men in 1955. Likewise, Zloczower (1973) based his analysis on a survey of Jewish men in Haifa in 1964. Other studies used more reliable data, but still failed to offer a complete analysis of Israeli society. Thus, Matras, Simha, and Weintraub (1975) studied the mobility pattern of Jews based only on the 1974 mobility survey. Likewise, Yaish (1995) did not include Israeli Arabs in his analysis of the 1991 mobility survey. What is more, the only two studies that are based on high quality data of all Israeli subpopulations – Matras and Weintraub (1977) and Goldthorpe, Yaish, and Kraus (1997) – applied different methods in their analyses. Whereas Matras and Weintraub (1977) studied social mobility between occupational groups, Goldthorpe *et al.* (1997) studied social mobility between classes. Without even questioning the validity of the results of these studies, the different methods of analysis would make a comparison of these results somewhat problematic, especially if one wished to study trends over time in social mobility.

Regarding relative mobility, only three studies are of any relevance: those of Tyree, Semyonov, and Hodge (1979), who studied the 1974 mobility survey; Yaish (1995), who studied the 1991 mobility survey; and Goldthorpe, Yaish, and Kraus, (1997), who also studied the 1991 mobility survey. Two features of the Israeli fluidity pattern emerge from the results of these studies:

- Israeli society is found to be the most 'fluid' nation from a comparative perspective (Tyree *et al.*, 1979; Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997); and
- The Israeli fluidity pattern is found to be constant over time (Yaish, 1995; Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997).

However, a comparison between the results of these studies would again lead to a somewhat unreliable picture of trends in the Israeli fluidity pattern. This is because these studies did not use similar methods of analysis. For example, Tyree *et al.* (1979) based their analysis on a three-class classification; Goldthorpe *et al.* (1997) based their analysis on a seven-class classification; and Yaish (1995) based his analysis on an eleven-class classification. These differences may cause difficulties when comparing the results between the studies, and in particular in assessing changes in fluidity patterns over time. What is more, even the results of Goldthorpe *et al.* (1997) and Yaish (1995) on trends over time may be biased, because these studies examined trends over time in social fluidity based on a quasi-cohort analysis. A quasi-cohort analysis, however, cannot make the necessary distinction between intra-generational mobility and inter-generational mobility – so very young Israeli men may seem to experience less mobility merely because of their age.

In the following analysis, I aim to overcome most of these problems by analysing data of high quality which represent the entire Israeli population at two distinct points in time. To achieve comparability

between the two datasets I use a standard method and classification of the stratification structure in the two datasets. More to the point, I adopt the CASMIN methodology, and Israeli mobility and fluidity are studied within a class framework using the Goldthorpe class schema as presented in Table 1.

The Data

The analyses in this paper are based on data from two nationally representative surveys that were tailored to suit the study of social mobility in Israel. The 1974 mobility survey (hereafter 1974 MS) was conducted by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistic as part of its 1974 civilian labour-force survey. The target population of the sample is all Israeli persons (Jews and Arabs) aged 14 and over, excluding the institutionalized population. The sample includes 3,500 households, with 15,078 persons aged 14 and above, of whom 11,917 are Jews and 3,161 Arabs (Matras and Weintraub, 1977).[6] The 1991 mobility survey (hereafter 1991 MS) was conducted by Vered Kraus and Nina Toren (1992), and carried out by Pori Research Institute in 1991. The target population of the sample is all Israeli persons (Jews and Arabs) aged 18 and above, excluding the institutionalized population. The sample includes 5,800 households, with 9,926 persons aged 18 and older, of whom 8,158 are Jews and 1,768 Arabs.[7]

However, two differences exist between the two mobility surveys which impose some constraints on the analysis. First, as mentioned above, the 1974 MS includes information on the civilian labour force only. Thus, I study the class mobility of the civilian labour force only – i.e. army personnel are excluded from the 1991 MS.[8] Secondly, the information on father's occupations in the 1974 MS is classified into a less detailed classification (the two-digit classification) when compared with the 1991 MS. Thus, only the less detailed seven-class version of the Goldthorpe class schema can be applied to the data. For this reason, moreover, I am unable to have as high quality class classification for Israeli women as for Israeli men – so the analysis is restricted to men only (see Yaish, 1998: ch. 3). To conclude, then,

Table 1. *Various working classifications of the Goldthorpe Class Schema*

Full Version	7 Class Version	5 Class Version	3 Class Version
I, II	I + II Service class	I + II + III White-collar workers	Non-manual workers
IIIa, IIIb	III Routine non-manual class		
IVa, IVb	IVab Petty bourgeoisie	IVab Petty bourgeoisie	
IVc	IVc – Farmers	Ivc + VIIb – Farm workers	Farm workers
V, VI	V + VI Skilled workers	V + VI Skilled workers	Manual workers
VIIa	VIIa Unskilled workers	VIIa Unskilled workers	
VIIb	VIIb Unskilled farm workers		

from the two mobility surveys I analyse all Israeli men aged 25 to 64 who were part of the Israeli civilian labour force. I restrict the male population to between the ages of 25 and 64 in order to achieve comparability with the CASMIN project which is our main point of reference. In the CASMIN project, the standard age-range is 20–64, but a modification seemed desirable in the Israeli case in view of the large proportion of men between the ages of 18 and 21 engaged in military service (see also Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997: 25 n. 3).

Trends in Absolute Mobility

In this section I study absolute mobility in the context of Total Mobility Rates (TMR) – the proportion of men who are mobile in a given mobility table. Three hypotheses are tested in this section:

1. the liberal thesis and the Marxist prediction that total mobility rates increase with industrialization;
2. Sorokin's prediction that absolute mobility will show no more than 'trendless fluctuations' over time; and
3. the Lipset and Zetterberg prediction that total mobility rates increase in the early stage of industrialization, but are constant after a certain level of industrialization.

Studying Israeli society enables us to follow trends in mobility rates in a society where most stages of the industrialization process are covered by data of high quality. It is well established by now that the industrialization process in Israel–Palestine began in the late 1930s, and this process accelerated in the 1960s. The 1974 MS and the 1991 MS covered these periods well. The industrialization process in Israel, and other factors which I have reviewed earlier, have, no doubt, altered the Israeli class structure. Table 2, which presents the two Israeli mobility tables, shows how both between origins and destinations and over time (i.e. between the two surveys) the Israeli class structure has changed. Thus, for example, a calculation of the dissimilarity index between the origin and destination distributions in the 1974 mobility table is as high as 45 per cent, and in the 1991 mobility table it reaches 30 per cent. For comparison, in the nations of the CASMIN project the dissimilarity index of only three nations (Hungary, Poland, and Japan) is higher than 30 per cent, although still

Table 2. *Counts and marginal in the seven-class integenerational mobility table for Israeli men aged 25–64 in the 1974 MS (top) and the 1991 MS (bottom)*

Class of origin	Class of destination								
	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb	N	%
I + II	80	19	19	7	31	17	–	173	6
	178	43	46	9	69	35	–	380	11
III	48	41	26	1	38	29	1	184	6
	83	29	29	1	64	23	1	230	7
IVab	218	181	382	51	340	389	8	1569	53
	217	128	273	16	283	154	1	1072	31
IVc	40	33	78	79	67	148	4	449	15
	83	25	74	44	73	88	1	388	11
V+VI	34	22	29	12	62	26	1	186	6
	96	52	79	7	227	78	1	540	16
VIIa	35	34	44	5	98	113	4	333	11
	126	99	104	7	244	142	2	724	21
VIIb	3	2	16	6	14	30	4	75	3
	10	16	12	1	25	16	–	80	2
N	458	332	594	161	650	752	22		
N	793	392	617	85	985	536	6		
%	15	11	20	5	22	25	1		
	23	11	18	2	29	16	–		

considerably lower than 45 per cent (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 193, Table 6.2). These high indices imply that a high rate of intergenerational class mobility is expected in both mobility tables. The question that is yet to be resolved is whether total rates of mobility have increased as Israel has become more industrialized.

