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# The Consequences of Immigration for Social Mobility: The Experience of Israel

*Meir Yaish*

A commonly held view argues that immigration is a major force propelling social mobility. Since, by definition, the immigration process entails a separation of individuals from their communities, it is argued that a relatively weak association exists between the immigrant's social position (in their country of origin) and that of their offspring (in the 'new' society). It follows from this that in immigrant society (i) the overall association between parents' social position and that of their offspring is relatively weak; and (ii) as long as immigration continues this association is expected to weaken. This paper utilizes the 1974 and 1991 mobility surveys in Israel to study the association between immigration and social mobility and fluidity amongst Israeli Jews. Israel is amongst the few nations where immigrants made up the majority of its original population, and throughout the years, successive waves of (Jewish) immigrants have continued to enter the country. Israel, moreover, is a distinctive immigrant society in which such a process can be traced back to its roots by analysing high-quality data. This study finds that immigration to Israel may not have been the force that generated a high level of fluidity in the society. Nonetheless, immigration to Israel has changed the Israeli class structure and generated high rates of absolute mobility. Thus, it is concluded, structural changes cannot account for the relatively high level of fluidity in Israel. It is also concluded that successive waves of immigrants entering a society do not affect relative mobility such that over time a trend towards increasing fluidity is produced. Finally, it is shown that the origin of the ethnic basis of the inequality of opportunity that prevails in Israeli society today may be embedded in historical immigration processes.

## Introduction

Students of immigration have long framed the progress of immigrants in their host society as an *intergenerational* process (Gordon, 1964; Lieberman, 1980), in which immigrants – the first-generation – enter society near or at the bottom of the stratification hierarchy, while their offspring – the second-generation – tend to reach socio-economic parity with the native population (cf. Hirschman, 1996: 56). This process implies, then, that immigration is a major force propelling intergenerational social mobility. As such, immigration would appear to bear on stratification processes and inequality in immigrant society. Nonetheless, at the heart of

immigration literature are studies that focus on the social and economic assimilation processes of immigrants and their offspring (cf. Massey and Denton, 1985; Borjas, 1987; Rajzman and Semyonov, 1995; Portes, 1996; Chiswick, Cohen and Zach, 1997; Semyonov, 1997; Haberfeld, Semyonov and Cohen, 2000). Little is known about the consequences of immigration for intergenerational social mobility (but see, Semyonov and Hodge, 1979; Kerckhoff, Campbell and Winfield-Laird, 1985).

This paper aims to bridge this gap in the literature by studying the association, if it exists at all, between immigration and intergenerational social mobility.

The social context for this study is Israeli society. Studying Israeli society can shine new light on this largely neglected issue for three main reasons:

1. Israel is an immigrant society
2. Intergenerational social mobility in Israel is high in a comparative perspective (Matrass, Simha and Weintraub, 1975; Tyree *et al.*, 1979; Goldthorpe, Yaish and Kraus, 1997; Yaish, 2000).
3. The immigration process in Israel can be traced back to its roots by analysing high quality data.

It is possible to distinguish between two effects that immigration might have on intergenerational social mobility. First, immigration might affect the overall opportunity structure of the immigrant society. By implication, immigration indirectly affects individual mobility chances in the host society. Secondly, and as mentioned above, immigration might directly affect the social position of immigrants and their offspring in the host society. In the following paragraphs I elaborate on these effects, beginning with the indirect effect of immigration on intergenerational social mobility.

There appears to be a consensus amongst economists that immigration has been beneficial to most receiving societies (Ghatak, Levine and Wheatley-Price, 1996: 187; Simon, 1999). Thus, for example, in a seminal study on 'the economic consequences of immigration', Simon (1999) shows that immigration to the USA is associated with an increase in productivity. This increase came about as a result of several factors. First, immigrants contributed to the development of productivity-enhancing technologies, and had no immigrant come to work in the USA these technologies might not have been developed. Secondly, immigration has a positive effect on the overall size of the population, which in turn further contributes to an increase in production. Just as important, an increase in the population size also means an increase in the number of customers and workers in the economy, the effect of which is an increase in investment, which then encourages the use of even newer technologies. Simon then concludes that the 'beneficial impact upon industrial efficiency of additional immigrant workers and consumers is likely to dwarf all other effects' (1999: 370).

All in all, then, immigration is shown to be closely related to economic growth and development in the host society. The consequences of economic

growth and development for stratification processes in general, and more particularly, for intergenerational social mobility, are at the heart of an ongoing debate in the sociological literature (cf. Yaish, 2000). Within this debate, proponents of the 'industrialization hypothesis' argue that a positive association exists between economic growth and intergenerational social mobility (cf. Treiman, 1970). Having established a theoretical association between immigration and economic growth, and then between economic growth and social mobility, it is possible to hypothesize that an open social structure, with many opportunities for intergenerational social mobility, characterizes immigrant society.

In addition to the effect of migration on economic growth, with the latter's potential effect on social mobility, immigration might directly affect the social position of immigrants and their offspring in their host society. Prior to this discussion, and because social mobility is a central concept in this discussion, it is important to bring to the fore the commonly used distinction in the study of social mobility between absolute and relative mobility. The former refers to the proportion of individuals in some base category who are mobile between origins and destinations. The latter shows the degree to which access to different, and unequally advantaged, positions within the stratification structure is equal. Relative mobility is often taken to represent the openness – fluidity – level of a stratification structure. Having made this preliminary, yet important, clarification I can embark on the discussion.

Students of sociology and economics have been engaged in the development of a theoretical framework within which to study the relationship between immigration and social mobility. Two models have suggested what the consequences of immigration for absolute mobility might be for both the native and the immigrant populations. First, a succession model of the so-called 'Chicago School' headed by Robert Park suggests that newcomers enter a society at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, and as a result the native population is pushed upward in this hierarchy. When multiple waves of immigrants enter a society, the early arrivals will be on top, while latecomers will be below them in accordance with their seniority in the society (Richmond, 1988: 31–4; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986: 342).

Secondly, a queuing model, similar to the succession model, suggests that employees are ordered in a 'job queue' according to their desirability to employers. Thus, the subordinate group – be it an ethnic group, immigrant group, or both – is *ceteris paribus* at the bottom of the job queue, while the superordinate group is at the top. An increase in the relative size of the subordinate group increases this group's disadvantaged position (Hodge, 1973; Thurow, 1975: ch. 4), while superordinates outflow into better social positions (Glenn, 1966: 162).

In addition to these models that link immigration to absolute mobility, Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge (1979: 420) discuss the consequences of immigration for relative mobility. This argument is based on the premise that immigration entails a separation of individuals from their communities of origin. This separation, it is then argued, weakens the association between the social position of immigrants and their offspring. It follows that immigration increases the fluidity level of the host society.

It is now possible to present in a more formal way the hypotheses that derive from the above mentioned models. Four such hypotheses can be constructed:

- H<sub>1</sub>: The mobility rates and patterns of the immigrant and the native sub-populations are not alike: immigrants are more likely to experience downward mobility, while natives are more likely to experience upward mobility. However, it is also expected that the immigrant population is not homogeneous with respect to mobility, and sons of immigrants (i.e., second-generation immigrants) are expected to experience more upward mobility than immigrants (i.e., first-generation immigrants).
- H<sub>2</sub>: Members of the dominant group in society – regardless of their immigration status – will benefit more, in terms of social mobility, from the influx of immigrants.
- H<sub>3</sub>: The fluidity patterns of the immigrant and the native sub-populations are not alike: the immigrant sub-populations should have a more fluid pattern compared with the native sub-population;
- H<sub>4</sub>: The fluidity level of the host society increases as immigration continues.

As these hypotheses are tested on Israeli data, the next section offers a review of the major

immigration waves in Israel, and a review of existing studies on the effect of immigration on social mobility in Israel. A description of the data and variables follows.

## Immigration Waves and Social Mobility in Israel

Israel is amongst the few nations where immigrants made up the majority of its original population, and throughout the years, successive waves of immigrants have continued to enter the country. However, unlike other immigrant societies such as the USA, Canada, and Australia, Israel is distinct for two main reasons. First, immigration to Israel is a right reserved only to Jews. This right is made very explicit in the Law of Return and Nationality, which gives only Jews the right of return to Israel. Second, immigration to Israel is not motivated, primarily, by economic factors. That is, the standard two-step decision-making process of potential migrants (i.e., a decision to migrate followed by a decision about the country of destination) may not apply to most immigrant Jews in Israel. This is because the majority of the Jewish immigrants may be characterized as political refugees, who were either 'brought' to Israel by Israel's government and its agencies, or immigrated to Israel since no other destination was feasible (cf. Smooha, 1978; Al-Haj and Leshem, 2000). The implication of this is that selectivity amongst Jewish immigrants is less problematic in Israel than in other immigrant societies.<sup>1</sup> Having made these preliminary clarifications, I move on to present a brief description of Israel's migration history.

Three periods can be identified in the Jewish history of Israel-Palestine: the Old-Yishuv period (old settlement) until 1882, the New-Yishuv period (new settlement) from 1882 to 1948, and the State of Israel period from 1948 to the present. As far as the Jewish population and immigration to Israel is concerned, it was not until the New Yishuv period that massive numbers of Jews, the majority of whom came from Eastern Europe, migrated to the region. This period is characterized by five waves of Jewish immigration. By the end of this period, the Jewish population in Israel-Palestine had increased from 24,000 to about 650,000. Since Israel was established

in 1948, growing numbers of immigrants have continued to enter the country. From 1948 to 1990 some 2,031,800 immigrants (the majority of whom were Jews who arrived in Israel during the 1950s and 1960s) entered the country (CBS, 1991: 43, Table 2.2). New arrivals to Israel now come from all over the world. Table 1 shows that a strong link exists between time of arrival to Israel and country of origin – ethnicity. Up to 1948, most immigrants were Ashkenazi Jews. The following decade – the 1950s – was characterized by a high rate of immigration to Israel; about 40 per cent of all Jewish immigrants arrived in this decade. The majority of these immigrants were Sephardi Jews. During the 1960s, equal proportions of Ashkenazi and Sephardi immigrants arrived in Israel. Finally, since the 1970s, most immigrants are from European and American countries of origin. This is because most of the remaining Jewish Diaspora lives in American and European countries. To summarize, Table 1 suggests that Ashkenazi Jews were the first arrivals to Israel, while Sephardi Jews were, to a large extent, the latecomers.

We may add to this history of immigration to Israel the differences between the two Jewish ethnic sub-populations. It is well documented that a hierarchical dimension in the form of education, income, occupational prestige, etc. is evident within Jewish Israeli society (cf. Smootha, 1978; Kraus and Hodge, 1990; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986). Accordingly, the Ashkenazi Jews occupy more desirable social positions than the Sephardi. Thus, in the context of Jewish Israeli society, Ashkenazi Jews are the dominant ethnic group while the Sephardi are the subordinate ethnic group. It is not surprising, then, that studies have shown that Ashkenazi immigrants were easily assimilated into the new Israeli society, while Sephardi Jews found this process more difficult and were pushed to the margins of society (cf. Kraus and Hodge, 1990). Thus, it is important to study not only the association between immigration and mobility, but also the association between immigration, ethnicity, and mobility.

Most students of Israeli society have examined the economic assimilation process of the Jewish

**Table 1.** *Time of immigration to Israel by continent of origin – ethnicity – for Jewish immigrant men aged 25–64*

Year of Immigration	Continent of Origin		Total	
	Asia–Africa: Sephardi Jews	Europe–America: Ashkenazi Jews	N	%
1925–1974	45.73	54.27	1966	100.00
<i>Pre-State Period</i>				
1925–1947	14.45	85.55	346	17.60
<i>Statehood</i>				
1948	22.40	77.60	183	9.31
<i>Post State Period</i>				
1949–1951	61.40	38.60	601	30.57
1952–1954	76.06	23.94	71	3.61
1955–1957	73.25	26.75	157	7.99
1958–1960	42.22	57.78	90	4.58
1961–1964	52.09	47.91	263	13.38
1965–1968	52.17	47.83	115	5.85
1969–1974	25.00	75.00	140	7.12

*Note:* The table is based on the 1974MS only, since most immigrants arrived in Israel within the first two decades; thus, the 1974MS covers these immigrants better than the 1991MS. A similar pattern would have been obtained from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics publications.

*Source:* 1974 labour force survey in Israel.

immigrants in Israeli society. In a study of Jewish men immigrating to Israel between 1979 and 1983, based on 1983 census data, Raijman and Semyonov (1995) have shown that immigrants from different countries of origin also have different patterns of economic incorporation into the Israeli labour market. Thus, for example, immigrants from Eastern European countries were more likely to become salaried workers, while immigrants from Asian or African countries tended towards self-employment. Based on annual income surveys in Israel (1991–1993), Semyonov (1997) has shown that on arrival to Israel, immigrants are at a disadvantage in the attainment of economic rewards in comparison with Israeli-born populations, while over time this disadvantage tends to decline, and even to vanish. However, the effect of ‘time in Israel’ on economic rewards is strongly associated with country of origin. In particular, amongst veteran immigrants, the economic costs that are associated with immigration to Israel are significantly higher for those arriving from Asian or African countries than for those arriving from European or American countries. Finally, most of the studies on the economic assimilation process of immigrants in Israel have found that women face more difficulties in their economic assimilation process than men (Raijman and Semyonov, 1997; Haberfeld *et al.*, 2000).

The studies cited above provide a very clear picture of the economic hardships of individuals who immigrated to Israel. That is, these studies focus on the consequences of immigration for the individual’s experiences in the labour market in the host society. In the context of social mobility research, these studies engage with the consequences of immigration for *intragenerational* social mobility. As such, they tell us very little about the consequences of immigration for *intergenerational* social mobility – which is the focus of this paper.

Only a few studies of Israeli society have addressed this issue. Matras and Weintraub (1977), who first analysed the 1974 mobility survey, report that the native population has experienced more upward mobility than the immigrant population, whilst the latter has experienced more downward mobility than the former. Yet they also argue that, ‘the shifts in occupational distribution associated with immigration to Israel . . . are more substantial than those associated with intergenerational

mobility’ (p. 18). That is, most of the mobility in Israel is associated with structural changes. This would then imply that the two sub-populations share a basically similar pattern of fluidity. Such an argument calls for an empirical test. Indeed, Goldthorpe and his associates, who analysed the 1991 mobility survey, find that native born Jews and immigrant Jews share a similar pattern of inter-generational class fluidity (Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997). They did not, however, go further and examine the association between immigration, ethnicity and class mobility.

In this respect, Matras and Weintraub (1977) showed that both ethnic and immigrant/native differences in social mobility prevail among Israeli Jews. Similarly, Kraus and Hodge (1990) report that Ashkenazi immigrants are less handicapped than Sephardi immigrants in their occupational adjustment to Israeli society. These authors offer two explanations for this finding. First, they relate it to time of arrival in Israel (see also Tyree *et al.*, 1987). Ashkenazi Jews were the first to arrive in Israel (see Table 1), thus their adjustment to the new society was relatively easy (Kraus and Hodge, 1990: 100). Secondly, and closely related to the above, Kraus and Hodge argue that, ‘European–American immigrants enjoy greater support than do Asian–African by veteran settlers of their same respective origins through informal personal networks’ (1990: 102).

In other words, the massive influx of immigrants to Israel has altered both the Israeli occupational and class structures. This process, in turn, has generated absolute mobility, which has been more beneficial to natives than to immigrants. However, the same pattern of relative mobility prevails for both native and immigrant Jews.

## Data and Variables

The analyses in this paper are based on data from two nationally representative surveys that were tailored to the study of social mobility in Israel. The 1974 mobility survey (hereafter 1974MS) was conducted by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics as part of its 1974 civil labour force survey. The target population of the sample is all Israeli persons (Jews and Arabs) aged 14 and over, excluding the

institutionalized population. The sample includes 3,500 households, with 15,078 persons (90 per cent response rate) aged 14 and above, of whom 11,917 are Jews and 3,161 Arabs (Matras and Weintraub, 1977).<sup>2</sup> The 1991 mobility survey (hereafter 1991MS) was conducted by Vered Kraus and Nina Toren (1992), and carried out by the Pori Research Institute in 1991. The target population of the sample is all Israeli individuals (Jews and Arabs) aged 18 and above, excluding the institutionalized population. The sample includes 5,800 households, with 9,926 persons (representing an 86 per cent response rate) aged 18 and older, of whom 8,158 are Jews and 1,768 Arabs.<sup>3</sup>

From the two mobility surveys, I study the class mobility of Jewish Israeli men aged 25 to 64 who were part of the Israeli civil labour force. Since, as mentioned above, the 1974MS includes information on the civilian labour force only, I also exclude army personnel from the 1991MS. To these data I applied the Goldthorpe class schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; see Yaish, 1995 for a detailed explanation of the application of the class schema to Israel). However, because the information on father's occupations in the 1974MS is classified into a less detailed classification (the two-digit classification) when compared with the 1991MS, only the less detailed seven-class version of the Goldthorpe class schema can be applied to the data. For this reason, moreover, I am unable to have as high quality class classification for Israeli women as for Israeli men – so the analysis is restricted to men only (see Yaish, 1998: ch. 3). Finally, I excluded the Israeli-Arab sub-population from the analysis because immigration to Israel is a privilege reserved to Jews only.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the experience of immigration in Israel would apply mostly to Jews.