The TMR calculated from these mobility tables are at a high but nonetheless constant level (74 per cent in both mobility tables).[9] In comparison to the CASMIN nations, Israel appears to be among the most mobile nation (along with Sweden and Hungary: 73 per cent and 76 per cent respectively; see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 195, Table 6.3). However, before any implication as to the validity of the hypotheses on changes over time in absolute mobility is drawn, a more detailed examination of these data is needed. Thus, a graph that represent the yearly TMR calculated from the two datasets is produced. Since as few as 80 men on average are included in each mobility table (6400/81=80, when the sample's N=~6400) the graph would display a highly fluctuating pattern. To reduce these fluctuations – which may originate in small Ns in each mobility table – the results are smoothed using the Karnel smoothing technique (Wand and Jones, 1995).

Figure 2 presents these smoothed yearly measures of the Israeli TMR. The bold line represents the 1974 mobility survey; starting with respondents who were born in 1909 and were aged 64 in the year of inquiry, and ending with respondents who were born in 1949 and were aged 25 in the year of inquiry. The dotted line represents the 1991 mobility survey; starting with respondents who were born in 1927 and were 64 in the year of inquiry, and ending with respondents who were born in 1966 and were 25 in the year of inquiry.

The trend that Figure 2 reveals is very clear. The total rate of mobility has stayed nearly constant over time.[10] Any fluctuations in the TMR are very slight, within a narrow range of five percentage points. The graphs confirm our earlier observation that Israeli total mobility rates are at a very high level and constant. That is, very little association exists between the industrialization process and TMR in Israel, as a comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 2 would suggest. This comparison shows that whereas the GDP per capita has increased over the years in an almost monotonic way, the TMR has remained nearly unchanged throughout the same period. What is more, any fluctuations that these graphs reveal do not correspond to the influx of Jewish immigrants to Israel, the influx of non-citizen Arabs to the Israeli labour market after the 1967 war, or the political upheaval of 1977 in which a Labour-led government was replaced by a conservative-led government.

What, then, are the theoretical implications of this analysis? As the analysis shows, Israeli total



Figure 2. *Yearly measured total mobility rates of Israeli men age 25–64 (N=6383)*

rates of mobility have stayed nearly constant over the years covered by the data. This constancy runs contrary to both the liberal thesis and the Marxist claim. In fact, this constancy is well predicted by the LZ hypothesis. However, this hypothesis would also predict a threshold effect, caused by industrialization, in these mobility rates. Such a threshold effect is not seen in the graphs presented above. This, then, would lead me to join the massive body of existing evidence which concludes that the LZ hypothesis is virtually obsolete. As far as Sorokin's argument is concerned, this analysis cannot contradict it, and in many respects it would appear to support his claim. For one thing, the period that this graph covers is too short to test Sorokin's idea on trendless fluctuations; thus, it is hard to determine whether or not Sorokin's argument is refuted. Secondly, and more importantly, the Israeli total mobility rates do not appear to correlate with economic growth. Thus, social mobility and the industrialization process do not appear to go hand in hand in Israeli society.

Trends in Relative Mobility

This section examines the following question: has the Israeli fluidity pattern changed over time? From a theoretical viewpoint, two hypotheses are put forward in this section:

1. The liberal thesis, predicting a secular trend towards increasing fluidity over time; and
2. The FJH hypothesis, in its strict form, predicting a constant fluidity pattern over time.

Table 3 presents the results of fitting three log-linear models to the 1974 and 1991 mobility tables (see Table 2), when the 1991 mobility table is contrasted with the 1974 mobility table. Model A states that class origins and destinations are independent of each other. This model is not expected to fit the data, but it serves as a baseline model to assess the extent to which further models are able to account for the total association between origins and destinations (as shown by the rG^2).[11] Model B, the Constant Social Fluidity (CnSF) model, has then been fitted to these tables. This model states that men have different origin and destination distributions in the two mobility tables, but the pattern of association between origins and destinations is constant in the two mobility tables. Alternatively, it implies that all corresponding odds ratios underlying the two mobility tables are identical in the two tables. This model offers a straightforward test of the FJH hypothesis in its strict form. The second row of Table 3 shows that model B (CnSF) misclassifies about 2.6 per cent of all cases, and captures more then 93 per cent of the association between father's class and son's class. However, the returned p-value is lower than the conventional standard of 0.05 (p=0.02). Thus, by this conventional test, the model does not fit the data well, and the implication is that the FJH hypothesis, in its strict form, should be rejected.

We turn next to pose another question regarding the fluidity pattern in the analysis of our two mobility tables: has the strength of the OD association changed over time? The liberal thesis would argue for precisely such a scenario, with an emphasis on a weakening association between father's class and son's class over time. To address this question, we apply in model C a multiplicative log-linear model – the UNIDIFF model – to the data (see Xie, 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*; Firth, 1998). This model explores the possibility that the odds ratios underlying the two mobility tables are uniformly closer to the value of 1 (complete independence) in one mobility table relative to the other. To support the liberal thesis, model C should show that the odds ratios underlying the 1991 mobility table are closer to the value of 1 relative to the

Table 3. *Results of fitting the CnSF and UNIDIFF models to the 1974 and 1991 seven-class inter-generational mobility tables, Israeli men aged 25–64 (N=6383)*

Model	G^2	d.f.	P-value	rG^2	Δ
A. Ind. {OT}{DT}	792.4	72	0.00	–	12.45
B. CnSF {OT}{DT}{OD}	55.0	36	0.02	93.1	2.56
C. UNIDIFF	52.4	35	0.03	93.4	2.56

Note: O=origin class; D=destination class; T=year of survey.

1974 mobility table. The third row of Table 3 shows that the UNIDIFF model does not improve significantly on the fit obtained by model B (G^2 is reduced by 2.6 for the loss of 1 degree of freedom: p=0.11). The implication is that the Israeli fluidity pattern has changed over time, but this change is not towards greater fluidity. In the context of the hypotheses stated at the outset, this analysis suggests that both the FJH hypothesis in its strict form, and the liberal thesis should be rejected, while the Israeli fluidity pattern would appear to fluctuate over time. This fluctuation, then, is the focus of the following analysis.