The variables in the analysis are the following:

*Class origin* – respondent's father's class position when the respondent was aged 14.

*Class position* (destination) – respondent's current or last class position.

Both class origins and positions are coded, based on a cross-tabulation of occupations and status at work, to Goldthorpe's class schema. In this study I employ the Goldthorpe seven-class class schema as follows:

- I+II: service class;
- III: routine non-manual class;

- IVab: petty bourgeoisie;
- IVc: farmer class;
- V+VI: skilled manual worker;
- VIIa: unskilled manual worker;
- VIIb: unskilled farm worker.

*Ethnicity* – a distinction between two groups based on country of origin. Ashkenazi Jews – men born in Israel to a European or American born father, or men born in Europe or America; Sephardi Jews – men born in Israel to an Asian or African born father, or men born in African or Asian countries.

*Immigration status* – a distinction between three groups based on the respondent and his father's place of birth, and the time of arrival of the respondent in Israel.

The first group includes those born in Israel to an Israeli born father. This group represents the 'native' sub-population in Israel.<sup>5</sup> The intergenerational class mobility process of this sub-population should not be affected directly by the experience of immigration, and both the respondent and his father's class positions were measured within Israeli society. The second group includes Israeli-born respondents of immigrant fathers, as well as respondents who immigrated to Israel before the age of 14.<sup>6</sup> This group represents the second-generation immigrant sub-population. The intergenerational class mobility process of this sub-population may be affected by the immigration experience of their fathers; however, both the respondent and his father's class positions were measured within Israeli society. Finally, respondents who immigrated to Israel after age 14 represent the first-generation immigrant sub-population. The intergenerational class mobility process of this sub-population may be affected by the immigration experience of the respondents. In this sub-population, moreover, the respondent's class position was measured within Israeli society, while that of his father was measured in his country of origin.

The analytical strategy is relatively straightforward. In the next section I compare the class distributions of natives and immigrants in the early 1970s and the 1990s to discover the extent of differences in the association between immigration status and class position at each point in time. Then I turn to an examination of class mobility patterns and trends in the three sub-populations in Israel. As

has become standard by now in the study of social mobility, a distinction is made between absolute and relative mobility. Thus, the next section provides an examination of absolute mobility rates, patterns, and trends for the three sub-populations. A section that examines relative mobility patterns – i.e. social fluidity – follows. This section, then, examines whether or not relative mobility rates of men of different class origins are similar for natives and immigrants, and whether there is any evidence of change over time in this respect.

## Absolute Mobility Rates and Immigration Status

Table 2 presents the origin and destination class distributions of natives, first- and second-generation immigrants as derived from Tables A1 and A2. Two features emerge from these distributions. First, Panel A shows that the majority of the first-generation immigrants originate in the petty bourgeoisie (71 per cent in the 1974 mobility table, and 51 per cent in the 1991 mobility table). This characteristic reflects, to a large extent, the class position of Jews in their countries of origin. Nonetheless, amongst the second-generation as well as the native populations, the relative size of the petty bourgeoisie – as far as class of origin is concerned – is also very large in the 1974 mobility tables (44 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively). For comparison, only 18 per cent, and 25 per cent, of Israeli-Arabs originate in the petty bourgeoisie in the 1974 and the 1991 mobility tables, respectively (Yaish, 2001: 418, Table 1). Similarly, only about 14 per cent of the population of the CASMIN nations originate in the petty bourgeoisie (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 193, Table 6.2). However, when we examine the petty bourgeoisie in the destination class distribution, a somewhat different pattern emerges. The relative size of the petty bourgeoisie is now much lower, and by 1991 it is similar, for all sub-populations, to that found in other nations.

Secondly, Panel B in Table 2 reveals that the destination class distributions of natives and second-generation immigrants, and those of first- and second-generation immigrants, tend to converge over time towards a similar distribution. Thus, for example, the dissimilarity index ( $\Delta$ ) for destination

distributions between natives and second-generation immigrants is 22 per cent in the 1974 mobility tables; the same index in the 1991 mobility tables is 18 per cent. Similarly, the dissimilarity index for destination distributions between first- and second-generation immigrants is 17 per cent in the 1974 mobility table; the same index in the 1991 mobility tables is 9 per cent. This would appear to suggest that over time immigrants and their offspring are incorporated into one dominant class structure that characterizes the Israeli stratification structure.

Panel B also shows significant between-group differences in the size of the dissimilarity indices for the origin–destination distributions. Thus, for example, in all mobility tables the lowest dissimilarity index is for natives, and the highest for first-generation immigrants. Differences in the marginal distributions for origins and destinations, which are of course captured by the above mentioned dissimilarity indices, necessitate social mobility between origins and destinations (i.e. intergenerational class mobility). Given, then, that these indices vary in size across sub-populations this implies that the different sub-populations will be characterized by different levels of intergenerational mobility. At the same time, it was suggested above that the class structures of the three sub-populations tend to converge over time. Thus, it is suggested that the three sub-populations may also have different patterns of intergenerational class mobility. In other words, and as Matras and Weintraub (1977) have suggested, the differences in mobility patterns between the three sub-populations may be the result of differences in the ‘take-off’ positions of these sub-populations. An examination of these propositions is the focus of the next analysis.

Table 3 presents the total mobility rates (TMR) and its components for natives and the two immigrant sub-populations, and these rates within each group by ethnicity.<sup>7</sup> From the first column (TMR), it can be seen that all sub-populations in Israel enjoy high rates of class mobility. The lowest rate of mobility characterizes the native population in 1974, where only about two-thirds were mobile. It can also be seen that all other sub-populations presented in the table have experienced fairly similar TMR in both mobility tables.

Moving next to the components of the TMR, as shown in the second and third columns of Panel B,



**Table 2.** Marginal distributions in intergenerational mobility tables for Jewish men aged 25–64, by sub-populations and year**Panel A: Marginal Distributions (%)**

	1974			1991		
	Native	2nd gen.	1st gen.	Native	2nd gen.	1st gen.
<i>Origin Class</i>						
I+II	8	8	6	19	12	16
III	10	8	7	10	8	9
IVab	51	44	71	34	27	51
IVc	9	7	4	8	6	1
V+VI	6	11	4	10	19	12
VIIa	17	18	7	18	25	11
VIIb	0	4	1	1	3	1
N	89	822	1485	181	1835	632
<i>Destination Class</i>						
I+II	26	23	14	20	22	28
III	17	11	13	24	12	11
IVab	29	16	21	20	18	13
IVc	2	5	3	6	2	1
V+VI	10	29	23	21	32	31
VIIa	16	16	26	9	13	14
VIIb	0	0	1	0	0	0
N	89	822	1485	181	1835	632

**Panel B: Dissimilarity indices ( $\Delta$ ) derive from pairwise comparison of origin, destination, subgroup, and year of survey as presented in Panel A**

		Origin		Destination	
		2nd generation	1st generation	2nd generation	1st generation
1974	Native	10	21	22	24
	2nd generation	–	27	–	17
1991	Native	18	19	18	25
	2nd generation	–	28	–	9

**Dissimilarity Indices for origin–destination distributions**

	1974	1991
Native	29	26
2nd generation	36	28
1st generation	51	38

it can be seen that for all sub-populations more men have experienced vertical mobility (TV) than non-vertical mobility (TNV). There are no clear differences in this pattern between Ashkenazi and

Sephardi Jews; the former sub-population has experienced slightly more vertical mobility than the latter. More differences appear to exist between first-generation immigrants and the natives, and