The Israeli Pattern of Social Fluidity

The objectives of this section are two:

- to reveal the Israeli pattern of class 'fluidity' in 1974 and in 1991, and
- to compare these patterns in order to study the degree to which they vary.

These objectives can be reached by applying the Erikson and Goldthorpe 'core model' of social fluidity to the two mobility tables shown in Table 2.

The core model of social fluidity is a 'topological' log-linear model (Hout, 1983) based on eight matrices that aim to capture four different kinds of effects that influence patterns of social fluidity. These effects are: hierarchy, inheritance, sector, and affinity, and can be understood as follows:[12]

Hierarchy (HI1, HI2) – effects on mobility resulting from differences between classes in the relative advantages they offer as classes of origin and from both their relative accessibility and desirability as classes of destination.

Inheritance (IN1, IN2, IN3) – effects that increase the likelihood of individuals remaining intergenerationally immobile in the same class as that in which they originated.

Sector (SE) – an effect resulting from barriers to mobility between agricultural and non-agricultural classes.

Affinity (AF1, AF2) – effects on mobility that derive from particular discontinuities (negative affinities) or linkages (positive affinities) between classes, and that operate, respectively, to reinforce or to offset the general effects of hierarchy and sector.

All in all, the core model is comprised of eight design matrices, as shown in appendix A. The additive effects of the eight parameters (see Table 4) that are returned from the Israeli data yield the Israeli fluidity pattern. This pattern is then compared to the core level of social fluidity (see Table 5) that Erikson and Goldthorpe have found to exist in modern industrial nations.

The core model is applied to the 1974 and the 1991 mobility tables (Table 2) in three stages. First, the model is fitted separately for each mobility table with the core parameters fixed (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 133–135). Second, the model is fitted with parameters estimated separately for each mobility table: i.e. its parameters are allowed to vary so as to be specific to each mobility table. Finally, the core model is fitted with alterations in one or more of the eight matrices to allow an acceptable fit of the model to each table. These alterations, if needed, are derived from empirical performance in the second stage – i.e. inspection of the residuals – but, nonetheless, must be supported by sociological and historical analyses of Israeli society. Having made these preliminary clarifications, it is possible to embark on the analysis.

Table 6 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics of the core model as applied to the 1974 mobility table. The reader should be familiar with these measures from the previous analyses, except for the $G^2(S)$ statistic. This statistic is a means of standardizing G^2s for samples of differing size.[13] A $G^2(S)$ of 40, implying, with 28 degrees of freedom, a p-value of approximately 0.05, has then been taken as indicating an adequate fit of the core model or of a variant model – with correspondingly larger values being accepted if the number of degrees of freedom increases through the dropping of non-significant terms. Model B in Table 6 shows the fit of the core model with its fixed parameters. The model misclassifies (Δ) more then 10 per cent of all cases, captures less than 25 per cent of the association between father's class and son's class, and the returned p-value is well below 0.05. This is, by far, a worse fit than in any nation from the CASMIN study (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 142, Table 5.1). Similarly, model C – the core model with specific parameters – does not fit the data well. In the next stage the model is altered so that an acceptable fit is achieved.

Table 4. *The model of core social fluidity: postulated effects of hierarchy, inheritance, sector and affinity in the cells of the seven-class intergenerational mobility table*

Class of origin	Class of destination I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb
I+II	IN1+IN2	HI1+AF2	HI1+AF2	HI1 +SE	HI1	HI1 +HI2	HI1+ HI2+SE
III	HI1+AF2	IN1	–	SE	–	HI1	HI1+SE
IVab	HI1+AF2	–	IN1+IN2	SE+AF2	–	HI1	HI1+SE
IVc	HI1+HI2+ SE	HI1+SE	HI1+SE+ AF2	HI1+IN1 +IN2+IN3	HI1+SE	SE+AF2	–
V+VI	HI1	–	–	SE	IN1	HI1+AF2	HI1+SE
VIIa	HI1+HI2	HI1	HI1	HI1+SE	HI1+AF2	IN1	SE
VIIb	HI1+HI2 + SE+AF1	HI1+SE	HI1+SE	HI1	HI1+SE	SE+AF2 +AF2	IN1

Note: Dashed lines indicate hierarchical divisions (shown horizontally), and sectoral divisions (shown vertically).

Table 5. *Effect parameters of the core model of social fluidity*

HI1	HI2	IN1	IN2	IN3	SE	AF1	AF2
−0.22	−0.42	0.43	0.81	0.96	−1.03	−0.77	0.46

Table 6. *Results of fitting the core model of social fluidity to the 1974 seven-class intergenerational mobility table for Israeli men aged 25–64 (N=2969)*

Model	G^2	d.f.	p-value	rG^2	Δ	$G^2(S)$
A. Ind.	410.3	36	0.00	–	12.1	287
B. Estimated parameters	312.7	36	0.00	23.8	10.5	222
C. Nationally specific parameters	101.2	28	0.00	75.3	6.3	77
D. Modified model	40.1	28	0.07	90.2	2.8	36
F. D minus n.s. terms	46.3	30	0.03	88.7	2.9	41

Three alterations of the core model are suggested for the 1974 mobility table, all of which concern the positive affinity effect (AF2) – the effect that reinforces the linkage between particular classes in the mobility table. The modifications introduced below are easily traced with reference to Table 4, where the cell effects in the 7×7 mobility table are presented:

- the AF2 term is omitted from the pair of cells indicating mobility between the petty bourgeoisie, class IVab, and the service class, I+II;

- the AF2 term is included in the cell indicating mobility from the petty bourgeoisie, class IVab, to the unskilled working class, VIIa;
- the AF2 term is omitted from the cell indicating mobility from the skilled manual class, V+VI, to the unskilled working class, VIIa.

These modifications follow a distinct pattern. In what follows they will be supported by the existing literature on social mobility in Israeli society.

The petty bourgeoisie

The petty bourgeoisie (class IVab) is of great importance to students of class mobility. Members of this class can transfer their wealth between generations more easily, and give their sons better starting positions than can members of the working class. They can provide their sons with better education that would lead them into the service class; at the same time they can prevent them from falling into the unskilled working class. The petty bourgeoisie are therefore expected to hold a distinctive position within the class structure (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 129–130). Thus, the core model suggests that individuals from petty bourgeois origins are expected to have a high propensity for mobility into the service class (I+II) and a low propensity for mobility into the unskilled working class (VIIa). The modified model, however, suggests that the Israeli petty bourgeoisie have a distinctively low propensity for mobility into the service class, and a distinctively high propensity for mobility into the unskilled working class.

There are two distinct features of the Israeli petty bourgeoisie that account for this deviation from the core model. First, the relative size of the Israeli petty bourgeoisie as a class of origin is very large (53 per cent), and it reflects to a large extent the class position of Jewish immigrants in countries other than Israel. Moreover, and related to the above, the majority of the Israeli petty bourgeoisie in the origin distribution are made up of the self-employed without employees. When we move to the full class schema (i.e. eleven classes) it turns out that for every small employer (class IVa) there are nine self-employed (class IVb). By comparison, in the CASMIN nations on which the core model is based, the employer class (IVa) and the self-employed class (IVb) in the origin distributions tend to be more or less equal in size. Secondly, studies on the Israeli self-employed reveal that they do not hold any advantaged economic position compared to employees. Thus, for example, Ben-Porath (1986), who studied income attainment based on the 1972 census data, finds the income return on schooling to be the same for both the self-employed and employees. Similarly, Kraus (1992*b*), who studied Israeli Jews based on the 1991 MS, finds that the self-employed do not hold any distinctive economic advantage over employees. Finally, examining the class mobility of the Israeli self-employed, Yaish (1995: 84) finds that sons from class IVb origins (self-employed without employees) have a rather high propensity for mobility into the working class, while those from class IVa origins (small employers) do not appear to have such a mobility pattern.

Therefore, I argue that the different composition of the Israeli petty bourgeoisie (class IVa vis-à-vis class IVb) compared to the CASMIN nations, and the disadvantaged economic position of the Israeli self-employed (which may be related to immigration), may explain the Israeli deviation from the core model.

The working class

In industrial nations, two status groups are identified (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 129): the 'white-collar bloc' (classes I+II and III) and the 'blue-collar bloc' (classes V+VI and VIIa). Status in the context of the core model does not imply a hierarchy of occupations, but rather differential associations in friendship, leisure activities, etc. It is expected under the core model that the propensity for mobility within each status group is relatively high. However, the Israeli fluidity pattern does not follow this expectation completely. Whereas the propensity for fluidity within the white-collar bloc does exist, the propensity for fluidity within the blue-collar bloc is asymmetric. There exists a relatively high propensity for mobility only from the unskilled working class (VIIa) into the skilled working class (V+VI).

An explanation for this deviation from the core pattern may be related to the heterogeneous composition of occupations within the skilled working class (V+VI). Hout and Hauser (1992) argue that the attachment of technicians and skilled workers

into one class produces a heterogeneous class with respect to income, education, and prestige. This heterogeneity, they argue, operates to reduce short-range mobility that is based on hierarchical differences. That is, the fluidity pattern of class V may be different from that of class VI due to hierarchical differences.[14] I thus examine these possible hierarchical differences within the Israeli class structure. The Israeli skilled working class (V+VI) combines technicians (class V) with manual skilled workers (class VI), so differences in prestige score between the two are expected. To uncover these differences we have to move back to the full class schema and to inspect class V and class VI separately. Such an examination reveals that in the 1974 data the average prestige score, on the Kraus prestige scale (Kraus, 1976), in class V is 47 points, but it is only 16 points in class VI. More importantly, Israeli technicians (class V) are often found in service-related occupations, while manual skilled workers (class VI) are mostly found in industry-related occupations. Therefore, members of these classes may belong to different friendship associations and leisure activities which define their status group, and hence they may have a different fluidity pattern. Yaish (1995), who studied the fluidity pattern of the two classes separately, supports this proposition. He finds that men who originated from class V have a higher propensity for mobility into the service class (I+II) compared to men who originated from class VI. At the same time, men who originated from class VI have a higher propensity for mobility into the unskilled working class (VIIa) compared to men who originated from class V.

However, status differences between class V and class VI alone cannot explain the Israeli deviation from the core model. A plausible explanation of this deviation may be given by inspection of the two sub-classes separately – as with the petty bourgeoisie. It appears that in the origin distribution, for every technician (class V) there are about one-and-a-half skilled workers (class VI), and in the destination distribution the ratio is 1:2. By comparison, the average ratio for the nine European nations of the CASMIN project is 1:3.5 and 1:2.5, respectively. Thus, as with the petty bourgeoisie, the difference in the relative sizes of classes V and VI compared to the CASMIN nations, and the hierarchical differences between the two sub-classes, may explain the Israeli variant fluidity pattern of class V+VI as a whole when compared to the core pattern. That is, in both cases distinctive Israeli compositional effects would appear to account for the deviation of the Israeli fluidity pattern from the core model.

The results of fitting this modified model (model D) to the 1974 mobility table are presented in Table 6. The model now misclassifies (Δ) less then 3 per cent of the cases, captures more then 90 per cent of the association between origin and destination class, and the returned $G^2(S)$ falls below our conventional mark of 40. Moreover, the returned p-value from the model is higher than the conventional 0.05 level. On all accounts, then, this model fits the data well. It is possible now to examine the parameter estimates derived from model D, as presented in Table 7, and to compare them with the core parameters. One should bear in mind that the hierarchy and inheritance effects are presented incrementally. That is, the estimates given for HI2 represent increments on those for HI1, those for IN2 represent increments on IN1, and those for IN3 represent increments on IN2.

Several points of interest emerge from the comparison. First, all parameters achieve their expected

Table 7. *Effect parameters of the 1974 variant model, and parameters estimated for the core model (standard errors in parentheses)*

	HI1	HI2	IN1	IN2	IN3	SE	AF1	AF2
Modified model (D)	−0.33*	−0.51*	0.40*	0.15	0.90*	−0.47*	−0.11	*0.49**
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.38)	(0.17)	(0.59)	(0.06)
Model minus n.s. terms (F)	−0.33	−0.56	0.47	n.s.	0.94	−0.49	n.s.	*0.50*
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.07)	–	(0.37)	(0.17)	–	(0.06)
CORE	−0.22	−0.42	0.43	0.81	0.96	−1.03	−0.77	0.46

Note: Parameters printed in italic are modified as explained in the text.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.

sign. This suggests that the Israeli fluidity pattern, taken as a whole, follows the general expectation of the core model. Secondly, a deviation from the core level is observed with reference to four effects:

- a non-significant IN2 effect;
- a non-significant AF1 effect;
- a weak sectoral effect SE; and
- a somewhat stronger hierarchy effect.[15]

In the following paragraphs these deviations from the core level and their implications for the Israeli fluidity pattern will be discussed.

First, the statistically non-significant IN2 effect in this variant model implies that the propensity to immobility for members of the Israeli service class, petty bourgeoisie, and farmer class is lower than the core level.[16] Moreover, the parameters in Table 7 indicate that the propensity for immobility in these classes is about half the strength of the core level. For example, the additive odds representing the propensity for immobility of the service class and the petty bourgeoisie, where IN1 and IN2 apply, is 1.59 in Israel compared to 3.45 in the core level ($e^{0.47}=1.59$ and $e^{(0.43+0.81)=1.24}=3.45$ respectively). Likewise for the farmer class, where IN1, IN2, and IN3 apply, the additive odds for immobility is 4.1 in Israel compared to 7.24 in the core level ($e^{1.41}=4.10$ and $e^{1.98}=7.24$ respectively). This confirms the conclusions of previous research that Israeli society is a highly 'fluid' society in a comparative perspective (Tyree *et al.*, 1979; Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997).