**Table 3.** *Decomposition of Total Mobility Rates (TMR), for selected Jewish sub-populations, into Total Vertical (TV) and Total Non-Vertical (TNV) Mobility and of Total Vertical Mobility into Total Upward (TU) and Total Downward (TD) Mobility*

Population	TMR	TV	TNV	TV/TNV	TU	TD	TU/TD
<i>1974</i>							
Native	64	45	19	2.35	34	11	3.00
2nd generation	75	50	26	1.94	36	13	2.73
Ashkenazi	75	49	26	1.89	38	11	3.51
Sephardi	75	50	25	2.01	34	16	2.10
1st generation	74	43	31	1.37	17	25	0.69
Ashkenazi	73	41	32	1.28	22	18	1.21
Sephardi	76	46	30	1.50	11	34	0.32
All Jews	74	45	29	1.57	25	21	1.19
<i>1991</i>							
Native	70	46	24	1.95	30	16	1.90
2nd generation	73	52	21	2.52	39	13	2.97
Ashkenazi	74	54	21	2.70	41	13	3.18
Sephardi	73	51	21	2.39	38	13	2.79
1st generation	72	44	28	1.54	27	17	1.57
Ashkenazi	70	47	23	2.01	32	15	2.11
Sephardi	76	40	36	1.10	20	20	0.98
All Jews	73	50	23	2.19	36	14	2.49

between the first- and second-generation immigrants than between the two ethnic groups.

First-generation immigrants experienced less TV mobility, and more TNV mobility, than natives or second-generation immigrants. This may be attributed to two factors. To begin with, Panel A in Table 2 revealed that many more first-generation immigrants originated from the petty bourgeoisie (class IVab) (71 per cent and 51 per cent) compared with natives (45 per cent and 28 per cent) or second-generation immigrants (44 per cent and 27 per cent). It also showed that the petty bourgeoisie class has significantly reduced in size between origins and destinations across all sub-populations. However, this reduction in size was more pronounced amongst first-generation immigrants. All the above would imply that the chance for class inheritance is lowest among first-generation immigrants. Alternatively, first-generation immigrants of petty bourgeois origins will experience more intergenerational class mobility compared with the other two sub-populations. Given that this movement is mostly non-vertical mobility, it is clear why first-generation immigrants are less vertically mobile.

When we move to examine the decomposed vertical mobility – the last three columns – we immediately notice the following:

1. natives and second-generation immigrants have always experienced more upward mobility than downward mobility;
2. natives and second-generation immigrants have always experienced more upward mobility than first-generation immigrants;
3. the vertical mobility of first-generation immigrants has changed over time, such that upward mobility has increased and downward mobility decreased; and
4. interesting differences exist between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, particularly amongst first-generation immigrants.

As predicted by the hypotheses set out at the beginning, natives and second-generation immigrants are more upwardly mobile than first-generation immigrants. That is to say, new immigrants who entered the society, probably near or at the bottom of the class hierarchy, may have pushed the more veteran population upwards in that hierarchy. At the same time, we can also see that the second-generation immigrants are more upwardly mobile

than the native population. This pattern was not hypothesized earlier, although it fits well with expectations regarding the *intragenerational* mobility process that characterizes different 'generations' of immigrants. In explaining why second-generation immigrants experience the highest rates of upward mobility, it is important to recognize that their fathers are first-generation immigrants. It is expected that as a result of migration the first-generation immigrants would enter the bottom of the class structure. The effect of this process is similar to a 'floor effect' that restricts the amount of downward mobility for their sons. Thus, in the context of Israeli society where second-generation immigrants experienced the highest level of vertical mobility, they are also expected to experience the highest level of upward mobility.

Table 3 also reveals some differences in vertical mobility rates between the two Jewish ethnic groups – across and within immigration statuses. In general, it is apparent that Ashkenazi Jews (the dominant sub-population) are more likely than Sephardi Jews to be upwardly mobile. However, ethnic differences in vertical mobility are not significant among second-generation immigrants, and very little has changed in this pattern between 1974 and 1991. As expected, however, ethnic differences in vertical mobility are found amongst first-generation immigrants. Thus, for example, Ashkenazi Jews would appear to benefit more from immigration to Israel than Sephardi Jews: the former have experienced more upward mobility than the latter, while the latter have experienced more downward mobility than the former. This pattern is fairly similar in both time periods; although over time an increasing number of Sephardi Jews have experienced upward mobility.

From a general description of the TMR and its components, I move next to examine differences in outflow mobility patterns across immigration statuses. Table 4 presents the intergenerational outflow rates of the three sub-populations in the 1974 and the 1991 mobility surveys. Before any further examination of these tables is made, it is important to point out that some of the comparisons cannot be made reliably owing to small Ns, particularly within the native sub-populations.

The general pattern that emerges from the figures in Table 4 is that in 1974, second-generation

immigrants are more likely to be upwardly mobile into the service class (I+II), and less likely to be downwardly mobile into the unskilled working class (VIIa) compared with first-generation immigrants. In other words, the intergenerational class mobility of second-generation immigrants is towards the more desirable classes, while first-generation immigrants end up in less desirable classes. For example, second-generation immigrants who originate in the routine non-manual class (III) have a higher probability for upward mobility into the service class (I+II) compared with first-generation immigrants (45 per cent and 16 per cent respectively). By contrast, first-generation immigrants from similar origins have a higher probability for downward mobility into the unskilled working class (VIIa) compared with second-generation immigrants (20 per cent and 8 per cent respectively).

Table 4 also reveals an interesting difference between the sub-populations in the outflow pattern of the farmer class (IVc) in 1974. Inheritance of farm-class positions is much more pronounced among second-generation immigrants than among first-generation immigrants (32 per cent compared with 4 per cent). This pattern may reflect the separation of first-generation immigrants from their countries of origin, which is more notable in the case of farmers. This is because capital and skills are more easily transferred between societies, while land is a resource that cannot be transferred. To this I may add that land in Israel is a particularly scarce resource and so less likely to be shared with new immigrants.

I move next to examine the outflow patterns in the 1991MS. Table 4 shows that in 1991, first-generation immigrants are still more likely than second-generation immigrants to be mobile into the unskilled working class (VIIa), and first-generation immigrants of farm origins are still substantially less likely to become second-generation farmers compared with second-generation immigrants of similar class origins. However, first-generation immigrants have improved their social position relative to second-generation immigrants. Most notable is the change in the probability of their entering the service class (I+II); first-generation immigrants now have a higher probability of mobility into the service class when compared with second-generation immigrants. Further evidence of changes over

Table 4. *Intergenerational Outflow rates for native (top), 2nd generation (middle) and 1st generation (bottom), Jewish men aged 25-64 in 1974 (left) and 1991 (right)*

Class of origin (% by row)	Class of destination												
	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb	N					
I+II	57	37	20	29	11	0	0	23	0	9	0	7	35
	45	16	13	6	12	6	3	16	6	11	0	64	212
	46	9	5	10	7	3	1	19	24	6	0	94	99
	22	26	37	33	5	0	0	11	21	11	0	9	19
III	45	35	11	9	14	0	1	23	29	8	0	89	356
	16	41	11	13	13	1	0	20	25	20	1	102	56
	27	18	30	38	31	0	3	9	15	13	0	45	61
IVab	23	21	12	21	27	3	1	26	28	16	0	364	501
	11	22	13	24	18	3	2	22	29	27	1	1056	322
	0	14	13	25	29	25	36	13	7	25	0	8	14
IVc	17	11	5	7	14	32	17	28	36	12	0	60	105
	11	0	18	18	0	4	0	27	40	23	0	56	5
	40	16	20	0	16	0	11	40	21	0	0	5	19
V+VI	19	17	8	11	15	6	1	42	44	8	0	89	356
	21	21	19	13	8	3	0	29	48	13	0	62	75
	20	9	27	13	16	0	3	7	38	19	0	15	32
VIIa	15	17	14	12	15	2	1	34	36	24	1	151	459
	6	20	8	15	7	2	0	31	39	37	2	104	70
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VIIb	10	16	3	24	11	3	2	24	33	24	15	29	55
	0	20	9	9	0	0	0	45	40	36	20	0	5

  

Dissimilarity indices for outflow distributions Comparison	Year	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb
		1974	34	36	25	39	33	30
Native/2nd generation	1991	14	27	25	40	23	8	76
Native/1st generation	1974	36	27	31	30	31	33	50
	1991	22	26	30	79	32	17	80
2nd generation/1st generation	1974	11	34	19	36	20	17	39
	1991	20	8	8	43	9	13	16

time in the outflow mobility patterns of the sub-populations is obtained by a comparison of the dissimilarity indices of the outflow pattern between 1974 and 1991, shown at the bottom of Table 4. This comparison indicates that the outflow mobility patterns of first- and second-generation immigrants have become more similar over time, as the majority of the indices of dissimilarity are smaller in 1991 than in 1974.