Secondly, the non-significant AF1 effect and the weak SE effect suggest that the boundaries between agricultural and non-agricultural classes are permeable in Israel. On the one hand, no specific barrier for movement between the farm-working class (VIIb) and the service class (I+II) appears to exist (the AF1 term is not significant). On the other hand, the general sectoral barrier (SE) in Israel reduces such mobility to only two-thirds of what it would have been in the absence of this effect ($e^{-0.49}=0.61$), compared with one-third in the core model ($e^{-1.03}=0.36$). The relatively easy intersectoral movement of the labour force in Israel may reflect government interventions in the economy as outlined earlier. Interestingly, a similar pattern is found in Hungary (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*: 153), where government intervention has played an important role in enforcing such a pattern.

Finally, hierarchical barriers to mobility seem to operate differently in Israel: they are slightly stronger than the core level. It appears that short-range mobility (HI1) reaches less than three-quarters of what it would have been in the absence of such an effect ($e^{-0.33}=0.72$), compared with four-fifths in the core model ($e^{-0.22}=0.80$). And long-range mobility, where HI1 and HI2 apply, reaches two-fifths of what it would have been in the absence of such effects ($e^{-0.89}=0.41$), compared with more than half in the core model ($e^{-0.64}=0.52$).

To sum up, the modifications that are introduced do not drastically change the core model. They simply aim to capture slightly different compositional effects of class transmission from father to son, and the effect of government interventions in the economy. The analysis shows that the level of class fluidity in Israel is higher then the core level; thus Israel does not seem to hold a central place in the 'space' within which cross-national variation in fluidity occurs. Nonetheless, the Israeli fluidity pattern can still be characterized as being within that space.

The next task is to fit the core model to the 1991 mobility table in a similar way. Table 8 presents the results of the three stages of fitting the core model to the 1991 mobility table. Model B misclassifies (Δ) more then 10 per cent of the cases, and captures less than 33 per cent of the association between origins

Table 8. *Results of fitting the core model of social fluidity to the 1991 seven-class intergenerational mobility table for Israeli men aged 25–64 (N=3414)*

Model	G^2	d.f.	P-value	rG^2	Δ	$G^2(S)$
A. Ind.	382.2	36	0.00	–	12.8	238
B. Estimated parameters	258.5	36	0.00	32.4	10.4	166
C. Nationally specific parameters	75.5	28	0.00	80.2	5.6	56
D. modified model	53.0	28	0.00	86.1	4.6	43
F. D minus n.s. terms	53.0	29	0.00	86.1	4.6	43

and destinations. When comparing the goodness of fit of model B between the 1974 and the 1991 mobility tables (compare Table 6 with Table 8) it appears that the core model fits the data better in 1991 than it does in 1974. Thus, for example, the returned G^2 from the core model with fixed parameters in the 1974 mobility table is substantially higher (for the same number of degrees of freedom) than in the 1991 mobility table (313 and 259, respectively). This would appear to suggest that the Israeli class fluidity pattern has shifted closer to the core level over time. Model C also appears to be rejected by our data. The model misclassifies (Δ) more then 5 percent of the cases, captures about 80 per cent of the association between origin and destination class, and the returned $G^2(S)$ is well above the acceptable standard of 40. However, this model too shows a better fit to the 1991 mobility table than to the 1974 mobility table.

To achieve a better fit of the core model to the 1991 mobility table three alterations are suggested. In contrast with the 1974 model, only two alterations are needed in the positive affinity effect (AF2) – the effect that reinforces the linkage between particular classes in the mobility table. However, a third, new alteration is needed which concerns the negative affinity effect (AF1) – the effect that reinforces hierarchy and sector effects:[17]

- the AF2 term is omitted from the pair of cells indicating mobility between the petty bourgeoisie, class IVab, and the service class, I+II;
- the AF2 term is omitted from the cell indicating mobility from the skilled manual class, V+VI, to the unskilled working class, VIIa;
- the AF1 term is included in the cell indicating upward mobility from the skilled working class, V+VI, to the service class, I+II.

These modifications follow a similar pattern to the 1974 variant model, with two differences. On the one hand, unlike the 1974 variant model, no evidence for a distinctively high movement of men from the petty bourgeoisie into the unskilled working class is found. On the other hand, a new barrier for mobility is suggested: a barrier for mobility from the skilled working class into the service class. These differences are of great interest when a trend in fluidity pattern over time is concerned, since the positive affinity term (AF2) is shifted back closer to the core model. The following paragraphs will elaborate on these two differences between the models, so that a better understanding of trends in fluidity patterns over time is achieved.

The petty bourgeoisie

The disadvantaged position of the petty bourgeoisie in Israeli society has been discussed earlier. However, it appears that the undesired movement from the petty bourgeoisie into the unskilled working class has been reduced over time. The most likely explanation for this trend has to do with changes in the relative size of the class of employers (IVa) and self-employed (IVb) within the petty bourgeoisie (class IVab). It has been mentioned above that the Israeli petty bourgeoisie as a class of origin, when compared with the CASMIN nations, is heavily dominated by the self-employed without employees (class IVb). However, when we compare the 1974 mobility table with the 1991 mobility table we find an interesting shift. In the 1974 mobility table, for every small employer (class IVa) among fathers, there are nine self-employed without employees (class IVb). However, in the 1991 mobility table, this ratio drops to as low as 1:2. As a result of this compositional change, I argue, the fluidity pattern of the petty bourgeoisie (class IVab) has shifted so as to be closer to the fluidity pattern of small employers (IVa). Thus, men from petty bourgeois origins have a lower propensity for mobility into the unskilled working class (VIIa) in 1991 than in 1974. But even in 1991, the composition of the Israeli petty bourgeoisie (class IVab) remains quite distinct from that of the CASMIN nations: thus we find that there is still no positive affinity with the service class, as the core model expects.

The working class

The modified model suggests a new hierarchical barrier for class mobility. This barrier prevents upward mobility from the skilled working class into the service class. The introduction of this barrier implies a shift away from the core pattern of fluidity over time, which would contradict Goldthorpe's argument that over time the fluidity pattern will shift closer to the core pattern. However, this barrier, it is argued here, is a by-product of the

data at hand – rather than a particular feature of Israeli society.[18]

As discussed elsewhere (cf. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*), the core model is derived from the expected mobility pattern of two European nations that include army personnel in the analysis. This study, however, excludes Army personnel from its analyses to gain comparability between the two surveys. This difference could be the source of deviations in fluidity patterns when the Israeli fluidity pattern is compared to the core pattern, particularly because the army plays an important role in stratification processes in Israel.

It has been previously suggested that the army affects the Israeli stratification process (Lissak, 1984; Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974: 273–274). The linkage between the political and the military élite in Israel is well documented in the writing of Moshe Lissak (see Lissak, 1984). This conclusion may be easily reached by counting the number of Israeli MPs, Ministers, and PMs who started their careers in the army. However, Israel has no military academy whose graduates are drafted as officers, and neither a high school education nor a university degree are required for promotion to an officer's rank. Every draftee must follow the same path, and climb through the army ranks, in order to become an officer. Furthermore, there is no tradition in the Israeli army of recruitment of officers from a particular stratum of society (Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974: 273). This would imply that the Israeli army may provide some degree of mobility even for groups whose starting point is low.