To conclude, it was hypothesized above that newcomers (i.e. first-generation immigrants) would benefit the least from immigration. They were expected to enter a society near or at the bottom of the class hierarchy and push the more veteran populations upwards in this hierarchy. The findings from the above analysis would appear to provide only partial support for this hypothesis. Whereas the intergenerational outflow patterns of first- and second-generation immigrants based on the 1974 mobility table fit well with this hypothesis, it is not clear that the same process characterizes the 1991 mobility table.

To the distinction between natives and immigrants, it is possible to further add the ethnic division.<sup>8</sup> Such an analysis has its theoretical merit because the Sephardi Jews are the subordinate ethnic group in Israel and the Ashkenazi Jews are the superordinate ethnic group (cf. Kraus and Hodge, 1990). Thus, the hypothesis that was derived from the queuing model (Hodge, 1973; Thurow, 1975) can be addressed (H<sub>2</sub>). An examination of the differences between the two ethnic groups would appear to lend support to the above hypothesis: members of the superordinate Ashkenazi group have benefited – due, in part, to immigration – from a more desirable outflow pattern of mobility compared with the subordinate Sephardi group. This, moreover, can be seen with respect to the outflow mobility of first-generation immigrants of Ashkenazi background when compared with second-generation immigrants of Sephardi background. Thus, for example, first-generation immigrants of Ashkenazi background are less likely to end up in the unskilled working class compared with first-generation immigrants of Sephardi background. The former are also more likely to end up in the service class compared with the latter. Finally, this analysis has revealed that amongst the second-generation immigrants there exist significant ethnic differences in the propensity

for farm inheritance. Thus, amongst the second-generation immigrants in Israeli society, Ashkenazi Jews of farm origin display a relatively strong tendency for intergenerational immobility (37 per cent and 29 per cent), compared with Sephardi-Jews of similar origin (24 per cent and 6 per cent). To remind the reader, we have seen earlier that class immobility among second-generation immigrants of farm origin is at a much higher level compared with first-generation immigrants of similar origin. This analysis reveals that this pattern is further differentiated by ethnicity (see also Yaish, 2001).

Three explanations are offered here for this ethnic differentiation. First, it may reflect differences in the quality of land that Ashkenazi and Sephardi farmers received on arrival in Israel, or even Israel-Palestine (Bernstein and Swirski, 1982: 69): Ashkenazi Jews who arrived first in the region benefited from better land than Sephardi Jews. Thus, sons from the former group could remain farmers while increasing their standard of living. Secondly, demography may play an important role in the explanation. Accordingly, the tendency for a Sephardi family to be bigger, on average, than an Ashkenazi family (cf. Peres and Katz, 1981), and the fact that only one family member has the right to land in his parents' agrarian community implies that among men of farm origins, more Sephardi Jews than Ashkenazi Jews will end up in non-farm classes. In other words, Ashkenazi Jews have a stronger propensity for class inheritance compared with Sephardi Jews.<sup>9</sup> Finally, ideological convictions could also be an explanation for this pattern. As the Zionist movement was in fact an Ashkenazi movement, its ideology of 'return to the soil' may appeal more to the Ashkenazi section of Jewish society.

To summarize, Ashkenazi Jews have benefited more than Sephardi Jews from immigration to Israel. Partly due to the fact that the Ashkenazi Jews were the first arrivals in Israel-Palestine (i.e. prior to 1948), they gained a dominant social position in an early stage of the development of the newly established Jewish society (Smooha, 1978: 57). In addition, Ashkenazi Jews had significantly higher levels of human capital on arrival in Israel compared with their Sephardi counterparts. It is not surprising, then, that studies have shown that Ashkenazi immigrants were more easily assimilated

into Israeli society, while Sephardi Jews found this process more difficult and were pushed to the margins of society (cf. Kraus and Hodge, 1990). My own analysis then showed some of the consequences of these divergent processes for intergenerational social mobility. In particular, it was shown that Ashkenazi Jews were able to transfer their initial advantageous position to their offspring, while immigrants of Sephardi origin had to work their way up from much lower positions. Thus, it is argued, the Israeli mobility pattern may have not been affected by immigration *per se*; rather, it is ethnicity – which is strongly associated with successful assimilation into Israeli society – that matters.

## Immigration Status and Trends in Social Fluidity

There is little reason to believe that a native population and immigrant populations in the same country will share the same intergenerational fluidity pattern. It is evident that the process of migration entails a separation of individuals from their communities of origin. Tyree, Semyonov and Hodge (1979: 420) have argued that this separation weakens the association between father's and son's social position. In the following, then, hypotheses  $H_3$  and  $H_4$  from above are assessed empirically.

To examine relative mobility, or social fluidity, I apply several log-linear models to the analysis of Tables A1 and A2. To overcome an apparent problem of low cell counts in these tables, the analyses are based on the Goldthorpe five-class class schema. That is, classes I+II and III are combined to form the non-manual class, and classes IVc and VIIb are combined to form the agricultural class. Table 5 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics for these models, where the mobility tables of first- and second-generation immigrants are contrasted with the native mobility table and, where applicable, the 1991 survey is contrasted with the 1974 survey.<sup>10</sup>

Panel A in Table 5 presents the fit statistics of log-linear models that examine the extent to which, if at all, the fluidity pattern and level of natives, first- and second-generation immigrants differ from one another, in each survey separately. To carry out such an examination, I apply the common social

fluidity (CmSF) model (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) and the UNIDIFF model (Xie, 1992; Firth, 1998) to the analysis of Tables A1 and A2 (where these are modified as explained above). Beginning with the 1974MS, Model B states, contrary to  $H_3$ , that the three sub-populations do share an identical fluidity pattern. This model fits the data by the conventional 0.05 level ( $p=0.11$ ). This would imply that the three sub-populations share the same fluidity pattern. Although the two sub-populations would appear to share the same fluidity pattern we cannot reject hypothesis  $H_3$  since it is still possible to find that, within this similarity, the three sub-populations may not share the same fluidity level. That is, although the pattern of the OD association is similar its strength may vary between the three populations. Next, then, I apply the UNIDIFF model to test for such a scenario. Model C shows that the UNIDIFF test does not improve significantly upon the fit obtained by Model B (for one degree of freedom used by the model, the  $G^2$  is only reduced by 2.1 points:  $p=0.15$ ). This implies that the strength of the OD association is similar in the three mobility tables. All the above, then, would lead us to reject Tyree *et al.*'s (1979) hypothesis (see  $H_3$  above).<sup>11</sup>

The same analysis is repeated for the 1991 mobility tables. Model B (CmSF) misclassifies about 2.6 per cent of all cases, captures about 84 per cent of the association between father's class and son's class, and its returned  $p$ -value is above the conventional level ( $p=0.13$ ). Thus, this model fits the data well, which implies that the three sub-populations share the same fluidity pattern. What is more, Model C shows that the UNIDIFF test does not improve significantly upon the fit obtained by Model B (for one degree of freedom used by the model, the  $G^2$  is reduced by 0.5 points only:  $p=0.48$ ). This would lead us to reject  $H_3$  for the 1991MS too.

To recapitulate, I have shown that the fluidity pattern of natives, first- and second-generation immigrants is similar in both time periods. Just as important, I have shown that the strength of the association between father's class and son's class is at a similar level for all sub-populations. Thus, the analyses of Israeli data from 1974 and 1991 have led to the rejection of hypothesis  $H_3$ . This would appear to imply that immigration may not be the force behind the relatively high level of social

**Table 5. Results of fitting various log-linear models to five-class intergenerational mobility tables for native 2nd generation and 1st generation in 1974 and 1991, Jewish men aged 25–64**  
**Panel A: The CnSF and the UNIDIFF models applied to each Survey separately**

Model	1974 (N=2396)				1991 (N=2648)				
	d.f.	G <sup>2</sup>	P-value	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ	G <sup>2</sup>	P-value	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ
A. Ind. {OI}{DI}	48	219.7	0.00	–	10.32	254.6	0.00	–	11.76
B. CnSF {OI}{DI}{OD}	32	41.9	0.11	80.9	2.91	40.9	0.13	83.9	2.62
C. UNIDIFF	30	39.8	0.11	81.9	3.29	40.4	0.10	84.1	2.54

**Panel B: The CnSF and the UNIDIFF models applied to each group separately**

Model	Native Jews (N=270)				2nd generation (N=2657)				1st generation (N=2117)				
	d.f.	G <sup>2</sup>	P	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ	G <sup>2</sup>	P	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ	G <sup>2</sup>	P	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ
A. Ind. {OT}{DT}	32	70.0	0.00	–	17.6	254.8	0.00	–	11.38	149.4	0.00	–	9.87
B. CnSF {OT}{DT}{OD}	16	18.6	0.29	73.4	7.8	16.7	0.41	93.4	2.30	15.4	0.50	89.7	2.14
B <sub>1</sub> UNIDIFFA+{ODT}	15	18.2	0.25	74.0	7.2	16.4	0.35	93.4	2.27	15.3	0.43	89.8	2.07

**Panel C: Models applied to the pulled data sets (N=5044)**

Model	d.f.	G <sup>2</sup>	P-value	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ
A. Ind. {OIT}{DIT}	96	474.2	0.00	–	11.08
B. CnSF and CnSF {OIT}{DIT}{OD}	80	105.6	0.03	77.7	3.67
B <sub>1</sub> UNIDIFFA+{OD.T}	79	105.5	0.02	77.7	3.65
B <sub>2</sub> UNIDIFFA+{OD.I}	78	104.6	0.02	77.9	3.75
B <sub>3</sub> UNIDIFFA+{OD.(T)(I)}	77	104.2	0.02	78.0	3.73
C. CnSF {OIT}{DIT}{ODT}	64	82.8	0.06	82.5	2.76
D. CnSF {OIT}{DIT}{ODI}	48	50.6	0.34	89.3	2.52

**Panel D: UNIDIFF models comparison**

Contrasts	Term	ΔG <sup>2</sup>	Δd.f.	P
B-B <sub>1</sub>	{OD.T}	0.1	1	0.75
B-B <sub>2</sub>	{OD.I}	1.0	2	0.61
B-B <sub>3</sub>	{OD.(I)(T)}	1.4	3	0.71

*Note:* O=5 class origins; D=5 class destinations; I=3 immigration status; T=2 surveys.

fluidity in Israeli society. Thus, hypothesis  $H_4$  might also be rejected by the Israeli data.

The next analyses, then, provide more explicit examinations of this hypothesis. More to the point, these analyses are concerned with the hypothesis that as a result of the constant influx of immigrants into Israel the level of fluidity of the three sub-populations would increase over time. Panel B in Table 5 presents the fit statistics of log-linear models that examine the extent to which, if at all, the fluidity pattern and level of each sub-population has changed over time. To carry out such an examination I apply the constant social fluidity (CnSF) model (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) and the UNIDIFF model (Xie, 1992; Firth, 1998) to the data.<sup>12</sup>

To begin with, Panel B shows that Model B (CnSF) fits the data well for all three sub-populations. Model C then shows that the UNIDIFF test does not improve significantly upon the fit obtained by Model B in any of the cases (for one degree of freedom the  $G^2$ s are reduced by less than 3.84 points:  $p < 0.05$ ). These findings suggest that each of the sub-populations has the same fluidity pattern over time, and that the strength of the OD association for each group is similar over time. Does this pattern still hold when the pooled data are analysed?

Panel C, then, presents the results of log-linear models that are applied to the pooled data-sets. These models examine changes over time in fluidity patterns of the three sub-populations. The aim of this analysis is to examine how, if at all, the fluidity patterns of the three sub-populations have changed over time. Model B, that posits that these tables are characterized by a constant level of social fluidity over time and a common level of social fluidity across sub-populations, nearly achieves an acceptable fit to the data. The model misclassifies about 4 per cent of all cases, captures about 80 per cent of the association between father's class and son's class, and its returned  $p$ -value nearly reaches the conventional level ( $p = 0.03$ ). This implies that the three sub-populations share a common, yet not identical, fluidity pattern. It also implies that this relatively common pattern is fairly constant over time.

An inspection of residuals under Model B reveals that a great deal of the variation in fluidity between these mobility tables has one source only.

The propensity for class inheritance is weaker for first-generation immigrants of farm origins (class IVc+VIIB) than for members of the two other sub-populations of similar origins, in both time periods. Indeed, re-applying Model B (CmSF) when the cell indicating immobility of the farmer class is excluded from the mobility table of the first-generation immigrants produces a very satisfactory fit ( $G^2 = 85.1$  with 79 d.f.:  $p = 0.3$ ). It is important to note that Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) would argue that the intergenerational immobility of the farmer class is 'upward mobility.' However, it would be misleading to argue based on this that natives and second-generation immigrants are more 'upwardly mobile' than first-generation immigrants. This is because a salient feature of such a pattern involves land transmission between generations. Therefore, the only way for such a transmission to be possible would be if immigrants had bought land on arrival in Israel. However, most Jewish immigrants arrived with very little physical capital from post-war Europe and underdeveloped Asia and Africa. Moreover, those who did arrive with money – mostly German Jews – were urban residents and not farmers. For these reasons, inheritance of land, and therefore intergenerational class inheritance among the farmers, would not characterize the class mobility of the first-generation immigrant sub-population.

Next, it is important to examine whether the strength of the OD association varies over time and/or across sub-populations. In order to assess any of these changes in the strength of the OD association, three UNIDIFF models ( $B_{1-3}$ ) are then introduced. These models fail to fit the data, and none of the UNIDIFF tests would appear to improve upon the fit obtained by Model B (see Panel D).

All in all, then, the result of the analysis of the pooled data-sets reaffirms the conclusions that were reached earlier. I have shown that the pattern and level of fluidity of all three sub-populations has remained constant over time. The pooled analysis, moreover, reveals some variation in the pattern of fluidity between the three sub-populations. This can be seen more clearly in Model D (Panel C), where the 'best' fit to the data is achieved when the OD association is allowed to change in an unrestricted way across sub-populations, but is



restricted to be constant over time. Nonetheless, I have shown that the fluidity pattern of the first-generation immigrants differs only with respect to the relatively low level of class inheritance amongst the farmers. Finally, this analysis does not lend support to the hypothesis that immigration promotes higher levels of social fluidity. The evidence suggests that, in spite of the nearly constant influx of immigrants to Israel over the years, the association between class origins and destinations has not weakened.

## Immigration, Country of Origin and Social Fluidity

There is one final issue that I wish to address in this paper. It relates to the effect of the country of origin of the immigrants on social fluidity. This issue is important because country of origin (i.e. ethnicity) is associated with advantages and disadvantages in Israeli society. In the next analysis, then, I examine the association between origins, destinations, immigration status and ethnicity. Thus, for each survey separately, I fit several log-linear models to mobility tables that represent a cross-tabulation of class origins by class destinations by immigration status by ethnicity. I exclude from this analysis the native sub-population.

Table 6 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics for these models, applied to the mobility tables of first- and second-generation immigrants in 1974 (Panels A and B) and 1991 (Panels C and D). In all models, the mobility tables of the first-generation immigrants are contrasted with those of the second-generation immigrants, and those of the Sephardi Jews with those of the Ashkenazi Jews.

Beginning with the 1974MS, Panel A shows that none of the models applied fits the data by the conventional 0.05 level. A more highly ordered model that would fit the data by this conventional level is the saturated model – a model that includes the ODEI interaction. Such a model, however, would depict complex interactions between O, D, E, and I. Thus, for example, it would suggest that class destination is allowed to change in an unrestricted way across sub-populations and class origins. This model, moreover, would not add any new

information to the mobility tables in their row frequency form. At the same time, other fit statistics, such as the index of dissimilarity, would appear to suggest that Models C, D, and E return acceptable fit to these data (these models misclassify fewer than 5 per cent of the cases in the tables). Similarly, a model selection based on BIC (Raftery, 1986) would appear to favour Model B (BIC = -279), which states that the OD association is common across ethnic and immigration statuses. Based on this information, then, I am inclined to select the 'best' model from these four models only. I do this by comparing the performance of Models C and D against Models B and E, by introducing a chi-square test to the differences in  $G^2$  with the differences in d.f. for each pair involved. This test, shown in Panel B, indicates that the ODI interaction term makes a statistically significant contribution in the models at the 0.07 level, while the ODE term does not make a statistically significant even at a much higher level. Having taken this approach for model selection, then, I am inclined to accept Model D: the model that suggests that a common ethnic-group fluidity pattern outweighs the common immigration-status fluidity pattern in these tables. The implication of this is that the variation in fluidity patterns in the 1974 mobility tables is more pronounced between the different generation of immigrants than between Ashkenazi Jews and Sephardi Jews. This being the case, one can argue that at the beginning of statehood (as reflected in the 1974 mobility tables) inequality of opportunity in Israeli society crystallized more around immigration status than around ethnicity. Since ethnicity is associated with time of arrival to Israel (cf. Tyree *et al.*, 1987), this result also suggests that time of arrival has little effect on inequality of opportunity in Israeli society.