To test this argument empirically, Table 9 presents the class distribution of army personnel and the civilian labour force from the 1991 mobility survey. Since the army personnel are assigned to the service class, it is possible to make a comparison of the recruitment pattern of the two sub-populations into the service class. It is apparent from the table that among army personnel men, who are now in the service class, 34 per cent are recruited from the skilled working class (V+VI), while among the civilian labour force, the service class recruits only 12 per cent from this class. Such a discrepancy in the recruitment pattern between the civilian labour force and the army cannot be seen in any other class. This evidence would appear to support an argument that the Israeli army serves as an alternative route for social mobility, especially for men from relatively disadvantaged social classes. Alternatively, I would stress that omitting the army personnel from an analysis that is based on the core model may result in some deviations from this pattern. Indeed, due to the exclusion of army personnel, the propensity for mobility from the skilled working class (V+VI) into the service class (I+II) is lower in Israeli society than the core level.

The results of fitting the variant model to the 1991 mobility table are presented in Table 8. Model D misclassifies (Δ) less then 5 per cent of the cases, captures about 86 per cent of the association between origins and destinations, and the returned $G^2(S)$ is closer to the acceptable standard of 40.[19] When comparing the parameter estimates of this

Table 9. *Distribution of army personnel and the civil labour force in the service class by class origins, Israeli men aged 25–64 in the 1991 MS*

	Army personnel Destination class I + II		Civilian labour force Destination class I + II	
Class of origin	**N**	**Inflow %**	**N**	**Inflow %**
I+II	20	14	178	22
III	7	5	83	10
IVab	35	25	217	27
IVc	3	2	83	10
V+VI	48	34	96	12
VIIa	28	20	126	16
VIIb	0	0	10	1
Total	141	100	793	100

Table 10. *Effect parameters of the 1991 variant model and parameters estimated for the core model (standard errors in parentheses)*

	HI1	HI2	IN1	IN2	IN3	SE	AF1	AF2
Modified model (D)	−0.12*	−0.24*	0.31*	0.33*	1.74*	−0.002	*−0.37**	*−0.36**
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.75)	(0.36)	(0.12)	(0.06)
Model minus n.s. terms (F)	−0.12	−0.24	0.31	0.33	1.74	n.s.	*−0.37*	*0.36*
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	0.25)	–	(0.12)	(0.06)
CORE	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.81	0.96	1.03	0.77	0.46

Note: Parameters printed in italic are modified as explained in the text.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.

model (see Table 10) with core parameters, several points of interest emerge. First, all parameters achieve their expected sign, as in the 1974 variant model. This suggests that the Israeli fluidity pattern, taken as a whole, follows the general expectation of the core model. An important implication of this feature is that a similar fluidity regime seems to persist over time.

Secondly, and in spite of the above, some deviations from the core pattern and the 1974 pattern emerge. Most notable is the non-significant sectoral effect (SE). This suggests that in Israel, no boundaries exist between agricultural and non-agricultural classes. Furthermore, in the 1974 model the SE term is substantially lower than the core level. This suggests that intersectoral barriers have always been permeable in Israel. The relatively easy intersectoral movement in Israel may be the result of government interventions which were discussed earlier.[20]

Thirdly, the pattern of immobility changed between 1974 and 1991. This can be seen with reference to the IN2 effect – the effect that enhances immobility for the service class and the petty bourgeoisie. The IN2 term has a significant effect in the 1991 model, while it has no significant effect in the 1974 model. This is yet another piece of evidence that suggests that the Israeli fluidity pattern has shifted closer to the core level over time. Comparing the inheritance effects between this model and the core model reveals two distinctive features. On the one hand, the propensity for immobility of the service class and the petty bourgeoisie, where IN1 and IN2 apply, is only about half of the core level ($e^{0.64}$=1.90 and $e^{1.24}$=3.45 respectively). On the other hand, inheritance among Israeli farmers is stronger than the core level by a factor of one-and-a-half ($e^{2.38}$=10.8 and $e^{1.98}$=7.24 respectively). Here again we see the distinctive position of the agricultural sector – this time its élite – in the Israeli class structure.

Finally, hierarchical barriers to mobility in Israel seem to be slightly lower than the core level. This pattern appears to be the opposite of the pattern in the 1974 table. It is calculated that short-range mobility, where HI1 applies, reaches nine-tenths of what it would have been in the absence of such an effect ($e^{-0.12}$=0.89), and long-range mobility, where HI1 and HI2 apply, reaches about two-thirds of what it would have been in the absence of such effects ($e^{-0.36}$=0.70). The equivalent figures under the core model are four-fifths ($e^{-0.22}$=0.80) and half ($e^{0.64}$=0.52), respectively.

The results of applying the core model of social fluidity to the Israeli mobility tables can be summarized as follows:

- The Israeli fluidity pattern is well-captured by the core model in the 1974 and the 1991 mobility tables;
- Overall, fluidity in Israel appears to be at a higher level compared to the core level;
- The Israeli fluidity pattern has shifted closer to the core pattern over time;
- Social institutions, such as the government and the army, and other features of Israeli society, such as the large size of the petty bourgeoisie, appear to have a limited though distinctive influence on the Israeli fluidity pattern.

Thus, I conclude that the reformulation of the FJH hypothesis by Erikson and Goldthorpe is supported by the above analysis: the Israeli fluidity pattern would appear to vary around a common range that characterizes industrial nations. However, the Israeli fluidity level would be near the most fluid end of this

range. Finally, and most importantly, the Israeli fluidity pattern has over time shifted closer to the core pattern of fluidity.

There is one more issue that needs to be addressed before we can draw our conclusion regarding the debate this paper has engaged with. The analyses thus far have revealed that Israeli society is amongst the most fluid nations in a comparative perspective (see also Tyree *et al.*, 1979; Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997). Yet, one may argue that immigration accounts for this rather exceptional position. It is evident that the process of migration entails a separation of individuals from their community of origins. Tyree, Semyonov, and Hodge (1979: 420) argued that this separation *weakens* the association between father's and son's social position. Thus, it is hypothesized that:

- immigrants and natives may *not* share the same fluidity regime; and
- immigrants may have a *more* fluid pattern of mobility when compared to natives.

It follows that immigration might explain the high level of fluidity in Israeli society. The focus of the following analysis is to address these hypotheses.

The analysis in this section is restricted to the Jewish population in Israel. This is because only Jews can migrate to Israel. An immigrant is defined here as someone who arrived in Israel after age 14 – so for this individual, class origin (i.e. father's class) is measured in his country of origin (i.e. not Israel). All those who entered Israel before age 14, or were born in Israel, are considered 'native' Jews in this analysis. The analysis is based on the 1974 MS and the 1991 MS, where two mobility tables from each survey are drawn: for native and immigrant Jews. To overcome a potential problem of low cell counts in these tables, the analysis is based on the Goldthorpe five-class class schema. Having made these preliminary clarifications, we can begin with the analysis. The analysis begins by applying the CmSF and the UNIDIFF models to the mobility tables of native and immigrant Jews from the two mobility surveys. In all models, the immigrant mobility table is contrasted with the native mobility table.