This suggestion can be tested more directly by fitting a log-linear model to the analysis of the 1974 mobility tables, when first-generation immigrants are further divided into those who arrived in Israel before 1948 and those who arrived after 1948.<sup>13</sup> This analysis did not reveal statistically significant differences in the fluidity pattern of these four sub-populations (the returned  $G^2$  from the CnSF model was 64.5 with 48 d.f.;  $p=0.06$ ). However, the analysis indicated that the fluidity level of the most veteran immigrants (i.e. those who arrived before 1948) was statistically significantly higher than that of the

**Table 6.** Results of fitting several log-linear models to five-class intergenerational mobility tables for the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi ethnic groups by immigration status in 1974 and 1991, Jewish men aged 25–64

**Panel A: Models applied to the 1974MS (N=2304)**

Model	G <sup>2</sup>	d.f.	P-value	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ	BIC
A. Ind. {OEI}{DEI}	363.6	64	0.00	–	10.34	–259
B. CmSF over I and E A+{OD}	93.0	48	0.00	62.3	5.45	–279
UNIDIFF Models B <sub>2</sub> A+{OD.E}	92.8	47	0.00	62.9	5.50	–271
B <sub>1</sub> A+{OD.I}	92.0	47	0.00	63.2	5.47	–272
B <sub>3</sub> A+{OD. (I) (E)}	91.7	46	0.00	63.6	5.53	–264
C. CmSF over I A+{ODE}	73.5	32	0.00	71.1	4.63	–174
D. CmSF over E A+{ODI}	68.2	32	0.00	73.1	4.84	–180
E. Variable Model {OEI}{DEI}{ODI}{ODE}	48.2	16	0.00	81.9	4.14	–76

**Panel B: Model comparison**

Contrasts	Term	ΔG <sup>2</sup>	Δd.f.	P
B–C	{ODE}	19.5	16	0.24
B–D	{ODI}	24.8	16	0.07
C–E	{ODI}	25.3	16	0.06
D–E	{ODE}	20.0	16	0.22

**Panel C: Models applied to the 1991MS (N=2467)**

Model	G <sup>2</sup>	d.f.	P-value	rG <sup>2</sup>	Δ	BIC
A. Ind. {OEI}{DEI}	215.2	64	0.00	–	10.65	–280
B. CmSF over I and E A+{OD}	59.1	48	0.13	72.53	4.55	–313
UNIDIFF Models B <sub>1</sub> A+{OD.I}	59.3	47	0.11	72.47	4.52	–305
B <sub>2</sub> A+{OD.E}	57.4	47	0.14	73.35	4.67	–307
B <sub>3</sub> A+{OD. (I) (E)}	57.3	46	0.12	73.40	4.74	–299
C. CmSF over I A+{ODE}	23.3	32	0.87	89.20	2.27	–225
D. CmSF over E A+{ODI}	44.0	32	0.08	79.54	4.03	–204
E. Variable Model {OEI}{DEI}{ODI}{ODE}	10.5	16	0.84	95.13	1.49	–113

**Panel D: Model comparison**

Contrasts	Term	ΔG <sup>2</sup>	Δd.f.	P
B–C	{ODE}	35.9	16	0.00
B–D	{ODI}	15.1	16	0.52
C–E	{ODI}	12.8	16	0.69
D–E	{ODE}	33.6	16	0.01

Note: O=5 class origins; D=5 class destinations; E=2 ethnic group; I=2 immigration status.

other three sub-populations – all of whom share the same level and pattern of fluidity. This result, however, would appear to highlight the fact that at the beginning of statehood, as captured by the 1974 data, the Israeli fluidity level was affected

by a particular advantage of the immigrant sub-population. This advantage, as it were, was their early arrival to Israel. As such, this analysis does not appear to disagree with our decision to accept Model D in Table 6. Nor does it damage our earlier

conclusion that successive waves of immigrations do not increase social fluidity in Israeli society. This is because we have not seen that the fluidity levels of the other sub-populations in the 'queue' (i.e. natives, second-generation immigrants, and the more recent immigrants) were affected in any significant way.

I move next to the analysis of the 1991MS. Panel C in Table 6 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics of the log-linear models that are applied to the 1991 mobility tables. As can be seen in the table, Models B, C, D, and E appear to fit the data well according to all the indicators. However, Model C would appear to fit the data 'better' than Models B, D or E. The contrast tests in Panel D confirm this conclusion, as they indicate that only the ODE interaction is statistically significant. This suggests that in the 1991 mobility table, in contrast to the 1974 mobility tables, a common immigration-status fluidity pattern outweighs the common ethnic-group fluidity patterns.

The conclusion from the above analysis is that at the beginning of statehood (as reflected in the 1974 mobility tables) the main cleavage in Israeli society – as far as inequality of opportunity is concerned – was along the line of immigration status and not the ethnicity of these immigrants. In time, differences in fluidity patterns between immigrants and natives were transformed into ethnic differences. It is suggested, thus, that the origin of the ethnic inequality in Israeli society is associated with the early arrival of the Ashkenazi Jews in Israel (see also, Tyree *et al.*, 1987; Kraus and Hodge, 1990: 100–2).

## Conclusions

Immigration is a process in which individuals move from their habitat to a less familiar environment. Research has shown that this transition has negative consequences for the social and economic well being of these individuals and their offspring. Just as important, immigration has social and economic consequences for members of the host society. Nonetheless, little is known about the consequences of immigration for stratification processes and inequality of opportunity. The aim of this paper was to bridge this gap in the literature by studying Israeli society.

The results concerning the consequences of immigration for absolute mobility can be easily summarized as follows. First, immigration to Israel has changed the Israeli class structure and has generated high rates of absolute mobility for all sections of Israeli society. Secondly, in both time periods examined, second-generation immigrants have experienced more upward than downward mobility. Thirdly, first-generation immigrants have initially (i.e. in 1974) experienced more downward than upward mobility. Over time, however, this pattern was reversed. Fourthly, growing numbers of all sub-populations in Israeli society have experienced upward mobility over time. Fifthly, the dominant Ashkenazi population has benefited more from immigration to Israel than the subordinate Sephardi population. These results fitted reasonably well with our theoretical expectations that were derived from the succession and the queuing models (see  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  above). Nonetheless, it was also found that the outflow mobility patterns of the two generations of immigrants in Israeli society have become slightly more similar over time. All the above, then, would appear to imply that immigrants of Ashkenazi background were able to transfer their initial advantageous position more easily to their offspring, while their Sephardi counterparts found this process more difficult. Thus, it is concluded, the Israeli mobility pattern may have not been affected by immigration *per se*; rather, it is ethnicity – which is strongly associated with successful assimilation into Israeli society – that matters.

At the heart of this analysis was a concern with the consequences of immigration for stratification processes and inequality. Thus, the focus of the analysis was shifted at this point from an examination of absolute mobility to the examination of relative mobility. The following questions, then, guided this analysis. Should immigration affect stratification processes and inequality in the host society? And, if so, how might immigration affect stratification processes and inequality in the host society? The review of the theoretical arguments concerning these questions led us to hypothesize that immigration is a major force propelling social fluidity – an open stratification structure – in the host society. Immigration, it was argued, affects stratification processes and inequality in two ways.

First, immigration is closely related to economic growth and development in the host society, which is in turn claimed to promote social mobility. Thus, an open social structure, with many opportunities for intergenerational social mobility, may characterize the immigrant society. Secondly, since immigration involves a separation of migrants from their countries of origin, the association between father's social position and his offspring is weakened. If, moreover, such a pattern were to be found, it could be reasonably argued that immigration increases the fluidity level of the host society.

The results concerning the consequences of immigration for relative mobility can be easily summarized as follows. First, natives, first- and second-generation immigrants in Israeli society share a basically similar fluidity pattern. Secondly, natives, first- and second-generation immigrants in Israeli society share the same level of fluidity. Thirdly, the fluidity pattern of each of these three sub-populations has not changed significantly over time. Fourthly, the fluidity level of each of these three sub-populations has not increased (or decreased) over time. Thus, as far as Israeli society with its high level of fluidity in a comparative perspective is concerned (cf. Tyree *et al.*, 1979; Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1997; Yaish, 2000), these results suggest that immigration to Israel may not have been the force that generated this high level of fluidity. Finally, it was shown that the origin of the ethnic basis of inequality of opportunity that prevails in Israeli society today (cf. Yaish, 2001) may be embedded in historical immigration processes. This finding provides a particularly striking example of how current inequalities of opportunity in Israeli society may be the product of processes that had emerged earlier under rather different conditions.

The implications of this analysis go beyond the immediate concern of Israeli society. The results from this analysis have implications for studies of both immigration and stratification processes. For one, these results suggest that the consequences of immigration for stratification processes and inequality are negligible at best. At the same time, immigration may change the stratification structure and by so doing generate high rates of absolute mobility. Thus, these results also suggest that the effect of structural changes on relative mobility is negligible.

## Notes

1. That is not to say that selection does not play a role in the immigration process in Israel. Most notable is the fact that Jewish immigrants from America and Western Europe could return to their country of origin (see also Semyonov, 1997). However, it would be reasonable to assume that other factors than economic conditions pulled these men and women to Israel.
2. For sampling procedures, see CBS, Labour Mobility Survey, 1977, no. 544.
3. The sampling procedures of this survey are similar to those of the CBS labour mobility surveys.
4. This is not to say that immigration to Israel is restricted to Jews only. For one, Israeli governments have always 'allowed' a number of non-Israeli Palestinians into the country, mainly for family unification. Secondly, under the Law of Returns non-Jews of Jewish ancestry are allowed into the country. It is estimated, in fact, that a third of the immigrants from the former USSR are not Jewish (cf. Lustick, 1999). Finally, since the end of the 1980s, a growing number of non-Jewish guest workers have entered the country.
5. Individuals in this group are not pure natives, however. This is because an unknown number of these individuals are the grandchildren of immigrants.
6. The cut-off point of age 14 was used because the information on fathers' class positions corresponds to their employment when their sons (i.e. the respondents) were aged 14.
7. TMR is the proportion of individuals who are found in cells off the main diagonal in a mobility table. The decomposition of TMR is based on the HII matrix in Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) 'core model' (see Table A3). Accordingly, vertical mobility (TV) is the proportion of mobile individuals who are found in cells that are indicated level 2 in the HII term. Non-vertical mobility (TNV) is the proportion of mobile individuals who are found in cells that are indicated level 1 in the HII term. Upward mobility (TU), then, is the proportion of vertically mobile individuals who are found in cells below the main diagonal, while downward mobility (TD) is the proportion of vertically mobile individuals who are found in cells above the main diagonal. The mobility tables of the native and immigrant populations broken down by ethnicity are available from the author on request.
8. To save valuable space, the outflow mobility tables used in this analysis are not presented in this paper. The tables are available from the author on request. It is important to note that the native population was excluded from this analysis. This is due to the fact

that the ethnic background of this sub-population cannot be identified in these data.

9. The tendency for a Sephardi family to be bigger, on average, than an Ashkenazi family also suggests that a random sample of the Israeli population is likely to include more Sephardi Jews of farm origins compared to Ashkenazi Jews. And, since only one son is likely to stay on his father's land, Sephardi Jews from this origin are more likely than Ashkenazi Jews to display intergenerational class mobility in survey data.
10. Although this may still be an insufficient solution for the very small native population (N=89 and N=181, in 1974 and 1991 respectively), they were included in the models because one of the reviewers has specifically asked that this should be the case. Nonetheless, the results from the analyses that exclude this sub-population from the models were nearly identical, and never lead to different conclusions.
11. This analysis, however, may be open to criticism on the grounds that the variable 'class origins' is measured across many societies that differ widely in their level of industrialization and ultimately their class structures. As a result of this heterogeneity, the association between class origins and destinations might be affected by factors other than immigration. In other words, if the OD association did differ across sub-populations, it would be impossible to determine whether it was due to immigration, or due to this heterogeneity. However, there is very little reason to believe that the above analysis is affected by this kind of heterogeneity in a way that biases the conclusion. This is because despite the heterogeneity problem it is found (and see also below) that the OD association is similar and constant across all sub-populations.
12. Based on Tables A1 and A2, I constructed six five-class mobility tables: two mobility tables for each sub-population (one for 1974 and one for 1991). The models in Panel B were then applied to these three sets of mobility tables, separately.
13. That is, this analysis includes four mobility tables based on the 1974 mobility survey as follows: natives, first-generation immigrants who arrived in Israel before 1948, first-generation immigrants who arrived in Israel after 1948, and second-generation immigrants.

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## Appendix

**Table A1.** *Counts and marginals in the seven-class intergenerational mobility table for native (Top), 2nd generation (middle), and 1st generation (bottom) Jewish men, aged 25–64 (1974MS)*

Class of Origin	Class of destination							N	%
	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb		
	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	7	8
I+II	29	10	4	4	13	4	0	64	8
	43	8	9	3	18	13	0	94	6
	2	2	3	0	1	1	0	9	10
III	29	8	6	0	15	7	0	65	8
	16	31	13	1	20	20	1	102	7
	12	6	17	0	4	6	0	45	51
IVab	82	41	75	10	96	60	0	364	44
	118	127	252	36	228	287	8	1056	71
	0	1	2	2	1	2	0	8	9
IVc	10	3	4	19	17	7	0	60	7
	6	10	10	2	15	13	0	56	4
	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	5	6
V+VI	17	7	16	5	37	7	0	89	11
	13	12	8	2	18	9	0	62	4
	3	4	2	0	1	5	0	15	17
VIIa	23	18	18	3	52	36	1	151	18
	6	8	16	2	32	38	2	104	7
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VIIb	3	1	10	1	7	7	0	29	3
	0	1	1	0	5	4	0	11	1
	23	15	26	2	9	14	0	89	
N	193	88	133	42	237	128	1	822	
	202	197	309	46	336	384	11	1485	
	26	17	29	2	10	16	0		
%	23	11	16	5	29	16	0		
	14	13	21	3	23	26	1		

**Table A2.** *Counts and marginals in the seven-class intergenerational mobility table for native (top), 2nd generation (middle), and 1st generation (bottom) Jewish men, aged 25-64 (1991MS)*

Class of Origin	Class of destination							N	%
	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb		
I+II	13	7	4	0	8	3	0	35	19
	95	27	26	7	34	23	0	212	12
III	56	5	7	1	24	6	0	99	16
	5	7	1	0	4	2	0	19	10
	51	16	21	1	43	14	1	147	8
IVab	23	6	7	0	14	6	0	56	9
	11	18	19	2	9	2	0	61	34
	103	58	133	4	140	63	0	501	27
IVc	70	43	59	8	93	48	1	322	51
	2	2	4	5	1	0	0	14	8
	12	11	15	18	38	11	0	105	6
V+VI	0	2	0	0	2	1	0	5	1
	3	4	3	2	4	3	0	19	10
	59	38	53	4	155	47	0	356	19
VIIa	16	7	6	0	36	10	0	75	12
	3	5	5	1	12	6	0	32	18
	80	63	70	4	165	75	2	459	25
VIIb	14	7	5	0	27	17	0	70	11
	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	9	13	6	1	18	8	0	55	3
N	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	5	1
	37	44	36	10	38	16	0	181	
	409	226	324	39	593	241	3	1835	
%	180	71	84	9	198	89	1	632	
	20	24	20	6	21	9	0		
	22	12	18	2	32	13	0		
	28	11	13	1	31	14	.....		

**Table A3.** *Hierarchical barriers to class mobility in a 7x7 mobility table: the H11 term in the 'core model' of social fluidity*

Class of Origin	Class of destination						
	I+II	III	IVab	IVc	V+VI	VIIa	VIIb
I+II	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
III	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
IVab	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
IVc	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
V+VI	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
VIIa	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
VIIb	2	2	2	2	2	1	1

Note: The core model of social fluidity is taken from Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 124.