Table 11 shows the analysis of the 1974 MS. Model B states, contrary to our hypothesis stated above, that the two sub-populations *do* share an identical fluidity pattern. This model, as can be seen in the second row, does not fit the data by the conventional 0.05 level (p=0.02). This would imply that natives and immigrants do not share an identical fluidity pattern. However, other indicators of the model suggest that the fluidity pattern of natives and immigrants is basically similar: the model misclassifies as little as 2.6 per cent, and the OD association explains more than 85 per cent of the associations in these tables. An inspection of the residuals under model B reveals that a great deal of the variation in fluidity between the two sub-populations has one source only: the propensity for class inheritance is much stronger among native Jews of farm origins (class IVc) than among immigrants of similar origins. In other words, if we were to fit the core model to these sub-populations separately, the returned IN3 term from the native mobility table would have been much stronger compared to that of the immigrant mobility table.[21] This would appear to suggest that some of the high level of fluidity in Israel, based on the 1974 MS, might indeed be accounted for by immigration.[22] However, one has to bear in mind that the high level of fluidity in Israeli society is mostly associated with easy intersectoral movement (i.e. the SE term of the core model).

In model C we move to test our second hypothesis: that the strength of the OD association varies between natives and immigrants. The UNIDIFF test does not improve significantly upon the fit

Table 11. *Results of fitting the CmSF and UNIDIFF models to five-class intergenerational mobility tables for natives and immigrants in 1974, Jewish men aged 25–64 (N = 2396)*

Model	G^2	d.f.	P-value	rG^2	Δ
A. Ind. {OI}{DI}	210.1	32	0.00	–	10.19
B. CmSF {OI}{DI}{OD}	30.4	16	0.02	85.6	2.63
C. UNIDIFF	28.1	15	0.02	86.6	3.08

Note: O=class origins; D=class destinations; I=immigration status.

obtained by model B (for one degree of freedom used by the model, the G^2 is reduced by only 2.3 points: p=0.13). This implies that the strength of the OD association is similar for natives and immigrants. This would lead us to reject the hypothesis of Tyree *et al.* (1979: see above).

The same analysis is repeated for the 1991 mobility tables (see Table 12). Model B (CmSF) misclassifies about 1.6 per cent of all cases, captures more then 93 per cent of the association between father's class and son's class, and its returned p-value is well above the conventional level (p=0.49). Thus, the model fits the data very well, which implies that natives and immigrants do share the same fluidity pattern. This would lead us to reject our first hypothesis. What is more, model C shows that the UNIDIFF test does not improve significantly upon the fit obtained by model B (for one degree of freedom used by the model, the G^2 is reduced by only 0.2 point: p=0.65). Thus, the second hypothesis stated above is also rejected. A similar result was obtained by Goldthorpe *et al.* (1997) who analysed the 1991 MS including army personnel.

Conclusions

Studying mobility trends in the context of a unique society such as Israel casts new light on the link between the industrialization process and social mobility and fluidity. This paper engaged with the debate concerning the consequences of the industrialization process for social mobility and fluidity. On the one side of this debate, it is argued that a strong link exists between industrialization and social mobility – yet, two theories view the consequences of this process for social mobility differently. On the other side of this debate, it is argued that a link between industrialization and social mobility does not exist (cf. Sorokin, 1959; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959; Featherman, Jones, and Hauser, 1975; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992*a*, among others).

I have shown in this paper that social mobility and fluidity do not correspond to the industrialization process in Israel – nor do they appear to be caused by immigration. I have also shown that historical and political features of Israeli society have affected the Israeli fluidity pattern. At the same time, and in spite of the above, I have shown that there appear to exist some forces that pull the Israeli fluidity pattern closer to a common level of fluidity. The above findings led me to conclude that Erikson and Goldthorpe's reformulation of the FJH hypothesis is supported by the analysis of Israeli society.

The implications of this study go beyond the immediate concerns of Israeli sociologists and members of Israeli society. The study has value, I believe, for all students of social mobility and stratification in industrial nations. The results of this paper serve to reject the idea that economic progress affects the process of stratification in industrial nations. In that respect, exponents of the liberal thesis offer a very functional and simple explanation, with little empirical support, for what should happen during the industrialization process. Accordingly, stratification processes affect individuals' actions, but are beyond the control of individuals: their only determinant is the industrialization process and its logic. Once society internalizes this logic, which is imposed on society, the process of stratification is affected. On the other side of the debate, exponents of the FJH hypothesis argue that the process of stratification is not affected by external factors, while internal factors that affect this process are common to all industrial societies and constant over time. Accordingly, the individual's actions – to fulfil his aspirations, to

Table 12. *Results of fitting the CmSF and UNIDIFF models to five-class intergenerational mobility tables for natives and immigrants in 1991 MS, Jewish men aged 25–64 (N = 2648)*

Model	G^2	d.f.	P-value	rG^2	ΔD
A. Ind. {OI}{DI}	234.9	32	0.00	–	11.72
B. CmSF {OI}{DI}{OD}	15.5	13	0.49	93.4	1.55
C. UNIDIFF	15.3	15	0.43	93.5	1.44

Note: O=class origins; D=class destinations; I=immigration status.

maintain his social standing, and/or in response to external factors – are the driving force behind social mobility. This paper concludes that the second view outlined above should be endorsed, thus it also argues that social mobility is affected by social action.

Students subscribing to this view aim ultimately to explain why the stratification process of industrial societies has a very clearly defined theme. The answer to this question requires one to open up the 'black box' of the process of stratification. The original FJH hypothesis argues that a similar level of socio-economic inequality between capitalist societies causes similar stratification processes in these societies. This would lead one to wonder what generates this similar socio-economic inequality. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992*a*) then argue that the key to understanding this similarity is embedded in familial institutions and the law of the market economy. However, little is known about the way in which the market economy and the family operate so as to generate these regularities. Further research needs to look at the mobility process as a 'family action'. Mobility studies will have to pay more attention to the ways in which the family divides resources between its members so as to maintain and improve their position in society.

This paper has value also for students of Israeli society – although the findings of this study do not radically change our previous knowledge of mobility processes in Israeli society. First of all, this study demonstrates the significant contribution of the class-analytical framework for the understanding of mobility processes in Israeli society. The majority of studies of Israeli society have relied on the status attainment approach (cf. Blau and Duncan, 1967) to study social mobility (see e.g., Smooha and Kraus, 1985; Tyree *et al.*, 1987; Kraus and Hodge, 1990; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993). According to this approach, the stratification structure has only a hierarchical dimension, along which individuals are allocated according to their occupation, and mobility is restricted to this one dimension. This approach, however, cannot accommodate any movement which is not vertical. Thus, a change in an individual's work environment, from agriculture to industry, for example, which is not coupled by a change in prestige, is not recognized as social mobility.

By contrast, the class-analytical framework takes into account these important, but not necessarily hierarchical, dimensions of social mobility, as well as the hierarchical dimension. I have shown that mobility between the sectors of the economy is crucial for understanding stratification processes in Israeli society. In this respect I demonstrated that the sectoral barrier to mobility in Israeli society is very weak and thus contributes a great deal to the relatively high level of fluidity in Israeli society overall. That is, the weak sectoral barrier to mobility contributes to the high level of equality of opportunity in Israeli society. I then argued that government interventions, and not the industrialization process, play an important role in promoting this pattern.

Notes

1. One can argue, however, that Israeli society may *not* be a good case study of the consequences of industrialization for social mobility. This is because demographic changes in Israel (in particular, the nearly constant influx of Jewish immigrants into Israel) may have affected social mobility to such an extent that industrialization is less relevant to the understanding of mobility trends in Israeli society. This argument throws a serious doubt on the merit of the theoretical discussion in this paper. Against this background I would argue that immigration and economic growth (i.e. industrialization) are very closely related: a massive number of new arrivals into society can initiate economic growth. By contrast, emigration may hinder economic growth (see e.g. Goldthorpe's (1992) analysis of Irish society). In this paper I address the 'immigration' issue by comparing the Jewish immigrants' mobility regime with that of non-immigrants. However, more rigorous discussion and treatment of this very important issue is beyond the scope of this paper – it deserves a separate paper.
2. Surprisingly enough, empirical studies have generated conflicting results regarding the validity of the hypothesis. More astonishing is the fact that even with the same data, researchers have arrived at different results and conclusions. See, for example, Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992*a*: 100–101) re-analysis of Ganzeboom *et al.*'s (1989) data.
3. This tendency to move closer to the core pattern does not have any affinity with the liberal claim of convergence that is 'logically' inherit in the industrialization process. This is because the fluidity pattern of society

may be affected by specific historical and political processes in each society.

4. Tyree, Semyonov, and Hodge (1979), for example, argued that immigration and social mobility are positively correlated. Based on data from 24 industrial nations, they showed that immigrant societies (e.g. the USA and Israel) are among the most mobile nations. Against this background, Goldthorpe, Yaish, and Kraus (1997), who study Israeli society, conclude that immigration and social mobility, in Israeli society at least, do not appear to be correlated. They show, moreover, that the same mobility regime characterizes native and immigrant Jews.
5. It can be argued that this influx of non-citizen Arabs into the labour market in the least desired occupations creates more chances for mobility among Jews and Arabs with Israeli citizenship. However, such an argument has not been confirmed empirically (cf. Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986).
6. For details of the sampling procedures used see CBS, *Labour Mobility Survey*, 1977, No. 544.
7. The sampling procedures used in this survey are similar to those of the CBS labour mobility surveys.
8. In this respect my data deviate from the common practice used in the CASMIN study. I discuss the implication of this restriction for the Israeli mobility pattern below.
9. When we exclude from this analysis men for whom father's class is not measured in Israel (i.e. immigrant Jews who arrived in Israel after age 14), the same pattern emerged. In the 1974 MS, 74% of native Israelis and immigrant Jews have experienced social mobility; in the 1991 MS the figures are 74% and 72%, respectively.
10. Furthermore, the two graphs show that the overlapping population has a very similar pattern of mobility. This would give some validity to the data I analyse.
11. Two additional measures of goodness of fit of a model are presented in the table: an index of dissimilarity (Δ), and a p-value.
12. The definition of these effects was taken directly from Goldthorpe *et al.* (1997).
13. The $G^2(S)$ is given by the following equation: $G^2(S)=((G^2 - df) / N) K+df$, where K is the sample size to be taken as standard. Here K is set at 1,991, to allow a comparison with the CASMIN nations where the smallest sample size is 1,991.
14. Erikson and Goldthorpe agree with Hout and Hauser's (1992) criticism that the consolidation of classes V and VI is not desirable. However, practical reasons forced Erikson and Goldthorpe to combine them, and had the CASMIN data allowed them, they would have chosen not to consolidate class V with class VI (1992*b*: 284–285). Our problem is similar, and we consolidate class V and class VI.
15. When the model is re-fitted without the non-significant terms it remains significant ($G^2(S)$ 41 with 30 degrees of freedom; see Table 6) and the parameters remained unchanged (see Table 7).
16. Since the majority of Israelis from petty bourgeois origins are sons of immigrants, it may be expected that they will have a relatively high propensity for mobility (see e.g. Tyree *et al.*, 1979 who discuss the effect of immigration on social fluidity). This being the case, the non-significant IN2 term in the Israeli variant model may refer to the petty bourgeoisie only. However, a model that excludes the IN2 term from the cell indicating immobility of the petty bourgeoisie did not confirm this hypothesis, and the IN2 terms for immobility of the service and the farmer classes were still not significant.
17. As will be seen below, the alteration of the negative affinity effect (AF1) here refers to reinforcement of the hierarchy effect, and not of sector.
18. What is more, this new hierarchical barrier should be viewed in light of the overall weakening of hierarchy effects when compared with the 1974 variant model.
19. It is shown in Table 8 that when the non-significant terms are removed the model fits well with $G^2(S)$ 43 and 29 df.
20. Goldthorpe, Yaish, and Kraus (1997) report a similar finding. These authors, however, give yet another explanations for this pattern. It may be the result of a small sample size, which in particular affects the number of individuals in the agricultural sector. Therefore, the SE effect does not come to realization under the statistical model (see Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997: 9).
21. Re-applying model B (CmSF) to the data when the cell indicating the immobility of the farmer class is excluded (i.e. with the IN3 term) produces a satisfactory fit to the data (G^2=14.9 with 15 df: p=0.46).
22. A plausible explanation of this pattern is that inheritance of farm position involves land transmission between generations. Therefore, the only way for such a transmission to be possible would be if immigrants had bought land on arrival in Israel. However, most Jewish immigrants arrived with very little physical capital from post-war Europe and underdeveloped Asia and Africa. Moreover, those who did arrive with money – mostly German Jews – were urban residents and not farmers. For these reasons, inheritance of land, and therefore intergenerational class inheritance among the farmers, would mostly characterize the native sub-population.

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Appendix

Table A1. *The eight design matrices of the 'core model' of social fluidity*

HI

1	2	2	2	2	2	2
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
1	1	1	2	2	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	2	2
2	2	2	2	2	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	1	1

HI2

1	1	1	1	1	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1

N1

2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	2	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	2	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	2	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	2

IN2

2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	2	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1

AF2X (1974)

1	2	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	2	1
1	1	2	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1

IN3

1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1

SE

1	1	1	2	1	1	2
1	1	1	2	1	1	2
1	1	1	2	1	1	2
2	2	2	1	2	2	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	2
1	1	1	1	2	1	2
2	2	2	1	2	2	1

AF1

1	1	1	1	1	1	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1

AF2

1	2	2	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	2	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	2	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1

AF2X (1991)

1	2	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	2	1	1	1
1	1	2	1	1	2	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	2	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	2	1

AF1X (1991)

1	1	1	1	1	1	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1